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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This dissertation explores the debates about Creole’s place in the French nation 
and public education in late twentieth-century France.  In 1946, Antilleans became 
French citizens when the French government decided to change Guadeloupe and 
Martinique’s political status from colonies to overseas departments (DOM).  Republican 
education and the dissemination of French was the means through which DOM and 
education officials sought to protect France’s national culture and assimilate Antilleans’ 
Creole culture and language into the nation.  In contrast, Antillean Creole activists 
envisioned a culturally diverse France.  They struggled to reshape the national 
curriculum, and ultimately the French nation, so that it included their Creole culture and 
language. 
 Through an examination of Antilleans’ specific case and how they used the 
Creole debates to argue for the right to difference, this dissertation explores the 
complexities of the discussions about diversity in France.  Recently, historians have 
challenged the myth of a colorblind Republic, arguing that questions of race and ethnicity 
have shaped the French nation.  While one group of scholars argues that exclusion 
occurred from the failure of state officials to live up to the lofty ideals of republican 
equality, the other group claims that inequality and exclusion developed as a part of 
republicanism. 
 xiv 
 This dissertation argues that republican assimilation was not a monolithic policy 
that either entirely included or excluded difference from the nation.  Rather, Antillean 
activists and the Ministries of the DOM and Education negotiated the terms of 
Antilleans’ assimilation and the extent to which the Creole culture and language was 
included in public classrooms and the nation.  Antilleans’ demands for cultural inclusion 
forced DOM and education officials to carve out a space for difference, and more 
specifically, Creole, in the nation.  I argue that it was these debates about the “Creole 
question” that challenged the republican definition of a French citizen as an individual 
divested of all particular and group affiliations.   In highlighting Antilleans’ struggle to be 
both French and Creole, I contend that government policies concerning the right to 
difference were not only shaped by state ministries, but also by the actions of Antilleans 
on both sides of the Atlantic.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 In the summer of 2005, Souria Adèle, a Martinican mother whose son wanted to 
learn Creole, organized an Antillean parents’ group to place pressure on the Ministry of 
Education to permit Creole language instruction in metropolitan France’s public schools.  
In a letter to the Minister of Education, Gilles de Robien, Adèle and her supporters 
reminded him that Creole had been an official regional language of France since 1983.  
They argued that in spite of this, Creole still did not have the same legal and cultural 
status as France’s other regional languages.  Adèle’s son and other students had the 
opportunity to learn languages, such as Basque, Breton, and Occitan, but they did not 
have the right to learn Creole.  Adèle insisted that Creole language classes also needed to 
be offered as a part of France’s national curriculum.1   
 The Ministry of Education promptly refused Adèle’s request, arguing that 
according to the current legislation, “the teaching of regional languages and cultures”, 
such as Creole,  “may only be provided…in the local communities where the languages 
are in use.”2  In other words, according to Robien, Creole classes could only be offered in 
Guadeloupe and Martinique where it was a part of daily communication.  With this 
statement, the Ministry of Education implied that Creole was exclusively spoken in the 
                                                
1 Letter from Le Collectif des Parents Antillais, Guyanais, Réunionais to Gilles de Robien, Ministre de 
l’Education, August 31 2005, accessed November 6, 2011, published on Kapes Kréyol website, 
http://www.potomitan.info/atelier/pawol/mango.php#a. 
2 Letter from Jean-Marc Goursolas, for the le Directeur de l’Enseignement Scolaire to Souria Adèle, 
January 10, 2006, accessed November 6, 2011, published on Kapes Kréyol website, 
http://www.potomitan.info/atelier/pawol/mango.php#a. 
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Antilles, and not in metropolitan France.  In doing so, the Ministry of Education ignored 
the nearly three hundred and forty thousand Antilleans living in metropolitan France, 
placing them and their Creole culture and language outside of the French nation.3 
 How did state officials perceive of and construct Antilleans’ cultural and political 
relationship to France?  Why was the Ministry of Education so concerned about Creole’s 
place in public education?  How did Antilleans interact with education officials to carve 
out a space for their Creole culture and language in public schools and ultimately, the 
French nation?  My dissertation seeks to answer these questions by exploring the debates 
about Creole’s place in republican education and the nation in late twentieth-century 
France. 
  Historians have argued that during the main period of decolonization (1956-
1962), France became an increasingly diverse nation.  As migrants and their families 
from former French colonies in Africa and Asia settled in the metropole, France was 
forced to deal with integrating this new wave of culturally and religiously distinct 
immigrants into the nation.4  However, this dissertation cotends that a decade prior to 
decolonization, France had already begun to work through the political and cultural 
implications of incorporating a diverse group of peoples and their cultures into 
metropolitan France.  In 1946, the French government transformed Guadeloupe and 
                                                
3 In his 2004 work Black Skins, French Voices, David Beriss estimated that 337,000 Antilleans resided in 
metropolitan France.  David Beriss, Black Skins, French Voices: Caribbean Ethnicity and Activism in 
Urban France (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004).   
4 For scholarship on postcolonial immigration see: Alec G. Hargreaves and Marck McKinney, eds., Post-
colonial cultures in France (Londong: Routledge, 1997); Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, 'Race' and 
Ethnicity in Contemporary France (London: Routledge, 1995); Maxim Silverman, Race, Discourse, and 
Power in France (Aldershot, Hants, England: Avebury, 1991); Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the 
Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France (London: Routledge, 1992); Tyler Stovall 
and Georges Van Dan Abbeele, eds., French Civilization and its Discontents: nationalism, colonialism, 
race (Lanham, M.D.: Lexington Books, 2003); Steven Ungar and Tom Conley, eds., Identity Papers: 
contested nationhood in twentieth-century France (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).   
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Martinique from colonies to overseas departments of France (DOM).  
Departmentalization granted French citizenship to Antilleans, making them and 
metropolitans a part of the same nation.  The newly formed Ministry of the DOM had to 
make sense of how Antilleans as France’s new culturally and racially distinct citizens fit 
into its national vision for a culturally and politically unified France.5  An important tool 
for constructing this national unity was education, and in particular, the French language.  
Republican education and the dissemination of the French language were the means 
through which DOM and education officials sought to protect France’s national culture 
and assimilate the Creole culture and language into the nation.  In contrast, Antillean 
activists envisioned a culturally diverse French nation.  They struggled to reshape the 
national curriculum, and ultimately the French nation, so that it included their Creole 
culture and language.   
 Through an examination of DOM officials’ and Antilleans’ differing visions for 
Creole’s place in a postcolonial nation, I explore how the inclusion and exclusion of 
diversity worked in late twentieth-century France.  According to the ideals of 
                                                
5 For scholarship on Antillean migration to France following the Second World War see: Alain Anselin, 
L’émigration antillaise en France: de bantoustan au ghetto (Paris: Anthropos, 1979); Alain Anselin, 
L’émigration antillaise en France: La troisième île (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1990); Chantal Madiner, “Les 
originaires des départements d’outre-mer,” Population 6 (November-December 1993): 1855-1868; 
Stephanie A. Condon and Philip E. Ogden, “Afro-Caribbean Migrants in France: Employment, State Policy 
and the Migration Process,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 16, no.4 (1991): 440-457; 
Fred Constant, “La politique française de l’immigration antillaise de 1946 à 1987,” Revue Eruopéenne des 
Migrations Internationales 3 (1987): 9-30;  Michel Giraud and Claude-Valentin Marie, “Insertion et 
gestion socio-politique de l’identité culturelle: le cas des Antillais en France,” Revue Européenne des 
Migrations Internationales 3, no.3 (1987): 31-48; Michel Giraud, “The Antillese in France: Trends and 
Prospects,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, no.4 (July 2004): 622-640; Marc Tardies, Les Antillais à Paris: 
d’hier à aujourd’hui (Monaco: Rocher, 2005).    
For histories of the departmentalization of Guadeloupe and Martinique see: Kristen Stromberg Childers, 
“Departmentalization, migration, and the politics of the family in the post-war French Caribbean,” History 
of the Family 14 (2009): 177-190; Robert Aldrich and John Connell, France’s Overseas Frontier: 
Départements et territoires d’outre-mer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Henri 
Deschamps, La politique aux Antilles Françaises de 1946 à nos jours (Paris: Librairie generale de droit et 
de jurisprudence, 1981); Nick Nesbitt, Voicing Memory: history and subjectivity in French Caribbean 
literature (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 2003); Arvin Murch, Black Frenchmen: the 
political integration of the French Antilles (Morristown, NJ: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1972).   
 4 
republicanism, French citizens are abstract individuals without differentiation or 
particular identifications.  This means that French citizens are expected to embrace a 
universal “civic identity” divorced from all other cultural and group affiliations.  Scholars 
of France have tended to characterize republicanism as a static set of ideals that was 
either entirely inclusionary or exclusionary of difference.  Those who support 
republicanism as a bastion of equality have argued that it was inclusionary in that all 
French citizens regardless of their racial and cultural differences possessed the same 
rights and privileges.  They contend that because the government does not recognize 
racial and cultural difference, racism and inequality do not exist in France.6  Others have 
criticized republicanism as a flawed ideal that is exclusionary in its promotion of 
assimilation.  These scholars argue that in requiring citizens to disassociate from their 
racial and cultural particularities, republicanism systematically excludes difference from 
the nation.7   
                                                
6 This group of scholars argues that inequality in France is a result of class, not race.  See: Dominique 
Schnapper, La France de l’intégration: sociologie de la nation en 1990 (Paris: Gallimard, 1991); 
Dominique Schnapper, L’Europe des immigrés: essai sur les politiques d’immigration (Paris: Editions F. 
Bourin, 1992); Christine Bard et al., Intégration et exclusion sociale: d’hier à aujourd’hui (Paris: 
Anthropos, 1999); Pierre Geroge, L’immigration en France: faits et problems (Paris: A. Colin, 1986). 
7 For scholarship that has analyzed the exclusionary nature of French republicanism see: Laurent Dubois, A 
Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804  (Chapel Hill, 
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea 
of Empire in France and West Afria, 1895-1930  (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Herrick 
Chapman and Laura L. Frader, eds., Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of 
Difference  (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004); Gérard Noiriel, Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en 
France, XIXe-XXe siècle: discours publics, humilations privées (Paris: Fayard, 2007).   
For more general scholarship on republicanism and diversity see: Adrian Favell, Philosophies of 
Integration: Citizenship, Republicansim and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France (Houndmills: 
Macmillan, 1998); Dominique Schnapper, Q’est-ce que la citoyenneté? France de la intégration  Paris: 
Gallimard, 2000); Dominique Schnapper, La Communauté des citoyens: sur l’idée moderne de nation 
(Paris : Gallimard, 1994) ; Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Citoyenneté, Nationalité et Immigration (Paris: 
Arcantère, 1987); Jeremy Jennings, “Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary 
France,” British Journal of Political Science 30 (2000): 575-598; Pierre Birnbaum, La France imaginee: 
Declin des rêves unitaires (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Serge Paugam, L’Exclusion: L’État des savoirs (Paris: La 
Découverte, 1996); Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Pierre Rosanvallon, Le Nouvel Âge des inéqualités (Paris: Seuil, 
1996); Christian Jelen, Les Casseurs de la République (Paris: Plon, 1997); Joël Roman, “Pour un 
multiculturalisme temperé,” Hommes et Migrations 1197 (1996): 18-22; Joël Roman, “Un 
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 My examination of the “Creole question” tells a different story about the 
relationship between republicanism and diversity in postcolonial France.  I argue that 
republicanism created neither an entirely exclusionary nor a completely inclusionary 
nation.8  Rather, diversity’s place in the French nation was determined by a set of 
negotiations between state officials and Antilleans concerning Creole’s place in public  
classrooms and more broadly, the nation.  The Ministries of the DOM and Education 
responded to Antilleans’ demands for cultural inclusion with a set of education policies 
that were simultaneously inclusionary and exclusionary of the Creole culture and 
language.  Inclusion and exclusion were inseparably linked in the debates about Creole’s 
place in republican education because of the fundamentally incompatible goals of the 
Ministry of Education and Antillean activists who argued for Creole’s incorporation into 
public classrooms.  The Ministry of Education wanted to preserve the universalist 
ambitions of the republican curriculum, but it insisted that the language of universalism 
was French.  Antillean teachers and activists argued that Creole was an autonomous 
                                                
multiculturalisme à la française,” Esprit 212 (1995): 145-160; Michel Wieviorka, “Le multiculturalism,” 
Les Cahiers du CEVIPOF 20 (1998): 104-129; Michel Wieviorka, Commenter la France (Paris: Editions 
de l’aube, 1997).   
8 In their histories of Algeria and West Africa, Todd Shepard and Gary Wilder have also addressed the 
simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of culturally distinct French citizens and colonial subjects.  They 
have argued that republicanism offered moments of inclusion for Algerians and West Africans in the 
French nation.  However, ultimately, the French government articulated new policies—decolonization in 
Algeria, and “colonial humanism” in West Africa, to exclude these culturally distinct groups from the 
nation.  See: Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between 
the Two World Wars  (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005); Todd Shepard, The Invention of 
Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2006).  Similarly, Mary Dewhurst Lewis and Clifford Rosenberg have argued that France’s immigration 
policies were both inclusionary and exclusionary.  In comparing how officials in Lyon and Marseille 
implemented national immigration policies at the local level, Lewis argues that the dividing line between 
citizens and foreigners was much more malleable than previous assumed.  She contends that the national 
laws on citizenship were not fixed.  Rather, they were molded to meet the perceived needs of the French 
administration at both the national and local levels.  In his work on policing immigrant labor during the 
interwar period, Rosenberg examines how greater police control accompanied increased state welfare 
benefits to immigrants.  See: Mary Dewhurst Lewis, The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and 
the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940 (Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 2007); 
Clifford Rosenberg, Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).   
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culture with its own linguistic legitimacy; yet, they also wanted to retain their French 
citizenship.  My dissertation argues that it was these debates about the “Creole question” 
that challenged the narrow perception of a French citizen as a individual divested of all 
particular and group affiliations.  In highlighting Antilleans’ struggle to be both French 
and Creole, I contend that government policies concerning the right to difference were 
not only shaped by state ministries, but also by the actions of Antilleans on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
 
From Colonization to Departmentalization: the Antilles’ Political and Cultural 
Relationship with France 
 
  Before we can begin to explore how the “Creole question” shaped the processes 
of inclusion and exclusion in late twentieth-century France, we must first understand the 
longer historical relationship between Frances and the Antillean islands of Guadeloupe 
and Martinique.9  The complexities of Antilleans’ place in the French nation did not 
emerge when the National Assembly transformed the islands from colonies to 
departments in 1946.  France, Guadeloupe, and Martinique had been intertwined for over 
three centuries before departmentalization officially legalized what already existed: a 
                                                
9 For general histories of Guadeloupe and Martinique, and their relationship to France see: Josette Fallope, 
Esclavages et citoyens: les noirs à la Guadeloupe au XIXe siècle dans les processus de résistance et 
d’intégration, 1802-1910 (Basse-Terre: Société d’histoire de la Guadeloupe, 1992); Oruno Lara, La 
Guadeloupe dans l’histoire: La Guadeloupe physique, économique, agricole, commerciale, financière, 
politique et sociale, 1492-1900 (Paris: Harmattan, 1999); Robert Aldrich and John Connell, France’s 
Overseas Frontier: Départements et territoires d’outre-mer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992); Henriette Levillain, ed., La Guadeloupe, 1875-1914: les soubresauts d’une société pluri-ethnique ou 
les ambiguïtés de l’assimilation (Paris: Ed. Autrement, 1994); Jean-Pierre Sainton, ed., Histoire et 
civilization de la Caraïbe: Guadeloupe, Martinique, petites Antilles: La construction des sociétés 
antillaises des origins au temps présent, structure et dynamique (Paris :Editions Maisonneuvre et Larosse, 
2004); Lucien René Abenon, Petite histoire de la Guadeloupe (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1992); Louis Abénon et 
al., Histoire des Antilles et de la Guyane (Toulouse: Privat, 1982); Paul Butel, Histoire des Antilles 
françaises: XVIIe-XXe siècle (Paris: Perrin, 2002); Liliane Chaleau, Dans les îles du vent la Martinique: 
XVIIe-XIXe siècle (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1993); Richard Burton, La famille coloniale: la Martinique et la 
mère patrie, 1789-1992 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994); Richard Price, The Convict and the Colonel: a story of 
colonialism and resistance in the Caribbean (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).   
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cultural, political, and economic union between France and the Antilles.  At the center of 
this close relationship was the question of Antilleans’ political status and how they would 
be culturally and politically integrated into French society.   
 Guadeloupe and Martinique are a part of the small arc of islands that constitute 
the Lesser Antilles in the Caribbean Sea, reaching from the U.S. Virgin Islands in the 
north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south.  France’s relationship with Guadeloupe and 
Martinique began in 1635 when the Cardinal Richelieu charged the Company of the 
American Islands with colonizing and settling Guadeloupe and Martinique for France’s 
economic gain.  The early history of the islands follows closely the general narrative in 
Caribbean history of European colonial and mercantilist expansion in the New World.  
French colonialists exterminated the indigenous Carib population, imported slave labor 
from Africa, and developed plantation economies.   
 In Guadeloupe and Martinique, the introduction of sugarcane cultivation had 
widespread ramifications for the history and settlement of the islands.  Sugarcane was an 
extremely labor intensive crop.  To meet this demand for labor, French settlers and 
landowners imported African slaves in large numbers to work in the fields, which by this 
time were almost exclusively dominated by sugarcane.  With the installation of sugar 
plantations, a new social and economic order was created.  Plantation society gave rise to 
two groups with extraordinarily unequal statuses: the dominant group of white settlers or 
plantation owners, known as habitants, and the subservient masses of black slaves who 
labored the land and were indispensable to sugarcane cultivation.  By the early eighteenth 
century, the number of African slaves living in Guadeloupe and Martinique was nearly 
double that of the French settler population.  Yet, the white minority held all of the power 
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and control.  The plantation owners were content with the unequal social hierarchy they 
had created; it afforded them great wealth and thus, a great amount of local political 
power.10 
 However, across the Atlantic in metropolitan France, a number of prominent 
Republicans were beginning to question the morality of slavery and colonialism.  In 
1789, the body of elected representatives in Paris set forth “The Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen”, proclaiming the liberty, equality, and universal rights of all men.  
Despite this declaration, France continued to enslave Africans in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  The slaves responded by using the language of rights to pursue equality and 
freedom.  In a series of revolts and insurrections that broke out in the early 1790s, the 
slaves forcibly integrated themselves into the French Republic.  They insisted that the 
rights of man were equally applicable in the metropole and the colonies.11 
 In 1794, the National Convention applied the universal rights of man to its 
colonies.  It abolished slavery throughout the empire, establishing a new juridical order in 
Guadeloupe and Martinique.  The people and territory of these colonies were to be 
integrated equally into the French nation with no distinctions between colonial and 
metropolitan law.  In theory, France and its colonies had become one nation-state, and all 
those living in Guadeloupe and Martinique, including the ex-slaves were now French 
citizens.  However, these principles of universal inclusion quickly became layered with 
practices of racial exclusion.  Colonial officials excluded former slaves from full 
                                                
10 Ellen M. Schnepel, In Search of National Identity: Creole and Politics in Guadeloupe (Hamburg: Helmut 
Buske Verlag, 2004), see especially chapter 2, “The Island Context.”  For more on the importance of sugar 
in Caribbean history see: Sidney Wilfred Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern 
History (New York: Penguin Books, 1986).   
11 For more on how slaves in the French Caribbean shaped and expanded the meaning of republican 
equality and principles of universalism to include all people in the nation regardless of race, see: Laurent 
Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804  
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).   
 9 
citizenship by arguing that they were not yet capable of possessing the rights and 
privileges of a French citizen.  They argued that slavery had damaged slaves’ moral and 
intellectual capacities and therefore, they could not be immediately included in the nation 
as citizens.  Former slaves possessed the potential to become citizens, but first, they 
needed to learn how to be French.12    
 This radical experiment integrating France and its Antillean colonies abruptly 
ended in 1804 when Napoléon Bonaparte came to power, overthrowing the Republic and 
reestablishing slavery.  Guadeloupe and Martinique were once again colonies of France.  
The former slaves and potential citizens became slaves once again.  Napoleon had 
stripped them of the possibility of attaining full French citizenship.  In 1848, a 
transformation in the French state brought about yet another change in the Antilles’ and 
the slaves’ political relationship to France.  With the establishment of the Second 
Republic (1848-1952), slavery was definitively abolished in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  
Shortly thereafter, universal male suffrage was also instituted in France and its colonies.  
In theory, the former slaves were once again French citizens with full political rights.13   
 However, enfranchisement was fleeting.  The abolition of slavery opened up new 
possibilities for colonial oppression.  With the establishment of a colonial administration 
in Guadeloupe and Martinique, state officials and the white settlers asserted their 
domination in new ways.  They sought to limit former slaves’ freedom and rights by 
controlling all aspects of local administration, including the judiciary system, the police, 
education, and the press.  When former slaves exercised their freedom and left the 
                                                
12 Laurent Dubois argues that former slaves’ exclusion from French citizenship was the result of a 
particular form of “republican racism.”  See: Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave 
Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804  (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004).   
13 Oruno D. Lara, Guadeloupe: Faire Face à l’Histoire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009).   
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plantations in search of better economic opportunities, colonial officials put in place a 
series of laws requiring noirs (blacks) to have interior passports with their employers’ 
signatures.  Colonial officials contained former slaves’ freedom by insisting that they 
needed their employers’ permission to move freely about the islands.14  These laws 
effectively tied the noirs to the plantation, and ensured that they remained economically 
and socially subordinate to the white settlers.     
 With the end of the Second Empire (1852-1870), and the rise of the Third 
Republic, the question of Antilleans’ political status and the islands’ relationship to 
France was once more at the center of state polices aimed at building a sense of 
nationhood in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  While state officials 
created republican institutions in metropolitan France, such as public schools and 
universal military conscription, to build a sense of national belonging among its citizens, 
colonial administrators also worked to integrate the Antilles and its newly acquired 
African and Asian territories into the larger French Empire.  With the founding of the 
Third Republic, republican officials also restored black Antilleans’ right to vote.  The 
former slaves were theoretically represented in the National Assembly in Paris, yet they 
continued to endure oppression at the hands of the wealthy white settlers.  This contrast 
between a liberating government and a repressive local social hierarchy created a sense of 
fierce loyalty to France among black Antilleans.  They viewed the Republic as their 
protectors against the white settlers who wanted to keep them in subordination.  The 
former slaves believed in the republican ideals of equality and that true political and 
                                                
14 Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 
1787-1804  (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Oruno D. Lara, Guadeloupe: 
Faire Face à l’Histoire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009).   
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social liberation could only be achieved if Guadeloupe and Martinique remained 
politically united with France.15   
 As France’s “old colonies” (vielles colonies), Guadeloupe and Martinique were 
the success stories of the “civilizing mission”.  Under the Third Republic, France made it 
its mission to bring civilization to the colonies.  Colonial officials believed that the 
colonized had the potential to possess equal rights and be assimilated as citizens of 
France.  Yet, they simultaneously argued that the acquisition of French citizenship was 
dependent on the colonized’s transformation from tradition to modernity and the adoption 
of French culture.16  In the late nineteenth century, colonial officials began to recognize 
the Antilles as more inherently French than the lands being colonized under the 
Republic’s “new imperialism” expansion in Africa and Asia.  In the colonial imagination, 
Guadeloupe and Martinique were “evolved” territories that had become economically and 
socially integrated into metropolitan France during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  The emergence of an educated and assimilated black elite that was loyal to 
France proved to colonial officials that the civilizing mission worked, and that the 
Antilles had in fact become French.17  Guadeloupe and Martinique became colonial 
officials’ models for politically and culturally uniting France’s new empire and the newly 
colonized to metropolitan France.  
                                                
15 David Berriss, Black Skins, French Voices: Caribbean Ethnicity and Activism in Urban France (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2004), Ellen M. Schnepel, In Search of National Identity: Creole and Politics in 
Guadeloupe (Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 2004), see especially chapter 2, “The Island Context.” 
16 For histories of France’s “civilizing mission” see: Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican 
Idea of Empire in France and West Afria, 1895-1930  (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); 
Raymond Betts, Assimilatoin and Associatio in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (New York: Columiba 
University Press, 1960); Raymond Betts, Tricoleur: the French overseas empire (London; New York: 
Gordon & Cremonesi, 1978); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain 
and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).   
17 Josette Fallope, “La politique d’assimilatoin et ses resistances,” in La Guadeloupe, 1875-1914: Les 
soubresauts d’une société pluri-ethnique ou les ambiguïtés de l’assimilation, ed. Henriette Levillain (Paris: 
Autrement, 1994), 249. 
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 Assimilation was also demanded from within the Antilles.  On three separate 
occasions in 1890, 1915 and 1918, Antillean deputies introduced bills in the National 
Assembly to change Martinique and Guadeloupe’s political status from colonies to 
departments.  They pressured state officials to live up to the ideal of republican equality 
and politically integrate Guadeloupe and Martinique into the Repubilc as full-fledge 
departments of France.  From 1918 to 1939, Antillean veterans who had fought in the 
First World War invoked the “blood tax” they had paid to France.  They argued that in 
dying for the mother country, they had earned departmental status for the Antilles and the 
right to be French citizens.18   
 The interwar years were also a time of cultural awakening for certain Antillean 
intellectuals, like Aimé Césaire, who discovered in Paris their cultural and political 
connection to the black community.  Antillean and West African intellectuals found 
solidarity in a common black identity, and formed the Négritude movement.  They 
believed that their shared black heritage as members of the African diaspora was the best 
tool for fighting French political and cultural domination.  The leaders of the Négritude 
movement did not envision political independence for Guadeloupe and Martinique.  
Rather, they criticized slavery and French colonialism for destroying Antilleans’ African 
heritage and called upon Antilleans to demand cultural and political equality under 
French rule.19     
                                                
18 Arvin Murch, Black Frenchmen: The Political Integration of the French Antilles (Morristown, NJ: 
Schenkman Pub. Co., 1972).   
19 For more on the Négritude movement see: Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude 
and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars  (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005); 
Isabelle Constant and Kahiudi C. Mabana, eds., Négritude: legacy and present relevance (Newcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars, 2009); Nick Nesbitt, Voicing Memory: history and subjectivity in French Caribbean 
literature (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 2003); Abiola Irele, The Negritude Moment: 
Explorations in Francophone African and Caribbean Literature and Thought (Trenton, NJ: Africa World 
Press, 2011).   
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 This history of making demands for equality as a part of the French nation shaped 
the Antilles’ political future following the Second World War.  As France’s newer 
colonies claimed their independence, Guadeloupe and Martinique strengthened their 
political and cultural ties with France.  On March 19, 1946, the National Assembly 
unanimously voted to transform the islands’ political status from colonies to overseas 
departments of France (départements d’outre-mer or DOM).  This meant that 
Guadeloupe and Martinique were now under the jurisdiction of the department of the 
interior, and were subject to the same administrative laws as metropolitan regions.  
Departmentalization dissolved the body of local colonial officials.  It eliminated the 
position of the colonial governor and replaced it with a prefect appointed by the French 
government.  The prefect was the primary representative of France in the Antilles.  He 
held the same authority as his counterpart in mainland France, but he also assumed a 
wide range of powers previously held by the local assembly (Conseil Général).  In 
addition to extending the highly centralized French administrative structure to 
Guadeloupe and Martinique, departmentalization also meant that Antilleans elected 
national officials to represent them in the National Assembly in Paris.20    
 Departmentalization was not an abrupt or unexpected modification.  Rather, 
Antillean and metropolitan leaders viewed this change in the islands’ political status as 
the culmination of a centuries-long process of progressive incorporation into the French 
state that had begun with the abolition of slavery in 1848.  Departmentalization, also 
known as the “law of assimilation”, merely accelerated the comprehensive 
transplantation of French political, social, and economic institutions to the newly created 
                                                
20 Nick Nesbitt, Voicing Memory: history and subjectivity in French Caribbean literature (Charlottesville: 
The University of Virginia Press, 2003); Ellen M. Schnepel, In Search of National Identity: Creole and 
Politics in Guadeloupe (Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 2004).  
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DOM.  As a part of this process of departmentalization, Antilleans’ political status was 
also transformed from colonial subjects to French citizens.  In 1946, the National 
Assembly granted all Antilleans the same rights and privileges as French citizens residing 
in the Hexagon.21      
 Most Antillean leaders were supportive of departmentalization.  Aimé Césaire, 
who at the time was Martinique’s deputy to the National Assembly, envisioned political 
assimilation as the final stage in Antilleans’ long struggle for political and social equality.  
Césaire encouraged the Antillean people to welcome departmentalization as a kind of 
liberation from the stronghold of colonial officials and white settlers who had kept 
Antilleans in a position of subordination for centuries.  According to Césaire, admission 
into the “French family” was the best means for ending the inequalities of colonialism.  
He supported the ideal of departmentalization as an equalizer, but the reality of the “law 
of assimilation” was much different than he had envisioned.22     
 Departmentalization ushered in widespread social changes.  The installation of 
French institutions in the DOM, including the national education system, the social 
service structure, and communication and transportation networks, was accompanied by a 
visible influx of metropolitan French who filled positions in islands as top administrators, 
civil servants, and technocrats.  Modernization and urban growth quickly ensued, 
contributing to a decline in agriculture, rural-to-urban migration, and the expansion of the 
service sector.  These sweeping social and economic transformations in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique were followed by a rise in unemployment that disproportionately affected the 
youth.  This precipitated a large-scale migration of young Antilleans to metropolitan 
                                                
21 Ellen M. Schnepel, In Search of National Identity: Creole and Politics in Guadeloupe (Hamburg: Helmut 
Buske Verlag, 2004), 1-3. 
22 Ibid. 
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France in search of education, training, and employment.  These dual migratory flows 
created new tensions between Antilleans and the French on both sides of the Atlantic.23  
As the islands’ social and economic problems persisted and became worse under 
departmentalization, certain Antillean activists began to question the benefits of 
assimilation and whether or not integration into France was desirable for the Antilles.  
Simultaneously, in the wake of decolonization, France was trying to make sense of how 
its former colonial subjects from Africa and Asia fit into the nation as culturally diverse 
immigrants.  Once again, metropolitan officials looked to its former “model colonies” for 
a precedent regarding how to assimilate culturally diverse populations into a politically 
and socially united French nation.   
 This history of Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s relationship with France 
demonstrates that the Antilles have played a formative role in shaping the French nation.  
As slaves, colonial subjects, and French citizens, Antilleans have always been at the 
forefront of the processes of exclusion and inclusion in France.  Their changing political 
status and relationship with France provides insight into the government’s shifting views 
regarding who was excluded from the nation and who had the potential to be included as 
French citizens.  My dissertation seeks to understand how Antilleans’ interactions with 
these polices of inclusion and exclusion shaped what it meant to be French at a time when 
France was struggling with becoming an increasingly diverse nation in the second half of 
the twentieth century.   
 
The Importance of Antilleans’ Role in Shaping Postcolonial France 
 
 Why is it important to highlight Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s political and 
                                                
23 Schnepel, In Search of National Identity, 1-3. 
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cultural relationship to France when these islands were just two of France’s many 
colonial possessions across the world?  Why should scholars examine how Antilleans 
have shaped what it meant to be French?  My dissertation is part of the work within 
colonial studies that has followed Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler’s call to bring the 
metropole and its colonies into one analytical framework in order to demonstrate how the 
nation was constructed through and within the empire.24  Scholars of this “new imperial 
history” have shown how the meaning of universal French citizenship developed within 
the larger imperial context.  The late nineteenth century was a key moment when 
Republican officials implemented social reforms, such as universal education and 
mandatory male conscription, in an effort to create French citizens.25  At the same time, 
colonial officials were developing new methods of colonial management for assimilating 
the colonial subjects of its newly acquired territories in Asia and Africa.  As a part of 
what scholars have termed France’s “civilizing mission”, colonial officials forcibly 
modernized its colonial possessions under the guise of helping the colonized achieve 
                                                
24 Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).  Catherin Hall’s edited volume also provides a good 
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(New York: Routledge, 2000).  See also: Antoinette Burton, After the Imperial Turn: Thinking through and 
with the Nation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose, eds., At 
Home with Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006); Philippa Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Veneral Disease in the British 
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25 See: Eugen Joseph Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1977); James R. Lehning, Peasant and French: Cultural Contact in Rural 
France During the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Judith Surkis, 
Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France, 1870-1920  (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 
2006). 
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assimilation and French citizenship.26  Colonial officials believed that the colonized had 
the potential to become assimilated citizens of the Republic.  However, this political 
assimilation was dependent upon colonial subjects’ adoption of French culture and the 
French way of life.  Therefore, while citizenship was possible for some elite colonial 
subjects who had been educated to serve as a part of France’s colonial administration, 
citizenship was deferred for the majority of the colonized.27 
 During the interwar period, as citizens in metropolitan France gained more social 
rights under the new welfare programs, colonial subjects began to agitate for greater 
access to political and social rights in Africa and Asia.28  This struggle forced French 
colonial officials to reconcile their republican principles of equality with the 
differentialist practices of governance that were central to colonial rule.  In this way, they 
were compelled to reconsider the meaning of citizenship and the degree to which colonial 
subjects were French.   
 While this earlier scholarship was mainly concerned with how the nation was 
constituted in France’s second colonial empire, recently, historians have explored how 
the meaning of French citizenship was first developed in the “old colonies” of 
Guadeloupe and Martinique.  Historian Laurent Dubois has demonstrated the ways in 
which slaves shaped the meaning of equality and universal citizenship in Republican 
                                                
26 Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-
1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: 
Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
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27 See: Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the 
Two World Wars (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005). 
28  Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society : The Labor Question in French and British 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: 
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political culture.29  In addition, Gary Wilder has explored how Antillean intellectuals and 
the Negritude movement challenged France’s assimilationist ideology and pushed the 
boundaries of French citizenship to include their transnational black aesthetic.30  Despite 
this recent attention given to the history of the French Caribbean, historians have yet to 
seriously examine Antilleans’ role in shaping French citizenship and the right to 
difference following the Second World War.31   
 There exists a large body of work underscoring how postcolonial immigrants in 
France have used the concepts of difference and multiculturalism to challenge a narrow 
perception of French citizenship that demands assimilation.32  However, Antilleans are 
largely absent from this story about the struggle for the right to difference in France.  The 
contemporary public debates surrounding the headscarf affair have made French 
Muslims, specifically Algerians, and the history of their relationship to France the salient 
object of study.33  In 2004, President Jacques Chirac singed a law banning the display of 
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“conspicuous religious symbols and apparel” in public schools.  The law purportedly 
applied to all students, but in practice, it was directed at female French Muslim students, 
and prohibited them from wearing headscarves in school.  Officials justified the 
headscarf ban, arguing that such religious and cultural symbols violated republican 
principles of secularism (laïcité) and universalism.34  According to the French 
constitution, citizens are abstract individuals without differentiation or particularities.  
Supporters of the headscarf ban argued that in displaying their particular affiliation to 
Islam, French Muslim women were obscuring their universality and claiming their right 
to difference, an action that fundamentally violated what it meant to be French.35  Recent 
scholarship has highlighted how French Muslims are using concepts of difference and 
multiculturalism to challenge this narrow definition of French citizenship.36     
 These current debates about secularism and its role in shaping what it means to be 
a French citizen have prompted scholars to look more closely at the historical relationship 
between Algeria and France, and how the State incorporated Muslims into the nation 
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l’islam (Paris: Stock, 2005).   
35 For a discussion of republican citizenship and the abstract individual see:  Dominique Schnapper, La 
Communauté Des Citoyens: Sur L'idée Moderne De Nation  (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); Dominique 
Schnapper, Qu’est-ce que la citoyenneté (Paris: Gallimard, 2000). 
36 Herrick Chapman and Laura L. Frader, eds., Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the 
Politics of Difference  (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004); Herman Lebovics, Bringing the Empire Back 
Home: France in the Global Age (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark 
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during colonialism and decolonization.37  This work has foregrounded religion as the 
most important category of exclusion in France today.  While it is important to 
understand how the French state has constructed Muslims’ religion as a marker of 
difference that threatens national unity, this privileging of religion in discussions about 
race and multiculturalism in France has obscured other processes of exclusion that have 
existed and continue to persist in France.  Guadeloupe and Martinique’s current 
departmental status is similar to that of Algeria before it became an independent nation.  
From 1946 to 1962, Martinique, Gudadeloupe, and Algeria were administratively and 
legally a part of the Frennch nation.  Antilleans and Algerians were French citizens.  In 
July1962, France severed its political ties with Algeria, arguing that independence was an 
inevitable outcome in the advancing “tide of History.”  However, in 1946, France had yet 
to “invent” decolonization.38  Instead, it strengthened its political union with Guadeloupe 
and Martinique by making the islands departments of France.  Complete integration was 
the National Assembly’s strategy for resolving Antilleans’ demands for more political 
rights.  In contrast to its more recently acquired African and Asian territories, 
metropolitan and colonial officials believed Guadeloupe and Martinique were more 
assimilated.  Antilleans were “model colonial subjects” in that they had embraced the 
institutions, language, and religion of France.  Because of Antilleans’ purported 
                                                
37 See: René Gallissot, La république française et les indigènes: Algérie colonisée, Algérie algérienne, 
1870-1962 (Paris: Atelier, 2006); Jonathan K. Gosnell, The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria, 
1830-1954 (Rochester, N.Y.: Rochester University Press, 2002); Patricia M.E. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: 
Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); Neil MacMaster, 
Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-62 (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1997); Jo 
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38 Todd Shepard argues that France “invented” decolonization and the notion that culturally distinct peoples 
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Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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assimilation, and the islands’ long historical ties to France dating back to the seventeenth 
century, the French government deemed Antilleans worthy of French citizenship.39  
Despite this, the extent to which Antilleans were in fact French remained in question.  
Antilleans were politically included as French citizens, but because of their racial and 
cultural particularities as black Creoles, they were also excluded from the nation.   
 My examination of Antilleans’ simultaneous inclusion and exclusion suggests that 
decolonization and the subsequent migration of former colonial subjects, particularly 
those of the Muslim faith, to France was not the only event that forced France to redefine 
the meaning of French citizenship in the late twentieth century.  The event of 
decolonization did not effectively sever France’s ties with its former colonies and place 
difference outside of the nation.  During this period, metropolitan and DOM officials 
were also struggling with how to assimilate Antilleans’ cultural differences into the 
nation.  I contend that only in exploring Antilleans’ unique political and cultural status, 
can historians begin to understand how inclusion and exclusion worked in France.  I 
argue that French citizenship was neither entirely inclusionary nor was it completely 
exclusionary.  Rather, the meaning of what it meant to be French was changing as state 
officials negotiated with Antilleans to determine how they would be politically and 
culturally incorporated into the nation.     
 
Inclusion and Exclusion in the French Republic  
 
 Under the French constitution, citizens are abstract individuals without 
differential identification or particularistic affiliations.  Accordingly, the government 
                                                
39 Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 
1787-1804  (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Laurent Dubois, “La République 
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interacts with its citizens as universal individuals, each of whom is purportedly equal 
before the law.  The state does not acknowledge the ways in which particular groups of 
citizens have been constructed and treated as racially and culturally different.  In theory, 
this erasure of difference ensures that all citizens are treated equally.  These republican 
ideals have produced a national myth of a colorblind France that has successfully and 
effortlessly assimilated multiple waves of culturally and racially diverse immigrants.40 
 Most of the scholarship on immigration and postcolonial France is focused on 
examining how France’s unique republican tradition has affected the cultural and 
political integration of former colonial subjects who migrated to France following 
decolonization.  More specifically, it scrutinizes the saliency of the myth of a colorblind 
Republic, and considers whether or not questions of race and ethnicity have shaped the 
nation.41  This body of work is divided between scholars who argue that the republican 
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tradition has been and can be inclusionary42, and those who contend that republicanism is 
an exclusionary ideal in that it has failed to create an equal society.43   
 Scholars who celebrate France’s history of assimilation argue that the 
contemporary “immigration problem” is not a new phenomenon.  In the past, France has 
confronted the issue of inassimilable “others” and therefore, it will eventually succeed in 
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incorporating this new wave of postcolonial immigrants.44  Others contend that the 
postwar restructuring of the labor market and the subsequent economic recession in the 
1970s is to blame for the marginalization of postcolonial immigrants.  In other words, this 
group of scholars insists that the inequalities present in French society are the result of 
social and economic problems, not racial ones.45 
 More recently, scholars have challenged this narrative of inclusion and 
assimilation.  In using race as a category of analysis to understand how exclusion works 
in France, they have demonstrated that social inequalities in France are also racial 
problems.46  Within this body of scholarship, there are two main arguments for 
explaining how republican policies of equality coexisted with forms of exclusion.  The 
first group of scholars claims that exclusion occurred from the failure of state officials to 
live up the lofty ideals of republican equality.47  For example, historian Todd Shepard 
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asserts that the French state turned its back on its republican principles when it revoked 
thousands of Algerian Muslims’ French citizenship during the process of decolonization.  
Shepard characterizes French Algeria as a kind of experiment in multiculturalism, and 
argues that republicanism was not a coherent set of policies.  Legal pluralism and many 
categories of citizens and colonial subjects existed in Algeria prior to decolonization.  
Republicanism had the capacity to include and adapt.  However, in 1962, at the moment 
of decolonization, the French government used racial categories to exclude Algerian 
Muslims from French citizenship.  Unlike Algerians of European descent, Muslims were 
stripped of their French nationality.  The government “invented” decolonization to 
effectively erase the post-1944 integration and positive discrimination policies that had 
sought to include French Algerian Muslims in the nation.  In characterizing 
decolonization as an inevitable step in the “tide of history”, France absolved itself of all 
responsibility in upholding its policy of universalism, which had made Algeria a legal 
part of France and transformed Algerians in French citizens.48  Similarly, Laurent Dubois 
argues that former slaves in the Antilles were denied the full rights and privileges of 
French citizenship not because of the failures of republicanism, but because colonial 
officials failed to fully implement the ideals of republican equality.  According to Dubois, 
republicanism freed the slaves and granted them citizenship; it was colonial officials who 
insisted that the former slaves were not yet ready to be French citizens.49   
 A separate group of scholars contends that inequality and policies of exclusion 
developed as a part of the French republican tradition.  For example, Maxim Silverman 
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challenges the founding myth of the universal modern French nation-state.  He argues 
that France has a long history of being restrictive and particular.  The notion of universal 
rights forged by the French Revolution was never universal.  Rather, Silverman contends 
that republican universalism was constructed within the particularistic framework of the 
nation.  The nation hijacked the republican ideal of the universal individual, and quickly 
subsumed it within distinctions between nationals and non-nationals.50    
 In addition, Alice Conklin claims that policies of exclusion developed as a part of 
the republican colonial project.  According to Conklin, colonial officials’ commitment to 
republican universalism justified the violent acts of modernization and assimilation that 
occurred under France’s “colonizing mission”.  The authoritarian nature of colonial rule 
and republicanism were not contradictory.  Rather, they developed together.  Conklin 
claims that colonial officials believed authoritarian measures were necessary in order to 
help colonial subjects assimilate and achieve their potential as French citizens.51   
 On the one hand, historians’ celebration of French republicanism has 
characterized France as completely inclusionary of difference in its commitment to 
assimilation.  On the other hand, scholars’ critical analyses of the practice of republican 
ideals have highlighted France’s exclusionary nature in its insistence that citizens 
conform to some imaginary ideal of what it means to be French.  For both groups of 
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scholars, inclusion is synonymous with the attainment of citizenship while exclusion is 
some other marginal political status.52  They assume that political inclusion necessarily 
signifies cultural inclusion and the existence of equality.   
 My consideration of Antilleans’ political and cultural status in the French nation 
reframes the debate about republicanism’s inclusionary and exclusionary nature.  Instead 
of analyzing republicanism in terms of its successes and failures in creating political 
equality and granting French citizenship to racially and ethnically distinct individuals, I 
examine how the Ministries of Education and the DOM have used republican ideals to 
construct a French nation that politically included Antilleans while culturally and socially 
excluding them.  When metropolitan officials granted Antilleans full political rights as 
citizens of France, their cultural and social inclusion remained in question.  Antilleans 
benefitted from French citizenship and were politically included in the nation; yet, 
culturally, they remained distinct and subject to discrimination on these grounds.  With 
respect to social and cultural rights, including equal access to housing and employment, 
as well as the right to learn Creole, the Republic continued to exclude Antilleans from 
obtaining the same rights and privileges as metropolitan citizens.  My examination of 
metropolitan and Antillean education policy suggests that although Guadeloupeans and 
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Martinicans were politically included, they were culturally excluded from the national 
curriculum, and more broadly, the nation.  I demonstrate how political inclusion and 
cultural exclusion occurred simultaneously as a set of processes in which metropolitan 
and DOM officials sought to reconcile their commitment to assimilation with Antilleans’ 
demands for cultural recognition and inclusion.   
 
Making French Citizens: Republican Education and the Politics of Language 
 Education provides a particularly useful lens through which to examine how 
inclusion and exclusion worked in postcolonial France.  First, France has historically 
used public education in both the metropolitan and colonial contexts to promote 
assimilation and make republican citizens.53  The dissemination of French was at the 
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heart of this expansion of republican education.  State officials viewed the mastery of the 
French language as the first step in the process of assimilation.  Therefore, education 
policies, particularly those concerning French language instruction, provide insight into 
what the state thought it meant to be French.  In particular, changes in these policies 
enable us to understand the transformations in the meaning of French citizenship, as well 
as who was included and excluded from the nation.  Second, there is a large body of 
education policies that explicitly addressed diversity’s place in public schools and the 
nation.  These policies and the debates surrounding them provide detailed information 
concerning the ways in which Antilleans’ Creole language and culture were included and 
excluded.  For these two reasons, I have chosen to explore how debates about Antillean 
education, and more specifically Creole’s place in the public classroom, have 
transformed French citizenship and the right to difference during the late twentieth 
century.       
 Before we can explore how education and Creole language policy shaped the 
meaning of citizenship in postcolonial France, we must first examine the history of 
republican education as a tool of assimilation.  Historians have pinpointed the late 
nineteenth century as a moment of nation building in France.  They have argued that prior 
to the Third Republic, there was no singular French national identity.  Rather, people 
living in the provinces were more likely to identify with their particular region.  French 
officials implemented mandatory and universal education as a strategy for instilling in 
peasants an awareness of being French and belonging to the nation of France.  They 
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contended that by introducting schoolchildren to the nation’s language, history, and 
culture, public education fostered the development of a national consciousness.54   
 More specifically, the establishment of French as the unifying national language 
of France was central to state officials’ nation-building project.  According to the state, 
the French language was the essential marker of Frenchness that signified national 
belonging.  They argued that the ability to speak French gave people in the provinces the 
linguistic tools they needed to be full participants in the national culture.55  It was the 
revolutionaries of 1789 who first set forth the idea that the dissemination of a 
standardized French language was essential for establishing a strong and unified 
Republic.  The republicans encouraged an active campaign to spread French to the 
masses and to rid France of its various patois and regional languages.  The many 
successive regimes of the nineteenth century were also favorable to idea of solidifying 
national unity and loyalty through the universalization of French language.  The 1833 
Guizot law stated that French was to be the only language used in schools.  In practice, 
regulation was ignored, but in 1850 the Falloux law, followed by the Ferry laws of 1881 
and 1882, reaffirmed that only French was to be used in public classrooms.56   
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 While the French state was using compulsory, free, and secular public education 
to disseminate the French language and create a sense of national belonging in the 
provinces, it was also struggling with how to assimilate its newly acquired colonial 
territories in Africa and Asia.  Jules Ferry, the architect of French public education, also 
orchestrated France’s colonial expansion in the 1880s as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
He used the same national school system that he had developed in France to spread 
Republican ideology to the colonies and foster colonial subjects’ loyalty to France.  
According to Ferry, republican education was the best way to “establish France’s 
territorial domination and penetrate the souls of the conquered.”57   
 Universal education, and the dissemination of the French language that 
accompanied it, was an important part of France’s “civilizing mission”.  The goal of 
colonial education was to bring colonial subjects into the modern world of France, and 
make them a part of the French family.58  However, this did not mean that colonial 
education policy was uniform and transplanted directly from metropolitan France.  While 
the purpose of universal education was the same for each colony—to assimilate the 
colonized and make them French—colonial officials implemented different education 
and language policies according to the particular circumstances of each colonial 
territory.59 
 In the Antilles, colonial officials purportedly implemented the same national 
school system that it was employing in metropolitan France to spread Republican 
ideology and create French citizens out of the diverse peoples of the provinces.  When 
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slavery was abolished in 1848, the provisional republican government also decreed that a 
free elementary school for boys was to be established in each commune.  Application of 
this law lagged until 1886 when France passed legislation enabling the state’s financial 
support for the development of primary education in the islands.  While republican 
officials supported the implementation of universal public education in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique as an integral part of their assimilation policy, white settlers fought against 
the creation of public schools as a threat to their authority.  This internal struggle over the 
place of public education in the islands encouraged Antillean leaders’ belief that greater 
assimilation into French society would lead to more freedom and power for people of 
color.   For Antilleans, this distinction between local whites who sought to perpetuate 
their domination, and representatives of the Republic who provided them with the tools to 
achieve social mobility, was sharpened over the course of the nineteenth century.  Equal 
access to education became an important part of the political agenda for the group of 
Antilllean elites that favored greater political and cultural assimilation into France.60   
 At the same time, the establishment of French republican schools meant that 
Antillean history, culture, and language were absent from the curriculum.  Schoolteachers 
taught Antillean children that they were French, erasing the history of their Creole culture 
and identity.  Education officials privileged French language instruction as a tool of 
assimilation, and forbade the use of Creole, the maternal language of most Antilleans, in 
classrooms.  For metropolitan and colonial officials, successful education was measured 
by Antilleans’ identification with French cultural models, their ability to speak proper 
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French, and most importantly, their loyalty and attachment to the French nation.61 
 These efforts to use republican schools to make Antilleans into Frenchmen 
continued throughout the Third Republic.  By then, public education had created a small 
class of elite Antilleans of color who dominated local assemblies.  French became the 
new language of this social class, and its acquisition was a marker of social prestige.  To 
speak French indicated a strong association with French culture, as well as a close 
identification with French values.  These elite Antilleans sought to exercise their political 
and social power to contain white settlers’ economic and social domination.  Dependent 
upon the Republic for their education and the legitimacy it had given them, the 
bourgeoisie of color in the Antilles was more interested in greater assimilation into 
France than independence.  Efforts to gain complete political integration as a department 
of France was the political goal of this group of Antillean leaders before the Second 
World War.62   
 This goal was achieved in 1946 when Guadeloupe and Martinique became 
departments of France.  Departmentalization brought about the expansion of the French 
national school system to the Antilles.  Previously, only a small number of elite and 
middle-class Antilleans benefitted from public education.  After 1946, education was 
made compulsory for all Antillean children until the age of sixteen.  To achieve this goal, 
secondary and technical education was added to the primary school infrastructure that 
had been implemented under colonial rule.  In addition, new schools were built in rural 
areas so that more Antillean children had access to education.  Prior to 
departmentalization, schools were generally limited to urban areas.  The Antillean elite 
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who supported departmentalization had gained their social mobility through republican 
education.  They therefore believed that its popularization was the most important aspect 
of their efforts to improve the economic and social circumstances of the Antillean 
masses.63   
 However, shortly after departmental status was achieved in 1946, the same 
Antillean leaders who had supported political assimilation realized that they had simply 
replaced one form of domination with another.  Departmentalization precipitated a huge 
increase in labor costs.  This, coupled with the growing competition for European 
markets by tropical products from African and Latin American countries, meant that most 
of the Antillean plantations could no longer compete.  Antillean leaders argued that in 
exchange for partial liberation from the power of local whites, departmentalization had 
destroyed the local economy and culture, making both Guadeloupe and Martinique 
largely French-controlled service-based economies and consumer societies.64   
 This destruction of Antillean institutions and the local economy precipitated a 
“cultural awakening” among educated Antillean elites.  This particular group of 
Antilleans began to perceive of Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s social and economic 
problems as a cultural problem.  They argued that the islands’ widespread unemployment 
and poverty were a result of departmentalization and its assimilation policy, which had 
destroyed Antilleans’ Creole language and culture.  For these Antilleans, assimilation 
kept the Antillean people in a place of subordination and prevented them from achieving 
social and economic advancement.  They argued that the only way to gain power and 
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overcome oppression at the hands of both local whites and the Republic was to reclaim 
their Creole language and culture.65   
 In the decades following departmentalization, Creole became the symbol of 
Antillean cultural and political revival.  The Creole language first appeared during the 
period of French colonial expansion in Guadeloupe and Martinique in the seventeenth 
century.  Creole developed from the mixing of white settlers’ French vocabulary, the 
syntax and grammar of the multiple African languages spoken by slaves, as well as the 
language of the indigenous Carib people that populated the Antilles prior to colonization.  
Creole emerged as a necessary form of communication between French settlers and the 
slaves they imported to work on their plantations.  Following the abolition of slavery and 
continuing through departmentalization, metropolitan officials banned Creole from public 
instruction, arguing that Antilleans’ assimilation was dependent upon French language 
acquisition.  Republican schoolteachers taught Antillean children that they were 
completely French, ignoring their Creole culture that had emerged from the Antilles’ 
history of colonization and slavery.  Therefore, in revalorizing their Creole language, 
Antilleans were also reclaiming their black African culture that republican education had 
tried to erase.   
 Beginning in the 1950s, Antillean elites forged a Creole movement in the Antilles, 
as well as in metropolitan France.  This movement was a quest for the reclamation of 
Creole as a part of Antilleans’ true cultural identity; it was intrinsically linked to the 
elevation of Creole’s role and status in public education, and more generally, Antillean 
society.  For supporters of the Creole movement, republican education was the site of 
assimilation where French officials had attempted to destroy Antilleans’ Creole identity.  
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For this reason, they argued that the most effective way to fight assimilation was to 
regain control of public education and infuse it with their Creole culture.  These Creole 
activists chose education as the forum of the Creole movement not only because of its 
importance to the republican assimilation project, but also because it was an institution 
where French officials had articulated concrete policies to erase Antilleans’ Creole 
language and culture, and make them into French citizens.  Education, and in particular, 
language policy, offered Antilleans a substantive set of ideas about French citizenship 
that they could challenge and interact with in order to achieve their goal of cultural 
equality.   
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 The first chapter, entitled “Assimilation Through Migration: BUMIDOM and the 
Creation of a Trans-Atlantic French Nation, 1963-1982”, explores the creation of the 
Office for Migration from the Overseas Departments (BUMIDOM), the government 
agency tasked with regulating and organizing Antillean migration from Guadeloupe and 
Martinique to metropolitan France.  It argues that state officials used BUMIDOM and the 
process of migration as an opportunity to educate Antilleans about what it meant to be 
French.  Upon arriving in France, BUMIDOM placed Antillean men and women in 
technical education programs designed to provide them with the professional skills they 
needed to secure employment.  In practice, however, these training programs taught 
Antilleans the everyday skills that BUMIDOM believed were essential for living in 
metropolitan France.  Women learned how to cook, clean, and care for children according 
to the ideals of French domesticity, and men learned the importance of punctuality and 
hard work in the workplace.  I argue that in the process of educating Antilleans about 
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how to conduct themselves in French society, BUMIDOM defined what it meant to be a 
proper French citizen.  However, Antilleans were not passive participants in their 
assimilation. I contend that in private letters to government officials, Antillean migrants 
challenged the policy of assimilation and argued for a definition of French citizenship 
that included their Creole culture.  In was in these exchanges between Antilleans and 
republican officials regarding BUMIDOM’s technical education programs that the 
meaning of French citizenship was redefined.    
 Chapter two, “The ‘right to difference’: the Forging of Antillean Ethnic Activism 
and French Multicularism before Mitterrand”, examines how Antilleans’ private claims 
discussed in the first chapter became public criticisms of BUMIDOM and the beginning 
of a political movement to gain official recognition of their Creole culture.  It contends 
that ultimately, it was the Antillean community who influenced public opinion, and put 
pressure on BUMIDOM to reexamine its assimilation policy.  In 1975, BUMIDOM 
responded to Antilleans’ demands and officially began to financially support their 
cultural associations.  The conventional narrative of the French anti-racism movement 
claims that the introduction of Mitterrand’s “right to difference” in the 1980s marked a 
complete break in policy from assimilation to multiculturalism.  This second chapter 
claims that the “right to difference” was not a uniform policy brought on by a 
homogenous anti-racism movement.  Rather, Mitterrand’s articulation of the “right to 
difference” was the culmination of a gradual move toward a tentative cultural plurality in 
which Antilleans played a formative role.    
 The third chapter, “From Militant Nationalists to Ethnic Minority:  The Antillean 
Creole Movement in Metropolitan France and the Antilles after Departmentalization”, 
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explores the movement to promote, develop, and popularize Antilleans’ Creole language 
and culture in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and France.  I argue that the Creole movement 
was a kind of reeducation in which the Antillean elite taught the Guadeloupean and 
Martinican people to value their Creole culture and language as an important part of their 
identity.  Supporters of the Creole movement argued that in ignoring Creole, republican 
education had erased Antilleans’ culture and language from the history of the French 
nation.  These Creole activists used the Creole language to fight against the policy of 
assimilation and argue for a particular kind of multicultural education in France.   
 While chapter three provides a foundation for understanding the politics of Creole 
and the cultural movement surrounding it, chapter four looks more closely at Antilleans’ 
efforts to make the Creole language and culture a part of republican education.  In chapter 
four, “The Creole Question in Republican Education: Gérard Lauriette and the 
Regionalization of the Antilles”, I examine Antillean education as a site of conflict 
between one of the most outspoken Creole activists, Gérard Lauriette, and the Ministry of 
Education.  Lauriette was a teacher and activist who struggled to overturn the Ministry of 
Education’s ban on the use of Creole in schools from 1946 through the 1980s.  This 
chapter claims that Lauriette and his vocal role in the debates about Creole’s place in 
public education put pressure on the French government to rethink the Antilles’ political 
and cultural relationship to France.  I argue that the French government’s decision to 
consider the regionalization of Guadeloupe and Martinique, and the possibility of 
granting Antilleans more control of their local affairs, was a direct result of the debates 
about Creole and republican education.    
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 Chapter five, entitled “From Assimilation to Intercultural Education: Immigrant 
Education and the Exclusion of Creole, 1970-1983”, examines these debates about 
Creole’s place in public schools in relationship to the Ministry of Education’s policies on 
immigrant education in French schools.  While the Ministry of Education debated the 
place of immigrant languages and cultures in the metropolitan education system, it was 
also embroiled in political struggle with Antillean activists concerning Creole’s role in 
the Antillean classroom.  From 1946 to 1970, the Ministry of Education treated 
Antilleans and immigrants similarly, and adhered to a policy of assimilation for both 
groups.  This changed in 1970 when the Ministry of Education gradually introduced 
immigrants’ cultures and languages into the metropolitan curriculum while continuing to 
prohibit Antilleans’ Creole language and culture from entering Guadeloupean and 
Martinican classrooms.   
 Chapter five seeks to understand why the Ministry of Education officially 
introduced immigrants’ languages and cultues into the national curriculum nearly a 
decade before it would do the same for Antilleans.  Historians of France have 
characterized exclusionary policies such as this as either a failure of republicanism to live 
up to its inclusionary ideals or as an inherent flaw of an exclusionary republicanism that 
only purported to be inclusionary.  However, I argue that the divergence in education 
policy for immigrants and Antilleans reveals that republican assimilation was not entirely 
exclusionary or completely inclusionary.  Rather, it simultaneously included and 
excluded different cultural and political groups, such as immigrants and Antilleans.   
 In the mid-1970s, the Ministry of Education incorporated immigrants’ languages 
and cultures into republican education as a part the government’s repatriation programs.  
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Education officials argued that instruction in immigrants’ languages of origin helped 
prepare them and their families for an eventual return to the homeland.  In contrast to 
immigrants, Antilleans were French citizens and thus, permament members of the nation.  
Therefore, the Minisry of Education contended that Creole language instruction 
threatened Antillean children’s ability to learn French and assimilate into the nation.  
Education and state officials used immigrants’ and Antilleans’ particular political statuses 
to justify the Ministry of Education’s decision to implement differential language polices 
for immigrant and Antillean children.   
 Whereas the previous five chapters focus on how Antilleans interacted with  
republican assimilation, particularly those policies pertaining to education and language, 
to make claims about the French nation, chapter six explores Antilleans’ more global 
position in the Creole-speaking world.  This chapter contends that Antilleans did not limit 
their political activities to France or the French Caribbean.  In addition to carving out a 
space for Antillean culture within the French nation, Creole activists also formed political 
and cultural networks with other Creole activists across the Caribbean and Europe.  They 
created a broader international movement that united all Creole-speakers in their struggle 
against European domination.  I argue that Antilleans used this movement to propose an 
alternative to their French citizenship: a pan-Creole identity.  
 Together, these chapters place Antilleans at the center of the debates about 
diveristy and the right to difference in late-twentieth century France.  Scholarship on 
postcolonial France tends to focus on the role of immigrants in shaping a multicultural 
France.  Because Antilleans are legally French citizens, they are largely absent from this 
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work on postcolonial immigration.66  Conversely, those scholars who recognize the ways 
in which Antilleans have been excluded from the nation, tend to assume that because of 
their racial and cultural differences, Antilleans were excluded from the nation in much 
the same way as postcolonial immigrants.67  In doing so, they have overlooked the 
particular ways in which Antilleans have used their French citizenship and invoked the 
history of their cultural and political ties with France to challenged republican 
assimilation.   
 My dissertation argues that debates about Creole’s place within public schools 
shaped metropolitan and DOM officials’ position regarding the place of cultural diversity 
in the nation after the Second World War.  From 1946 to 1983 Antilleans sought to 
reform France’s national curriculum so that it included their Creole language and culture.  
Antilleans’ demands for cultural inclusion forced DOM and education officials to carve 
out a space for difference, and more specifically, Creole, in the nation.  I argue that it was 
these debates about the “Creole question” that challenged the republican definition of a 
French citizen as an individual divested of all particular and group affiliations.    
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CHAPTER I 
Assimilation Through Migration:  
BUMIDOM and the Vocational Education of Antillean Migrants 
    
Introduction 
 On March 22, 1960, crowds of cheering Martinicans greeted their president in 
Fort-de-France, prompting him to spontaneously affirm their loyalty to France: “My God, 
you are so French!”1  With this statement, President Charles de Gaulle highlighted 
Antilleans’ and French metropolitans’ shared sense of belonging to the same national 
entity.  Fourteen years earlier, in 1946, both French and Antillean leaders had 
unanimously legalized this common attachment to the French nation when they voted to 
make Guadeloupe and Martinique overseas departments of France.  Departmentalization 
granted French citizenship to Antilleans, and gave them all of the same rights and 
privileges of their metropolitan counterparts.  Antilleans and metropolitans were both 
French; they belonged to same nation. 
  At the time of President de Gaulle’s visit, Antilleans’ legal status as French 
citizens was not in question.  Why then, did President de Gaulle seem so surprised when 
Martinicans expressed their patriotism by warmly receiving their president?  In contrast 
to other former colonial subjects who were renouncing their status as French subjects, 
and claiming their independence from France, Antilleans were openly asserting their 
allegiance to France.  Yet, decolonization alone cannot explain de Gaulle’s surprise.  In 
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late twentieth-century France, what it meant to be French was determined by more than 
just legal status; Antilleans’ membership in the French nation was also predicated on 
their cultural assimilation.  This meant that Antilleans were expected to give up their 
Creole culture and language in favor of French citizenship.  In 1960, French officials 
were unsure about the extent to which this assimilation had occurred, and thus the extent 
to which Antilleans were in fact, French.   
 Antillean political leaders had supported departmentalization under the 
assumption that it would bring social and economic equality to Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  French officials promised that the transplantation of French institutions and 
the extension of social welfare programs to the islands would accelerate economic 
development, allowing Antilleans to enjoy the same standard of living as their 
metropolitan counterparts.  However, after nearly a decade and a half 
departmentalization, disparities between citizens in the Antilles and in France persisted, 
and were only growing larger.  Legal integration did not create the parity Antilleans had 
hoped for.  Social welfare payments, as well as minimum wage, were significantly lower 
in the Antilles than in France.  Antilleans pointed to these inequalities as evidence of their 
status as second-class citizens.2   
 Throughout the 1950s, Antillean civil servants went on strike, protesting the 
government’s preferential treatment of metropolitan civil servants.  Workers joined in 
these strikes, demanding that their wages match those of metropolitan workers.  Left-
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wing political groups gained popularity among these groups of disaffected Antilleans.  
They characterized departmentalization as a continuation of colonialism that kept 
Antilleans in a subordinate position and inhibited the islands’ economic development.  
Inspired by other French colonial subjects’ demands for autonomy, leftist political leaders 
called for Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s independence as the only solution to 
Antilleans’ continued oppression at the hands of the French government.3  The 
metropolitan press widely covered this rhetoric of Antillean independence, along with the 
social unrest created by multiple strikes.  This caused metropolitans to question whether 
or not Antilleans held the same allegiance to the French nation, prompting debates about 
whether or not Antilleans were in fact French.   
 Were Antilleans French citizens, or were they just another group of discontented 
former colonial subjects?  Following the Second World, colonial subjects’ calls for 
sovereignty forced the French government to forge a new kind of French nation that no 
longer included vast colonial holdings.  At the Brazzaville conference in 1944, General 
Charles de Gaulle had tried, to some extent, to the meet the aspirations for sovereignty of 
those peoples of the Empire who had shown solidarity with Free France during the Nazi-
allied Vichy regime.  He hesitantly suggested that France would grant parts of French 
Africa more control over of their own affairs.  However, decolonization was not a 
peaceful process.  During the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), colonial subjects became 
discontented with France’s false promises, and began to use force to claim their 
independence first in Indochina and then, in Algeria.  These colonial uprisings created 
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political instability in France, and induced the dissolution of the Fourth Republic.   In 
1958, de Gaulle forged the Fifth Republic and redefined the relationship between France 
and its Empire.  He revised the constitution to allow French-ruled territories to 
unilaterally change their own constitutions and political relationship with France.  The 
majority of these territories opted for and obtained independence that same year.4   
 While France was granting political autonomy to its colonial subjects across the 
globe, it was also trying to bring Antilleans into a closer union with French nation.  
France accepted decolonization on the grounds that its former colonies had different 
histories and cultures and thus, constituted separate nations; but Antilleans were different.  
Metropolitan officials had always asserted that Antilleans were inextricably linked to 
France, citing their shared history that dated back to the seventeenth century.  Despite this 
insistence that Antilleans were French, an increasing number of supporters of 
Guadeloupean and Martinican independence argued that Antilleans possessed their own 
unique history and culture: they were Creole.  As the last of its colonies became 
independent in the 1960s, France was faced with the task of how to assimilate 
Antilleans—French citizens who claimed to be culturally distinct—into the nation.   
 This chapter argues that Antilleans were at the heart of these debates about who 
would be included and excluded from the French nation following decolonization.  At a 
crucial moment when it seemed assimilation had failed in its colonial territories, France 
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clung to its Antillean departments and sought new ways it could fulfill the republican 
ideal of assimilation and make Antilleans into Frenchmen.  Migration became a strategy 
for doing just that.  France wanted to affirm Antilleans’ cultural and political union with 
the French nation by literally bringing them to metropolitan France.   In 1963, the French 
government created a new state agency—the Office for Migration from the Overseas 
Departments or BUMIDOM—to facilitate and organize Antilleans’ migration to France.  
Metropolitan officials encouraged Antillean migration as a solution to the Antilles’ 
economic and social problems.  They hoped that large-scale Antillean migration would 
improve the standard of living in the islands by reducing unemployment and 
overpopulation.  Metropolitan officials argued that these social and economic 
improvements would alleviate discontent among Antilleans, diminishing popular support 
for the Guadeloupean and Martinican independence movements.   
 The first part of this chapter examines Antillean migration as a government 
strategy to assimilate Antilleans.  I argue that state officials used BUMIDOM and the 
process of migration as an opportunity to solidify the Antilles’ political ties with France, 
and to educate Antilleans about what it meant to be French.  Upon arriving in France, 
BUMIDOM placed Antillean men in women in technical education programs designed to 
provide them with the professional skills they needed to secure employment.  In practice, 
however, these training programs taught Antilleans the everyday skills that were 
purportedly essential for living in metropolitan France.  Women learned how to cook, 
clean, and care for children according to the ideals of French domesticity, and men 
learned the importance of punctuality and hard work in the workplace.  I argue that in the 
process of educating Antilleans about proper conduct in French society, BUMIDOM 
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defined what it meant to be a proper French citizen.  In doing so, they culturally excluded 
Antilleans from the French nation.   
 Antilleans were not passive participants in the government’s construction of 
French citizenship.  The second part of this chapter explores how Antilleans interacted 
with BUMIDOM to shape the migration process and carve out a space for themselves in 
the French nation.  Antillean migrants had fully internalized the Republican rhetoric that 
they enjoyed the same rights and privileges as metropolitan citizens.  Yet, when they 
arrived in the “Hexagon”, BUMIDOM controlled their access to housing and 
employment by placing them in technical education programs that only trained them for 
unskilled and low-paying jobs.  This disconnet between the discourse of equality and the 
realities of migration forced Antilleans to actively rethink the parity of their French 
citizenship.  Antilleans asserted their belonging to the French nation by writing letters to 
government officials demanding equal employment opportunities; however, the content 
of these letters also questioned how and if Antilleans fit into the nation.  I argue that 
Antilleans used these letters to challenge republican assimilation and argue for a 
definition of French citizenship that included their Creole culture.  In was in these 
exchanges between Antilleans and metropolitan officials regarding BUMIDOM’s 
vocational education programs that the meaning of French citizenship was defined.    
 This chapter builds upon the work of historians who have shown how the 
meaning of French citizenship was defined in the colonial project, which sought to 
assimilate France’s colonial subjects and make them into Frenchmen.5  In their studies on 
                                                
5 See:  Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French 
Caribbean, 1787-1804  (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Todd Shepherd, The 
Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
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how inclusion and exclusion worked in France and its Empire, scholars have focused on 
political definitions of French citizenship.  They have characterized the attainment of 
French citizenship as the marker of inclusion in the nation; conversely, exclusion was 
signified by the denial of full-fledged citizenship rights.  For example, Laurent DuBois 
has argued that in creating the category of “new citizens” for former slaves who were 
purportedly not yet ready to possess all of the rights and privileges of French citizenship, 
colonial officials continued to exclude former slaves from the nation despite claims that 
they upheld republican equality in abolishing slavery.6  This emphasis on moments of 
political inclusion has obscured the ways in which the Republic has continued to 
culturally and racially exclude particular groups of citizens.   
 My examination of Antilleans’ precarious position in the French nation suggests 
that this was not the case.  Antilleans were politically included in the nation as French 
citizens; the government encouraged them to exercise their right as citizens to migrate to 
and settle in metropolitan France.  Yet, at the same time, state officials limited Antillean 
migrants’ citizenship rights by using BUMIDOM to control where they worked and 
lived.  In doing so, they created a category of second-class citizenship that was linked to 
Antilleans’ racial and cultural differences.  I argue that in politically including Antilleans 
in the French nation, metropolitan officials created state agencies, such as BUMIDOM, to 
facilitate their assimilation.  In the process, they created a definition of French citizenship 
that culturally excluded Antilleans.  In other words, political inclusion and cultural 
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6 Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 
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exclusion were a part of the same process of assimilating Antilleans and making them 
into Frenchmen.   
 
Part I.  Departmentalization and BUMIDOM’s Construction of French Citizenship 
 On March 19, 1946, the French National Assembly voted to make Guadeloupe 
and Martinique overseas departments (DOM) of France.  Under the law of 
departmentalization, Guadeloupe and Martinique were presumably as integral to France 
as its other metropolitan departments.7  Legally, Guadeloupe and Martinique were a part 
of the French nation, and Antilleans were French citizens.  Aimé Césaire, mayor of Fort-
de-France, Martinique and deputy to the National Assembly, was one of the principal 
drafters of departmentalization, which was also known as the “law of assimilation”.  He 
believed that a closer union with metropolitan France would end the racial hierarchy of 
the colonial regime, and bring social and economic equality to the Antilles.  He perceived 
of the Republic as a liberating force that had abolished slavery, granted Antilleans the 
right to vote, and provided all Antilleans with access to public education.  It was the 
white settlers (békés) who sought to limit Antilleans’ freedoms in order to reinforce the 
islands’ racialized social hierarchy and keep Antilleans in a position of subordination.8  
Admission in the “French family” seemed to be the best means for containing the white 
settlers’ stronghold and ending the inequalities of colonialism.   
 The béké elite opposed departmentalization for the same reason Césaire supported 
it: legal assimilation would give metropolitan officials more control of Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, threatening their position of power in Antillean society.  Historically, békés 
                                                
7 France is divided into one hundred different departments, all of which have identical legal status as 
integral parts of France.  Together, these one hundred departments make up the French nation.   
8 Ellen M. Schnepel, In Search of National Identity: Creole and Politics in Guadeloupe (Hamburg: Helmut 
Buske Verlag, 2004). 
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had perceived of metropolitan officials as a meddling force whose policies interfered with 
their economic interests.  However, white settlers could do little to stop 
departmentalization.  Césaire and members of black Antillean elite dominated the local 
assemblies in Martinique and Guadeluope.  They argued for departmentalization as the 
fulfillment of republican equality; it was the culmination of a centuries-long process of 
progressive incorporation into the French state that had begun with the abolition of 
slavery in 1848.  This kind of reasoning appealed to the leftist majority in the National 
Assembly.  Communist and Gaullists, imagining themselves as the moral upholders of 
republicanism, unanimously supported and passed the law of departmentalization.9 
 Césaire and the National Assembly supported the ideal of departmentalization as 
an equalizer, but the reality of political integration was much different than they had 
envisioned.  Departmentalization and assimilation—both political and cultural—were a 
part of the same process.  The goal of departmentalization was to secure the Antilles’ 
political union with France by granting Antilleans French citizenship, and making them 
loyal to the nation.  The decision to make Guadeloupe and Martinique departments of 
France was made in the wake of the 1944 Brazzaville conference.  During the Vichy 
regime, many of France’s Western African colonies aligned with the Free French 
movement to liberate France from Nazi control.  In exchange for their loyalty to France, 
colonial subjects demanded more political autonomy.  At Brazzaville, President de 
Gaulle recognized the need for reform, and granted colonial subjects limited rights, such 
as the ability to vote for representatives in the National Assembly.  However, de Gaulle 
adamantly insisted that the French Empire would remain united and that there was no 
                                                
9 See: David Beriss, Black Skins, French Voices: Caribbean Ethnicity and Activism in Urban France 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004). 
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possibility of full political sovereignty for the West African colonies.  For de Gaulle, the 
colonies were French and they would remain so.  Assimilation was the solution to 
colonial subjects’ demands for autonomy.  In order to secure their loyalty, de Gaulle 
argued that metropolitan officials simply needed to politically and culturally assimilate 
them into France.  Departmentalization was meant to be the highest achievement of this 
policy of assimilation. 
 When Guadeloupe and Martinique became departments of France, the French 
government set out to literally export metropolitan France to the Antilles.  The “law of 
assimilation” called for the whole-scale transplantation of French institutions to the 
islands, including schools, courts, social services, and the French political structure.  A 
prefecture and its accompanying ministerial departments were established in the capital 
cities of both Guadeloupe and Martinique.  In addition, political divisions, such as 
arrondissements and circonscriptions were added in order to replicate the metropolitan 
model of local governance and electoral process.  The implementation of France’s highly 
centralized administrative structure in the Antilles created a large local bureaucracy with 
the need for trained personnel.  This prompted improvements in the public education 
system to meet the growing demand for educated civil servants.  Guadeloupe’s and 
Martinique’s urban centers also experienced limited economic development as 
metropolitan bureaucrats settled on the islands to administer the various social welfare 
programs that departmentalization had brought to the Antilles.  In terms of social 
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services, Antilleans won social security benefits, including healthcare, workers’ 
insurance, pensions, and guarantees for minimum wage.10   
 Along with these social improvements, departmentalization also put in place a 
form of economic assimilation that threatened Antilleans’ local institutions.  The transfer 
of the French welfare state to the DOM, while markedly improving Antilleans’ quality of 
life, actually contributed to the decline of the local economy.  Social legislation and 
economic aid largely focused on developing tertiary economies, not local means of 
production.  While agricultural and industrial production in Guadeloupe and Martinique 
declined steadily throughout the twentieth century, the service sector (commerce, 
transportation, and administration) grew dramatically following departmentalization.  
This underdevelopment reinforced Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s dependence on France 
for consumer goods, and made the State the major employer of the region.  
Unemployment grew exponentially as former agricultural workers moved to the urban 
centers in search of bureaucratic jobs for which they had no training.11   
 An even more menacing form of cultural assimilation accompanied these social 
and economic changes.  It was not enough for the Antilles to become politically and 
economically integrated into France; departmentalization was also about making 
Antilleans culturally French.   In 1946, local radio stations were subsumed within the 
national organization, Office de Radio-Télévision Française (ORTF), and began to 
exclusively broadcast French programs.  The government subsidized the importation of 
French newspapers and magazines, making them more affordable.  The local popular 
                                                
10 See: Nick Nesbitt, Voicing Memory: History and Subjectivity in French Caribbean Literature 
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press struggled to compete as it was replaced by cheaper French publications.  When 
television was introduced to the Antilles in 1964, the State used it as a tool to disseminate 
information about metropolitan life and culture.  Departmentalization vastly improved 
Antilleans’ access to education, but at the same time, the transplantation of the French 
education system to the Guadeloupe and Martinique excluded local Antillean history and 
culture from public education.  DOM officials even went so far as to ban the use of 
Creole, Antilleans’ maternal language, in political meetings and addresses, the media, as 
well as within public schools.12   
 Despite these sweeping efforts to make the Antilles culturally, economically, and 
socially equal to metropolitan France, Guadeloupe and Martinique continued to lag 
behind metropolitan France.  Since departmentalization, unemployment in the Antilles 
hovered around twenty-five to thirty percent, and economic production sharply decreased 
as Antilleans became dependent upon imported French goods and the State for service 
sector jobs.13  In 1961, only thirty-five percent of Antillean children had scored within the 
“average” range on the national exam for an elementary school diploma.14  From 1960 to 
1964, an average of nearly six (5.8) children were born to Guadeloupean women between 
the ages of 15 and 49.  This high fertility rate contributed to a large population growth of 
three percent, which would have doubled Guadeloupe’s population in twenty years.15  
Following the Second World War, France experienced its greatest population growth in 
history as policymakers implemented social welfare programs designed to encourage 
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women to have more children.16  However, when compared to its Caribbean departments, 
metropolitan France’s population growth paled in comparison: its fertility rate was less 
than half of Guadeloupe’s (2.7), and population growth peaked at one percent.   
 Overpopulation in the Antilles was of particular concern to metropolitan officials 
charged with implementing departmentalization.  In 1950, Guadeloupe’s total population 
was approximately 210,000 and around 222,000 people resided in Martinique.17  Officials 
feared that if the current Antillean fertility rates persisted, then nearly one million people 
would be living in Guadeloupe and Martinique by 1970.18  These small islands, which 
together totaled just under 1100 square miles or one half percent the size of metropolitan 
France did not possess the economic and social infrastructures to support its current 
population, let alone the projected population of one million Antilleans.  Welfare officials 
were concerned about the financial burden of such a large Antillean population on 
France’s nascent social security system.  Moreover, with approximately 4200 miles 
separating metropolitan France from Guadeloupe and Martinique, officials worried that 
they would not be able to effectively govern a growing population that would continue to 
make even more social and economic demands on a remote centralized government.   
                                                
16 For histories of the pro-natalist movement in France see: Elisa Camiscioli, Reproducing the French 
Race: Immigration, Intimacy and Embodiment in the Early Twentieth Century  (Durham, NC:Duke 
University Press, 2009); Kristen Stromberg Childers, Fathers, families and the state in France, 1914-1945 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Joshua Cole, The Power of Large Numbers: Population, Politics 
and Gender in Nineteenth-Century France  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Marie-Monique 
Huss, “Pro-Natalism in the Inter-War Period in France,” Journal of Contemporary History 25 (January 
1990): 39-68; Mary Louise Roberts, Civilization Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 
1917-1927 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994): Tara Zahra, The Lost Children: 
Reconstructing Europe’s Families After World War II  (Cambridge, MA: The President and Fellows of 
Harvard College, 2011).   
17 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Population 
Ageing 1950-2050, Martinique,” accessed December 2, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050. 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Population 
Ageing 1950-2050, Guadeloupe,” accessed December 2, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050. 
18 Dagenais, “Women in Guadeloupe: the paradoxes of reality,” 97. 
 55 
 For metropolitan officials, high fertility rates and uncontrolled population growth 
were the social problems that had caused and would continue to contribute to Guadeloupe 
and Martinique’s economic underdevelopment, high unemployment, and widespread 
poverty.19  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the French government commissioned 
several investigations into how to solve overpopulation in the Antilles.  Report after 
report scrutinized Antillean family life, concluding that the rarity of nuclear families, 
consisting of a husband/father, wife/mother, and children living in one discrete 
household, was the main cause of overpopulation.  Population experts noted the “casual” 
nature of romantic unions and the “irresponsibility” of Antillean fathers who claimed 
they did not have the financial resources to marry; they argued that it was these moral 
shortcomings that had created a large number of illegitimate children in the islands.  One 
report claimed that sixty to eighty percent of all Antillean children were illegitimate and 
lived in households in which a woman was the sole caregiver and provider for multiple 
children fathered by different men.20  This kind of negative discourse asserted that family 
life in Guadeloupe and Martinique was not the same as in metropolitan France where the 
nuclear family was the accepted norm.   
 In the process of constructing Caribbean family life as distinct and inferior to that 
of metropolitan France, these reports created a definition of French citizenship that 
excluded Antilleans.  Following the Second World War, the government put in place a 
series of social welfare programs designed to give citizens equal access to healthcare, 
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housing, employment, and education.  One of the most popular of these social welfare 
programs was family allowances (allocations familiales), which gave families a fixed 
amount of money for each dependent child.  In theory, when Guadeloupe and Martinique 
became French departments, the family allowance program was supposed to be equally 
applied in the Antilles and metropolitan France.  In practice, welfare officials had a 
different standard of compensation for families in the Caribbean departments.  They cited 
the “dysfunctional” nature of Antillean families to justify smaller social subsidies for 
citizens of its overseas departments.  They argued that families in the form of a male-
headed nuclear household, such as those in metropolitan France, did not exist in the 
DOM.  Antillean “families” were more likely to be composed of a single mother and her 
numerous illegitimate children, each of whom had a different father.21 
 For these reasons, welfare officials claimed that the application of equal social 
benefits in the Antillean departments would do more harm than good.  It would 
encourage Antillean women to have more illegitimate children so that they could receive 
more financial support from the state.  The result would be even more overpopulation and 
an increase in matrifocal families.  According to welfare officials, children born into 
these kind of unstable families were more likely to be bound to a life of poverty and 
crime, which would only fuel the Antilles’ economic and social problems.  In justifying 
their unequal treatment of Antillean and metropolitan families, welfare officials made the 
nuclear family consisting of a breadwinner father, a mother, and their children a 
requirement for obtaining equal social subsidies.  Antilleans were legally French citizens, 
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but their different domestic arrangements excluded them from obtaining equal social 
rights and the full status of French citizenship that accompanied it.  This exclusion 
created a definition of French citizenship that only included those who adhered to the 
nuclear and patriarchal family model.  In doing so, French citizenship became associated 
with white middle-class ideals of domesticity, further excluding Antilleans from the 
nation.22   
 For metropolitan and DOM officials, the decision to provide Antilleans with 
smaller social subsidies did not mean that Antilleans were not full-fledged French 
citizens.  It simply meant that they would need to assimilate the domestic ideals of the 
French nation before they could enjoy equal social rights.23  This policy of assimilation in 
the Antilles was informed by nineteenth and early twentieth century French colonial 
policy, which stipulated that colonial subjects could become French citizens as long as 
they adopted the French language, culture, and customs.  DOM officials applied this link 
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between assimilation and French citizenship to the Antilles, arguing that Antilles would 
be granted the same rights and privileges as metropolitan citizens as soon as they adopted 
the nuclear family model.    
 One of the first ways the French government envisioned transforming Antillean 
families into French families was through the proper example of metropolitan life.  To 
accomplish this task, it sent civil servants and functionaries, along with their wives and 
children, to Guadeloupe and Martinique.  The government encouraged esteemed senior 
administrators with experience in the colonies as well as young officers (cadres) who had 
not received a post in the Hexagon to consider a career in the overseas departments.  
They and their families were to act as cultural models of French citizenship to which 
Antilleans could and should aspire.  Many of these metropolitan bureaucrats had attended 
the prestigious École Coloniale de la France d’Outre-Mer.  They were not only trained in 
administration, but also in classical French literature and culture.  Their broad education 
was designed to prepare them to be leaders of disparate peoples, as well as ambassadors 
of French culture overseas.  It was also assumed that these functionaries’ wives would set 
up proper, nuclear households, consisting of a mother, a father, and their children living 
under one roof.  Upon their husbands’ appointments, wives were given directives to set 
up well-maintained and clean homes furnished with all of the modern conveniences of a 
metropolitan household.24    
 However, these functionaries only succeeded in gaining Antilleans’ disdain.  
Metropolitans who accepted posts in the islands received various monetary bonuses 
(primes) and extended paid leaves that the government did not grant to Antillean-born 
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civil servants.  They were also awarded higher cost of living allowances so that they 
could import higher quality foods and goods from the Hexagon.  These various 
advantages were meant to compensate for the hardship of living and working in a tropical 
climate far from home.25  Metropolitan functionaries also argued that their wives needed 
this extra income to import the metropolitan goods required to set up the proper French 
households that were to function as models of French family life.  This unequal treatment 
of metropolitan and local civil servants confirmed for many Antilleans that racism and 
the colonial system still persisted in the new departments.  It caused an enormous amount 
of social tension, leading to significant strikes in both Guadeloupe and Martinique that 
often ended in violent clashes between the French police and Antillean workers.  For 
example, on February 14, 1952, during a labor strike at the Gardel sugar mill in the 
Guadeloupean town of Le Moule, the French military police opened fired on striking 
workers, resulting in four deaths and fourteen injuries.   
 By the early 1960s, it had become apparent that the presence of metropolitan 
bureaucrats had not produced the desired social and economic harmony in the Antilles.  
Instead, they had failed to serve as positive examples of French family life.  Jacques 
Brunel, one of Guadeloupe’s first Prefects, had a scandalous reputation.  It was rumored 
that Brunel had set up house with a woman who was not his wife and their four 
illegitimate children.26  With such poor models of domesticity, metropolitan officials 
were not surprised that the number of illegitimate births in Guadeloupe and Martinique 
continued to increase exponentially throughout the 1950s.  White metropolitan civil 
servants turned cultural emissaries had failed to transform Antillean family life into the 
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ideal of the proper French household consisting of a husband, a wife, and their children.27  
Female-headed households and absentee fathers continued to plague the Antillean 
departments, fuelling poverty and underdevelopment.  Departmentalization had 
legitimized the political union between France and the Antilles; yet in terms of 
Antilleans’ social and cultural assimilation, officials worried that thousands of kilometers 
of ocean still separated Antilleans and metropolitan citizens. 
 Back in Paris, the Ministry of the DOM decided that it needed to act quickly to 
avoid the potentially volatile situation being created by the high birth rate and unstable 
family life in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  It developed a new approach to assimilation 
that did not rely upon metropolitan civil servants to be models of French family life: 
emigration.  More specifically, the implementation of a government-funded program to 
organize Antillean migration to France was at the heart of this new strategy to assimilate 
Antilleans.  As early as 1958, the Central Commission of Economic Planning for the 
Overseas Departments recognized that migration was the necessary solution to 
Guadeloupe and Martinique’s economic problems of underdevelopment and a high rate 
of unemployment.  The large-scale departure of young Antilleans would lower the 
islands’ working population, alleviating unemployment and the widespread poverty that 
accompanied it.  Most importantly, supporters of migration argued that emigration would 
expose Antilleans to French culture, and encourage them to absorb the norms of French 
family life in the Hexagon.  Ideally, Antillean women would cease to have illegitimate 
children and Antillean men would begin to value hard work as a means through which to 
support their families.  This process of assimilation through migration would solve the 
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dysfunction of Antillean families, which for the Commission, was as integral part of the 
solution to the Antilles’ social and economic problems.28   
 The French state’s decision to organize migration from the Antilles to the 
Hexagon offers insight into the goals and practices of departmentalization, as well as how 
officials envisioned bringing Guadeloupe and Martinique into the French nation.  On 
April 6, 1960, the Secretary of State for the Overseas Departments (DOM) created a 
specific government body to oversee the settlement of Antillean families in France.  One 
year later, in 1961, the Minister of the DOM decided that “in the name of national 
solidarity”, the Ministry of the DOM was going to “facilitate the implantation in the 
Metropole of Antillean workers desiring to come and install themselves here.”29  
Although DOM officials insisted on the voluntary nature of these migrations, they 
actively promoted and encouraged migration as the means through which Antilleans 
could achieve economic success.  In official documents, administrators frequently 
affirmed that Antillean migration policy was to be understood within the framework of 
social advancement (promotion sociale).30  Antilleans who could not find work in the 
islands could come to France to receive job training and employment.  Organized 
migration was purportedly the solution to the disparity in social and economic 
opportunities between metropolitan France and the islands.  At the same time, the 
Ministry of the DOM hoped that the migration process would facilitate Antilleans’ 
adoption of French cultural norms, particularly the nuclear family structure.  In order to 
                                                
28 Bureau pour la développement des migrations intéressant les départements d’outre mer (BUMIDOM), 
“Projet de budget pour DOM pour 1968”, juillet 1967, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 
Fontainebleau, 940380, Art. 30. 
29 Yvon Gouguenheim, Directeur de la Recherche, “Etude-Intervention.  Pour une amelioration qualitative 
de la migration en provenance des Antilles”, octobre 1974-janvier 1975, Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 840442, Art. 3. 
30 Ibid. 
 62 
ensure that migration would ultimately lead to assimilation, DOM and metropolitan 
officials set out to organize and control the entire process.   
 From the outset, the Ministry of the DOM framed its involvement in Antillean 
migration as an economic and social obligation to help “our fellow citizens of the 
overseas departments” and “facilitate their adaptation [to France].”31   For DOM officials, 
“adaptation” or “integration” meant securing for Antillean migrants the basic necessities 
for success in metropolitan France, which included education, housing, and employment.  
Adaptation or integration was of the utmost importance because it provided the crucial 
foundation for cultural assimilation.  It was an integral part of the government’s 
assimilationist policy toward Antillean migrants.  Upon their arrival at the airport in 
Paris, an official welcoming committee greeted the young Antilleans.  The committee 
placed each migrant in either a vocational training program or a job, and helped him find 
adequate housing.  Over half of all migrants were placed in temporary government-
funded housing where they attended daily classes to learn to read and write French.  They 
were also introduced to the wonders of modern French life, such as refrigerators and 
washing machines.32 
 In April of 1963, the government decided to make this provisional migration 
program an official state organization.  The state funded the Office for Migration from 
the Overseas Departments or BUMIDOM from its social welfare budget.  This fiscal 
decision reflected the government’s perception of Antillean migration as a necessary 
social program for the social and economic advancement and most importantly, the 
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assimilation of Antilleans.  In a published report of the Bureau’s activities for 1966, Jean 
Emile Vie, the General Secretary of the DOM and the President of BUMIDOM, 
emphasized that Antillean migrants held the same rights as metropolitans, and like all 
French citizens, they could migrate freely; however their situation was unique in that they 
would have to face the exceptional difficulties in adapting to their new life in the France.  
“They leave their islands, their sun, their rhythm of work and their style of life to find 
themselves, without a transition period, in a very different environment…from the one in 
which they have lived.  The landscapes are no longer the same, the sky is no longer as 
luminous, the temperature is colder; efficiency and exactness have become the most 
important elements [of their lives].  They are shocked and have a very difficult adaptation 
[to metropolitan France].”33   
 From a political point of view, Vie recognized the equal rights of Antilleans as 
fellow citizens.  However, Vie’s physical description of the Antilles as a completely 
different environment from France reveals that from a cultural and racial standpoint, he 
was not quite sure if Antilleans were suited to life in metropolitan France.  His 
questioning of Antilleans’ ability to assimilate drew upon classic scientific theories of 
race that argued that cultural and physical variation was the result of differences in 
environments.34  Vie used the discourse of environment as a stand in for Antilleans’ 
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racial and cultural differences.  For Vie, it was these unnamed racial particularities that 
threatened Antilleans’ ability to assimilate and become culturally French.  For this 
reason, Vie argued that Antilleans required particular treatment.  A specific organization, 
like BUMIDOM, needed to step in and provide Antilleans with a unique form of social 
aid that would ensure assimilation by managing and controlling every step of the 
migration process.   
 In BUMIDOM’s founding statutes, Vie summarized the organization’s main 
objective as “assuring the settlement of Antillean workers and their families”.  Helping 
migrants settle in France was not as simple as securing employment and housing.  The 
Ministry of the DOM created BUMIDOM as a comprehensive administrative body that 
closely monitored migrants’ progress from the time they inquired about migration in the 
Antilles to one year after they settled in the Hexagon.  BUMIDOM’s social aid included 
“the realization of programs [in the Antilles] that help prepare future migrants with 
information about migration, the professional selection of candidates for migration, the 
organization of their travels and their welcome, and eventually, the creation of welcome 
centers and places of transition for migrants.”35  BUMIDOM envisioned these “places of 
transition” as temporary housing facilities where it could provide Antilleans with 
vocational training, as well as more general education about life in France.  In this sense, 
BUMIDOM was a part of the part paternalistic heritage of the colonial state, as well as 
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paternal nature of the welfare state that was expanding during this period.36  In much the 
same way that colonial and welfare officials perceived of themselves as the caretakers of 
those who could not provide for themselves, the Ministry of the DOM viewed 
BUMIDOM as benevolent organization that helped Antilleans, France’s less fortunate 
citizens.  For the Ministry of the DOM, BUMIDOM, like any other social welfare 
program, was essential for national stability and unity.  It ensured that Antillean migrants 
had the necessary economic resources so that they could successfully assimilate to 
France.     
 
Selecting and Training Proper French Citizens 
 Selection was the first step in this process of assimilation through migration.  
Shortly after its inception, BUMIDOM opened satellite offices in both Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  Administrators assigned to these overseas offices recruited, selected, and 
prepared the best candidates for migration.  Antilleans could legally migrate without 
going through the Bureau; however, the high cost airfare and the uncertainty of finding 
employment in France meant that most Antilleans needed the Bureau’s financial support.  
BUMIDOM required Antilleans to register their migration requests at the office in their 
island of residence.  This application consisted of the potential migrant’s level of 
education and training, employment history, and the type of profession that the migrant 
wished to seek in the Hexagon.  After filing the necessary paperwork, the potential 
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migrant underwent medical and professional aptitude evaluations.  The Ministry of the 
DOM financed metropolitan doctors to work with the Bureau’s Antilles-based offices, 
and perform these health assessments, which included general medical and dental exams, 
x-rays, and blood tests.37  BUMIDOM officials used these examinations to verify whether 
or not the candidate was in sufficient health to migrate and work in France.  The 
government wanted to avoid having to incur the medical and social welfare expenses of 
unhealthy migrants after they arrived in the Hexagon.   
 The Bureau used several different methods and government organizations to 
determine the professional aptitude of the potential migrant.  For the candidate who 
already possessed the specific qualifications needed for his intended profession in France, 
the selection process was straightforward.  The Bureau verified the candidate’s training 
with the Office of Employment Services, and then placed him in a job for which he had 
been trained.  A large number of Antilleans, particularly women, migrated with the hopes 
of obtaining employment as a paramedical professional; it was commonly assumed that 
the health sector provided long term career opportunities and therefore, upward social 
mobility.  The Bureau required Social Services to evaluate migrants who wished to be 
employed in the health services.  BUMIDOM placed migrants in this field only if they 
had the proper qualifications.38   
 Direct placement in skilled jobs, such as those in the healthcare field, was limited.  
The majority of migrants possessed limited education and did not have specific 
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professional skills.  Instead, they sought the Bureau’s help in financing their migration, as 
well as their training once they arrived in France.  The Bureau put this more common 
type of migrant through a vigorous selection process to ensure that it was choosing the 
right kind of individual with the physical and moral qualities to succeed in metropolitan 
France.  The staff of the Bureau’s overseas offices included several psycho-technicians 
(psychotechniciens) or a type of social worker who was purportedly trained in discerning 
a candidate’s character.  The psycho-technician’s evaluation provided the Bureau with 
information on the migrant’s aspirations, education level, and job skills so that it could 
direct him into the appropriate employment.  Most importantly, it assessed the migrant’s 
proclivity for full assimilation into metropolitan life.39  Those who expressed traits of 
assimilability were deemed more desirable migrants and were selected by BUMIDOM to 
receive full financial support in their journey across the Atlantic.    
 What were these character traits of assimilability? What did it mean to possess the 
ability to assimilate?   It is illustrative to compare a psycho-technical examination that 
recommended migration and one that strongly discouraged it.  In the spring of 1964, Miss 
T, a single thirty-eight-year-old woman from Martinique, filed an application, requesting 
the Bureau’s help in migrating to France.  The psycho-technician who reviewed Miss T’s 
case noted that she was a housekeeper and possessed adequate skills to continue this 
profession in the metropolitan France.  More importantly, Miss T had a favorable 
upbringing and current socio-economic situation.  She came from a modest, but intact 
and respectable family.  She currently lived in her employer’s home, which the psycho-
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technician described as a grand and beautiful house.  Unlike more humble homes in the 
Antilles, it contained modern furniture and conveniences. The psycho-technician praised 
Miss T’s impeccable maintenance of the home.  She received excellent recommendations 
from her employer who described her as hardworking and honest.  Miss T appeared to be 
in good physical condition and mental health.  She also spoke perfect French.  Lastly, the 
psycho-technician noted that Miss T was eager to work hard and adapt to a new life in 
France.  She was the perfect candidate for migration, and the Bureau should be able to 
help her.40   
 In contrast, Mr. P, a forty-one-year-old male from Guadeloupe, was not 
recommended for migration.  Unlike Miss T, Mr. P had a very unstable work and family 
life.  The psycho-technician noted that Mr. P did not live with his wife and six children.  
He occasionally worked in construction, but did not make enough money to support his 
family.  This meant that his wife was forced to leave the children at home alone while she 
took irregular work as an agricultural laborer.  Mr. P was not in good physical or mental 
health.  He did not know how to read or write, was an alcoholic, and had a congenital 
defect in one of his eyes.  The psycho-technician concluded that Mr. P’s lack of 
education, lazy character, and physical defects would make him a burden to French 
society.  Although Mr. P was legally a French citizen and could migrate freely to the 
Hexagon, he did not possess the social and cultural characteristics deemed necessary for 
life in metropolitan France.  Therefore, the psycho-technician recommended that he 
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should not be offered assistance from the Bureau.  In addition, he should be discouraged 
from migrating on his own.41 
 These contrasting recommendations reveal that BUMIDOM was looking for a 
particular kind of candidate.  In carefully choosing the Antilleans it would financially 
fund for migration, Bureau officials were determining the cultural characteristics of those 
who could be a part of the French nation.  In other words, BUMIDOM was defining what 
it meant to French.  Those, like Miss T, who had good hygiene, spoke French, valued 
hard work, and lived in a clean household with modern appliances such as a refrigerator 
and washing machine, were welcome in metropolitan France.  They belonged in the 
French nation.  Migrants, such as Mr. P, who were uneducated, could not hold a stable 
job, had failed to support their family, and were physically deformed, did not possess the 
proper character traits of an individual who had the potential to succeed in the Hexagon.  
They were excluded from the French nation.  BUMIDOM denied migrants like Mr. P 
their right as French citizens to migrate freely in France.  Without the Bureau’s economic 
and social aid, Mr. P would be forced to remain in the departments where he did not 
enjoy the same opportunities for economic advancement as his metropolitan counterparts.  
Through its vigorous selection process, the Bureau defined what it meant to be French 
against what it perceived to be the negative characteristics of Antillean culture and 
society.  In doing so, it created a definition of French citizenship that excluded Antilleans 
on the basis of their cultural differences.     
 At the same time, cases like that of Miss T proved to BUMIDOM that Antilleans, 
if placed in the right environment, could adopt the cultural traits deemed necessary for 
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migration to metropolitan France.  In order to prepare potential migrants for life and work 
in the Hexagon, the Bureau implemented technical education programs in Guadeloupe 
and Martinique.  Once selected, BUMIDOM required migrants to obtain professional 
training before they migrated to France.  In the early 1960s, most Antilleans had not 
completed primary school and therefore, did not have the minimum level of education to 
enter technical education programs in France.  The Bureau solved this problem by 
establishing pre-training programs (préformation professionnelle) in the islands.  These 
provided migrants with the basic skills they needed to successfully complete their 
professional education in metropolitan France.  Antilleans willingly participated in these 
programs, believing that such training would help them obtain the high-status positions 
and economic advancement unavailable to them in the overseas departments.  However, 
more often than not, the Bureau shuttled Antilleans into low-paying jobs in domestic 
services, sanitation, and the postal service.42  This type of employment rarely required the 
complex technical skills that were purportedly taught in the Bureau’s pre-training 
programs.  The reality was that BUMIDOM used pre-training to prepare Antilleans for 
specific types of low-status jobs that metropolitans did not want.   
 Pre-training also had a more important purpose: to teach migrants the cultural 
values and skills that the Bureau believed were essential for a successful life in 
metropolitan France.  BUMIDOM officials were particularly concerned about the 
instruction Antillean women received before crossing the Atlantic.  While there were a 
number of pre-training programs for men in both Guadeloupe and Martinique, the Bureau 
created more programs specifically for women.  Nearly a third of all of female Antillean 
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migrants received pre-training prior to their arrival in the Hexagon; in contrast, the 
Bureau only trained approximately six percent of all male migrants.43  BUMIDOM 
officials designated more resources to the education of Antillean women because they 
were simultaneously more vulnerable to vice in metropolitan France, as well as the 
upholders of morality.  The Bureau feared that untrained Antillean women would resort 
to prostitution to make a living, threatening the stability of the nuclear family, a cultural 
value, which for the Bureau, defined what it meant to French.  Conversely, properly 
educated Antillean women would act as a moralizing factor in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, instilling in Antillean men the value of hard work and providing for their 
families.44  As previously discussed, these were cultural characteristics BUMIDOM 
required of Antilleans for migration and thus, belonging in the French nation.   
 Recently, scholars have begun to give more attention to how notions of gender 
and race, such as those influencing the Bureau’s selection process, have shaped national 
identity.  Laura Briggs has argued that the United States government used “scientific 
findings” regarding Puerto Rican women’s perceived overt sexuality and high 
reproduction to establish Puerto Ricans’ racial difference.45  Lora Wildenthal has shown 
how German women living in the empire leveraged their sexual morality and role as 
mothers to distinguish themselves from the allegedly overly sexual and promiscuous 
indigenous women.46  In both cases, white female sexual morality became inextricably 
linked to national identity.  In mid-twentieth century France, the image of the moral and 
                                                
43 Bureau pour la développement des migrations intéressant les départements d’outre mer (BUMIDOM), 
Comité de Direction, “Rapport: exécution du budget 1966”, 9 décembre 1966, Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940380, Art. 30. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico  
(Berkeley:University of California Press, 2002). 
46 Lora Wildenthal, German Women for Empire, 1884-1945  (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). 
 72 
sexually pure mother was also on the minds of politicians and social reformers.  When 
the Bureau announced that it was going to be organizing Antilleans’ job placement in the 
metropole, it immediately began to receive a steady stream of requests from metropolitan 
families who were looking to hire Antillean women to work in their homes.  French 
families often preferred Antillean housekeepers and nannies to Southern European 
immigrants, who often demanded higher wages and did not speak French.47    
 BUMIDOM officials recognized that Antillean women could fill this specific 
niche in France’s developing service economy, and began to direct female migrants 
almost exclusively toward employment in domestic services.  The Bureau explicitly 
stated that the main goal of pre-training was to provide Antillean women with a “basic 
qualification for domestic work that will permit direct placements as household 
employees.”48  Ann Stoler, a historian of colonialism, has shown that definitions of 
“European” and the “other” were defined in the “intimate” spaces of the home where 
interactions between the colonizer and the colonized blurred racial boundaries and 
classifications.  Colonial rulers made it a priority to educate indigenous women in the 
European methods of childrearing and housekeeping.  This ensured that the children of 
European fathers and indigenous mothers were brought up in proper European homes and 
became recognizably “European”.49  The case of Antillean migration demonstrates that 
when the racial blurriness of the empire came to the metropole, former colonial officials 
who were now a part of the Ministry of the DOM, were no longer interested in defining 
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the boundaries between the former colonial subjects and French citizens.  After all, 
Antilleans—the formerly colonized—were now French citizens.  Rather, they were 
focused on bringing Antillean women into the nation by instructing them in metropolitan 
childcare and household tasks.  The Bureau used the “intimate” space of the French home 
not to distinguish Antillean women from French women, but to define what it meant to be 
a French woman in late twentieth-century France.  
 BUMIDOM officials were sensitive to the role Antillean women would play in 
uniting Guadeloupe, Martinique, and metropolitan France into one nation.  As potential 
nannies and housekeepers who would have intimate relationships with metropolitan 
families, it was essential that Antillean women possess the cultural values that the Bureau 
believed was befitting of a French citizen.50  As previously discussed, government-
commissioned studies on Antillean family life had defined what it meant to be French 
against what it perceived to be the social dysfunction of its overseas departments’ “loose 
familial organization”, high illegitimate birth rate, female-headed households, and 
absentee fathers.51  In order to ensure that Antillean migrants would not carry these social 
problems with them to the Hexagon, the Bureau set out to reeducate Antillean women.  
 In 1964, BUMIDOM’s leaders used a large portion of the Bureau’s government 
funding to build a training center specifically for women in both Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  Together, these two centers had the resources to train 157 Antillean women 
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each year for jobs in the domestic services.52  Correspondence between Max Moulins, the 
Secretary of State for the Overseas Departments, who was also the president of 
BUMIDOM, and the Prefects of Martinique and Guadeloupe reveals the sense of urgency 
concerning Antillean women’s education:  “It is a recognized fact that the pre-training of 
Antillean women (préformation féminine) in the overseas departments is indispensable; it 
constitutes the necessary support for female migration, which can only be contemplated 
for young girls who have already achieved some sort of qualification, even if it is 
minimal, but nonetheless sufficient to permit their placement in and assimilation to 
metropolitan life.”53  In a separate report on female migration, Bureau officials also 
argued that pre-training in the departments was essential for Antillean women’s 
successful assimilation: “All hopes for social advancement lie within pre-training.  
Consistent and well-adapted training courses will direct competent young [Antillean] 
women toward the metropole who are honestly informed about the difficulties they will 
encounter [in France] as well as the advantages that they can they can draw upon from 
their new way of living.”54 
 In order to prepare as many Antillean women as possible for their new lives in 
metropolitan France, the Bureau allocated a part of its government funding to finance 
private organizations dedicated to training Antillean women for employment in domestic 
services.  By December 1966, l’Entraide Féminine (Mutual Aid for Women) had trained 
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210 women in Guadeloupe, and the Centre d’Orientation et de Promotion Educative et 
Sociale (The Center of Guidance and Social and Educational Advancement or COPES), 
located in Fort-de-France, Martinique, had trained 500 young Antillean women.55  The 
Bureau’s correspondence with metropolitan officials and its reports on female migration 
made it clear that it was committed to providing “consistent and well-adapted” domestic 
training courses for Antillean women.  Yet, it did not have a clear vision of exactly what 
would be taught it these courses.  This became apparent in the Bureau’s examination into 
how private organizations in the Antilles were using its funds to educate and train 
Antillean women.   
 In a letter dated August 5, 1965, Moulins, BUMIDOM’s president, informed the 
Prefect of Martinique that private organizations were not sufficiently preparing Antillean 
women for their intended occupation as domestic workers in French homes.  According 
to the Secretary of Public Health’s evaluation of domestic training in Martinique, “too 
much time was spent on general education”, such as basic reading and math skills.56   The 
content of the training courses resembled “remedial classes”, and did not teach any 
pertinent domestic skills.  This placed additional financial strain on the Bureau, which 
was forced to finance additional training for Antillean women once they arrived in 
France.  Moulins informed Martinique’s Prefect that this was not acceptable; he must 
impose “strict control of female pre-training.”  He demanded that the Prefect give the 
leaders of l’Entraide Féminine and COPES specific directives “to define the conditions in 
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which domestic education must be conceived, achieved, and taught to young girls who 
plan to migrate, as well as for those who will remain in the Antilles, but can also benefit 
from domestic training.”57  
 Four months later, on December 1, 1965, Moulins sent another letter to the 
Prefect of Martinique.  This time, he gave a detailed description of the content that should 
be taught in BUMIDOM-financed education programs for Antillean women.  He notified 
the Prefect that he was to reshape female professional training and education according to 
this curriculum so that it focused exclusively on household and childrearing skills.  
Moulins argued that even if the migrants would not be working as a domestic or nanny, 
as women, they still needed to know how to run a household and care for children.  
Domestic training was indispensable for “gain[ing] a minimum understanding of the 
social and family order in France.”58  Moulins insisted that Antillean women needed to be 
familiar with French family life in order to properly run their future employers’, as well 
as their own metropolitan households.  But, what was the “correct” way to run a 
household and care for children in the Hexagon?  What were the cultural characteristics 
of a French family?  In 1960s France, what it meant to be French was in the process of 
being defined as Antilleans migrated to the metropole.  The Bureau’s domestic services 
curriculum for Antillean women was a part of this process, laying out the expectations for 
how women in the Hexagon were to care for their homes and families.   
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 Antillean women’s domestic training consisted of thirty hours of classes per 
week.  Twenty of these hours were dedicated to the following classes: family education 
and psychology, family health and cooking, sewing and darning, hygiene and infant care, 
general maintenance of the house, laundry, and ironing.  First, Antillean women learned 
household “safety, order, cleanliness, [and] economy.”59  These basic skills formed the 
foundation of domestic education, and were meant to promote an understanding of the 
daily life of families in France.  Second, Antillean women received instruction in the 
“modern conveniences” of a French home, which the Bureau found lacking in Antillean 
homes.  In its evaluations of candidates for migration, the Bureau noted that most 
Antillean women had no knowledge of how to use the essential household appliances 
present in modern French homes.60  Instructors demonstrated how to use and maintain a 
refrigerator, water-heater, vacuum, iron, and pressure-cooker.  Family nutrition was the 
third component of domestic training.  The migrants took classes on how to shop in 
French grocery stores and markets, the quantity and type of food that a French family 
consumed, as well as how to prepare French meals.61  Together, these classes “help[ed] 
trainees [Antillean women] understand the favorable conditions” for a metropolitan home 
and “made them cognizant of their responsibility in this [domestic] domain.”62   
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 The above analysis of preparatory courses for female migrants reveals what 
BUMIDOM believed to be the skills and personal characteristics required of Antillean 
women for assimilation: the capacity to run a household with modern appliances, a neat 
and clean physical appearance, and the ability to speak French.  In making this kind of 
education a prerequisite for migration and entry into metropolitan society, the Bureau 
constructed a particular ideal of what it meant to be a French citizen.  In postwar 
metropolitan France, women were encouraged to return to the home and have children in 
an effort to rebuild the nation following the devastating losses of the Second World War.  
During this period, modern households appliances, such as refrigerators and vacuums 
became readily available to middle-class families for the first time.  The poverty and 
underdevelopment of its new overseas departments contrasted sharply with the 
government’s vision for a prosperous and modern French nation.  The Bureau defined 
metropolitan families against its perception of Antillean woman as unclean, un-modern, 
and poor.  In doing so, it constructed a definition of Frenchness that was very much 
connected to the ideal of the middle-class nuclear household and the woman who used 
modern conveniences to run it.   
 
Crouy-sur-Ourq: The Domestic Education of Antillean Women in Metropolitan 
France and the Making of Female French Citizens 
 
 Antillean women’s preparation for metropolitan life did not end when they left 
Guadeloupe and Martinique.  Upon their arrival in France, the Bureau continued to 
monitor female migrants’ education, placing them in domestic training centers in various 
parts of the country.  In these centers, BUMIDOM continued to encourage and train 
female migrants to enter the “noble profession” of a domestic, which provided good 
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working conditions in a “family environment”.63  Bureau officials were concerned about 
the instability Antillean women experienced during the migration process.  They were 
particularly worried about the development of a disaffected and unassimilated Antillean 
population residing in France.  The Bureau’s “centers for adaptation to metropolitan life” 
solved this potential problem by providing migrants with a place to transition from their 
lives on a small island to their new surroundings in a large French city.64   
 Crouy-sur-Ourcq, located about a forty-five minute train ride from Paris, was one 
of the largest adaptation centers that received female migrants.  In March 1965, the 
Bureau opened Crouy’s doors to “young girls who have received training in overseas 
departments, but who [still] need[ed] an adaptation to metropolitan life.”65  When the 
Bureau began to receive complaints from French families who were dissatisfied with 
Antillean domestics who either performed unsatisfactorily or failed to come to their 
homes, it concluded that the departmental domestic training courses had failed to 
successfully teach Antillean women how to conduct themselves in metropolitan France.  
BUMIDOM officials reported that young Antillean women who had received domestic 
training in the Antilles still lacked the metropolitan values of “discipline”, “regular 
attendance”, and “maintaining a schedule”, all of which were necessary for obtaining 
employment.66  Employers “demand[ed] responsibility and a respect for timeliness”, 
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characteristics which the Bureau believed Antilleans did not possess because of the 
“nonchalance of the warm climate” in which they lived.67      
 Crouy was the Bureau’s answer to this particular problem of undisciplined 
migrants.  Instructors at Crouy encouraged Antillean women to adopt the practices of 
hard work, order, and timeliness.  These were behaviors that Antillean women needed to 
embrace in order to obtain a job, achieve social advancement, and assimilate into French 
society.  The Bureau saw no room in metropolitan France for what it perceived to be 
Antilleans’ lack of discipline and work ethic.  These characteristics were not native to 
metropolitan France; rather they were prevalent in warmer climates, such as those found 
in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  The Bureau linked Antillean women’s personal 
behaviors to tropical climates, something entirely outside the reality of metropolitan 
France.  In doing so, BUMIDOM officials placed Antillean women outside of the 
definition of who could be included in the French nation.  The Bureau’s designation of 
Antillean migrants’ actions as “un-French” conflated metropolitan practices with French 
culture, and categorized French nationals living in the overseas departments as second-
class citizens.  Although Antillean women were legally French citizens, they did not 
share the same behaviors as metropolitan French women and thus, did quite fit into 
French society.   
 A detailed examination of Crouy’s curriculum uncovers the Bureau’s main focus: 
teaching Antillean women to adopt what it perceived to be metropolitan practices.  This 
would ensure that metropolitan culture would continue to define what it meant to be 
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French.  The Bureau’s president, Max Moulins, created two types of adaptation programs 
at Crouy.  The curriculums for both programs were similar; the only major difference was 
the amount of time the young women lived at the center.  Migrants who had not 
participated in a domestic training program in the Antilles needed approximately six 
weeks to learn how to work and live in France.  Three weeks of “adaptation classes” was 
sufficient for those who had already received domestic training, but who, according to 
BUMIDOM, had failed to embrace metropolitan practices.68   
 The Bureau described Crouy as a “socioeducational” experience, “providing these 
young women with training and complete integration into the social life [of France].”69  
“Complete integration” began with the transformation of Antillean women’s outward 
appearances.  Moulins characterized hygienic practices in the Antilles as “incorrect”, 
implying that Antillean women were unclean and unkempt.  For this reason, he insisted 
that every Antillean woman receive instruction on how to wash their faces and style their 
hair, as well as how to eat and breathe properly.70  The Bureau went so far as to require 
migrants to use 250 francs of their 300 franc allowance to purchase quality French 
clothing from salespeople that the Bureau brought to Crouy.   
 While it is certainly true that a neat physical appearance was essential for 
obtaining employment, the Bureau’s focus on Antillean women’s personal hygiene and 
fashion suggests that what it meant to be French was closely linked to outward physical 
appearance.  French women were neatly groomed and fashionably dressed.  This 
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contrasted sharply with the Bureau’s description of Antillean women as dirty and 
unkempt.  Yet, the Bureau never mentioned the most obvious indicator of Antilleans’ 
difference: their black skin.  It refused to recognize how race contributed to the 
difficulties Antilleans faced in adapting to France.  In doing so, the Bureau made 
Antilleans’ racial difference invisible—at least on paper.  Recently, scholars of race in 
France have argued that despite the fact that race remains unnamed in public discourse, it 
still has been a significant factor in shaping and structuring French society.71  The Bureau 
used other unspoken indicators of race that did not match its perception of a French 
citizen, such Antillean women’s curly and coarse hair, to exclude Antilleans from the 
French nation.  Although the Bureau frequently emphasized Antilleans’ political status as 
French citizens, in terms of their behaviors and physical appearance, Antillean women 
were somehow not quite “French” enough.   
 The Bureau also used differences between Antillean and French households to 
define French citizenship so that it excluded Antillean migrants.  In the early 1960s, small 
household appliances, such as ovens, refrigerators, electric kettles, and vacuum cleaners 
were becoming common conveniences of everyday family life in metropolitan France.  
The production of consumer goods was not only a strategy of economic recovery 
following the Second World War; modern household appliances and the ability to 
purchase such goods were also becoming a part of middle-class metropolitan identity.72  
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In contrast, Antillean homes had no such technology; nor did the majority of Antilleans 
have the capacity to purchase these modern appliances.  Therefore, it was not surprising 
that Antillean women were completely unaware of how to use such machinery.   In 
classrooms lined with sewing machines and washing machines, Antillean women 
familiarized themselves with how to run a modern French household.73  For the Bureau, 
using a machine to wash and sew clothes was the modern way to run an efficient 
household.  Antillean women’s unfamiliarity with electric household appliances marked 
them as “un-modern” and “backwards”, and thus outside of the Bureau’s vision of France 
as a modern and technologically advanced nation.     
 
Simandres: The Training of Antillean Men for Second-Class Citizenship 
 The Bureau was also concerned with male migrants’ lack of experience with 
modern technology.  The Second World War had created demands for more advanced 
weaponry and aircraft, leading to the development of new production technologies 
dependent on the operation of heavy machinery.  In postwar France, these industrial 
advancements were the key to rapidly producing consumer goods to rebuild a prosperous 
and modern nation.  Across the Atlantic, Guadeloupe and Martinique’s economies were 
still very much connected to agricultural production and the extraction of raw materials 
for exportation.  Antillean men, therefore, were unfamiliar with large factory settings and 
did not possess the technical skills for jobs in which the Bureau hoped to place them 
when they arrived in France.  In 1968, the Bureau opened the Simandres Center and 
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Boardinghouse near Lyon specifically designed to educate young Antillean men about 
modern machinery and their new work environments.  One year later in March 1969, the 
Bureau obtained property near Marseille on which it built another training center for male 
migrants.  Both the Simandres and Marseille centers prepared young Antillean men for 
employment in the construction trades, metallurgy, or the machine industry.74     
 However, training for these kinds of professions did not offer Antillean men the 
social mobility promised by the BUMIDOM.  A examination of Simandre’s program 
reveals that the Bureau was preparing young Antillean men to be a particular type of 
French citizen: a second-class one who filled low-status jobs.  The construction industry 
used the Bureau as an intermediary to recruit lowest-level workers into jobs rejected by 
the native French population.  The majority of men who signed the Bureau’s contract for 
training in France at Simandres received five to six month training courses in 
construction trades.  Most other migrants received training for the most dangerous and 
lowest-paying positions in they metallurgy or machinery industries.  Although the Bureau 
claimed that its “adult vocational training courses offered workers the indisputable 
opportunity of social advancement”, employment records show that virtually all migrants 
received the lowest level of training and almost none were found to have specialized at a 
higher level.75  Simandres amounted to a means to produce an employable low-level 
workforce.   
 The Bureau envisioned postwar France as a technologically advanced society in 
which men possessed the technical skills required to create a modern and prosperous 
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nation.  Life in the Antilles did not match this perception of what it meant to be French.  
Following departmentalization, report after report linked the Antilles’ social and 
economic problems to Antillean men’s lack of discipline and efficiency.  The overseas 
departments’ high unemployment rate and large number of single-mothers and female-
headed households demonstrated Antillean men’s weak character traits.  Guadeloupe and 
Martinique’s economies were underdeveloped because Antillean men did not have the 
same strong work ethic that metropolitan men possessed.76  For the Bureau, these 
negative stereotypes of Antillean men justified their placement in low-level jobs.  Lack of 
behaviors that the Bureau believed were characteristic of metropolitan workers precluded 
them from full participation in the nation and greater economic opportunities. 
 At Simandres, social workers and instructors sought to modify Antillean men’s 
conduct.  They carried out a specific “adaptation” program that taught migrants the social 
behaviors the Bureau believed young Antillean men needed to possess in order to live 
and work in the Hexagon.  Training courses at Simandres lasted for six weeks.  During 
the first two weeks, instructors introduced or “initiated” migrants to everyday 
metropolitan life.  Initiation classes “alleviated the difficulties encountered by natives of 
the overseas departments in changing from an overseas work environment to a factory 
job in the metropole, while also bringing their attention to the professional knowledge 
that will enable them to be hired.”77  This “professional knowledge” consisted of the 
technical skills that Antillean men needed to become manual laborers in factories.  One 
of the most important initiation classes, known as “psycho-gestural training” (formation 
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psychogestuelle) taught Antillean men how to adjust and develop their body movements 
to perform machine work in factories.  They learned “refinement of touch”, “precision of 
gestures”, “steadiness of hands”, “rapidity of movements”, and “independent movement 
of each hand”.  The migrants spent four weeks of the six-week training program 
“practicing the correct gestures on the machines…while respecting the imposed rhythms 
and safety rules [of a factory]”.78  The Bureau literally impressed a certain notion of 
Frenchness on Antillean men’s bodies.   
 In addition to training Antillean men’s bodies, BUMIDOM also used Simandres 
to prepare migrants for their low-level jobs.  As occupants of the lowest positions in the 
factory hierarchy, Antillean men needed to be disciplined, as well as passive.  At 
Simandres, Antillean men learned the importance of  “accepting rules”, “respecting 
others”, “taking charge of one’s own actions”, “sound judgment”, and “cordial 
relationships with others.”79  Young Antillean men also received instruction in “diet”, 
“hygiene”, “personal upkeep”, “rules of social life”, and “discipline”.80  This type of 
instruction was similar to Crouy’s “personal comportment” course; it taught Antillean 
men how to change their outward appearance and grooming habits so that they were more 
physically agreeable and employable.  “Physical and bodily adaptation to work, to life, to 
the [French] mode of life, follows psychological adaptation, which is indispensable for 
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professional and personal advancement.”81  In other words, for the Bureau, personal 
hygiene was a requirement for access to employment and thus, social mobility.   In 
making the above behaviors and practices essential for obtaining the full rights of French 
citizenship, the Bureau created particular definition of French citizenship that privileged 
hard work, control of the body, discipline, and a clean physical appearance.   
 
Part II.  Acts of Citizenship: Antillean Migration and New Ways of Being French 
 While the first section of this chapter addressed how the Bureau used the process 
of Antillean migration to create a particular definition of French citizenship, the second 
part considers how Antilleans interacted with and challenged the Bureau’s construction 
of Frenchness to create their own meaning of what it meant to French.  For BUMIDOM 
officials, the goal of its domestic and technical education programs was to teach Antillean 
men and women about metropolitan life.  Yet, these purportedly metropolitan behaviors 
and practices were merely constructed ideals of what the Bureau thought it meant to be 
French.  Antillean migrants did not always conform to the Bureau’s expectations of how 
they should conduct themselves as French citizens.  They had their own vision for what it 
meant to be French: French citizenship afforded them the right to freely migrate, as well 
as equal access to high-status employment and social mobility.  It was not the process of 
assimilation that the Bureau had envisioned.  The case of Ms. Pierrette Nampri, a woman 
selected by the Bureau for migration, is particularly illustrative of these differing 
constructions of French citizenship.  Whereas the Bureau interpreted Nampri’s 
misconduct as a marker of her difference and thus grounds for her exclusion from 
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BUMIDOM’s social services, Nampri believed she was simply exercising her right as a 
French citizen to social and economic advancement.   
 On February 27, 1979, a representative of BUMIDOM, Albert Bros, sent a letter 
to the Secretary of State for the Overseas Departments concerning Nampri, an Antillean 
woman residing in Paris who had recently solicited the Bureau to finance her repatriation 
to Guadeloupe.  Nampri’s interaction with BUMDIOM began in 1965 when she applied 
for migration.  A psycho-technician reviewed Nampri’s application, and concluded that 
she had “sufficient professional qualifications”, a “healthy and well-maintained physical 
comportment”, and “stable family connections” in the Hexagon.82  These distinctions 
made Nampri an ideal candidate.  The Bureau decided to finance her migration based on 
its belief that such characteristics closely resembled that of metropolitan woman, making 
it easier for her to assimilate into French society.   
 Like most BUMIDOM-sponsored female migrants, Nampri signed a contract with 
the Bureau, agreeing to receive domestic training at Crouy-sur-Ourq before being placed 
in a French family’s home as a housekeeper.  However, the Bureau’s records show that 
“as soon as she arrived at Crouy, she refused the domestic job for which she had migrated 
and for which she had been contracted.”83  Instead, Nampri expressed to the Bureau her 
desire to work in a hospital as a nurse’s aid, a profession she felt provided her with more 
avenues for economic and social advancement.  Despite her objections, the Bureau 
insisted that Nampri’s level of education was not sufficient for this type of work, and sent 
her to work as a domestic in the home of a French family.  The Bureau required migrants 
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to sign employment contracts so that it could control migration and the kinds of 
individuals it welcomed to French metropolitan society.  In hand-selecting migrants, such 
as Nampri, who exhibited desirable qualities, the Bureau hoped to create a particular kind 
of French citizenry.  However, as BUMIDOM officials discovered, Antillean migrants 
did not always act according to their physical appearance and professional qualifications.   
 When Nampri arrived at her employer’s house, she protested her placement, and 
refused to work.  The dissatisfied employer sent Nampri back to Crouy, where the Bureau 
could deal with her stubborn behavior.  It decided to lodge her at the Rush 
boardinghouse, where Nampri continued to be uncooperative.  The Bureau reported that 
Rush’s director had to continuously reprimand Nampri for poor conduct.  At least three 
nights per week, Nampri did not return to the boardinghouse until the next morning.  She 
telephoned her friends at Crouy, encouraging them to abandon their domestic training in 
favor of coming to live with her at Rush.  The director was so fed up with Nampri that 
she decided to expel her.  For Nampri, migration was not about exhibiting the behavior 
that the Bureau expected of her.  She had her own ideas about what French citizenship 
afforded her, which did not include being controlled by social workers or being forced 
into low-status jobs.  Her signed contract with the Bureau was merely a free ticket to 
France where she could seek out higher-status and higher-paying work. 
 On March 19, 1965, only 17 days after arriving in Paris, the Bureau gave into 
Nampri’s demands and found her a job outside of a French household at Nigy 
Laboratories.  It also secured a place for her at Nigy’s employee boardinghouse.  Nampri 
was still not satisfied with the work at Nigy Laboratories, which largely consisted of 
janitorial services and did not provide a path to social advancement.  She refused this job 
 90 
as well, and within days, she was expelled from the Nigy boardinghouse.  After being 
discharged from two separate residences, Nampri informed the Bureau that she did not 
want to live in a group home; she preferred to live on her own.  The Bureau agreed to 
lend her 400 F for the security deposit for an apartment.  Shortly thereafter, Nampri 
found what she was looking for—employment in a Parisian hospital; but the head of staff 
terminated her contract when she failed to show up for work on three separate occasions 
without any prior notification.84   
 Ms. Nampri then solicited CASODOM—a social welfare organization for 
migrants from the overseas departments—for financial aid.  However, due to her record 
of misconduct with the Bureau, CASODOM refused to help her.  It cited Nampri’s 
defiance and her inability to maintain a job as justification for its decision to deny 
Nampri social aid.85  In this way, CASODOM made compliance with the Bureau’s 
expectations a requirement for social services.  Those, like Nampri, who failed to do so 
were precluded from receiving the social welfare benefits that were purportedly available 
to all French citizens.  This denial of social rights created a definition of French 
citizenship that only included those Antilleans who conformed to the Bureau’s 
expectations and accepted their directives.   
 Nampri did not accept this definition of French citizenship that excluded her from 
obtaining the social aid she felt was rightfully hers.  She continued to exercise her right as 
a French citizen to solicit the government for social services.  On November 1, 1966, a 
year and a half after migrating to Paris, she gave birth to a baby boy, who she placed in 
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the care of Aide à l’Enfance, a social welfare organization for children.  On February 11, 
1968, she again contacted the Bureau to ask for money to pay her rent.  At this time, the 
Bureau learned that she had given birth to a second child, who she had also placed in the 
care of Aide à l’Enfance.  Two years later in 1970, she contacted the Bureau yet again to 
help her find employment outside of Paris.  She assured BUMIDOM officials that she 
had reformed her behavior.  The Bureau directed her to its branch office in Rouen, which 
placed her in a job in Havre.86   
 Shortly thereafter, the Bureau received information that Nampri had returned to 
Guadeloupe on her own expenses; but, in 1973 she wrote the President of the Republic 
requesting financial help to return to Paris.  The President’s office forwarded her letter to 
the Bureau.  “I am asking for help, because I am not married.  I have three children.  
Jacques was born in Paris in 1966, Eddie in 1968, Cristelle in 1969. . . . I would like to 
know what I must do [to return to Paris]…if it is possible.”87  BUMDIOM officials 
refused to help Nampri re-migrate to Paris.  However, Nampri was a French citizen; she 
was free to move between France and Guadeloupe, and she would exercise this right.  
Like many Antilleans whom the Bureau had refused financial help, Nampri took matters 
into her own hands; she used her own resources to cross the Atlantic and establish herself 
in France.  In February 1979, Nampri contacted the Bureau one last time, seeking to be 
repatriated to Guadeloupe because she could not find adequate employment in France.  
The Bureau’s social workers counseled Nampri to present herself at the national 
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employment agency so that she could find a job in the Hexagon and support her 
children.88   
 The case of Nampri illustrates how Antillean migration shaped the meaning of 
French citizenship.  Nampri’s behavior embodied the cultural characteristics of Antillean 
society against which the Bureau constructed French citizenship in the late twentieth 
century.  She represented Antilleans’ purportedly underdeveloped notions of discipline 
and hard work.  For the Bureau, Nampri was also a classic expression of the “problem” of 
the Antillean family: promiscuous Antillean women who had multiple children out of 
wedlock with absentee fathers who could not support their families.  For these reasons, 
BUMIDOM social workers attempted to deny Nampri her status as a French citizen in 
refusing her social aid on several occasions.  Yet, Nampri asserted her French citizenship 
when she repeatedly insisted that the Bureau help her find desirable employment and 
social aid for her children.  Nampri managed to use the welfare system to attempt to 
achieve her goal of social mobility.  In doing so, Nampri insisted upon her place in 
metropolitan France and the nation.  She was French despite the fact that she did not act 
according to the Bureau’s perception of what it meant to be a French citizen.   
   
“Spontaneous” Migration & Antilleans’ Struggle for Inclusion 
 By the early 1970s, it was becoming apparent to the Bureau that it was not firmly 
in control of Antillean migration.  Cases like that of Nampri confirmed to BUMIDOM 
officials that it could not dictate Antilleans’ actions.  In 1965, the Bureau had 
characterized Nampri as the “ideal” candidate, but this quickly changed upon her arrival 
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in the Hexagon.  Antillean men and women had their own goals for migration that did not 
match the Bureau’s vision of Antilleans’ role in metropolitan society.  This compelled the 
Bureau to reconsider its organization of the migration process and its expectations for 
how Antilleans fit into the French nation. 
 Throughout the 1960s, when France was experiencing an economic boom, the 
Bureau encouraged Antillean migration to fill the high demand for unskilled and low-
level workers.  Beginning in the 1970s, France began to experience an economic 
recession, and employers no longer demanded Antillean labor.  In 1974, this shift in 
France’s economy was a big factor in the French government’s decision to put a ban on 
immigration.  Officials believed France had reached its “threshold of tolerance”; the 
government needed to focus on integrating immigrants already established in France 
before it could accommodate any more immigrants.89  This policy did not directly affect 
Antillean migrants because they were French citizens, and therefore could reside in the 
Hexagon if they wished.  Nonetheless, the government used the same reasoning to justify 
why it needed to reduce the number of Antillean migrations sponsored by BUMIDOM.  
The Bureau needed to spend its resources on integrating the Antilleans that were already 
established in metropolitan France before it could welcome more migrants.   
 Public officials did their best to discourage Antilleans from establishing 
themselves in France without the Bureau’s financial help.  On September 23, 1975, Mrs. 
Françoise Kancel Dampierre wrote a litter to the wife of President Valéry Giscard 
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d’Estaing pleading for financial help so that she could migrate to France.  “Please grant 
me what I ask of you, my children are hungry.  I prefer to go to Paris to work.  I would 
especially like to be employed at the University of Paris—in any type of job or at Air 
France….I can pay my own fare, but I would like for you to provide housing for the five 
children…”90  Mrs. Giscard d’Estaing’s personal secretary forwarded the letter to the 
Maurice Gérard, the Secretary of State for the DOM.  He responded to Kancel 
Dampierre, informing her that she needed to present her request to the local BUMIDOM 
office in Guadeloupe.  He then vigorously discouraged her from migrating to France 
without the Bureau’s support.  “I strongly counsel you not to leave your place of 
residence [Guadeloupe] without actually having obtained from BUMIDOM the necessary 
consent for your departure, as well as a guarantee of employment in the Metropole.  This 
warning is even more important because you must care for a large family and your 
departure is not urgent.”91   
 On February 7, 1979, another Gaudeloupean woman, Miss Marie Caby, pleaded 
for the government’s help:  “Mr. President, I’m asking you if you could help me pay for a 
one-way plane ticket [to Paris].  My parents can truly not help me, we are all poor….I 
know that you will not refuse me this little help.  Mr. President, Help me, Mr. President, 
to pay for this plane ticket, and I will always remember that you have helped me…”92  
Again, the government tried to dissuade young Antilleans from migrating.  The Secretary 
of State for the Home Office informed Caby that she needed to present her request to the 
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local BUMIDOM office in Guadeloupe.  This was the proper procedure, and her only 
option for help.  Without the Bureau’s help “the actual employment situation in the 
metropole is very difficult, I advise against installing yourself here [in France] without 
the certainty of employment.”93   
 The government’s responses to Mrs. Kancel Dampierre and Miss Caby indicate 
that officials were most concerned with ensuring that the Bureau remained in control of 
the migration process.  It sought to do so by describing migration without the Bureau’s 
help as a very arduous process.  In all likelihood, they would not be able to find 
employment or lodging.  The government recognized that Antilleans’ had the right to 
migrate to France without going through BUMIDOM; but it warned that migration 
facilitated by the Bureau was the only option that would lead to social advancement.  
Government-controlled migration ensured that all Antilleans would benefit from a period 
of adaptation and job training in the Bureau’s vocational centers.  Without this, 
government leaders feared that they would not be able to instruct Antilleans in 
metropolitan behaviors and practices, making them unemployable, without access to 
housing, and a burden on the nation’s social welfare system.   
 Despite the government’s efforts to dissuade Antilleans from migrating without 
the Bureau’s aid, Antillean migrants refused to allow the Bureau to dictate who could and 
could not migrate to France.  They were set on seeking out a life for themselves in the 
metropole regardless of what the Bureau said.  One of the greatest obstacles to migration 
was affordability of plane tickets.  During the 1960s, high airfares effectively limited the 
number of migrants who could afford to migrate to France on their own without the 
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Bureau’s financial help.  Dissatisfied with being at the Bureau’s mercy, Antilleans began 
to campaign for lower airfares.  They framed the debate in terms of their French 
citizenship, arguing that high prices limited their right as French citizens to freely travel 
between the Antilles and France.  Affordable airfare would enable Antilleans to migrate 
to the Hexagon, where they could enjoy equal access to education and employment.  
Migrants convinced Air France that if it lowered its prices, more and more Antilleans 
residing in both the Antilles and the Hexagon would take advantage of the cheaper fares, 
ultimately increasing Air France’s business.   
 Air France’s decision to implement a “tarif pour tous” or “airfare for all” program 
made the flights between overseas departments and France much more affordable.  This 
caused a substantial increase in the number of “spontaneous” migrations, which quickly 
began to surpass those facilitated by the Bureau.  “Spontaneous” migrants were 
individuals whom the Bureau had not sponsored; it was not responsible for providing 
them with job training or placement.  At the same time, the Bureau began to finance 
fewer and fewer migrations.  In the 1970s, France’s economy was also suffering from 
economic recession.  The Bureau did not have sufficient funds to finance Antilleans’ 
migration, and there was no longer a great demand for their labor.  Although economic 
recession had decreased the number of jobs available in France, there were still more 
employment opportunities in France than in the Antilles.  This disconnect between 
Antilleans’ increasing demand for migration, and the number of migrants that the Bureau 
could afford to sponsor transformed Antillean migration from a process controlled by the 
government to a more unstructured phenomenon dictated by Antilleans’ desires.  
Antilleans used the airfare debate to insert themselves into the nation as legitimate 
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consumers who contributed to France’s economy.  They skirted the Bureau’s attempts to 
control migration and claimed their right as French citizens to move freely between the 
Hexagon and the overseas departments.94  In doing so, they carved out a space for 
themselves in metropolitan France that was neither dictated nor controlled by the Bureau.   
 Once “spontaneous” migrants arrived in metropolitan France, they continued to 
invoke their citizenship to create opportunities for social and economic advancement.  
They were aware that the Bureau’s statutes stipulated that “spontaneous” migrants could 
not benefit from the Bureau’s financial and social aid.  In circumventing the Bureau’s 
selection process, “spontaneous” migrants had supposedly given up their right to 
government aid.  However, Antilleans refused to accept these limits that the Bureau 
placed on their access to training, employment, and social welfare.  In letters addressed to 
either the Bureau or other public officials, Antillean men and women used their political 
status as French nationals to demand the full benefits of citizenship enjoyed by their 
metropolitan counterparts.  For many Antillean migrants, this meant equal access to 
higher-status and higher-paying jobs.   
 On March 19, 1976, Miss Annie-Fleur Danican wrote to Olivier Stirn, the 
Secretary of State for the Overseas Departments, requesting the government’s help in 
finding a job.  “I am from Guadeloupe, [and] of French Nationality.  I have a child [and] 
not finding any work in my country, I went to France four months ago.  Since my arrival 
I have done nothing but look for a job and up until now I have had no results.  I live with 
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a cousin who does not have a job either.  Do you think that you could find me something 
and that you could come to my aid.”95   
 On March 10, 1974, Miss Clotilde Pétan also wrote a letter to Stirn, appealing for 
his help.  In the spring of 1974, Pétan, a migrant from Guadeloupe, was living at the 
Bureau’s adaptation center in Crouy.  The Bureau claimed that adaptation centers 
provided Antillean migrants with the necessary education and training so that they could 
achieve the same economic and social success enjoyed by metropolitan citizens.  
However, Miss Pétan described an entirely different reality to Mr. Stirn.  “Our lives are 
intolerable here.  The instructors are racist, but it appears that they are afraid of the 
Guadeloupeans and Martinicans because they answer back….We freely traveled 13, 000 
kilometers, we took on the risks, we are big enough to look after ourselves, we do not 
need bodyguards.  I only have one wish to leave Crouy and its wards.”96  Three days 
later, Pétan pleaded with Mr. Stirn, asking for the government’s help in rescuing her from 
the Bureau’s control.  “I am on the brink of a nervous depression.  I no longer understand.  
I no longer know what to do. . . . I am in a trap like all the other girls.  I’m fed up with 
Crouy and its horrors and its hypocritical instructors and directors.  Creoles have an 
insupportable life here. . . . I cannot live here.  I want to leave here…please come get me.  
If not, I will end up in a psychiatric hospital.”97  Like a lot of Antillean migrants, Pétan 
had embraced republican notions of equality, and expected to be treated as full-fledged 
French citizens in metropolitan France.  When Pétan realized that the Bureau was more 
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interested in controlling her actions than providing her with vocational training, she 
began to rethink the meaning of her French citizenship.  
 In their letters, both Danican and Pétan clearly stated their French nationality to 
demand their rights as French citizens.  For Danican, this meant equal access to 
employment, and for Pétan this meant freedom from the Bureau’s control.  By the 1970s, 
Antillean migrants were becoming disillusioned with the Bureau’s promises for a better 
life in France.  They began to perceive of the Bureau as a repressive organization that 
sought to control how and when they migrated to France, as well as their access to 
education and employment.  They questioned whether or not the Bureau really promoted 
Antilleans’ best interests.  Pétan informed Stirn that Antillean women’s “lives are 
intolerable” at the adaption center in Crouy because “the instructors are racist.”98  In a 
letter to a close girlfriend, Pétain complained that the center’s teachers and social workers 
treated Antilleans “worse than dogs”; they perceived of the migrants as “animals” who 
needed to be “rendered docile”.  She described “Crouy” as a kind of perpetual “prison” 
from which she could not escape.99  In using this kind of language, Pétan was invoking 
Antilleans migrants’ past as slaves, a period during which Antilleans’ black skin color 
stripped them of all rights and made them the property of French plantation owners.   
 For Pétan, it was Antilleans’ race that made them second-class citizens in the eyes 
of the Bureau.  Unlike white metropolitan white citizens, Antilleans were forced to 
endure vocational training at adaptation centers where they were watched over and 
controlled.  Pétan argued against this definition of French citizenship that excluded 
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Antillean migrants on the basis of their race.  She claimed that Antilleans’ skin color did 
not preclude them from being included in the nation as first-class French citizens.  Like 
all citizens, Antilleans possessed the right to migrate and reside in the metropole, and 
they exercised this right by freely “[taking] on the risk” of migration.  Therefore, like all 
French citizens, they should be free from the Bureau’s oppressive control.   
 In their letters, Danican and Pétan simultaneously claimed their equal rights as 
French citizens and affirmed their cultural differences, as well as their particular 
circumstances as migrants.  Danican referred to Guadeloupe as her “country”; Pétan 
identified the women at Crouy as “Guadeloupeans”, “Martinicians”, and “Creoles”.  In 
other words, they drew attention to their racial and cultural particularities as 
Guadeloupean and Creole women.  In doing so, Danican and Pétan created a definition of 
French citizenship that conflicted with the Bureau’s understanding of French citizenship.  
The Bureau perceived of itself as an upholder of France’s republican ideals.  This meant 
that it refused to acknowledge how Antilleans’ racial and cultural differences affected 
their experiences in the metropole.  Instead, BUMIDOM officials chose to interact with 
Antillean migrants as universal individuals, arguing that this abstraction of difference 
ensured equal treatment.  In choosing to highlight their French citizenship alongside their 
race and Creole identity, Danican and Pétan were creating a new type of French 
citizenship—one that encompassed universal rights, as well as cultural and racial 
difference.   
 
BUMIDOM’s False Promises 
 Antillean migrants’ ideas about migration contrasted sharply with the Bureau’s.  
BUMIDOM encouraged young Antillean men and women to migrate, promising that life 
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in metropolitan France offered economic and social advancement.  It reassured them that 
as French citizens, they would have equal access to education, training, and employment.  
However, Annie-Fleur Danican’s story illustrates that the Bureau’s promises of equal 
citizenship did not match the reality of the circumstances in which Antillean migrants 
found themselves.  In the spring of 1976, Albert Bros, the president of BUMIDOM, and 
Olivier Stirn, the Secretary for the DOM, exchanged several letters regarding Danican, an 
unemployed “spontaneous” migrant from Guadeloupe who needed help securing 
employment.100  Danican’s case exemplified the Bureau’s fears concerning spontaneous 
migration.  Bros informed Stirn that Danican “is a single mother who traveled alone [to 
France], leaving her child with her mother, who herself has 12 [children].”101   After 
arriving in France, Danican went to live with her cousin, who “has only one room in the 
18th district, and had to entrust her two children to Social Welfare because she is 
unemployed.”102  As more and more Antilleans migrated to France without the Bureau’s 
help, officials worried that an increasing population of unassimilated Antillean migrants, 
like Danican and her cousin, were becoming a burden on France’s social welfare system.   
 In order to solve this “problem” of spontaneous migration, Stirn requested that the 
Bureau help migrants like Danican.  “Although this situation has to do with a 
‘spontaneous’ migrant, I would greatly appreciate it if you would carry out a social 
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investigation on Miss Danican, and inform me of the possibilities for helping her…”103 
After some investigation, the Bureau confirmed that Annie-Fleur was “unknown” to the 
Bureau, and was indeed a “spontaneous” migrant, who three months ago, in December 
1975, had financed her own trans-Atlantic passage.104  Ms. Danican had supposedly 
forfeited her right to BUMIDOM social aid when she financed her own migration, but the 
Bureau informed Stirn that it would nonetheless help her.105  The Bureau recognized 
Antilleans’ right as French citizens to have access to employment and social welfare.  It 
hoped that this type of aid would promote assimilation, and prevent the development of a 
large disaffected Antillean population.   
 Yet, at the same time, the Bureau chose to offer Antillean migrants a particular 
kind of help that directed them toward low-status jobs rejected by other French citizens 
and immigrants.  According to Bros, the Bureau offered Danican what it described as an 
“excellent” job as a housekeeper, which provided her with room and board and a salary 
of 1000 F.106  The Bureau’s records indicate that officials placed the majority of Antillean 
women in the domestic services either within a French home or a hotel.107  In 1982, the 
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) reported that the majority 
of Antillean women residing in France still worked in the domestic services and had 
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experienced limited social mobility.108  Bureau officials pushed migrants toward these 
types of low-status jobs by threatening to withdraw their help if the migrant did not 
accept the position.  In a letter, the Secretary of State for the DOM sternly advised 
Danican that her acceptance of the job as a domestic at Villa Saint-Roman was the 
“condition under which the BUMIDOM can continue to help you, particularly with 
respect to bringing your child, who still lives in Guadeloupe, to the Metropole.”109  The 
Bureau used this type of conditional social aid to coerce Antilleans into accepting their 
place in French society as second-class citizens.  Antillean migrants were not under any 
obligation to the Bureau, but it used the promise of social aid to treat Antilleans as 
second-class citizens who needed to be controlled and guided toward what it perceived to 
be suitable professions for migrants.   
 However, Antillean migrants did not just passively accept the position of second-
class citizens that the Bureau had carved out for them.  Instead, they asserted their French 
citizenship to demand their right to social advancement, and created their own economic 
opportunities.  Some Antilleans claimed their equal status as French citizens by simply 
refusing to work at the low-level job the Bureau had placed them in.  Danican did exactly 
that.  When she refused to work as a domestic in a French family’s home, the Bureau 
found her two additional posts as a maid in the hotels “Avenir” and “Villa Saint-
Romain”.  Danican also declined these jobs, informing the Bureau that she preferred a 
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more respectable position as a nurse’s aide in a hospital.  She had no desire to work as a 
low-status housekeeper or hotel maid.110  
 Like Danican, most Antillean migrants’ expectations for life in metropolitan 
France did match the Bureau’s understanding of migration as a kind of economic solution 
to France’s need for unskilled and low-status workers.  Antilleans perceived of migration 
as an opportunity for socio-professional and personal advancement, which in their minds, 
had little to do with cleaning house, serving French families, and operating industrial 
machinery on factory lines.  Employment records show that migrants left domestic and 
factory work relatively quickly and tried to find employment in other jobs that were seen 
as less demeaning, often as nurses’ aides in hospitals or as low-level civil servants.111  
Public service employment held a great attraction for migrants.  It provided certain 
employment advantages, such as easier access to public housing and a clearly defined 
career path.  It was also reported that the public sector was especially welcoming to 
Antilleans.112   
 In order to revive France’s economy following the Second World War, the 
government nationalized several large industries, arguing that the state needed to be in 
control of sectors of the economy vital to the country’s recovery.  By early 1946, several 
major banks, the bulk of the insurance industry, the gas and electric networks, and the 
Paris public transportation system had been nationalized.  The result was an increasing 
need for workers in low-level employment in France’s new public service sector; but 
other migrants could not fill these positions because civil servant jobs were only available 
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to French citizens.  Antilleans’ status as French citizens enabled them to fill this unique 
hole in the labor force.   
 Antillean migrants’ desire to work as civil servants is particularly telling.  In 
demanding access to government jobs, Antilleans exercised their right as French 
nationals to have equal access to higher-status employment.  They used their French 
nationality, but also their particular identity as citizens from the overseas departments, to 
carve out their own economic niche in metropolitan society.  Antillean migrants also 
simultaneously used and worked around the Bureau to create a unique place for 
themselves in the Hexagon as both French citizens and Antilleans.  When Antilleans 
requested the Bureau’s help, they were exercising their right as French citizens to migrate 
and live in France where they would have equal access to social aid and employment.  
For many Antillean men and women, migration offered social advancement for 
themselves and their families.  Many migrants left their young children behind in the 
Antilles, hoping that they would be able to finance their children’s own migrations once 
they secured employment and housing.  When Antilleans realized that this task of family 
reunification was financially impossible to accomplish on their own, they sought the 
French government’s and the Bureau’s help.   
 In 1976, Sébastien Dulac wrote a letter to the President of France requesting 
financial assistance for family reunification.  “Soon it will be a year that I have been 
separated from my family because work is sparse in Guadeloupe, and the little work that 
there is, does not pay sufficiently, and it is too bad for fathers who have a family.  I tell 
you this because I have lived it myself.  Having decided to migrate to Amiens, I would 
now like to repatriate my family, but not having myself the ability to finance all of the 
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costs of their migrations, and not knowing at whose door to knock for help, I am asking 
you for help and the necessary information to make a financial request [for my 
family]…”113  In his request for financial assistance, Dulac sought to claim his right for 
him and his family to reside in the metropole, a privilege that he and his family 
purportedly possessed as a French citizens.   
 However, the reality was that the Bureau was only interested in helping those 
Antilleans who had proved that would be able to financially support themselves and their 
families once they arrived in metropolitan France.  For the Bureau, migration served 
mainly an economic function.  BUMIDOM officials hoped that Antillean migration 
would solve the unemployment problem in Guadeloupe and Martinique while 
simultaneously providing France with the low-level workers it needed to increase 
production and revive the economy.  Therefore, the Bureau took care not to support 
migrants who it felt would compromise these economic goals.  Its migration records 
show that it was wary of financing the migration of Antillean men who had taken no 
interest in finding employment and supporting their children, the majority of which they 
had allegedly fathered out of wedlock.   
 In the summer of 1976, the Bureau looked into Dulac’s case to determine if it 
would be able to finance his family’s migration.  “Mr. Sébastien Dulcac…is 55 years old, 
[and] has not worked since his arrival in the metropole….This migrant is the father of 10 
children, 6 of whom are still his responsibility…He does not have sufficient housing to 
accommodate his family because he lives at his daughter’s place…In these conditions, it 
appears to me that it would be desirable to defer this family reunification until Mr. Dulac 
                                                
113 Monsieur Sébastien Dulac à Monsieur le Président de la République, 6 juin 1976, Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940380, Art. 23. 
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has secured a permanent employment…”114  For the Bureau, Dulac was not an ideal 
candidate for social aid.  He was unemployed, did not have adequate housing, and had 
fathered too many children whom he could not adequately support.  Dulac and his 
children were undesirable migrants because they were potentially a financial burden on 
French society.   
 Antillean migrants, such as Dulac, were certainly aware of the Bureau’s 
requirements for financial support.  Nevertheless, they were not discouraged.  For 
Antilleans, social aid was not exclusively for those who had demonstrated their ability to 
secure employment and find adequate housing.  Rather, as French citizens, all Antilleans 
possessed the right to social aid regardless of their economic and social position.  In his 
letter to the President of France, Dulac strategically invoked his French citizenship to 
claim his right to social aid.  Dulac asserted his status as a French national when he 
described himself as a father who had sought out all opportunities available to him to 
support his family, including migration to France.   He linked himself even more closely 
to the French nation when he described his children’s future migrations as “repatriation”.  
After departmentalization the French government highlighted France and the Antilles’ 
long historical relationship, and encouraged Antilleans—who had recently acquired 
French citizenship—to regard the Hexagon as the “motherland”.  Officials hoped that this 
rhetoric of historical and cultural ties would help unite France and the Antilles into one 
French nation.   In referring to his family’s migration as “repatriation”, Dulcac was 
                                                
114 L’Administrateur-Délégué du BUMIDOM à Monsieur le Secrétaire d’Etat aux Départements et 
Territoires d’Outre-Mer, Secrétaire Général des DOM, Service des Affaires Administratives, Financières et 
Sociales, “R.F. souhaité par Mr. Sébastien Duclac”, 12 août 1976, Centre des Archives Contemporaines 
(CAC), Fontainebleau, 940380, Art. 23. 
 
 108 
invoking the French government’s rhetoric of national unity to construct himself and his 
family as French citizens who were returning to the “motherland”.   
 Antillean migrants, like Dulcac, learned how to leverage their citizenship and use 
it to their advantage to gain what they desired, whether it was migration, employment, or 
family reunification.  In the process, they challenged the Bureau and the French 
government to carve a space for Antilleans in metropolitan France that fulfilled their 
expectations for social mobility, not those of the Bureau.  In doing so, Antillean men and 
women inserted themselves into French society on their own terms, pushing against the 
Bureau’s established notions of who belonged in the nation and what it meant to be 
French. 
 
Conclusion 
 Antillean migration significantly affected the construction of French citizenship in 
the late twentieth-century.  When the government began to encourage Guadeloupeans and 
Martinicans to migrate to metropolitan France, it had to figure out how Antilleans would 
fit into its vision for a new modern and prosperous French nation following the Second 
World War and decolonization.  This proved to be difficult for the Bureau, as Antilleans 
purportedly possessed all of the behaviors and characteristics believed to be potentially 
detrimental to a rebuilding nation: namely, unemployment, high illegitimate birthrate, 
and low-education levels.  The Bureau set out to solve this “problem” by establishing 
vocational training centers to educate Antilleans about how they were to conduct 
themselves in the Hexagon.  In laying out the character traits and technical skills required 
for migration, BUMIDOM officials articulated who belonged in the nation; in other 
words, they defined what it meant to be French.    
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 The Bureau claimed that it treated Antilleans as equal French citizens, providing 
them with opportunities for social mobility.   However, Antilleans’ interactions with the 
Bureau revealed a different reality.  The Bureau used vocational education to train 
Antillean migrants for a particular kind of citizenship: one that was second-class in 
nature.  For the Bureau, Antillean migration served an economic function; it fulfilled 
France’s demand for low-level and unskilled workers.  In contrast, for Antillean men and 
women, migration was about exercising their right as French citizens to access the same 
economic opportunities as their metropolitan counterparts.  However, upon their arrival 
in metropolitan France, Antilleans learned that they did not have the same rights as 
metropolitans.   The Bureau compelled Antilleans to endure vocational training at 
adaptation centers where they were closely monitored and controlled, and forced into 
undesirable and low-status jobs.  This was not the promise of social mobility that their 
French citizenship purportedly afforded them.   
 The realities of migration compelled Antilleans to rethink their French 
citizenship.  They began to see their identities in light of their experiences as second-class 
citizens.  In enduring differential treatment at the hands of the Bureau, Antilleans were 
made aware of how their racial and cultural particularities had excluded them from the 
nation.  Yet, Antilleans insisted that these differences did not preclude them for obtaining 
the same rights and privileges enjoyed by metropolitan citizens.  In letters to the Bureau 
and other public officials, Antillean migrants demanded social aid for themselves and 
their families.  In doing so, they claimed their French citizenship and carved out a space 
for themselves and their difference in the French nation. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
The “right to difference”: the Forging of Antillean Ethnic Activism 
 and French Multicularism before Mitterrand 
 
Introduction 
 
  I’m in Bordeaux.  I’m expecting a baby in December.  My maternity leave 
  begins on the 24th of October.  When I migrated to France, I did not dare  
  to ask to be employed as a teacher’s assistant (I had worked as one the two 
  previous years in Guadeloupe), or look for another job; I told myself that  
  no one would hire me for only a month….I decided [to stay at home] to  
  raise our daughter for one year (a year during which we lived in a   
  dilapidated and unhealthy two-room apartment… On one winter’s night,  
  we were the victims of carbon monoxide poisoning), and I searched [for a  
  job]…. I contacted a social worker who promised me that she would find  
  “something” for me.  Time passed.  Nothing…In June, confident, I went to 
  this official organization, which boasts flyers with smiling hostesses,  
  ANPE.1  It told me: “It’s vacation, there is certainly temporary work,  
  come back in August.”  In the meantime, I wrote to different   
  administrations: SNCF2, PTT3, city hall; I looked around all month.  I  
  returned in August to ANPE.  On the first day, I filled out a   
  questionnaire…Result: I was told that there was no work…I was fed  
  up….The month of September was already here.  I bought all of the local  
  daily newspapers to inspect all of the classifieds…. I received a letter from 
  SNCF.  “Yes, they are recruiting office workers, but they do not want high 
  school graduates!”  I called them.  I told them that I did not care about my  
                                                
1 ANPE (Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi) was the National Employment Agency in France.  It was created 
in July 1967 to provide counseling and aid to those who are in search of a job or training, including 
Antillean migrants.  It served as a kind of intermediary, matching potential employees’ skills and work 
experience with employers’ requests for workers.  BUMIDOM worked with ANPE to help secure 
employment for Antillean migrants in metroplitan France.  In December 2008, ANPE merged with the 
Assédic (Association for Employment in Industry and Trade), an agency which collected and paid 
unemployment insurance benefits, to create a comprehensive employment agency called Pôle Emploi.   
2 The SNCF (Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français) or the National Corporation of French 
Railways, is France’s national state-owned railway company.  It was a large employer of Antilleans and 
even used BUMIDOM to recruit unskilled workers.   
3 The PTT (Postes, télégraphes, téléphones) was the French public administration of postal services and 
telecommunications.  Many Antilleans were employed as low-level administrators in the public sector, such 
as the Post Office.  French citizenship was a requirement for these types of public service jobs, which 
meant that other immigrants were not qualified.  Following the Second World War, as France’s economy 
became much more service-based, there was a demand for Antillean workers who could fill this particular 
niche requiring unskilled French nationals.   
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  high school diploma, I want to work…They told me that they were  
  “sorry”…These contradictions began to imprison me.  No work because I  
  have a high school diploma, because it is nothing, because it is too   
  much!…AMITAG.4  BUMIDOM.  The people who seem to believe that  
  you wish them ill will….I inquired about a job, without much hope, at a  
  four star hotel that just opened up not very far from our neighborhood:  
  Esso-Hotel.  A few days later, I received a job offer for a maid.5 
 
 In its December 1974 issue, Alizés, a popular Antillean magazine, published 
Arlette Mansor’s account of her struggle to find adequate housing and employment in 
metropolitan France after migrating from Guadeloupe in October of 1972.  Alizés was 
committed to informing Antilleans in Guadeloupe and Martinique about French politics 
and the experiences of Antillean migrants in the Hexagon.  The magazine also had a 
political motive in publishing migrants’ negative impressions regarding the harsh realities 
of migration: it wanted to politically mobilize Antilleans in both metropolitan France and 
the islands and unite them in a common struggle against BUMIDOM and its treatment of 
them as second-class citizens.  Mansor’s story, entitled “Journal of a Maid” was a part of 
Alizés’s recurring column, “Diary of an Antillean in Paris”, in which Antillean men and 
women reported on their lives in France.  Similar to Mansor’s account, these narratives 
were rarely positive, detailing the hardships Antilleans faced in securing employment and 
finding housing, as well as the discrimination they faced in their interactions with 
government organizations and their fellow French citizens.   
 Mansor’s story was just one of Alizés’s many accounts depicting BUMIDOM’s 
failure to find employment and comfortable housing for Antillean migrants.  On 
                                                
4 The AMITAG (L’Amicale des Travailleurs Antillais et Guyanais) or the Association of Antillean and 
Guyanese Workers was founded in 1960.  It received a substantial amount of financial support from 
BUMIDOM, who funded most of its projects.  The AMITAG established relationships with employers in 
both the public and private sector who subsequently hired many Antilleans.  It also organized cultural 
events for Antillean migrants, such as film showings, exhibits, dance and musical performances.   
5 Arlette Mansor, “Journal d’une femme de chambre,” Alizés, December 1974-February 1975, 11-12. 
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numerous occasions, Mansor sought the aid of BUMIDOM, and ANPE, the National 
Employment Agency that worked with the Bureau to place Antilleans in jobs.  However, 
despite her perseverance, her strong desire to work, and her qualifications and previous 
work experience, Mansor argued that the Bureau did little to help her.  She had migrated 
to France believing BUMIDOM’s promises to secure employment for her as a teacher’s 
aid.  Instead, she was informed that she did not have the right qualifications and skills.  
Mansor described her search for employment as a type of abandonment in which she was 
forced to fend for herself and take an undesirable and low-paying job as a hotel maid 
despite the fact that she was a high school graduate with several years experience as a 
teacher’s assistant.  Although Mansor never explicitly claimed that her inability to find a 
job was the result of discrimination, the inexhaustible excuses, such as being either 
overqualified or under-qualified, given to Mansor as to why she was unemployable, 
raised suspicions about the real reason why multiple employers refused to hire her.  
Mansor’s experience suggests that metropolitans were treating her as if she was a second-
class citizen.  This certainly did not match Mansor’s or other Antilleans’ hopes for 
migration.  The Bureau had promised Antilleans social mobility and equal treatment as 
French citizens; yet, upon their arrival in metropolitan France, Mansor and her fellow 
migrants faced an entirely different reality.   
 Alizés used stories like Mansor’s to foster among Antilleans a shared political and 
cultural identity based on their common experiences of discrimination at the hands of 
BUMIDOM in metropolitan France.  Alizés’s editors were a part of a larger group of 
leaders within the Antillean press who emerged in the early 1970s, hoping to challenge 
state agencies, like BUMIDOM, to officially recognize their cultural differences.  These 
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Antillean editors and activists claimed that Antilleans possessed a particular Creole 
identity, which was entirely separate from their political identity as French citizens.  Yet, 
they also insisted that Antilleans’ cultural particularities did not preclude them from 
being French citizens.  They argued that Antilleans were both Creole and French, and 
they struggled to be recognized as such by the French government.  This chapter argues 
that beginning in the early 1970s, Antillean activists used the popular press as forum to 
create a dual identity for Antilleans as both Creole and French.  In doing so, they were at 
the forefront of the movement for the “right to difference” in France.   
 Historians have tended to privilege other postcolonial immigrants’ role in debates 
about diversity in France.6  They have argued that it was the anti-racism movement, 
largely organized by the second generation of Algerian and West African immigrants, 
that opened up the possibility for the “right to difference” in France during the early 
1980s.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the French government actively encouraged 
immigration from its former colonies. These immigrants provided France with the labor it 
needed to rebuild the nation following the Second World War.  This abruptly changed in 
the 1970s when economic recession set in across Europe.  Employers ceased to recruit 
immigrant labor, but large numbers of immigrants continued to settle in France, resulting 
in a visible group of unemployed foreigners.  Moreover, as employment opportunities 
grew scarcer, French workers blamed immigrants for driving down wages and pushing 
them out of their jobs.  Official policy and public opinion concerning immigration 
                                                
6 See: Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark McKinney, eds., Post-colonial cultures in France  (New York: 
Routledge, 1997); Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, ‘Race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France  (New 
York: Routledge, 1995); Alain-Philippe Durand, Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in 
the Francophone World (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002); Carrie Tarr, Reframing Difference: Beur 
and Banlieue Filmmaking in France (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Sharif Gemie, 
French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010).   
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transformed from an economic necessity to an economic and social “problem” that 
needed to be solved.   
 Scholars have demonstrated how the category of “foreigner” became synonymous 
with the term “immigrant” in 1970s France.7  In public and official discourse, the word 
“immigrant” was indeterminately used to signify those of non-European descent or 
appearance regardless of their nationality.  In other words, questions of race and ethnicity 
within French society became conflated with the term “immigration”.  The “immigration 
problem” referred to distinct racial categories of peoples whose cultural differences posed 
a perceived threat to national unity and identity.  It was therefore primarily individuals of 
North African descent and blacks from West Africa and the Caribbean who were 
assumed to be the “immigrants”, although many of them were in fact French nationals.  
 More specifically, the “immigration problem” referred to the young second 
generation of immigrants who despite being born in France appeared to be unassimilated 
and on the margins of French society.  In 1974, the French government officially banned 
immigration, but it proved unsuccessful in preventing family reunifications.  This 
brought about a major change in France’s immigrant population.  Whereas young men 
had made up the majority of immigrants until the early 1970s, in the mid-1970s and 
1980s women and children began to dominate the immigrant population.  Before 
families settled in France, many immigrant workers had been housed in hostels and 
boardinghouses, which kept them apart from the majority of French nationals.  The 
                                                
7 See: Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern 
France  (London: Routledge, 1992), especially Chapter 3, entitled “The ‘problem’ of immigration”; Gérard 
Noiriel, Le creuset français: histoire de l’immigration XIXe-XXe siècles (Paris: Seuil, 1988); Patrick Weil, 
France et ses étrangers: l’aventure d’une politiuque de l’immigration 1938-1991 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 
1991); Patrick Weil, La république et sa diversité: Immigration, integration, discrimination (Paris: Seuil, 
2005); Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Citoyenneté, nationalié et immigration (Paris: Arcantère, 1987); Alec 
G. Hargreaves, Immigration, ‘Race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France  (New York: Routledge, 1995).   
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arrival of families meant immigrants were now a part of the mainstream housing market.  
At the same time, children of immigrants were enrolled in French schools.  As a result, 
immigrants became more visible on a daily basis in a growing number of neighborhoods.  
Their increased visibility was remarkable for one reason: in contrast to earlier 
generations, this new wave of immigrants was instantly recognizable because of their 
skin color.8  Officials feared that if France’s “immigration problem” was not solved, the 
nation would be torn apart by a similar form of social and economic unrest that had 
erupted in race riots in several cities across Britain.9    
 As the children of postwar immigrants reached adulthood in the 1970s and 1980s, 
they became increasingly resentful of their status as second-class citizens.  French 
citizenship purportedly granted them equality; yet, they faced widespread discrimination 
in housing and employment.  In 1972, the Front National (FN) emerged as a popular 
right-wing political party seeking to unify a variety of far-right parties against 
immigration.  The party’s platform blamed non-European immigrants for causing crime 
and unemployment, and revived the old Action française slogan “La France aux 
français” or “France for the French.”  In response, second- and third-generation 
immigrants, many of whom were French nationals, formed a left-wing anti-racism 
movement, which sought to unite all of France’s ethnic minority groups against the 
growing popularity of a racist politics in France.  Together, they mobilized support for 
                                                
8 Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, ‘Race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France  (New York: Routledge, 
1995); Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern 
France  (London: Routledge, 1992); See: Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark McKinney, eds., Post-colonial 
cultures in France  (New York: Routledge, 1997).  
9 In 1958, a series of racially motivated riots broke out in the Notting Hill neighborhood of London, 
England.  Racial tension between white working-class “Teddy Boys” and recent Caribbean migrants 
erupted in two weeks of violence.  These riots strained the already bad relationship between the London 
Metropolitan Police and the British Caribbean community, which claimed that the police had not taken 
their reports of racial attacks seriously and had failed to protect them.   
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the socialist presidential candidate, François Mitterrand, who just two months prior to 
his election to the presidency in May 1981, had proclaimed “le droit à la difference” or 
“the right to difference” in France during a speech in Lorient.  Mitterrand argued that it 
was time for the government to officially recognize France’s immigrant languages and 
cultures and guarantee them a place in French public life.    
 In the early 1980s, Mitterrand’s new team of socialist political leaders 
enthusiastically embraced the ideal of cultural difference.  They supported anti-racism 
organizations, such as SOS Racisme, which was formed in 1984 as direct response to the 
growing electoral appeal of the Front National.  SOS Racisme’s principal aims were to 
promote racial harmony and to protect ethnic minority groups against the spread of 
racism.  It prided itself on uniting youths of all different backgrounds in a struggle 
against a common enemy: racism.  Historically, the French Republic does not 
acknowledge the racial and cultural particularities of its citizens.  Instead, it chooses to 
interact with its citizens as universal individuals who have purportedly given up all 
group and particular affiliations in favor of French citizenship.  Opponents of 
multiculturalism, known as “the right to difference” in France, argued that claiming the 
right to cultural difference fundamentally violated what it meant to be French.10  Others 
believed that France needed to protect a national culture that immigrants should 
assimilate into.11   
                                                
10 For discussion of the Republican public sphere and the abstract citizen see: Dominique Schnapper, La 
communauté des citoyens: sur l'idée moderne de nation  (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); Jeremey Jennings, 
"Citizenship, Republicanism, and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France," British Journal of Political 
Science 30, no. 4 (October 2000): 575-597.   
11 For scholarship highlighting the relationship between assimilationism and republicanism see: Alain 
Finkielkraut, La défaite de la pensée (Paris: Gallimard, 1987); Christian Jelen, Les casseurs de la 
République (Paris: Plon, 1997), Christian Jelen, “La Régression Multiculturaliste,” Le débat  97 (1997); 
Christian Jelen and Ilios Yannakakis, La famille, secret de l'intégration: enquête sur la France immigrée 
(Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993).   
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 Following the Second World War, France, like other European nations, sought to 
distance itself from the Nazi-allied Vichy regime’s use of race as a biological category to 
deport and exterminate millions of French Jews.  This recent past, combined with the 
republican tradition of universalism, have made discussions of racial difference taboo 
and effectively excluded from public discourse in postwar France.12  In the early 1980s, 
the anti-racism movement brought discussions of race to the forefront, using concepts of 
difference and multiculturailism to challenge republican perceptions of Frenchness.  
Members of the anti-racism movement argued for the right to be both different and 
French.  Their struggle for the “right to difference” represented a shift away from 
assimilation toward the possibility of multiculturalism in France.   
 This narrative of French multiculturalism as a response to the increasing 
popularity of the Front National tends to oversimplify French anti-racism as a unified 
movement of racial “others” who experienced similar forms of exclusion and therefore, 
banned together to fight a singular form of discrimination.  When we consider the 
particular case of Antillean migrants, it becomes clear that this was not the case.  
Antilleans are French citizens; yet, because of their racial and cultural differences, they 
are often treated as and perceived to be immigrants.  Consequently, scholars have 
wrongly assumed that because Antilleans’ experiences in France were similar to those of 
postcolonial immigrants, they naturally aligned themselves with these cultural and 
                                                
12 For scholarship on the ways in which race has been excluded from public discussion in France, see: 
Herrick Chapman and Laura Levine Frader, eds., Race in France: interdisciplinary perspectives on the 
politics of difference (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004); Tyler Stovall and Sue Peabody, eds., The Color 
of Liberty: History of Race in France (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Rita C.K. Chin et al., 
After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2009).   
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political groups in France.13  This chapter calls into question this assumption.  It 
demonstrates that Antillean migrants’ interactions with and position in French society 
was very different from that of postcolonial immigrants.  It explores how Antilleans’ 
particular status as both French citizens and racial and cultural “others” shaped their role 
in bringing about the possibility of the “right to difference” in 1980s France.  In doing 
so, it illuminates how inclusion and exclusion worked in postwar France for particular 
migrant groups, such as Antilleans.   
 There is a tendency for scholars of the French anti-racism movement to 
characterize the introduction of President François Mitterrand’s policy of the “right to 
difference” in the 1980s as a complete break in France’s immigration policy from 
assimilation to multiculturalism.14  In other words, inclusion and exclusion in postwar 
France worked as a uniform set of official policies.  However, an examination of 
Antilleans’ particular case reveals that Antillean migrants were neither systematically 
included as French citizens, nor were they entirely excluded as racial and cultural others.  
Rather, inclusion and exclusion worked as a set of negotiations among Antilleans, 
government officials, and social aid organizations.  These interactions concerning 
Antilleans’ status and role in French society shaped discussions of the “right to 
difference” in France.  This chapter argues that the “right to difference” was not a 
uniform policy brought on by a homogenous anti-racism movement; rather, Mitterrand’s 
                                                
13 See: Alain Anselin, L’émigration antillaise en France: la troisième île, (Paris: Karthala, 2000). Alec G. 
Hargreaves and Mark McKinney, eds., Post-colonial Cultures in France  (London: Routledge, 1997). 
14 See: Sarah Waters, Social Movements in France: Towards a New Citizenship (Houndmills, England: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Catherine Lloyd, Discourses of Antiracism in France (Aldershot, England, 
Ashgate, 1998); Catherine Lloyd, “Anti-racism, racism and asylum-seekers in France,” Patterns of 
Prejudice 37, no.3 (2003): 323-340.   
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articulation of the “right to difference” was the culmination of a gradual move toward a 
tentative cultural plurality in which Antilleans played a formative role.    
 Since 1989, discussions of diversity in France have largely focused on the 
particular status of Islam.15  Debates about the place of multiculturalism in France 
shifted from “the right to difference” to religion, particularly individuals’ outward 
expressions of cultural difference in the form of religious symbols.  This change in the 
terms of the debate is largely due to the recent headscarf affair.  In the fall of 1989, three 
Muslim girls were suspended from school when they refused to remove their veils in 
class.  The Conseil d’État ruled that that the veil’s religious expression was compatible 
with laïcité (secularism) of public schools.  It recognized students’ legal rights to wear 
the veil, but nonetheless allowed school officials to forbid them if they were worn to 
proselytize, disrupt order, or interfered with the school’s mission of sexual equality.   
 In 2004, President Jacques Chirac signed a law definitively banning the display of 
“ostentatious religious symbols” in public schools.  The law purportedly applied to all 
students, but in reality, it was specifically meant to prohibit female French Muslim 
students from wearing headscarves in school.  Supporters of the headscarf ban argued 
that in publicly donning religious and cultural symbols, French Muslim students were 
violating what it meant to be French.  They claimed that the headscarf threatened 
republican notions of a French citizen as an abstract individual divested of all 
differentiation and particular affiliations.16   
                                                
15 Jocelyne Cesari, Musulmans et républicains: les jeunes, l’islam et la France (Bruxelles: Editions 
Complexe, 1998); Alain Gresh, L’islam, la République et le monde (Paris: Fayard, 2004); Cédric Vincent, 
Bleu blanc beur (Nice: France Europe éditions livres, 2006); Jonathan Laurence, Integrating Islam: 
political and religious challenges in contemporary France (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2006); Dounia and Lylia Bouzar, La République ou la burqa: les services publics face à l’islam manipulé 
(Paris: Albin Michel, 2010).   
16 For scholarship on the headscarf affair in France see: Saïd Bouamama, L'affaire Du Foulard 
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 Because media coverage of the headscarf affair has made questions of religion, 
particularly Islam, the central issue in discussions about difference, scholars have 
overlooked Antilleans’ important contributions to the debates about diversity in France.  
This chapter argues that Antilleans are in fact central to these discussions concerning the 
politics of multiculturalism.  The first part of this chapter examines Antillean migrants’ 
public interactions with BUMIDOM (the Bureau), the state agency that organized 
Antillean migration.  It argues that these public interactions were at the forefront of the 
emergence of a limited form of multiculturalism that began in the1970s and culminated 
with Mitterrand’s election in 1981 and the subsequent implementation of “right to 
difference” in France.  The first chapter of this dissertation demonstrated how Antilleans 
leveraged their citizenship in private letters to BUMIDOM officials to obtain equal 
access to employment and housing, and reshape the meaning of French citizenship.  This 
second chapter continues this narrative, exploring how Antilleans’ private claims 
became public criticisms of BUMIDOM and the beginning of a political movement to 
gain official recognition of their Creole culture.  It contends that ultimately, it was the 
Antillean community who influenced public opinion and placed pressure on the Bureau 
to reexamine its migration policy so that it took into consideration Antillean migrants’ 
cultural specificities.   
 Antilleans argued for a particular kind of multicultural citizenship, namely one 
that enabled them to express their cultural difference in the forum of cultural 
                                                
Islamique: La Production D'un Racisme Respectable  (Roubaix: Geai Bleu, 2004), John Richard Bowen, 
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associations.  These kinds of claims for the “right to difference” were compatible with 
republican notions of cultural difference as an exclusively private matter.  This made it 
easier for the government to consider Antilleans’ new way of being French.  In 1975, the 
Bureau officially changed its organization’s mission, and began to financially support 
Antillean cultural associations.  This decision was a break from the government’s 
historical understanding of the place of difference in France.  Not only did the Bureau 
officially recognize Antilleans as cultural distinct citizens, but it also used public funds 
to support Antilleans’ expressions of difference.  Cultural difference was slowly 
becoming a public matter.   
 The second part of this chapter explores how Antillean migrants used the 
Bureau’s public support of its cultural associations to forge a unique ethnic activism 
movement in France.  Throughout the 1970s, Antillean migrants founded hundreds of 
cultural organizations that celebrated their Creole culture.  Together, these organizations 
formed a France-based Creole movement that challenged the government to change its 
policy of assimilation and recognize Antilleans’ particular Creole identity.  They 
constituted a unique form of Antillean ethnic activism that was separate from the anti-
racism movement, but nonetheless shaped discussions about the “right to difference” in 
postwar France.   
 Antilleans carved out a space for their difference in the nation by using an 
established institution around which particular groups in France could legally forge a 
group identity: cultural associations.  In doing so, Antillean migrants established 
themselves in the nation as the “right” kind of culturally distinct French citizens who 
may have pushed the boundaries of the Republic to include their difference, but did so in 
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a way that was acceptable to the French government.  This is why the government was 
so threatened by female French Muslim students’ decision to express their cultural 
difference in donning the headscarf.  Their struggle for the right to wear the headscarf in 
public schools was different from how other groups had argued for the right to 
difference in France.  Whereas Antilleans argued for their particular group identity 
within the cofines of republican insitutions, namely cultural associations, French 
Muslims sought new ways to be different and French that did not fit within the 
Republic’s established framework for expressing group identities within the nation.   
 This chapter contends that claims for difference and group identity first developed 
within Antillean cultural associations; these claims have slowly developed into the 
contemporary expressions of difference that are now embodied in the Muslim headscarf.  
The history of Antilleans’ struggle to be recognized as both Creole and French reveals 
that the debates about the “right to difference” in France did not simply emerge as the 
Socialist government’s response to the far-right’s racist campaign against Algerian 
immigrants.  Antilleans’ demands during the late 1960s and 1970s regarding their status 
and role in French society laid the foundation for discussions about difference in the 
early 1980s.   
 
Part I.  Public Criticism of BUMIDOM and the Creation of an Antillean Creole 
Identity  
 
 Antilleans employed three strategies, which together, put pressure on the 
government to reexamine the meaning of French citizenship.  First, the previous chapter 
of this dissertation explored Antillean migrants’ personal letters to various public 
officials, in which they openly stated both their French citizenship and Creole identity.  
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In these letters, Antilleans not only claimed their rights as citizens of France, but also 
pushed the boundaries of French citizenship to include their cultural and racial 
differences.  Simultaneously, Antillean activists began to publish articles in newspapers 
and pamphlets, publicly criticizing the Bureau’s treatment of Antilleans as second-class 
citizens.  These types of publications circulated among Antilleans in both the Caribbean 
and France and made them aware of the harsh realities they faced in France as migrants.  
Activists used their political writings to transform Antilleans’ struggle to be recognized 
as first-class citizens from private complaints in the form of letters to the beginnings of a 
more public political and social movement.  An even more public debate emerged in the 
early 1970s when the mainstream Antillean press also began to expose the 
discrimination Antilleans faced in France at the hands of other French citizens and the 
Bureau.  Antilleans successfully used the press, which reached both Antilleans and 
metropolitans, as their third strategy to build a political movement that challenged state 
agencies, like BUMIDOM, to officially recognize their cultural differences.  This 
marked the beginning of Antillean ethnic activism in France.  Instead of making singular 
claims in private letters to government officials, Antilleans began to claim their rights as 
a collective political group.   
 
Political Pamphlets and Newspapers 
 
 In the 1970s, leaders within the Antillean community began to publically vocalize 
BUMIDOM’s poor treatment of migrants and its failure to provide adequate social and 
economic support.  They sought to make Antilleans’ struggles in France a part of the 
public discourse.  Outspoken activists published and circulated their criticisms of the 
Bureau and the migration process in pamphlets and in the mainstream press.  One such 
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political pamphlet, entitled “Nous Créoles” was a forum in which migrants expressed 
and made public their grievances.  In particular, it published editorials from Antillean 
migrants that offered scathing critiques of the Bureau.  One migrant wrote, “I am in 
complete despair.  Three months ago I lost my wife and I wrote to BUMIDOM, asking 
for help to repatriate my three children.”  When the Bureau responded that it could not 
help with such matters, the migrant described how he fell deeper and deeper into 
depression, and warned his “dear compatriots” about the harsh reality of migration.  
“That’s what the French government is…do not let yourselves be trapped by 
BUMIDOM…remorse…will weigh you down later.  Why did the Bureau make these 
beautiful promises?”17   
 In a different proclamation published by “Nous Créoles”, Marcel Gargar, a 
member of the Communist Party and Senator of Guadeloupe’s representative assembly, 
expressed his party’s support for the current movement in another overseas department, 
Réunion, to suspend the Bureau’s activities and recruitment of migrants.  Gargar 
encouraged Antilleans to also fight the Bureau and claim their right as French citizens to 
freely migrate to the Hexagon without having to pass through a government 
organization.  “We, natives of the overseas departments, we want to draw the public 
opinion’s attention to our particular form of repression that is emigration.”18 Gargar 
criticized the Bureau as an oppressive organization that used its jurisdiction over 
migration to control Antilleans’ movements in metropolitan France and keep them in a 
subordinate position as second-class citizens.    
                                                
17 “Nous Créoles”, No. 2, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 840442, Art. 7. 
18 Ibid. 
 125 
 In the spring of 1971, a separate Antillean publication, La voix de l’émigration or 
“The voice of emigration” circulated yet another condemnation of the Bureau and its 
female adaptation program at the Crouy vocational education center and boardinghouse.  
In an article entitled “BUMIDOM’s welcome: Crouy-sur-Ourcq”, a group of Antillean 
reporters related the experiences of sixty-six young female migrants who had just arrived 
in France, and were now living at Crouy.  The purpose of public criticisms, such as those 
in “Nous Créoles” and these interviews, was to make Antilleans more aware of the 
injustices they faced as second-class citizens in the Hexagon.  “This world [of 
metropolitan France] does not reflect the promises that the Bureau has made…Shorthand 
typists, secretaries, nurse’s aids, hospital workers, household domestics, this is the range 
of professions from which Antillean women can choose.  However, at CROUY, they 
[young Antillean women] are all pushed toward household work: mop the floor, peel the 
vegetables, cook and clean the rooms.”19  The reporters argued that BUMIDOM’s false 
promises of vocational training for high-status jobs compelled Antillean women to 
migrate to metropolitan France in search of social mobility.  However, upon their arrival, 
Antillean women learned the reality: the Bureau was preparing them to fill undesirable 
and low-status jobs refused by metropolitan citizens.     
 Around the same time, in March 1971, the Antillean activist group Groupe 
d’Action de la Communauté Antillo-Guyanaise also published a critical report on the 
Bureau’s training centers entitled “Investigation of an organization beyond reproach”.   
The Communauté Antillo-Guyanaise (CAG) described migration as a process of deceit.  
                                                
19 "L’accueil du BUMIDOM: Crouy S/Ourcq,” La voix de l'émigration 2  (Mars/Avril 1971).  This article 
was attached to the following letter: Bernard Reine au Bureau pour la développement des migrations 
intéressant les départements d’outre mer (BUMIDOM), Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 
Fontainebleau, 840442, Art. 7. 
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Bureau officials enthusiastically handed out brochures to young, unemployed Antilleans 
glamorizing the opportunities for social advancement in France.  It “gave [young 
migrants] a free plane ticket for the “motherland”, promising “well-being, stability, 
abundance, [and] security.  When one has nothing to eat, a free plane ticket is very 
enticing. Even more so, when you are promised the most lucrative job [and] the best job 
training.”20  CAG claimed that the Bureau sought to maintain strict control over 
Antillean migration so that it benefitted France, not Antilleans themselves.  First, the 
Bureau pushed migrants toward low-status and undesirable jobs.  CAG reported that 
according to a psychologist who worked for the Bureau at its Fort-de-France office in 
Martinique, the medical and career tests he performed to determine candidates’ 
professional skills and potential areas of employment did not have any value.  
“Conceived in France, for the French, they have no worth in the Antilles.”21  Regardless 
of candidates’ level of education, job skills, or career aspirations, these tests consistently 
concluded that Antilleans were best suited to fulfill France’s need for unskilled labor.  
After being selected for low-status jobs, “the (im)migrants are deported to [training] 
centers”, where they endured oppressive discipline.  For CAG, these training centers 
were the second form of oppression endured by Antillean migrants at the hands of the 
Bureau. Once the young women arrived at Crouy, they were “at the mercy of the 
center’s Director, who…immediately sets out to control them.”22  Residents could only 
leave the center to visit their families if Crouy’s director had pre-authorized their 
absence.  The Bureau allowed migrants’ families to come to Crouy to visit the young 
                                                
20 Le Groupe d’Action de la Coummunauté Antillo-Guyanais, “Enquête sur un organisme au-dessus de tout 
soupcon”, Edition Norman-Bethune, Mars 1971, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 
Fontainebleau, 840442, Art. 7. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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women on either Saturday evenings or Sunday afternoons.  During these visits, the 
young women and their families had to remain in the center’s common areas.  CAG 
claimed that the Bureau imposed these regulations because it felt they were “simply 
necessary for the legal security and future of the young women.”23      
 La Communauté Antillo-Guyanaise viewed the Bureau’s adaptation centers and 
training programs as tools of assimilation that “strongly resemble[d] the beginnings of 
brainwashing.”24  It contended that at Crouy, the young Antillean women learned to 
devalue their Antillean culture in favor of French culture.  “Integration into white society 
began with the denigration of Antilleans’ race: the use of an iron to straighten hair, [and] 
authorization to wear rollers at ungodly hours.  This was a part of the program of 
alienation, of depersonalization, of transformation to which our sisters of Crouy were 
forced to submit.”25  In addition, CAG claimed that the Bureau deliberately designed the 
length of Crouy’s vocational training programs to ensure that Antillean migrants would 
not only occupy low-states positions in French society, but also passively accept this 
second-class status as their fate.  In CAG’s opinion, three weeks was not long enough to 
teach young women any useful job skills other than those of a housekeeper; yet it was 
“still a period of time sufficiently long enough to accustom the girls to censorship (the 
policing of mail), to harassing, and to impregnate them with the most degrading values 
of a dying bourgeoisie.”26   
                                                
23 Le Groupe d’Action de la Coummunauté Antillo-Guyanais, “Enquête sur un organisme au-dessus de tout 
soupcon”, Edition Norman-Bethune, Mars 1971, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 
Fontainebleau, 840442, Art. 7. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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 CAG argued that the short time period also prevented Antillean women from 
banning together and collectively developing “vague impulses of resistance”.  As proof 
of the Bureau’s controlling nature, it offered one young resident’s impression of Crouy 
based on her personal experiences at the center.  According to her, the Bureau designed 
the center’s rules to keep them from forming personal relationships.  “We are not 
allowed to dance together [and] do not have the right to visit a friend’s room.”  CAG 
insisted that these type of strict regulations “prevented all lasting political work, all 
militancy” from developing in the center.  “Division guarantees docility.  Crouy’s 
oppressors know this well.”27  CAG used this harsh language in its report on the Bureau 
to convince its Antillean readers that through control and oppression, Crouy instructors 
were attempting to keep Antillean women in their inferior positions as second-class 
citizens.  For CAG, the testimonies of the women it interviewed at Crouy embodied the 
Bureau’s real and malicious intentions: to create a population of adapted migrants who 
did not question their unequal status or the authority of their employers, and thus, would 
not challenge France’s social hierarchy.   
 These scathing public criticisms of BUMIDOM articulated by La Communauté 
Antillo-Guyanais, Gargar’s letter in the pamphlet “Nous Créoles”, and La voix de 
l’émigration, were politically motivated.  All three organizations, including the 
Guadeloupean Communist Party to which Gargar belonged, identified as autonomists.  
They promoted Guadeloupe and Martinique’s autonomy within the French community.  
Autonomists wanted the Antilles to remain a part of the French nation, but at the same 
time, they argued that because of Antilleans’ separate Creole culture, they should have 
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more control of their local affairs.  In other words, autonomists constructed Antilleans’ 
identity as both Creole and French.  They used political pamphlets and newspapers as a 
tool to promote this political agenda.  Pro-autonomy activists employed the harsh 
language of “brainwashing”, “depersonalization”, and “oppressive discipline” to 
characterize the Bureau as more sinister and controlling than it probably was.  The 
Bureau’s records include many cases in which it granted Antillean migrants financial aid 
to secure housing and employment, as well as airfare for family members’ migrations.28  
In exaggerating the Bureau’s demeaning treatment of migrants, autonomists hoped to 
anger Antilleans and incite them to reevaluate the meaning of their French citizenship.  
Their public critiques of BUMIODM were meant to mobilize Antilleans around their 
shared experiences of oppression in metropolitan France.  Autonomists wanted Antillean 
migrants to believe that in the eyes of the Bureau and more broadly, the French 
government, they were second-class citizens.  They hoped that this realization would 
make Antilleans aware of their shared experiences as “others” or members of a distinct 
cultural group: Creole.  Autonomists used the press as a public forum to forge a Creole 
identity for Antilleans with the intention that they would not only embrace it, but also 
leverage it to make political demands, such as access to the social mobility and first-
class French citizenship that the Bureau had promised.     
 For example, in “Nous Créoles”, Gargar encouraged Antillean migrants to assert 
themselves as French citizens who deserved the same rights and privileges as 
metropolitan citizens.  He demanded that Antilleans be free from the Bureau’s 
“repression” and control, arguing that Antilleans, like all French citizens, should be free 
                                                
28 See chapter 1 in which I examine Antilleans migrants’ personal letters requesting social aid from the 
Bureau and the Bureau’s responses detailing the specific kinds of social and economic support it offered 
migrants.  
 130 
to migrate without the intervention of a government agency.  At the same time, Gargar 
openly expressed Antilleans’ particular identity as “natives of the overseas 
departments”.29  Moreover, the title of the political pamphlet—“Nous Créoles”—in 
which Gargar’s remarks were published, suggested that Antillean migrants shared a 
“Creole” identity that was separate from their French citizenship.  He encouraged 
Guadeloupeans and Martinicans to embrace their close “connections derived from 
diverse forms of political, economic and cultural repression and discrimination.”30  
Gargar challenged Antilleans to demand equal treatment as French citizens; but he also 
wanted Antilleans to struggle for official recognition of the “particular form of 
repression” that they had endured as racially and culturally distinct migrants.  In doing 
so, he forged a Creole identity around which Antilleans could mobilize to claim their 
equal, yet culturally particular positions in the French nation. 
 
Regionalization and the Antillean Popular Press  
 
 In the late 1960s, the National Assembly began to debate the possibility of 
regional reform for both its metropolitan and overseas departments.  Regionalization was 
a kind of decentralization of the state government.  It would give the locally elected 
assemblies of each department or region more control over its affairs, as well as the 
power to make legislative decisions that had previously been made by the State.31  In 
1972, the National Assembly approved a series of regional reforms, grouping France’s 
ninety-six departments into twenty-two separate regions.  A legislative council of locally 
elected deputies was formed in each region, granting France’s metropolitan regions 
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significantly more economic and cultural autonomy.  However, the National Assembly 
was still unsure about the regionalization of the Antilles.  In May 1967, the pro-
independence group GONG had led a construction workers’ strike in Basse-Terre, 
Guadeloupe, resulting in a violent confrontation between Antillean workers and the 
French army in which nearly fifty Guadeloupean workers and protestors were killed.32  
During a time when anti-France voices were growing stronger and DOM officials were 
struggling to maintain French political authority, the National Assembly worried that its 
overseas departments were not yet ready for regional reform.  It argued that 
decentralization of the DOM would politically and culturally divide metropolitan France 
and the Antilles, threatening national unity.  Thus, for the time being, Guadeloupe and 
Martinique remained departments of France without any of the regional autonomy that 
had been granted to France’s metropolitan departments.   
 This decision not to regionalize the overseas departments infuriated Antilleans 
across the political spectrum.  Whereas French politics is divided into the right and left, 
the political status issue in the Antillean islands provided the fundamental point of 
identification for local party politics and created three main groups: assimilationiste, 
autonomiste, and indépendantiste.  Assimilationists argued that legislative laws were not 
being equally applied in the Hexagon and the overseas departments; autonomists saw 
their goal of cultural autonomy within the French nation slip away.  For nationalists who 
supported Guadeloupean and Martinican independence, this was just another example of 
the government’s attempt to coercively maintain political control of the Antilles.  In 
response, activists aligned with all three camps aired their grievances in the popular 
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press, hoping to mobilize Antilleans.  In making public Antillean migrants’ many 
experiences as second-class citizens, activists sought to empower Antilleans as both a 
political and cultural group.  BUMIDOM, because of its familiarity to Antilleans on both 
sides of the Atlantic as a part of their daily lives, became the focus of activists’ political 
discontentment and frustration.  The National Assembly’s refusal to make Guadelope and 
Martinique regions of France and grant them more local autonomy was symptomatic of 
the everyday injustices Antilleans faced in metropolitan France.   
 Amidst these regionalization debates in the early 1970s, the popular magazine, 
Alizés, published several articles portraying Antillean migrants’ experiences in France as 
a constant struggle against discrimination and racism.  Alizés’s founder, Father Pierre 
Lacroix, perceived of the magazine as a “place of reflection” for Antilleans to “confront 
the collective problems” they experienced during the process of migration.33  Lacroix 
was also committed to informing Antilleans in Guadeloupe and Martinique about 
Antillean migrants’ shared experiences in metropolitan France.  He named Alizés for the 
warm Caribbean winds that flowed northeast to Europe; it was meant to be a network of 
information for Antilleans residing in France and in the Caribbean.   
 In the magazine’s first issue of 1971, Etienne Gaujour, an Antillean priest, 
recounted his conversations with several Antillean workers at Bichat Hospital in Paris.  
When asked how he was received in France, one migrant responded: “What makes me 
suffer is the color of our skin.”34  He mentioned that when he offered his seat to someone 
on the metro, the person refused and then took a seat a few places away from him.  
Alizés intentionally chose to relate this anecdote to its readers in order to characterize 
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metropolitan France as an unwelcoming place for Antilleans.  When this particular 
migrant stepped into the public space of Paris’s subways, he expected to be received as a 
fellow French citizen.  Instead, he was ignored; he failed to form a relationship with his 
purported compatriot in what was seemingly an ordinary everyday encounter.  Public 
transportation or “transport en commun” was intended as a common space for all French 
citizens, literally a collective service and space for the public.  However, the migrant felt 
singled out, as if he was not a part of this collective experience.  He understood this 
rejection in terms of the color of his skin.  In his interactions with his fellow French 
citizens in the public realm of transportation, the migrant discovered his difference.   
 The following year in 1972, Alizés published the first installment of “Diary of an 
Antillean in Paris”.  In this reoccurring column, Max Loubli, an Antillean migrant, 
reported on his life in France.  Readers followed this migrant’s story from his arrival in 
Paris through his struggles to find housing and employment.  Loubli related no positive 
experiences; in every facet of his life, he endured discrimination and racism in his 
interactions with government agencies and his fellow French citizens.  Alizés’s decision 
to only publish Loubli’s negative impressions was intentional.  Alizés’ editors 
recognized the value of using popular magazines and newspapers to inform the Antillean 
public about how migrants experienced their difference and negotiated their position in 
metropolitan society.  As Loubli discovered his difference over the course of several 
installments of “Diary of an Antillean in Paris”, Alizés’s readers were supposed to see 
themselves in Loubli’s struggles and realize their own difference.   BUMIDOM’s 
official discourse insisted upon Antilleans’ equal status as French citizens.  Yet, in his 
relationships with government agencies and metropolitans, Loubli did not benefit from 
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the sense of belonging that his French citizenship purportedly granted him; instead, he 
felt isolated and on the margins of French society.   
 For example, at one point during his search for an apartment, Loubli telephoned a 
landlord who assured him that the apartment about which he was inquiring was still 
available to rent and that he should come quickly to view it.  When Loubli arrived at the 
apartment, the landlord seemed surprised by his appearance: “Oh! Are you the 
gentleman who phoned?...It’s a shame, sir….My mother just arrived unexpectedly; she 
grew weary of staying away from us, and her arrival obliges us to…”35  The reader was 
expected to fill in the next part of the story with the assumption that upon seeing the 
color of his skin, the landlord no longer wanted to rent to Loubli.  According to Loubli, 
this was just one story of many in which he was either denied housing or employment 
because of his skin color.  “On the telephone, one cannot match a skin color to the voice.  
So imagine the surprise…”36   
 Alizés used the first story about a migrant’s experience in the public realm of the 
Paris subway and Loubli’s private interaction with a landlord to relate how Antilleans’ 
difference was constructed in both public and private spaces.  In public spaces, such as 
the subway, migrants felt outside of the collective experience.  The rental market, as a 
space where the public and private converged posed an entirely different obstacle to 
Antilleans’ sense of belonging.  Loubli freely participated in and had equal access to the 
public rental market.  However, when his interactions with the landlord became a private 
matter in which the landlord decided who had access to his private space, Loubli 
perceived his difference.  French public education had provided Loubli with the ability 
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to sound like a French citizen, but his skin color made him feel marginalized as an 
undesirable tenant.  Alizés employed this narrative of Antilleans’ difference and isolation 
to forge a collective political identity based upon Antilleans’ shared experiences as a 
racial and cultural minority in France.  These stories of discrimination and alienation 
were meant to incite resentment among Antilleans residing in both France and the 
Caribbean.  They acted as a political call for Antilleans to realize their common struggle 
and ban together to claim their belonging to the French nation, and to demand equal 
access to housing and high-status employment.  
 Antillean activists’ efforts to use the press to build a political movement began to 
coalesce in the second half of 1970s.  In 1976, the monthly news magazine, Flash 
Antilles-Guyane, assumed the task of reconnecting Antillean migrants with their “native 
lands” of Guadeloupe and Martinique.  It sought to promote solidarity among Antilleans 
residing in both the Caribbean and France by providing its readers with information 
about their common struggles.37  In 1978, Martinican migrant Ernest Marcelin became 
editor of Flash Antilles-Guyane, and changed the publication’s name to Flash Antilles 
Afrique.38  In doing so, he aligned Antilleans’ fight against French oppression with the 
struggles of other ethnically black islands, such as Réunion and St. Pierre and Miquelon, 
that shared a similar history of oppression as France’s former slave colonies.39  Marcelin 
was particularly concerned with the fight against cultural oppression that manifested 
itself in France’s official policy of assimilation, which sought to eliminate cultural 
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differences.  In an editorial entitled “What cultural identity?”, Marcelin called upon 
Antilleans to challenge assimilation and claim their “right to difference”.   He 
encouraged Antillean migrants to “rediscover” their Creole culture and language and 
seek a “new cultural balance” between their French citizenship and Creole culture.  In 
other words, Marcelin wanted Antilleans to use their unique status as both Creole and 
French to fight for what he called “cultural pluralism” in France.40  Marcelin also 
published letters to the editor in which readers reflected upon Antilleans’ right to claim a 
cultural identity separate from that of France.  In one such letter, a student at the 
university in Fort-de-France, Martinique, depicted the French government as a culturally 
oppressive force.  “France has always ignored the fact that we [Antilleans] are a people 
with our own cultural, intellectual, and linguistic heritage, and as such, we have the right 
to develop it, to enrich it, and to make it live.”41  For this reader, it was time for 
Antilleans to claim this right to their own Creole identity.    
 
Autonomy and “the right to difference” 
 
 Throughout the 1970s, leaders within the Antillean press sought to foster 
Antilleans’ particular Creole identity.  They used the press to argue that assimilation had 
caused Antilleans to distance themselves from their Creole culture in favor of French 
culture and citizenship.  While the nationalist press claimed that Antilleans’ distinct 
cultural identity justified Guadeloupe and Martinique’s independence, autonomist 
activists believed Antilleans possessed a Creole culture, which was entirely separate 
from, but also compatible with their political identity as French citizens.  As the 
nationalists and autonomists publicly debated the Antilles’ future political status in their 
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respective publications, the French government sought to discredit nationalists’ claims 
for independence and secure the Antilles’ union with France.  Aware of the 
government’s concern for a burgeoning independence movement, autonomists called for 
“the right to difference” as the less threatening alternative to independence.  In doing so, 
they played a substantial role in forging an Antillean political movement that challenged 
the republican model of assimilation and argued for the introduction of a specific form 
of multiculturalism in French society.  For autonomists, Antilleans were both Creole and 
French and argued that they should be recognized as such by the French government.  In 
addition to claiming equal access to employment and housing, autonomists wanted 
government agencies, such as BUMIDOM, to financially support Antilleans’ private 
cultural associations in metropolitan France.   
 As Antilleans’ demands for “ the right to difference” became more a part of the 
public discourse in the second half of the 1970s, the general public and government 
officials began to realize that the Bureau had failed to assimilate Antillean migrants into 
the nation.  For metropolitan officials, the mere fact of the existence of an Antillean 
cultural movement was reason enough to believe that migrants had become a 
discontented population isolated from the metropolitan community.  On September 19, 
1971, an article in Le Monde, entitled “Antilleans on the path of exile”, exposed 
Antillean migrants’ feelings of isolation.  According to Father Bocquillon, a chaplain for 
Antillean migrants in the metropole, Antillean migrants “come up against in the 
metropole, more and more, racist reactions that force them to question the reality of their 
French citizenship.  Some of them begin to feel closer to the Malians or the Senegalese, 
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immigrants like themselves, than their metropolitan compatriots.”42  Bocquillon argued 
that the experience of migration had alienated Antilleans from their fellow French 
citizens, making them feel as if their experiences in the metropole were closer to those of 
other black immigrants rather than a French citizen.  Boquillon blamed metropolitans’ 
poor treatment of Antilleans for the growing divide that migrants felt between 
themselves and metropolitans.  He claimed that within the first six months of their 
arrival in France, Antilleans’ sense of national belonging had disappeared.  Migration 
had “traumatized all [Antillean] migrants and if they had the money, they would all 
repatriate.”43   
 Le Monde was not the only newspaper to report on the tense relationship between 
metropolitans and Antillean migrations.  Local newspapers in France’s overseas 
departments played an important role in informing Antilleans who had remained in the 
islands about metropolitan events, and more importantly, migrants’ lives in the Hexagon.  
However, the goal of the local press was not merely to inform; the daily newspapers and 
magazines were also politically motivated efforts to mobilize the Antillean community.  
Témoignages was one such local newspaper.  It was founded in 1944 as the press outlet 
of the Communist Party of Réunion (PCR), which in the 1970s was politically aligned 
with both the Martinican and Guadeloupean Communist Parties.  In 1973, Marcel 
Gargar, a member of Guadeloupe’s Communist Party and an elected representative of 
Guadeloupe’s local assembly, expressed his support for communist leaders’ calls for 
autonomy in Réunion, an island located in the Indian Ocean, east of Africa.  He agreed 
that metropolitan officials needed to recognize all of the overseas departments’ cultural 
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differences and grant them more control over their local affairs.44  Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, and Réunion shared the same political status as overseas departments of 
France.  The people of Réunion were also French citizens; their migration experience 
was very similar to Antilleans’ in that it was also facilitated and controlled by 
BUMIDOM.  Therefore, although Témoignages was affiliated with Réunion’s 
Communist Party, it also reported on Antillean migrants’ experiences and was circulated 
throughout Guadeloupe and Martinique.   
 On July 10, 1973, Témoignages, detailed the recent lynching of a young 
Guadeloupean migrant in the Lorraine region by a mob at the rally of New Order, an 
extreme right political organization.45  Témoignages linked this migrant’s murder to 
what it perceived to be the increasing acceptance of racism in French society.  “This 
lynching is characteristic of racist feelings that certain extreme right organizations, such 
as New Order, are developing in the population of France.  Yet, racism is not solely 
expressed by radical groups, but has become an everyday, and even accepted 
phenomenon in French society.”46  Témoignages condemned the French government’s 
complacency, arguing that although it knew of New Order’s discriminatory goals, it did 
not prevent the group’s rally against the immigration of people of color to France.  
However, it did prohibit the Communist League, an opponent of New Order, from 
attending the rally in order to protest New Order’s opinions.  Moreover, despite the fact 
that the lynching occurred in a crowd, no one did anything to prevent the young 
Guadeloupean’s death.  Although all evidence pointed to the deliberate and intentional 
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nature of Rousseau’s murder, the police only charged the assailant for manslaughter and 
not murder.  Témoignages criticized the police’s handling of the case, stating “the skin 
of a Guadeloupean is apparently worth less than that of a French man….This is not the 
first time in France that in the matter of justice, the color of one’s skin has an influence 
on the act of accusation and judgment.”47   
 Local newspapers like Témoignages often retold stories that had already been 
published in metropolitan newspapers.  However, they did not simply republish articles; 
they added commentary and analyzed the events to make them relevant and compelling 
to Antilleans.   In the case of Rousseau’s murder, Témoignages explicitly stated that his 
lynching had been reported in a “metropolitan newspaper”, causing “a certain emotion in 
the Antilles, which the press echoes”.48  Témoignages chose to report on France’s 
racially biased justice system and the government’s complacency in spreading racism as 
a strategy to gain support for its own political agenda.  The communist parties of the 
overseas departments used Témoignages as a public forum to relate particular kinds of 
events and stories that would anger Antilleans and encourage them to join their 
movement for autonomy.   
 On the other side of the Atlantic in metropolitan France, the minority ethnic press 
was also seeking to mobilize Antilleans around their anti-racism movement.  One such 
publication, Sans Frontière (No Border), conceived of itself as a “weekly news 
magazine of immigration.”  Launched in March 1979, the editorial team included 
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journalists and activists from numerous ethnic groups, including Antilleans.49  Sans 
Frontière emerged as the public voice of the anti-racism movement that was coalescing 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to the rise of the National Front and its use 
of arguments about racial and cultural difference to justify why immigrants should be 
excluded from the French nation.  Anti-racism sought to unite all of France’s minorities 
in a singular movement.  However, Antilleans were not well represented in this 
movement.  They were wary of aligning themselves with a cause that separated them 
from the larger national community as “immigrants.”   
 In order to gain more support within the Antillean community for the anti-racism 
movement, publications like Sans Frontière chose to report on stories that were relevant 
to Antilleans.  In June 1981, Sans Frontière, published a letter from the Nanterre Office 
of Affordable Public Housing (HLM) informing Léa Larairie, an Antillean migrant, that 
she had been refused housing.  The president of the Nanterre HLM Office explained that 
23,000 immigrants already lived in Nanterre’s public housing, creating a “ghetto”.  In 
order to avoid the establishment of large immigrant shantytowns in Nanterre, the 
President explained that he could no longer accept applications from immigrants or 
Antilleans.50  Sans Frontière employed this story to argue that Antilleans and 
immigrants experienced similar forms of discrimination.  Antilleans’ French citizenship 
did not grant them equal access to housing; rather, because French officials perceived of 
Antillean migrants as racially and culturally different from metropolitans, they placed 
Antilleans in the category of “immigrant.”  For Sans Frontière, immigrants and 
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Antilleans were excluded from the nation in similar ways and therefore, should be united 
in their fight against this exclusion.  In relating stories such as this one, Sans Frontière’s 
editors hoped to make Antilleans’ aware of how their struggles in metropolitan France 
mirrored those of immigrants.  Sans Frontière believed that this realization would 
encourage Antilleans to align themselves with anti-racism, making the movement even 
broader and more effective.    
 
The Failure of BUMIDOM 
 
 As the local press in the overseas departments and the minority press in France 
competed for Antillean migrants’ support for their respective political agendas, they 
produced a large body of stories detailing Antilleans’ treatment as second-class citizens.  
This information circulated throughout France and the Antilles, prompting public 
criticism of the Bureau.  Headlines in mainstream newspapers began to question whether 
or not BUMIDOM had effectively assimilated Antillean migrants.  In its September 19-
20 issue, Le Monde reported that hundreds of thousands of Antillean migrants were now 
living in the metropole, concentrated in what it referred to as “islands of immigration” or 
particular Parisian neighborhoods.  Antillean migrants, as an unassimilated population, 
were quickly becoming a social problem, which the Bureau had failed to adequately 
address.  “A number of criticisms have been made concerning the actual politics of 
organized migration from the overseas departments to the metropole.  Some of these 
criticisms address the methods [of migration], others call into question its nature, and 
even its very existence.”51  According to Le Monde, the Minister of the Overseas 
Departments, Pierre Messmer, had openly admitted the inadequacies of the Bureau and 
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its professional training programs, which “confine migrants in subordinate jobs.”52  Le 
Monde also noted that despite substantial help from the Bureau, hotelkeepers and 
apartment owners discriminated against Antilleans, making it extremely difficult for 
them to secure housing.  The experience of migration had only succeeded in making 
Antilleans feel less connected to the Hexagon and unsure about their French nationality.  
“Upon their arrival in France, Antilleans discover that they are black like the others”.53  
Le Monde warned the public that activists affiliated with autonomist groups, such as the 
Rassemblement des émigrés martiniquais, were drawing upon migrants’ sentiments of 
isolation to bolster support in the Antilles for more cultural and political autonomy.  
“The left and extreme left in Martinique and Guadeloupe are in agreement in denouncing 
[migration] as the deportation of the youth” and BUMIDOM as “the upholder of a new 
type of slave trade.”54  According to Le Monde, this kind of language was dangerous 
because it divided Antilleans and metropolitans, threatening the political unity between 
France and its overseas departments.     
 In October 1974, Yvon Gouguenheim, a public servant specializing in immigrant 
issues, wrote a report corroborating Le Monde’s early concerns regarding Antillean 
migrants’ growing disillusionment with their treatment as second-class citizens.  He 
published a scathing critique of BUMIDOM and its organization of Antillean migration.  
In his interviews with numerous Antillean migrants, Gouguenheim discovered that the 
Bureau had failed to effectively communicate with Antilleans.  This had resulted in a 
general misunderstanding among Antilleans concerning the migration process.  
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Although Bureau officials insisted that it informed potential migrants about the 
difficulties of migration, Gouguenheim learned that the Bureau did not systematically 
distribute its pamphlets on migration.  Therefore, the majority of Antilleans did not have 
access to the information circulated by the Bureau.  Those prospective migrants who did 
obtain the pamphlets could not understand them because the language used by the 
Bureau was too sophisticated; the Bureau had failed to take into account Antilleans’ 
limited education.55  Gouguenheim claimed that Antilleans understood BUIDOM as a 
type of “travel agency” that permitted them to travel free of charge to the metropole 
where they could forge their own destiny and achieve economic prosperity for 
themselves and their families.  The voyage to France was “experienced as a celebration” 
and “the first step toward fulfilling [their] dreams.”56  This initial optimism quickly 
changed.  Once in France, Antillean migrants faced the realities of unemployment, 
inadequate housing, and discrimination.  
 According to Gouguenheim, discrimination combined with the Bureau’s 
mistreatment of migrants and its false promises, had the potential to produce a dangerous 
combination: an unassimilated and politically active population that could threaten the 
nation’s stability.  “As soon as he arrives in France, the Antillean is…quickly forced to 
call into question his belonging to the French collectivity…he experiences, little by little, 
rejection from the society to which he believed he belonged….This situation…translates 
into aggressiveness,…which leads to the discovery that he has a new identity to 
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construct.”57  From a young age, Antilleans had learned to idealize France.  In school 
they learned of all the opportunities afforded to them by their French citizenship.  
However, Gougeneheim contended that when Antilleans settled in France, they 
discovered their black identity and that they belonged to a racial minority.  
Metropolitans stripped them of their citizenship and treated them like an immigrant.  
According to Gouguenehim, Antilleans’ “discovery of a metropolitan world different 
from the one [they] had imagined” made it difficult for them “to find a satisfying way to 
relate to metropolitans.”58  Gouguenheim argued that if the Bureau did nothing to 
improve the state of alienation in which Antilleans found themselves, then Antilleans 
would be forced to turn inward.  He warned that Antilleans’ feelings of isolation had 
already caused many of them to fall victim to different forms of “delinquency”, such as 
crime, prostitution, and drugs.  Antillean migrants were separating themselves further 
and further from French society and their French identity, and they would continue to do 
so if nothing was done to ameliorate their situation.59   
 Gouguenheim’s warning resonated with the Bureau.  BUMIDOM officials were 
increasingly concerned about the rising prominence of some Antillean activists who 
were becoming more and more vocal in their calls for Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s 
independence.  They were wary of nationalist activists who employed critiques of 
BUMIDOM to generate support for the independence movement.  For example, in 1974, 
the Groupe de soutien Réunionnais et Antillais leveraged the controversy surrounding 
the Bureau’s dismissal of two instructors to gain support for its nationalist politics.  The 
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group’s leaders hoped to rally Antillean migrants around their movement to cut ties with 
France and end migration.  In October 1973, Father Claude Jacquin, a teacher at the 
Bureau’s Marseille adaptation center, took his young Antillean students to an 
informational meeting organized by the French Democratic Confederation of Labor 
(CFDT).  As a Marxist, Jacquin believed that Antillean migrants should be conscious of 
their solidarity with and responsibility to the French worker’s movement.  BUMIDOM 
promptly dismissed Jacquin arguing that he had not maintained the political neutrality 
required of Bureau employees.  When Albert Montagny sent a letter to the Bureau 
protesting his colleague’s dismissal, the Bureau quickly relieved him of his post as well.  
 In response to what they perceived to be their wrongful dismissals, Jacquin and 
Montagny released a public manifesto condemning BUMIDOM as a colonial 
organization.  They argued that the Bureau had constructed migration so that it was a 
new form of malicious colonialism, emptying the Antilles of its youth in order to fulfill 
the labor and economic demands of metropolitan France.  Migration is a form of “true 
mass deportation practiced today, [and] is not a cure for the ‘underdeveloped Third 
World’ ”.60  In employing the word “deportation”, Jacquin and Montagny were 
comparing Antilleans’ migration experience to the Nazis’ deportation and extermination 
of Jews during the Second World.  For Jacquin and Montagny, departmentalization was 
a kind of occupation of the Antilles.  It had severely hindered the islands’ economic 
growth, forcing Guadeloupeans and Martinicans to migrate in search of work and a 
better life.  They claimed that the Bureau’s policies were not much different from the 
Nazis’ in that they used perceptions of racial difference to justify Antilleans’ second-
                                                
60 Claude Jacquin and Albert Matigny, “Reflexions sur l’émigration des jeunes antillais et réunionnais,” 
January 15, 1974, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 840442, Art. 7.   
 147 
class status in French society.  Jacquin and Montagny called upon Antilleans to rise up 
against this kind of foreign control, arguing that independence was Antilleans only 
source of liberation.  They claimed that the only way to end this continued colonial 
oppression was to cut ties with France and end migration.61   
 In January 1974, when the Groupe de soutien Réunionnais et Antillais, learned 
about Jacquin and Montagny’s dismissals, they quickly began to distribute flyers 
throughout France in support of the instructors’ cause.  They asked Antilleans to sign a 
petition to be delivered to BUMIDOM demanding that it end its control of migration and 
provide Antilleans with equal access to higher status jobs.  In doing so, the Groupe de 
soutien impressed upon Antilleans the importance of coming together as a political 
group to fight not only for change in the Bureau’s policies, but also in French society as 
a whole.62   
 Within the Caribbean, Antillean leaders also began to call for a change in the 
migration process.  On November 5, 1973, at a press conference at the Lutétia Hotel in 
Paris, Henri Bangou, the mayor of Guadeloupe’s capital city, Point-à-Pitre, compared 
migration to colonialism.  He claimed the Bureau’s employment policies pushing 
Antilleans toward low-status jobs in the metropole was a modern adaptation of France’s 
nineteenth-century colonial policies in Algeria; they made Antilleans economically 
dependent and subordinate so that an independence movement would never successfully 
materialize.   Bangou informed Antilleans that migration only benefitted France.  
Antilleans provided France with the labor it needed to rebuild the nation, but Antilleans 
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had received nothing in return.  In general, Antillean migrants’ economic position had 
not improved and the Antilles remained economically dependent on France for jobs and 
imports.  Bangou argued that Antilleans needed to embark upon a political struggle to 
radically change this persistent colonial relationship between France and the Antilles.63   
 These public critiques of the migration process identified BUMIDOM as the 
cause of Antilleans’ alienation in French society.  They convinced the Ministry of the 
DOM that the Bureau’s failure to provide migrants with adequate employment and 
housing had pushed them toward Antillean nationalism.  The existence of the Antillean 
independence movement in metropolitan France indicated to the Ministry of the DOM 
that the Bureau had not succeeded in cultivating Antillean migrants’ emotional 
attachment to the French nation.  Although the Ministry of the DOM had identified 
BUMIDOM as the part of the problem, it was not yet ready to dissolve the organization.  
DOM officials believed that the government still needed to oversee Antillean migration, 
and the Bureau was the only organization in place with the capacity to undertake such a 
large project.  Therefore, instead of abandoning the Bureau, the Ministry of the DOM 
sought to transform the agency.  In 1975, the Ministry of the DOM recommended that 
instead of continuing to increase the number of migrants it financed each year, the 
Bureau needed to focus on assimilating those Antillean migrants who were already 
residing in France.  It dictated that the Bureau could finance no more than five thousand 
migrations per year.64   The Ministry of the DOM also challenged the Bureau to rethink 
its focus on housing, employment and education; it encouraged Bureau officials to 
                                                
63 Henry Bangou, press conference at Hôtel Lusetia, Paris, November 5, 1973, Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), 840442, Art. 7.   
64 Bureau pour le développement des migrations intéressant les départements d’outre mer (BUMIDOM), 
“Compte-rendu des principales activités”, 30 septembre 1976, Centre des Archives Contemporaines 
(CAC), Fontainebleau, 940380, Art. 28. 
 149 
develop new strategies for helping Antilleans overcome the isolation they felt as second-
class citizens.  DOM officials believed that political contentment among Antillean 
migrants would diminish their support of nationalist movements, and ensure national 
unity. 
 
The “New” BUMIDOM  
 In the mid-1970s, BUMIDOM responded to the Ministry of the DOM’s concerns 
and completed an exploratory study on how it could improve the overall quality of 
Antillean migration.65  In 1975, the Bureau decided to change its mission.  Prior to 1975, 
BUMIDOM focused its efforts on selecting candidates for migration, funding migrants’ 
airfares to France, and facilitating job training and placement.  After 1975, BUMIDOM 
made the “cultural adaptation” of Antilleans its main priority.  For BUMIDOM, 
“cultural adaptation” meant eliminating Antilleans’ feelings of isolation, and cultivating 
their emotional attachment to the French nation.  In order dedicate more of its time and 
funds to Antilleans’ “cultural adaptation”, the Bureau began to encourage other public 
agencies and private organizations to provide social services to Antillean migrants.  This 
was a substantial break from its previous function as the sole provider of social and 
economic assistance to Antilleans.  More significantly, BUMIDOM began to actively 
support Antillean cultural events as a part of its strategy to promote Antilleans’ “cultural 
adaptation.”  In doing so, it implicitly began to acknowledge that Antilleans possessed a 
Creole culture separate from that of France.66 
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 BUMIDOM’s first organizational change was to transfer its jurisdiction over 
Antillean employment to the National Employment Agency (ANPE), a public agency 
under the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Employment that maintained a branch in 
each of France’s metropolitan departments.  From 1975 to 1977, ANPE opened a DOM-
Metropole branch in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Paris.  It became the central agency 
that assisted Antilleans in finding employment; the Bureau directed all migrants to 
ANPE and ceased to provide all employment services.67   
 While Bureau officials relinquished control of the migration process in some 
areas, they simultaneously sought to broaden the scope of BUMIDOM by extending its 
services to all Antilleans residing in metropolitan France.  Previously, it was 
BUMIDOM’s unofficial policy to only provide social services to those Antilleans who 
had migrated with the Bureau’s aid.  Now, the Secretary of State for the DOM 
authorized the Bureau to use its funds to help “spontaneous” migrants who had settled in 
France without the Bureau’s support.  The Bureau must “take into account, on the 
grounds of national solidarity, that it is not possible for the public powers to ignore those 
migrants who, arriving on their own, have become expatriated and are not adapted to 
metropolitan life.”68  In the 1960s, BUMIDOM facilitated and financed nearly all 
Antillean migrations to France.  In doing so, it believed that it could effectively monitor 
migrants’ assimilation.  This changed in the 1970s when large reductions in airfare made 
it affordable for Antilleans to migrate to France without BUMIDOM’s financial aid.  
Beginning in the 1970s, the Bureau facilitated only a small fraction of Antillean 
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migrations to France; the vast majority of Antilleans either financed their own 
migrations or received help from family members who had already established 
themselves in the Hexagon.   
 In order to maintain control of the migration process, the Bureau decided that it 
would extend its social services to those Antilleans who had not sought BUMIDOM’s 
help prior to leaving Guadeloupe and Martinique.69  The Ministry of the DOM and the 
Bureau perceived of this change as both inevitable and necessary.  As more and more 
Antilleans migrated without the Bureau’s aid, the Ministry of the DOM felt that the only 
way the Bureau could continue to maintain control of migration was to offer its social 
services to all Antilleans regardless of how they had come to metropolitan France.  
Moreover, by the mid-1970s, it had become apparent to the Ministry of the DOM that 
Antillean migration was not a temporary solution to France’s labor shortage.  Rather, 
Antillean migrants wished to permanently settle in metropolitan France.  Throughout the 
1970s, the Bureau received hundreds of letters from Antillean migrants requesting 
financial aid so that the families they had left behind in the Antilles could join them in 
the Hexagon.70  In anticipation of this shift in the Antillean migrant population from 
single men and women to families, the Ministry of the DOM insisted that the Bureau 
open up its services to all Antilleans.  Specifically, the Bureau began to play an 
important role in helping “spontaneous” migrants secure housing.  BUMIDOM officials 
recognized that Antilleans faced discrimination in the housing market; many private 
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citizens and landlords refused to rent to Antillean migrants.  Therefore, many Antilleans 
needed to obtain public housing through the Agency for Affordable Housing (HLM).  
Bureau social workers helped new migrants navigate the complicated public housing 
market, educating them on how to apply for and obtain subsidized housing.71  Without 
this policy change enabling the Bureau to help “spontaneous” migrants, the Ministry of 
DOM feared that more and more Antilleans would not have access to the social aid they 
needed, creating a large population of discontented migrants.   
 In addition, as a part of its new “cultural adaptation” initiative, the Bureau began 
to finance private associations whose mission it was to facilitate Antilleans’ integration 
into French society.  BUMIDOM believed that public agencies’, including their own, 
exclusive focus on employment and housing had ignored Antilleans’ social assimilation 
or their “integration” into French society.  In an attempt to fill this gap in the 
assimilation process, the Bureau began to support private organizations focused on 
providing Antilleans with a sense of community in metropolitan France.  One such 
organization, CASODOM (Committee of Social Action for Peoples Originating from the 
Overseas Departments in the Metropole), provided many of the same services as the 
Bureau.  However, it specifically focused on administering aid to those Antilleans who 
had been settled in France for longer periods of times.  It extended the timeframe of 
BUMIDOM’s services and created a kind of community support for all Antilleans.72   
 AMITAG (Association of Antillean and Guyanese Workers in the Metropole) 
also received a substantial amount of financial support from the Bureau.  AMITAG was 
significantly different from any of the other private organization the Bureau had 
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financed.  AMTIAG was not exclusively focused on providing economic aid to 
migrants; rather, it organized cultural events, such as film showings, exhibits, dance, and 
musical performances.  The Bureau claimed that these events enabled Antilleans to 
remain connected to the Antillean culture they had left behind in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  They “permitted members of the Association to rediscover themselves in a 
setting that evokes their native land.”73  In other words, AMITAG gave migrants a safe 
community in which they could maintain a sense of their own cultural identity while 
simultaneously acclimating themselves to French metropolitan society. 
 The Bureau’s support of AMITAG was a substantial break from its previous 
policies, which contained no mention of Antilleans’ distinct cultural identity.  In 
financing AMITAG and its cultural events, BUMIDOM was implicitly recognizing that 
Antilleans possessed a Creole culture and identity separate from that of France.  
Nonetheless, this acknowledgement of Antilleans’ cultural differences did not 
necessarily mean that the Bureau was distancing itself from its policy of assimilation.  
For the Bureau, it was simply making the conscious decision to financially support 
Antilleans’ right as French citizens to establish cultural associations, such as AMITAG, 
in metropolitan France.74  It could be argued that the Bureau’s use of public funds to 
support private cultural associations was a move toward multiculturalism; yet, the 
Bureau insisted upon its policy of assimilation.  BUMIDOM officials claimed that its 
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recognition of Antilleans’ Creole culture was a strategy to promote Antilleans’ 
assimilation by improving Antillean-metropolitan social relations.   
 In a June 1979 note on its organizational changes, BUMIDOM stated that the 
social role of Antillean cultural associations is “not only precious, but irreplaceable.”75  
BUMIDOM supported AMITAG as part of its “endeavor to fight against the feeling of 
isolation that migrants can feel upon their arrival” in France.76  It argued that cultural 
associations “permit[ted] isolated [migrants] to meet each other, to help one another, and 
to come into contact with those who preceded them in the metropole, in order to better 
adapt themselves [to France].”77  Ultimately, the Bureau believed that cultural 
organizations promoted “cultural adaptation” or social assimilation and thus, stabilized 
the national union between the Antilles and France.  In a July 1979 memo on the state of 
Antillean migration, the Ministry of the DOM noted that AMITAG has had a “positive 
influence on the migrants” and is therefore “beneficial to France.”78 
 This shift in the Bureau’s attitude was a response to autonomist and nationalist 
activists’ politicization of Antillean migration.  While autonomists used Antillean 
migrants’ discontentment with the Bureau to garner political support for political 
autonomy within the French nation, nationalists argued that independence was 
Antilleans’ only chance for liberation from the Bureau’s control.  As Antilleans’ 
frustrations with the Bureau pushed them toward these leftwing political groups, the 
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Ministry of the DOM became concerned about the possible dangers of a politically 
active and discontented population of Antillean migrants.  In the late 1970s, it initiated a 
study on how to improve Antilleans’ situation in France.  In October 1979, the Director 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs of the DOM officially gave its 
recommendations for improving the politics of Antillean migration.  He noted that the 
Antillean left had characterized migration as a continuation of French colonial rule under 
which the government manipulated Antilleans for their own economic gains.  He then 
encouraged the Bureau to refute this perception by supporting Antillean cultural 
associations.  The Director claimed that this would suggest to Antilleans that the Bureau 
was concerned about their social wellbeing and not just France’s economy.79   
 One month following the Director’s recommendations, the Secretary of State for 
the DOM also encouraged BUMIDOM leaders to reevaluate its organization so that it 
promoted integration, not political frustration.  In November 1979, the Secretary of State 
for the DOM informed the Bureau that it needed to “adapt its mission…to the evolving 
relationship between the overseas departments and metropolitan France.”80  For the 
Secretary of State, this meant supporting Antillean cultural associations.  The “evolving 
relationship” referred to the fact that the Bureau could no longer afford to ignore 
Antilleans social and cultural demands for fear of a bourgeoning Antillean political 
movement.  The Ministry of the DOM reasoned that by aligning themselves with 
Antillean cultural associations, such as AMITAG, the Bureau would rehabilitate its 
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reputation with Antilleans.  In doing so, it would mollify Antilleans’ discontentment and 
create political stability between the Antilles and France.  
 Shortly after receiving these recommendations from the Ministry of the Overseas 
Department, the Bureau officially revised its statutes to read: “On the cultural plan, an 
effort will be taken by BUMIDOM to enable migrants to affirm their identity and permit 
the blossoming of their unique personality.”81  In November 1979, the Secretary of State 
for the DOM announced that the Bureau was going to finance the development of 
several Creole cultural centers throughout France in order to promote “the awakening of 
a culture of the [Antillean] ‘other’.”82  These centers would provide a meeting place for 
Antillean associations that were focused on preserving Creole culture and providing 
migrants with social support.  
 The Bureau named its Marseille Creole culture center Portes Ouvertes or “open 
doors” to symbolize its new openness toward Antilleans’ Creole culture.   For the 
opening of this particular center, the Bureau invited leaders in the Antillean community 
to teach schoolchildren in Marseille how to make Creole musical instruments, and use 
them in Creole songs and dances.  For the Bureau, events such as this marked the 
beginning of a greater cultural understanding between Antilleans and metropolitans.  
Antilleans’ cultural differences did not exclude them from the French nation; rather they 
were a part of France’s cultural history and diversity.  “The departure has been taken. 
The future must spread the promises of these first achievements.  Our ambitions have not 
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always been sensible in taking stock of and in expressing by all possible means and 
forms the Creole Cultural identity.”83  The decision to open these Creole cultural centers 
marked a turning point in the Bureau’s politics on Antillean migration.   
 In 1980, the Bureau articulated its financial support of Antillean cultural 
associations as an integral component of its new policy of action culturelle or “cultural 
action”.84  Paul Dijoud, who headed BUMDIOM as Secretary of State for the DOM 
(April 1978 to May 1981), played a significant role in developing “cultural action.”  As 
the Secretary of State for Immigrant Workers (May 1974 to March 1977), Dijoud had 
implemented a handful of social policies that to some extent moved away from the 
government’s strict adherence to assimilation, and began to recognize a multicultural 
French society.  For example, Arabic language classes began to be offered in public 
schools and Muslim prayer rooms were created in several factories and public housing.85  
Dijoud perceived of these social policies as an attempt to accommodate the growing 
number of second-generation immigrants living in France.  Dijoud understood the 
Antillean migration “problem” as similar to the “problem” of second-generation 
immigrants.  Both groups were French nationals who wished to maintain their distinct 
cultural identities.   
 Under Dijoud’s leadership, the Bureau noted the emergence of a new “Antillean-
Guyanese establishment…composed of a number of young and dynamic individuals, 
often born in the Metropole or having established themselves here during the first years 
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of their life, have a strong desire to preserve and express their cultural specificities.”86  
BUMIDOM also recognized that participation in cultural associations had become the 
foundation of young Antilleans’ expressions of difference in metropolitan France.  
“These organizations, centered on the defense of migrants’ interests and the protection of 
their cultural specificities…indicates a rapid evolution in the migrant community’s 
awareness of their [political] importance in the Metropole.”87  The existence of 
numerous newly established Antillean cultural associations indicated to the Bureau that 
there was a burgeoning Antillean cultural movement in metropolitan France.  Not only 
did young Antilleans wish to maintain their cultural particularities, but they were also 
putting in place an organizational foundation for a political movement.  The French 
government viewed this growing population of politically active young Antilleans who 
refused assimilation as a potential threat to national unity.  For this reason, Dijoud 
encouraged the Bureau to develop a new policy that would satisfy young Antilleans’ 
desire to maintain their cultural links with Guadeloupe and Martinique while 
simultaneously solidifying the political union between the Antilles and France.88     
 The Bureau followed Dijoud’s recommendations and decided to embark upon a 
new plan of action culturelle that would “assure [Antilleans] of the power to express 
their difference and integrate themselves in the host environment [France] while 
remaining themselves.”89  In other words, BUMIDOM acknowledged Antilleans’ 
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cultural particularities because it believed that this change in policy would facilitate 
Antilleans’ “integration” or social assimilation.  Therefore, the Bureau’s decision to 
recognize Antilleans’ right to difference was essentially a conservative policy in that it 
maintained the political status quo in France.  In providing financial support to Antillean 
cultural groups, action culturelle placed Antilleans’ difference under the surveillance of 
the Bureau.  In doing so, it enabled BUMIDOM to monitor the extent to which, as well 
as how Antilleans’ cultural difference would be incorporated into the nation.   
 
France créole 
 
 Leading up to the implementation of action culturelle in 1980, there was much 
discussion within the Bureau and the Ministry of DOM concerning Antilleans’ Creole 
culture and how the government should go about recognizing these citizens’ differences 
while simultaneously maintaining France and the Antilles’ political unity as a singular 
nation.  The Ministry of DOM’s focus on securing Guadeloupe and Martinique’s 
departmental status stemmed from a series of political transformations that occurred in 
France’s territories under the leadership of Dijoud’s predecessor Olivier Stirn (June 1974 
to March 1977).  Stirn negotiated the independence of Dijibouti (1977), and The Comoro 
Islands, excluding Mayotte (1975), and autonomy for New Caledonia (1976) and 
Polynesia (1977).  Dijoud worried that if nothing was done to address Antilleans’ 
grievances with departmentalization, then the sweeping political changes that had 
occurred in France’s territories would also be carried out in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  
The Ministry of the DOM’s internal discussions regarding the future of its territories and 
departments contributed to a broader reevaluation of republican assimilation and a more 
public reflection on the possibility of the right to difference in France.   
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 In a press conference on September 26, 1979, Dijoud, publicly stated that the 
policy of assimilation was not working; the government had failed to integrate 
Antilleans.  “Traditionally, France has conducted a policy of assimilation that aims to 
align the behavior, the approaches, and the thinking of its compatriots to those of 
metropolitans; [however], we have come to believe that it is now quite clear that this 
approach is not sufficient.”90  Dijoud based this conclusion on the unstable political 
climate that was currently enveloping the Antilles and France.  In Martinique, the 1974 
banana farm workers’ strike had paralyzed the Martinican economy and created tension 
between Antillean labor unions and the Ministry of the Overseas Departments.91  
Similarly, Antillean migrants in the Hexagon were confronting economic recession and 
widespread unemployment during the mid-1970s.  On both sides of the Atlantic, 
Antilleans were becoming increasingly discontent with their social and economic 
situation, prompting them to form their own political groups.  Dijoud was particularly 
concerned about the establishment of one pro-independence political party: the Popular 
Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG).  Established in 1978, the UPLG sought 
to bring together different factions of the nationalist movement under the political 
platform of independence, while highlighting the importance of Antilleans’ Creole 
identity.  During his September 1979 press conference, Dijoud argued that in order to 
counteract this potentially destructive political movement, “we must strive to make our 
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compatriots of the overseas department realize that we are not looking to deny their 
difference, but on the contrary, are enhancing it.”92  Dijoud informed the public that the 
Ministry of the DOM was working to fight against two extremes: those “who believe 
that to be French is to have Gallic ancestors and deny all the rest” and those who “make 
the recognition of difference a rejection of all other people who have shaped their 
past.”93  In other words, Dijoud sought to reconcile republican assimilation with 
Antilleans’ cultural specificities.  He wanted to recognize Antilleans’ right to difference 
while simultaneously ensuring that Antilleans would remain proud of and connected to 
their French identity.   
 Dijoud also argued the government could no longer ignore Antilleans’ desire to 
express their Creole culture when it had recently recognized metropolitan citizens’ 
regional cultures and languages as a distinct part of the French nation.  As Antillean 
nationalists claimed their Creole identity to justify their demands for independence, 
French citizens from metropolitan regions, such as Bretagne, Alsace, and Provence, were 
also reviving their particular languages, histories and folklores.  In 1958, regional 
activists from across France banned together and formed the Secular Movement for 
Regional Cultures (MLCR), a special interest group concerned with promoting the 
preservation of France’s regional languages and cultures.  Over the course of two 
decades, the MLCR activists gained official recognition of their respective regions’ 
cultural particularities, including the right for high school students to choose to be tested 
in their regional language as a part of the national university qualifying exams.  Yet, the 
government refused to grant Guadeloupe and Martinique the same status as distinct 
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cultural regions of France.  Dijoud claimed that these differential cultural policies for 
metropolitan France and the Antilles had created discontentment among Antilleans who 
were finding an outlet for their anger in various nationalist organizations.  For this 
reason, he encouraged DOM officials to grant Guadeloupe and Martinique the same 
cultural recognition it had given to metropolitan departments.  In a televised interview 
on France’s national network FR3, Dijoud stated that he saw no reason why “young 
Antilleans would not also possess the right to have passion for their roots.”94  In the 
wake of the 1974 general labor strike from which Martinque was still recovering, as well 
as the establishment of the UPLG in Guadeloupe, Dijoud hoped that the Ministry of the 
DOM’s recognition of Antilleans’ Creole culture would heal the political tensions 
between Antilleans and the metropolitan government, and bring the Antilles and France 
closer in their political union.95  This cultural and political project became what Dijoud 
referred to as France créole.   
 In his closing statement to the third Interregional Conference, an event attended 
by leaders from France and its overseas departments, Dijoud articulated the meaning of 
France créole.  France créole was the cultural future of France and the Antilles in which 
both French and Creole cultures would concurrently exist and enrich the French nation.   
At this conference, Dijoud set in place a commission to oversee the creation of a France 
créole nation.   The purpose of this commission was to reinforce Antilleans’ political and 
cultural connection to metropolitan France while also making room within the nation for 
Antilleans’ Creole culture.  Dijoud was adamant that the recognition of difference should 
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not alienate Antilleans from the French nation; rather, it must “make sure that they are 
French…and conscious of belonging to a great nation.”96  Dijoud was aware that some 
Antilleans wanted to use their Creole culture to launch a political fight for independence.  
France créole was a solution to this politicization of culture.  It would use culture to 
“unite men and to assemble them, not divide them.”  Antilleans had a distinct Creole 
culture, but they were also “heirs of the French Culture.”97  France créole was as much 
about promoting Antilleans’ French heritage as it was about recognizing Antilleans’ 
Creole culture.  Dijoud claimed that to ignore their unique cultural identity as both 
Creole and French would be to push Antilleans away from their French identity and 
citizenship.  In a televised interview Dijoud stated that he wanted “Antilleans to be 
proud of being both French and Creole.”98  Only then would the political and cultural 
union between France and the Antilles be stabilized.  
 Historians of France have argued that the anti-racism movement, largely 
organized by the children of Algerian and West African immigrants, opened up the 
possibility for the “right to difference” in France during the early 1980s.99  Yet, the 
Ministry of the Overseas Departments’ policies on Antillean migration complicates this 
narrative.  The Bureau’s financial support of Antillean cultural associations, its decision 
to build Creole cultural centers throughout France, its articulation of action culturelle, 
and Dijoud’s policy of France créole all played a significant role in shaping President 
François Mitterrand’s articulation of the “right to difference”.  For Mitterrand, the “right 
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to difference” was a break from the French tradition of assimilation, which required 
individuals to shed all of their cultural particularities to obtain French citizenship.  The 
“right to difference” permitted individuals to claim dual identities, such as Antillean and 
French, and also required that the government recognize the right of its citizens to claim 
multiple cultural identities.  In a speech at Petit Bourg’s city hall in Guadeloupe, 
Mitterrand informed Guadeloupeans that for them the “right to difference” meant the 
reversal of the assimilation policies of departmentalization that had denied Antilleans the 
right to express their unique identity.  It was the “realization of the synthesis between the 
Guadeloupean identity and French nationality.”100  In other words, it permitted 
Guadeloupeans and Martinicans to be both Antillean and French. 
 To symbolize this break with assimilation, Mitterrand’s new socialist government 
dissolved the Bureau and established ANT (National Agency For the Insertion and 
Promotion of Overseas Department Workers) in its place.  For all intents and purposes, 
ANT was a continuation of BUMIDOM in that it provided Antilleans with the same 
social services.  However, it reflected the socialists’ new policy of the “right to 
difference”.  ANT’s statutes explicitly stated “integration into the metropole, must not be 
an assimilation”, noting that the “Government is very attached to the ‘right to difference’ 
as a means to promote tolerance and solidarity.”101  One of ANT’s most important 
initiatives was to expand the Ministry of DOM’s financial support of Antillean cultural 
associations, which had begun under BUMIDOM as a part of its action culturelle policy.  
With this increased funding and ANT’s explicit support of the “right to difference”, 
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Antillean migrants founded hundreds of cultural associations throughout metropolitan 
France.  It was these cultural associations that put in place the organizational foundation 
for the emergence of a distinct form of Antillean ethnic activism.    
 
Part II.  Antillean Ethnic Activism and the France-Based Creole Movement 
 
 During the 1960s, a strong Creole cultural movement developed in both 
Guadeloupe and Martinique.102  However, across the Atlantic in metropolitan France, 
Antillean migrants had yet to forge and unite around a singular Creole identity.  A 
distinct form of Antillean ethnic activism did not emerge in the Hexagon until the 1970s 
when two simultaneous occurrences made the construction of a France-based Creole 
movement viable.  First, as more and more Antilleans settled in metropolitan France, 
Creole activists in Guadeloupe and Martinique began to realize the importance of 
gaining migrants’ support for their political and cultural movements.  Throughout the 
1970s, representatives of Guadeloupean and Martinican cultural groups traveled to the 
Hexagon, actively seeking to mobilize migrants around a shared Creole identity.  
Second, by the 1970s, the migration experience had made Antilleans aware of their 
difference as second-class citizens.  Antillean activists in metropolitan France used these 
feelings of difference to construct a Creole identity around which migrants could 
mobilize for inclusion in the French nation as first-class citizens.  Together, these two 
changes in how migrants perceived of their relationship to Antilleans in the islands and 
their position in French society established the groundwork for the development of 
Antillean ethnic activism in metropolitan France.   
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 In the 1970s and early 1980s, Antillean activists adopted the language of the 
Bureau’s action culturelle and France créole, as well as Mitterrand’s “right to 
difference” and forged a unique ethnic activism movement in France.  Activists in 
Guadeloupe and Martinique who were particularly concerned with the preservation of 
and veneration of the Creole language and culture leveraged this emerging Antillean 
ethnic activism in the Hexagon to gain support for the Creole movement   In doing so, 
they forged a France-based Creole movement that celebrated the Creole language and 
culture.  This France-based Creole movement was significantly different from the pro-
independence Creole movement that had been gaining momentum in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique since the 1960s.  While the Antilles-based movement employed Creole to 
justify the islands’ political separation from France, the France-based movement used 
Creole to argue for the inclusion of Antilleans’ cultural differences within the larger 
French national culture.     
 
Guadeloupean and Martinican Cultural Groups and the Performance of Creole 
Identity in Metropolitan France  
 
 During the 1960s there was a proliferation of Antillean cultural groups in 
Guadeloupe and Martinique dedicated to the preservation of the Creole culture and 
language.  Theater troupes, dance and music groups, as well as educational centers 
sought to counteract the damaging cultural effects of departmentalization.  When 
Guadeloupe and Martinique became departments of France, the French government 
banned the use of Creole in public spaces, such as schools, the media, and labor unions, 
and replaced it with French.  In doing so, the Ministry of Overseas Departments hoped to 
disseminate the French culture throughout the Antilles.  According to Creole activists, 
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Antilleans had internalized this degradation of Antillean culture, creating a widespread 
disdain for Creole as an inferior culture and language.  As early as the late 1950s, 
Antillean activists in Guadeloupe and Martinique founded Creole cultural organizations 
to help Antilleans rediscover and develop a newfound appreciation for their Creole 
culture and language.   
 By the 1970s, this strong presence of Antillean cultural associations throughout 
Guadeloupe, and Martinique had developed into full-fledged Creole cultural movement.  
On February 19, 1976, Le Monde published an article describing the cultural awakening 
occurring in the Antilles.  On the occasion of Léopold Senghor’s official visit to 
Martinique as the President of Senegal, there was a weeklong celebration of black 
culture in Fort-de-France.  Le Monde interpreted these performances, art exhibits, film 
showings, and conferences as an expression of an “initiative of the city whose cultural 
politics for the past four years has consisted of rediscovering its own [cultural] sources 
and formulating an Antillean identity.”103  In the early 1970s, two competing cultural 
organizations emerged in Martinique.  The Martinican Center for Cultural Animation 
(CMAC), financed by the Ministry of Culture, dedicated itself to promoting European 
art and culture in the Antilles.  In contrast, the Municipal Office for Cultural Animation 
(OMAC) denounced CMAC’s neglect of Antilleans’ own unique culture, and supported 
research on the local Creole culture.  These opposing perspectives generated a public 
debate about which form of cultural politics Antilleans should embrace.  On the occasion 
of Senghor’s visit to France, Creole activists took it upon themselves to highlight 
Antilleans’ cultural links to Africa.  In doing so, they emphasized their cultural 
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differences and claimed their cultural connections to a nation other than France.  Le 
Monde described this weeklong cultural event as a “particular expression of being 
Martinican”.  It “demonstrated the capacity of Martinicans to develop in several 
directions at the same time, the cultural potentials of their island.”104   
 Yet, this Creole cultural movement was slow in crossing the Atlantic to France.  
In the 1960s, Antillean migrants were more immediately concerned with securing 
housing and employment in France than with discovering their Creole culture.  The 
metropolitan Antillean population had more pressing worries.  At the same time, Creole 
activists believed that this was the population it needed to reach.  Antillean migrants, 
particularly their children who had been born in France, were the most disconnected 
from their Creole culture and language.  The physical distance between France and the 
Antilles made it extremely hard for migrants to maintain their cultural and personal links 
to Guadeloupe and Martinique.  By the 1970s, nearly one third of the entire population 
lived in metropolitan France.105  This staggering statistic worried Creole activists who 
feared that as more and more Antilleans settled in France, the Creole language and 
culture would be completely neglected and forgotten.   
 To prevent this from happening, Creole activists began to look for ways it could 
promote Antillean culture and spread the Creole movement throughout metropolitan 
France.  During the 1970s, numerous Antillean cultural groups traveled to the Hexagon 
with the intention of helping migrants rediscover their cultural links to Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  On January 12, 1978, R. Guathierot, a representative of Guadeloupe’s 
Groupe Folklorique Karukéra, wrote to Olivier Stirn, the Secretary of State for the 
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DOM, requesting financial aid for his group’s performance in France.  Stirn quickly 
dismissed Gauthierot’s request, stating that the Ministry of DOM’s budget does not 
finance performances, but might be able to fund his group’s travel expenses to France.106  
This letter is representative of the numerous demands from Antilles-based theater 
troupes, dance groups, and musical ensembles who wished to travel to France and 
literally perform their Creole culture for French metropolitans and Antillean migrants.  
Some organizations received funding from the Ministry of the DOM, and some did not.  
What is significant is how these groups represented themselves to the French 
government when requesting financial aid.   
 Each organization portrayed itself an “authentic” Antillean cultural group who 
wished to promote cultural exchange between France and the Antilles.  For example, 
Karukéra wrote, it is “our desire to present, for the first time in France, Guadeloupean 
folklore from the perspective of traditional dances and songs, perfectly reflecting the 
mores and culture of our country….Our goal is to perpetuate the tradition of 
Guadeloupean folk dance, to make it appreciated and loved by the entire world, and to 
promote [cultural] contact between Europeans and Guadeloupeans.”107  In their letters, 
cultural associations like Karukéra expressed their particular Creole identity, arguing 
that Antilleans possessed an authentic or “traditional” culture that was distinct from 
France’s cultural heritage.  At the same time, the representatives of these organizations 
were careful to characterize these cultural differences as a part of the French nation.  
Guathierot wanted his group to perform with other Guadeloupean dance troupes that had 
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organized a performance for the national Bastille Day festivities on the fourteenth of 
July.108  The inclusion of Guadeloupean’s Creole culture in a national celebration would 
symbolize that Antillean culture was a part of France’s national culture.  Moreover, the 
act of writing to the government for financial support and possibly securing it was also 
an implicit claim for state recognition of Antillean culture.  Karukéra members wanted 
more than an official acknowledgement of their unique cultural identity; they also 
emphasized the educational benefits of their organization.  Through performances of 
Guadeloupean dance and song, Karukéra hoped to spread the message of cultural 
diversity and promote cultural exchange between metropolitans and Antilleans.  
Karukéra challenged the Secretary Stirn to revise the Ministry of the DOM’s policy of 
assimilation; however, it also assured him that their organization promoted national 
unity.          
 
The Development of Antillean Ethnic Activism in the Hexagon 
 
 It is hard to quantify the success of Antillean cultural groups like Karukéra in 
promoting the development of a Creole cultural movement in France.  Nevertheless, the 
proliferation of Antillean cultural associations within France during the 1970s attests to 
the fact that there was a kind of cultural awakening developing among Antillean 
migrants.  In 1976, the magazine Flash Antilles Guyane remarked upon the recent 
“sudden emergence of Associations and this revival of interest for our [Antillean] 
cultural heritage.”109  Among Antillean migrants, “homesickness has created a need to 
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return to the homeland.”110  However, the high cost of air travel prohibited Antilleans 
from visiting Guadeloupe and Martinique on a regular basis.  This situation encouraged 
migrants to create cultural associations to organize “cultural events in which folkloric 
groups recreate the image of the homeland” in France.111  Flash Antilles Guyane placed 
this revitalization of Creole culture within the politics of a larger regional movement 
organized by leaders of Corse, Bretagne, and Occitan, who were also seeking to preserve 
and gain state recognition of their regional cultures.  Like other culturally distinct 
citizens of France, Antillean migrants exercised their political right to formulate cultural 
associations.  These cultural associations were powerful political instruments 
symbolizing Antilleans’ cultural presence within the nation.  They brought Antillean 
migrants together in their struggle for cultural and social rights. 
 In 1973, the presidents of several Antillean associations decided to coordinate 
their cultural and political efforts under one main organization.  The Federation of 
Antillean and Guyanese Associations in the Metropole (FAGAM) acted as a 
representative of Antillean migrants’ interests in France.112  In particular, it was 
concerned with ensuring that Antillean cultural associations received the financial and 
social support to which they were entitled as French citizens.  In a letter to Mr. Ferret, 
the Director of economic, social and cultural affairs for the DOM, FAGAM’s President, 
G. Ravenet, criticized the successive governments of the Fifth Republic for failing to 
address the social needs of Antillean migrants.  In France, Antilleans “confront 
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difficulties of reception, of adaptation, of employment or lodging, and are too often 
affronted by the incomprehension and ignorance of those with which they live.”113  
Because Antilleans are “different from others by the color of their skin and by their 
customs”, they are not “recognized as French.”114  This rejection of Antillean migrants’ 
culture and French citizenship has caused them “to form a ghetto in the disastrous image 
of certain groups of foreigners.”115  Ravenet argued that Antillean associations promoted 
positive cultural images of Antilleans in French society.  Through cultural exchange, 
they reduced social tension and improved relations between metropolitans and Antillean 
migrants.  Therefore, the Ministry of the DOM had an obligation to support Antillean 
cultural associations as a kind of social aid that helped Antilleans adapt to French 
society.   
 By the 1980s, Antilleans had more registered cultural associations than any other 
immigrant group in France.116  This proliferation of cultural associations was an 
assertion of Antilleans’ social right as French citizens to form non-profit organizations.  
Under the “association law” of 1901, all French citizens have the right to form a non-
profit association of two or more people.  Antillean migrants registered their 
organizations with the municipal police department; the declaration of the association’s 
existence then appeared in the French government’s Journal Officiel.117  Antilleans 
could have created functioning associations without registering them with the 
government.  However, they consciously chose to make their cultural associations legal 
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entities recognized by the French government.  Although these non-profit theater 
troupes, dance groups, and music ensembles by definition could not promote any 
political agenda, they were political in the sense that they promoted the revival and 
preservation of Antilleans’ Creole culture.  In literally performing their Creole culture 
for Antillean as well as metropolitan audiences, Antillean migrants were publicly 
asserting and claiming their difference.  Yet, Antilleans were also employing their 
French citizenship in these public expressions of difference.  Antilleans were only able 
to form cultural associations because as French citizens they possessed the right to do so.  
Antillean migrants’ use of their French citizenship to express their distinct Creole 
identity was a direct challenge to assimilation, which demanded that Antilleans 
relinquish all of their cultural particularities to become French citizens.   
 These types of legally recognized non-profit cultural associations represented a 
different kind of Creole movement that was separate from the pro-independence Creole 
movement that had been gaining momentum in the Guadeloupe and Martinique since the 
1960s.  Like the indépendantistes or pro-independence supporters, proponents of the 
new Creole movement were critical of assimilation, which they believed had denigrated 
and nearly destroyed Creole culture.  However, whereas indépendantistes believed that 
Antilleans could only regain control of their cultural identity through independence, 
supporters of the new Creole movement wanted to reclaim their Creole identity while 
still remaining a part of the French nation.   
 Prior to the Second World War and throughout the 1950s, indépendantistes had 
some success in gaining support for Guadeloupean and Martinican independence in 
France.  For the most part, indépendantistes attracted educated Antilleans who had 
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migrated to France to attend university.  In the 1960s, Antillean university students were 
influenced by the struggles for decolonization in the former French colonies, the rise of 
pan-Africanism, the Cuban and Algerian Revolutions, and the political climate leading 
up to the May 1968 movement in France.  These students came together and formed 
nationalist student associations, such as the General Association of Guadeloupean 
Students (AGEG).  From AGEG, several pro-independence political parties formed, 
including the Antillean-Guyanese Front (FAG) in 1961 and the Group for the National 
Organization of Guadeloupe (GONG) in 1963.  These organizations were relatively 
small, but they produced a substantial propaganda campaign against the French presence 
in the Antilles. 
 However, after the 1960s, indépendantistes’ strategy of using university-based 
groups to build a mass movement proved to be ineffective.  Since the 1963 when 
BUMIDOM first began to organize Antillean migration, the overwhelming majority of 
Antilleans who settled in France had a limited education and were a part of the working-
class.  According to BUMIDOM’s migration records, there was a low level of schooling 
among migrants, with most having left school around the age of eleven and not always 
having obtained the primary education certificate.  By the 1970s, around half of all 
Antillean migrants had left school at either fifteen or sixteen; nonetheless, they remained 
employed in low-level occupations in the either the construction, metallurgy or 
machinery industries.118  These migrants of the BUMIDOM era did not relate to the 
educated and middle-class indépendantistes.  BUMIDOM migrants had no use for the 
indépendantistes’ intellectual movement and philosophical arguments that equated 
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departmentalization and migration with colonialism.  They had created a new life for 
themselves and their families in France, and they wanted to remain connected to the 
French nation.   
 In 1982, the magazine Antilles Guyane Actualités interviewed a migrant of the 
BUMIDOM generation who had settled in metropolitan France during the early 1960s.  
The magazine argued that after nearly twenty years of living in Paris, Ronald had created 
a stable life for himself, his wife, and three children.  He had a secure job as a public 
functionary; he owned a home, and played soccer with his friends on Sundays.  Ronald 
also maintained his cultural connection with the Antilles.  He subscribed to all of the 
Antillean magazines and newspapers; he preferred to exclusively listen to Antillean 
music, and he spoke Creole with his friends, the majority of whom were also Antillean.  
Ronald claimed that he was comfortable with his life in France, and did not understand 
why Antilleans in Guadeloupe and Martinique were calling for independence:   
  I do not understand the people over there.  They talk about independence.  
  But with what?  Of course, there must be improvements.  More power  
  given [to the Antilles], but independence, that’s bullshit.  Suppose that  
  there was independence, what would become of us here?  The homeland  
  cannot restrain us.  Me, I live for my homeland, but also see clearly; if  
  there is independence, it is us [Antillean migrants] who will have to  
  remake ourselves again. That does not interest me.119  
 
According to Antilles Guyane Actualités, Ronald was the “archetype of the Antillean in 
the metropole” who preferred the economic benefits of living in France over 
independence.   
 In April 1974, François Mitterrand, then a candidate for the presidency, 
committed what Flash Antilles Afrique (FAA) referred to as a “political blunder”: he 
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promised independence to those departments who wished it.  Mitterrand’s statement 
guaranteeing “right to difference” and “respect for cultural identity” was a part of a 
political speech he made in Ajaccio, the capital of Corsica, an island off of the southeast 
coast of France.120  It was an attempt to gain the favor of Corsican voters who since the 
early 1970s had endured widespread violence at the hands of various nationalist 
movements calling for either some degree of political autonomy or full independence.121  
For FAA, Mitterrand’s call for the “respect for cultural identity” was essentially giving 
into the demands of nationalists who only represented a minority of France’s citizens in 
Corsica as well as Guadeloupe and Martinique.  FAA claimed that Mitterrand misread 
the desire of Antillean migrants like Ronald for autonomy, and alienated the Antillean 
electorate.  For the magazine, Mitterrand’s statement had facilitated the victory of his 
opponent Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, who won the election by only 1.6%.  FAA argued 
that if Mitterrand had not mentioned the possibility of independence for Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, then more Antilleans would have voted for him, securing his overall victory 
in the national election.    
 However, in reality, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s electoral victory was not a 
landslide in the Antilles.  Antilleans did not completly reject Mitterrand; forty-three 
percent of Antilleans voted for him.122  It is more likely that d’Estaing failed to win by a 
greater majority because of divisions within the Right, not because of Mitterrand’s 
supposed “blunder.”  FAA’s interpretation of the 1974 presidential election represented a 
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widely held popular belief among Antilleans that independence would be detrimental to 
migrants who had carved out a life for themselves in metropolitan France as citizens of 
the French nation.  “The majority of Guadeloupeans do not want separation from France 
because the politics is about social benefits.  To maintain a decent income, is it not better 
to remain in the French bosom?”123  Even if the indépendantistes did have some early 
success in gaining Antillean students’ support, students represented only a small 
proportion of the Antillean population in France.  They needed the support of the 
working-class migrants of the BUMIDOM generation to make the independence 
movement politically viable.   
 
Théâtre Noir and the Forging of a French Creole Identity  
 
 In the 1970s, the Creole movement crossed the Atlantic, but it established itself in 
France as a cultural movement that Antillean migrants could relate to and rally around.  
It recognized the desires of migrants like Ronald to hold onto their Creole cultural 
identity while also maintaining their political status as French citizens.  In its journey 
from Guadeloupe and Martinique to France, the Creole movement had shed its 
arguments for independence.  By the 1980s, it was largely a movement of Antillean 
cultural associations whose leaders sought to make Creole culture a part of the French 
nation.  The Théâtre Noir (Black Theater) is an example of the type of association that 
was a part of the new France-based Creole movement.  In February 1974, Martinican 
Benjamin Jules-Rosette founded the “Black Theater Group” to perform the works of 
Antillean and African authors and artists unknown to the metropolitan public.  Jules-
Rosette placed his association within the burgeoning cultural movement of Antillean 
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migrants who wanted to rediscover their cultural roots.  It was focused on representing 
both African and Antillean writers and artists, suggesting that Antilleans had cultural 
connections to nations other than France.  In an interview, Jules-Rosette described his 
organization as the “Antillean people’s permanent search for an identity” from which 
they have been alienated.124  In October 1979, Jules-Rosette opened the Théâtre Noir in 
the twentieth arrondissement of Paris, enabling his theater troop to reach a wider 
metropolitan audience with more frequent public performances.  Jules-Rosette wanted 
the performances at Théâtre Noir to evoke in Antilleans a rediscovery of their cultural 
links to Africa, as well as their Creole heritage.   
 The play Errance or “Wanderings”, directed by Jules-Rosette, reflected this 
theme of cultural self-discovery.   It depicted the “dilemma of a young rootless migrant 
woman halfway between the land of her birth and her adoptive country.”125  In an 
interview, the actress who starred in Errance, Lisette Malidor, explained how the play’s 
story reflected her own discovery of her black identity as a Martinican migrant in Paris.  
In 1978, Malidor, a celebrated burlesque dancer who performed at the Moulin Rouge 
and the Casino de Paris, left music hall to follow her dream of becoming an actress.  
Malidor wanted to “return to her race”; she no longer wanted to be sexually objectified 
by a white metropolitan audience.  At Théâtre noir, she “discovered her own race and 
herself.”126  Errance celebrated this process of cultural awakening, in which migrants 
uncovered their black and Creole roots that they had left behind in the islands and lost in 
France.  However, Jules-Rosette was also adamant that his theater was “certainly not a 
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cultural ghetto.”  Rather, it is “above all a place of affirmation, not of confinement.”127  
It was a “humanitarian” organization that facilitated “the coexistence of different racial 
communities through knowledge and reciprocal respect.”128  The troupe performed in 
schools throughout France with the goal of teaching children to “respect cultural 
differences.”129  These performances taught “blacks and whites to mutually understand 
and appreciate each other.”130  
 Associations like Théâtre Noir promoted the public recognition of Antillean 
culture in France.  It encouraged Antillean migrants to explore and claim their Creole 
cultural heritage; however, it did it in a politically accepted manner that did not pose a 
threat to the political union between France and the Antilles.  The Théâtre Noir was 
registered with the government as an official non-profit cultural association.  Although it 
was a publicly recognized organization, the Théâtre Noir’s expression of cultural 
difference remained connected to a private association.  In other words, the Théâtre Noir 
was within the constraints of the nation’s republican ideals, which understood diversity 
as strictly a private matter.  For this reason, the Théâtre Noir had an excellent reputation.  
It was lauded in the metropolitan press as a positive expression of Antillean culture.131   
The Ministry of the DOM was not hesitant to grant the Théâtre Noir 300,000F in 
financial support when it threatened to close it doors at the end of 1980 due to lack of 
monetary funds.  The Secretary of State for the DOM praised Théâtre Noir for its ability 
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to “promote a better understanding of [Antillean] cultures and an exchange based on the 
respect of their differences.”132   
 Similarly, in 1978 when M. Rilos, the president of the Communauté Antillo-
Guyanaise (CAG) asked for extra funding to transfer its organization’s headquarters to a 
larger space, the Ministry of the DOM agreed without hesitation.133  CAG was also a 
legally recognized association that promoted social and cultural support for Antilleans 
living in the metropole.  They organized every kind of Antillean cultural activity, such as 
community parties and dances, film viewings, dance performances, musical groups, and 
plays.  The Ministry of the DOM regarded CAG as a positive organization.  It went so 
far as to send a representative to the inauguration of CAG’s community center to praise 
the association and its leaders.  DOM officials were pleased to support CAG’s 
organizational growth because of the association’s commitment to helping Antillean 
migrants adapt to French society.134  As long as CAG served the greater purpose of 
Antilleans’ integration, then the Ministry of the DOM was eager to support Antilleans’ 
expression of their Creole culture. 
 Compared to nationalist groups, organizations like the Théâtre Noir and CAG 
posed a minimal political threat to the nation.  For this reason, the Ministry of the DOM 
encouraged their activities as a strategy to silence those Antillean activists who were 
arguing for independence.  Debates in the National Assembly during the early 1980s 
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reveal that the France’s elected representatives were extremely concerned about the 
subversive potential of the Guadeloupean and Martinican independence movements.  In 
June 1980, a member of the National Assembly described the radicalization of the 
Antillean independence movement.  Pro-independence leaders’ “determination is 
increasing day by day”, making the “masses ever more likely to fight a ferocious and 
indiscriminate repression.”135  The representative described independence as a 
movement of hate and racism that encouraged Antilleans to despise France and all that is 
not Guadeloupean or Martinican.   
 Joseph Cambolive, a member of the Socialist Party, responded to this 
representative’s worries; he argued that the government could improve Antilleans’ 
relationships with the nation by recognizing their cultural differences.  He described the 
political and cultural atmosphere of France as one in which “claims for decentralization, 
self-autonomy, and expressions of regional cultures are already strong.”136  A similar 
cultural movement focused on the rediscovery of “the Caribbean man” was also growing 
stronger in the Antilles and among Antillean migrants in France.  Cambolive argued that 
the denial of Antilleans Caribbean identity would create political and social tensions in 
France.  This was already happening in the French territory of Polynesia: a member of 
Polynesia’s territorial assembly noted that Polynesians felt contempt for the French 
government that had degraded and devalued their culture.  Taking into account this 
particular situation, Cambolive encouraged members of the National Assembly to 
recognize Antilleans’ Creole culture:  “Faced with the sad situation, do you not feel, 
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members of the Government, my colleagues, the urgent need to actively be inspired by 
the expression coined by François Mitterrand in Ajaccio on April 26, 1974: "Right to 
difference, respect for cultural identity?”137   
 Some members of the French government philosophically supported the 
recognition of Antilleans’ cultural specificities as a kind of cultural right that should be 
granted to all individuals.  However, the “right to difference” took political hold and was 
effectively implemented as a solution to the pro-independence Creole movement’s threat 
to national unity.  The Ministry of the Overseas Departments’ financial support of 
Antillean cultural associations, such as Théâtre Noir and CAG, was a part of this 
strategy to use “the right to difference” to solidify the political and cultural union 
between France and the Antilles.  This does not imply that the France-based Antillean 
cultural movement was not politically subversive; it was not a passive movement that 
followed the government’s directives concerning diversity’s place within the French 
nation.  Metropolitan Antillean activists’ conscious decision to revive the Creole culture 
while simultaneously distancing their cultural organizations from the independence 
movement enabled a new kind of Creole movement to take hold in France.  Antillean 
migrants could support this type of cultural movement that permitted them to maintain 
their social and cultural links with metropolitan France while also expressing their 
Creole identity.  Moreover, the government could support Antillean associations as legal 
cultural groups that did not seem to pose a threat to national stability.  With such 
widespread support from the Antillean migrant community as well as from the French 
government, the France-based Creole movement had the power to create political and 
                                                
137 Débats Parlementaires, Assembée Nationale, June 10, 1980.  Published in Journal Officiel de la 
République Française.  Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940216, Art. 12.    
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cultural change in France.  Most significantly, it pushed French officials to recognize 
Antilleans’ “right to difference.”  The France-based Creole movement reformed the 
policy of assimilation and pushed French republicanism toward the possibility of 
multiculturalism in France.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 The history of Antillean ethnic activism is important for understanding the 
contemporary debates about diversity in France, which are largely focused on the 
question of religious diversity and the outward expression of difference in public spaces.  
The headscarf affairs and the 2004 law prohibiting students from wearing “ostentatious” 
religious symbols in public schools have reinforced education officials’ conception of 
difference as incompatible with the purported universality of republican education.  
Historians have argued that the French government’s focus on religion and Islam’s place 
in public classrooms is due to the fact that Muslims now represent one of the largest 
minority groups in France.  However, the history of Antillean activism reveals that this 
construction of Islam as the new threat to national unity is not simply about numbers; it 
is about the particular way in which Muslims are arguing for the right to difference in 
France.    
 This chapter argues that Antillean migrants employed the established republican 
insitution of cultural associations to claim their right to be both Creole and French.  
BUMIDOM’s recognition of Antilleans’ Creole identity was a limited form of 
multiculturalism that fit into state officials’ conception of how French citizens should be 
permitted to form groups with particular cultural identities.  The Ministry of DOM’s 
articulation of action culturelle and France créole was not a complete break with 
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assimilation.  Rather, it offered the government a viable solution for effectively 
integrating Antilleans into French society.  In acknowledging Antilleans’ Creole 
identity, the Bureau hoped to placate Antillean activists while simultaneously solidifying 
the political union between France and the Antilles.  BUMIDOM’s recognition of 
Antilleans’ difference took the form of financial support for the establishment of 
Antillean cultural associations in metropolitan France.  The Bureau and the Ministry of 
the DOM supported Antilleans’ expression of difference as long as it remained within 
the accepted realm of cultural associations.  Therefore, in general, Antilleans asserted 
their difference by exercising their right as French citizens to form cultural associations.  
They used these organizations as a platform to insert their Creole culture into the French 
nation.   
 In contrast, French Muslims’ expression of their cultural and religious difference 
does not fit into the model of cultural associations previously established by Antillean 
migrants.  Female French Muslim students’ decision to wear headscarves in public 
schools has therefore been interpreted by education officials as a challenge to the 
Republic’s understanding of diversity and group identity as something that is exclusively 
expressed within cultural associations.  French Muslim women’s struggle to express 
their Islamic culture and faith by wearing the headscarf and veil is so controversial 
because it is a break from how other minority groups, such as Antilleans, have argued 
for the right to difference in France.  Scholars of France have characterized the “right to 
difference” in France as a distinctive political change that only came to fruition in 1981 
when Socialist François Mitterrand was elected President.  However, this chapter has 
demonstrated that the “right to difference” in France was not an abrupt change in policy.  
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Rather, it was a much more gradual process that began in the 1970s.  Negotiations 
among the Ministry of the DOM, the Bureau, and Antillean migrants concerning how 
and the extent to which Antilleans’ Creole culture would be included in the nation 
connected the “right to difference” and group identity in France with cultural 
associations.  This nuanced understanding of Antilleans’ construction of diversity sheds 
light on the new ways in which French Muslims are expanding the concept of 
multiculturalism in France to include public expressions of difference.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
From Militant Nationalists to Ethnic Minority: The Antillean Creole Movement 
in Metropolitan France and the Antilles after Departmentalization 
 
 
Introduction 
  Currently, among the Antillean people, a powerful cultural movement is  
  growing, closely linked to the broader movement for national liberation,  
  transforming it and reinforcing it.  At the center of this cultural movement: 
  the Creole language, the knowledge of its rules and writing script.1 
 
  Now, we declare ourselves Creoles.  We declare that Créolité   
  (“Creoleness”) is the cement of our culture and that it must govern the  
  foundations of our Antilleanness.  Créolité is the interactional or   
  transactional aggregate of Caribbean, European, African, Asian, and  
  Middle Eastern cultural elements, united on the same soil by the yoke of  
  History….Indeed, Créolité claims a full and entire sovereignty of our  
  peoples without, however, identifying with the different ideologies which  
  have supported this claim to date....We also want to distance ourselves  
  from this somewhat narrow nationalism…2 
 
In 1977, Jingha, a Paris-based Antillean magazine with readership in both the 
Antilles and France, reported that the Creole language had become the center of the 
Guadeloupean and Martinican nationalist movements.  After a period of repression, the 
Guadeloupean and Martinican nationalist movements reemerged in the early 1970s with a 
new strategy: their political platform was now infused with a cultural agenda.   
Nationalist leaders chose the Creole language as the symbol to distinguish local Antillean 
culture from the metropolitan French one.  They argued that Guadeloupeans and 
                                                
1 “La langue créole: l’écrit et la parole”, Jingha, November-January, 1977, p. 17. 
2 Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, Raphaël Confiant, Éloge de la Créolité  (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 
1989), 26, 55.  See also: M.B. Taleb-Khyar, trans.  In Praise of Creoleness  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1990).    
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Martinicans possessed a different language and culture from French metropolitans and 
therefore, should be independent nations.3  Simultaneously, Antillean academics set out 
to legitimize nationalists’ appropriation of Creole by developing a standardized Creole 
writing system, vocabulary, and grammar.  Martinican linguist Jean Bernabé deliberately 
chose to construct a Creole language that deviated as much as possible from French to 
symbolize Antilles’ cultural and political independence from France.4   
In 1989, in his essay entitled Éloge de la Créolité (In Praise of Creoleness), 
Bernabé and his colleagues, Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant, reconceived of 
the Creole language and culture as an amalgamation of European, African, Asian, and 
Middle Eastern cultures.  Créolité also defined Creole as the embodiment of Antillean 
cultural identity, and encouraged both the preservation and creation of a distinct Antillean 
language and culture.  However, in contrast to nationalist rhetoric, which used the Creole 
language to argue for independence, Créolité emphasized the unique transnational 
character of Antillean culture.  In doing so, it argued for Antilleans’ inclusion in the 
French nation as a distinct ethnic and cultural group.  In the span of a decade, the Creole 
language, which was once synonymous with Antillean nationalism, became the symbol 
of French multiculturalism. 
                                                
3 There is a large body of literature describing how various nationalist movements have used language & 
culture as a marker of a group’s distinct nationality to argue for independence.  The special role that 
language, in particular, has played in building nationalist movements has been acknowledged by historians 
and social scientists.  See especially: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 
1983); Richard Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1988); Joshua A. Fishman, Language and Nationalis: Two Integrative Essays (New 
York: Newbury House Publishers, 1973); Anwar S. Dil, ed., Language in Sociocultural Change: Essays by 
Joshua A. Fishman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); Eric Hobsbawm, “Waving Flags: Nations 
and Nationalism” in The Age of Empire  (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 142-164; Ernest Gellner, 
Nations and Nationalism  (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds.  The 
Invention of Tradition  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Stephen Barbour and Cathie 
Carmichael, ed., Language and Nationalism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
4 Jean Bernabé, “Ecrire le créole,” Mofwaz 2  (1977): 11-20. 
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This chapter analyzes this shift in the Creole movement from nationalism to 
multiculturalism, and seeks to explain how such a transformation occurred.  It traces both 
the France-based and Antillean-based Creole movement from its inception in the 1950s 
as a part of the Antillean “cultural awakening” to the nationalization of Creole in the 
1970s, and finally to Creole’s redefinition during the 1980s as a symbol of multicultural 
politics.  This political shift can be explained in part by a change in geographical focus 
from Guadeloupe and Martinique to metropolitan France.  Due to a large wave of 
government-organized migration, by the 1970s, nearly one third of the entire Antillean 
population lived in metropolitan France.5  As more and more Antilleans settled in the 
Hexagon, independence became less and less popular.  Migrants had created lives for 
themselves in metropolitan France, and they wished to remain a part of the French nation.  
Recognizing the desires of migrants, leaders within the Creole movement moved away 
from the discourse of independence toward multiculturalism.  Their new argument for 
Antilleans’ right to be both Creole and French embodied the kind of Creole movement 
that appealed to an increasingly large population of Antilleans residing in metropolitan 
France. 
  This kind of historicization and trans-Atlantic analysis of the Creole movement 
reveals that Antillean ethnic activism emerged from the convergence of two political 
strategies of the postwar era: nationalism and assimilation.  Beginning in the late 1970s, 
the Guadeloupean and Martinican nationalist movements took a militant turn.  In April 
1980, the GLA (Group of Armed Liberation) set fire to the studio of France 3, a national 
television station, in Point-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe.  This was the first of a series of violent 
attacks in which the GLA and a separate nationalist organization, the Caribbean 
                                                
5 Alain Anselin, L’émigration antillaise en France: la troisième île (Paris: Karthala, 2000).   
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Revolutionary Alliance (ARC), started fires and planted bombs to destroy various French 
government buildings throughout Guadeloupe and Martinique.  These indépendantistes’ 
use of terrorism to achieve their political goals alienated the Antillean people in both the 
Antilles and France.   Their acts of violence threatened the validity of the Creole 
movement, which had become virtually synonymous with the independence movement.    
In 1983, the Ministry of the Overseas Department lifted the legal ban on the use 
of Creole in public spaces and declared Creole a regional language of France.  This 
decision was a strategic move to depoliticize the Creole movement and undermine 
nationalists’ appropriation of Creole as a tool of nationalism.  In response, nationalist 
Creolists in the Antilles decided to join forces with assimilationist Creole-supporters in 
France to keep the Creole movement from disintegrating.  They found common ground 
and popular support for the Creole movement in Antillean activists’ articulation of “right 
to difference”, and together, they began to argue for Creole’s connectedness to the French 
language and culture.  Creole’s new incarnation as a symbol of multiculturalism appealed 
to Antillean migrants in France who wished to remain politically linked to the French 
nation, but also wanted to maintain their Antillean culture and identity.   
The movement to promote, develop, and popularize the Creole language in the 
Antilles and France is a story of constant political transformations in which Antillean 
nationalists, intellectuals, and political activists in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and France 
used Creole to navigate their specific positions regarding the Antilles’ political status in 
relation to the French nation.  Under departmentalization, Antilleans had become French 
citizens and therefore, possessed the same civil and political rights as metropolitans.  Yet, 
for Antilleans, full liberation went beyond civil and political liberties.  It meant freedom 
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from French cultural domination as well as the recognition of Antillean cultural 
distinctiveness.6  Antillean intellectuals and activists consistently defined Creole as the 
embodiment of Antillean cultural identity and elevated language as the rallying point 
around which Antilleans could achieve cultural emancipation.   
However, the meaning of cultural emancipation was in flux in the postwar era.  
From departmentalization in 1946 through the 1980s, Antillean elites constructed and 
reshaped Creole and the goals of the Creole movement to correspond with their changing 
and competing political objectives.  Nationalists used the Creole language to express 
Antilleans’ separate cultural and national identity; assimilationists highlighted Creole’s 
historical and cultural connection to France; multiculturalists constructed Creole as an 
integral component of the French nation.  As each group appropriated Creole for its own 
political means, it became not only a symbol and object of struggle, but also a political 
resource to gain popular support for their specific cause and vision of the Antilles’ 
relationship to France.   
The first part of this chapter explores how Creole became a symbol of Antillean 
cultural revival in the decade following departmentalization.  Departmentalization, and its 
destruction of Antillean cultural and political institutions, precipitated a “cultural 
awakening” among educated Antillean elites.  These “Creolists” constructed the Creole 
language—the last vestige of Antillean culture that French officials could not destroy—as 
the symbol of Antillean cultural identity.  Nevertheless, in the 1950s, Antillean 
intellectuals sought to disassociate the Creole movement from politics, and were careful 
                                                
6 See: Gerhard Grohs, “Difficulties of Cultural Emancipation in Africa,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 14, no.2  (March 1976): 65-78.  Grohs distinguishes cultural emancipation from economic and 
social emancipation, and argues that “true” emancipation not only includes political and civil liberties, but 
also freedom from cultural domination as well as recovery of a past cultural identity.   
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to minimize the potentially subversive nature of an Antillean cultural movement.  Creole 
only became politicized with the emergence of the anticolonial and nationalist 
movements in Guadeloupe and Martinique. 
Part two examines this nationalization of Creole in the 1960s and 1970s.  During 
this time period, two groups formed the basis of the Creole movement: linguists or 
Creolists who shaped and codified the Creole language as a symbol of cultural and 
political resistance and national militants who sought to gain popular support for 
independence through the instrumental use of the Creole language.  Linguists, such as 
Jean Bernabé, were Antilleans who had been educated in French universities during the 
1950s and 1960s.  As students in France, they were influenced by the struggles for 
decolonization in the former French colonies, the rise of pan-Africanism, the Cuban and 
Algerian Revolutions, and the political climate leading up to the May 1968 movement in 
France.  This atmosphere politicized these young intellectuals as they discovered their 
Creole heritage, which for them was separate from their French identities.  After 
returning to the Antilles, Bernabé surrounded himself with other linguists interested in 
Creole and in 1975 formed the Group for the Study and Research of “Créolophonie” 
(GEREC).  For GEREC, the study of language, and in particular, Creole was a political 
assertion of their Creole identities and personal resistance against French cultural 
domination.  Nationalists were former members of the Martinican and Guadeloupean 
communist parties who had become disillusioned with the party line.  While communists 
advocated political autonomy within the French federation, nationalists began to press for 
a more radical position.  These dissidents broke with the autonomist communist parties, 
declared themselves in favor of independence, and founded GONG (Group for the 
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National Organization of Guadeloupe), an anticolonialist and clandestine organization.  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, GONG was the main nationalist organization in the 
Antilles.  It focused on public protest against colonialism and on mobilizing the masses 
for national independence.  The second section of this chapter argues that the Creole 
movement emerged from the interdependence of linguists and nationalists.   Nationalists 
were dependent upon the academic authority of linguists to validate their political 
ideology, and linguists needed a nationalist following to promote their ideas among a 
skeptical populace.   
At the same time, assimilationist Creolists in France were forging their own 
movement that used Creole to discredit the nationalists’ claims and place Creole and the 
Antilles firmly within the French nation.  The most prominent assimilationists were Guy 
and Marie-Christine Hazaël-Massieux, a husband and wife team who were associated 
with the University of Provence in France.  They argued for the interdependence of 
French and Creole, a claim that directly challenged nationalists’ construction of Creole as 
a completely distinct language from French.   For the most part, the scholarship on the 
Antillean Creole movement is exclusively focused on the nationalist politics of Creole in 
Guadeloupe and Martinique.7  This chapter expands this narrative beyond the Caribbean, 
and places the Antilles-based and France-based Creole movements in conversation with 
each other.  In the 1980s, Antillean migrants had no interest in nationalism or 
assimilation; rather, they were attracted to the movement for the “right to difference.”8  
                                                
7 See: Hubert Devonish, Language and Liberation: Creole language politics in the Caribbean; Michel 
Giraud, “Les Conflits de langues aux Antilles françaises: fondements historiques et enjeux politiques” 
Études Polémologiques  34  (1985): 45-65; Maryse Romanos, La poésie antillaise d’expression créole de 
1960 a nos jours: Essai d’analyse socioculturelle  (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998); Ellen M Schnepel, In Search 
of National Identity: Creole and politics in Guadeloupe  (Hamburg: Helmut Buske, 2004). 
8 For more on the Antillean movement for “the right to difference” in France, see Chapter 2.   
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Therefore, in order to attract migrants to the Creole movement, Bernabé and other leaders 
of the Antilles-based Creole movement found common ground with the Hazaël-
Massieuxs’ France-based Creole movement in the emerging politics of French 
multiculturalism.  This chapter contends that Antillean ethnic activism emerged in France 
during the 1980s from the convergence of the France- and Antilles-based Creole 
movements.   
The third part of this chapter analyzes the French government’s reaction to the 
Creole movement.  Prior to the 1980s, all efforts to advance the cause of Creole had been 
controlled by nationalist sympathizers and militants.  In 1983, in an attempt to regain 
control of the Creole issue and pacify the independence movement, the Ministries of 
Education and Overseas Departments officially recognized Creole as a regional language 
of France and supported its preservation.  This placed the Creole movement within the 
confines of the socialist government’s articulation of the “right to difference”. 
In response to the government’s attempt to coopt the Creole movement, Creolists 
embraced the language of the “right to difference” to reconstruct Creole as a political tool 
of Antillean ethnic activism.  Nationalist militants associated with GONG continued to 
use Creole to argue for independence, but in 1982 with the publication of the Charte 
Culturelle Créole, Bernabé and his GEREC linguists chose to break with the 
indépendantistes and separate cultural rights claims from nationalist goals.  Instead of 
using Creole to justify political separation from the French nation, linguists reinvented 
Creole as a symbol of French and Antillean cultural connectedness to argue for the 
government’s recognition of Antilleans as an ethnically distinct cultural group within the 
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French nation.  The fourth section of this chapter explores this shift in the Creole 
movement from nationalism to multiculturalism.   
 
Part I.  Creole and the Antillean Cultural Awakening 
 Prior to the departmentalization of Guadeloupe and Martinique in 1946, 
discussions in the National Assembly regarding the future assimilation of the Antilles 
raised concerns about how the State could use its social and political institutions to make 
Antilleans into French citizens.  In 1944, the colonial newspaper, La Tribune Syndicale et 
Laïque, argued that the French language could possibly be a solution to this problem of 
assimilation in the Antilles: 
 To speak French is an act of patriotism.  A community of one language is  
  the surest guarantee of national unity. …It is necessary to explain (to  
  Antilleans) that to love France is not only to imitate its customs and  
  traditions, to take advantage of its benefits, its protection, its laws, to share 
  its history and its glories, it is also and above all to assimilate, to adopt its  
  doctrines and its language.  To be French is to think and speak French.9 
 
When Guadeloupe and Martinique became departments of France, the Ministry of the 
DOM immediately employed the French language as a tool of assimilation.  DOM 
officials believed that the dissemination of the French language would effectively 
distance Antilleans from their local Creole culture and incorporate them into French 
society as loyal citizens.  Thus, they forcibly established French as the official language 
of Guadeloupe and Martinique, and banned the use of Creole in public institutions, such 
as schools, courtrooms, and the media.  In doing so, they relegated Creole to the private 
sphere, and reduced its status to that of a local vernacular.  The ability to speak French 
signified social prestige and power; in contrast, Creole was the language of lower-class 
                                                
9 La Tribune Syndicale et Laïque, February 1944, 2.  Quoted in Ellen M. Schnepel, “The Politics of 
Language in the French Caribbean: The Creole Movement on the Island of Guadeloupe”  (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1990), 108.   
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Antilleans who had received little schooling, and thus did not have access to French or 
the social mobility it afforded.   
 Despite this stigmatization, Creole persisted in daily communication.  Close 
friends and relatives addressed each other in Creole, and local merchants in smaller cities 
used Creole to interact with their customers.  Teachers in rural areas often used Creole in 
their classrooms to ensure that students understood their directions.  Moreover, Creole 
remained the primary expression of local Antillean culture.  In particular, it dominated 
music and theater productions.  The French government may have been able to declare 
French the national language of the Antilles, but it could not regulate how Antilleans 
communicated with each other or the cultural meanings they attributed to their Creole 
language. 
In the 1950s, some Guadeloupean and Martinican elites reacted against the state’s 
efforts to assimilate Antilleans to the French cultural model.  Across the French empire, 
colonial subjects in Indochina, Algeria, and West Africa formed nationalist groups and 
entered into war with France for their independence.  Inspired by these nationalists’ 
claims that they possessed a separate cultural tradition from France, a group of elite 
Antilleans also began to explore their own cultural heritage.  In July 1957, they formed 
ACRA (l’Académie Créole des Antilles), a cultural association dedicated to the 
preservation and creation of an Antillean culture distinct from French culture.  This 
postwar Antillean “cultural awakening” was intrinsically different from the interwar 
Négritude cultural revival.  Négritude was a literary and political movement founded by a 
group of Antillean and African intellectuals living in Paris during the 1930s and 1940s.  
Led by Aimé Césaire of Martinique and Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Négritude broke 
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with other French-educated intellectuals from France’s colonial territories who had 
emulated French standards in art and culture and denied their African heritage.  Césaire 
and Senghor revalorized Africa as the “motherland” and a source of inspiration in the 
construction of diasporic black cultures.  The Négritude movement claimed “blackness” 
as a source of pride and identity in the struggle against colonialism.   
In contrast, ACRA’s members criticized Négritude writers’ over-privileging of 
“blackness”; they looked within the Antillean context rather than to Africa for the 
cultural center of Antillean identity.  For ACRA, Négritude was an exclusive movement 
in that it only appealed to those Antilleans who traced their roots to Africa.  However, 
Antilleans were not just black.  Since the slave trade first brought Africans to Guadeloupe 
and Martinique, many other cultures, including those from South and East Asia, the 
Middle East, Europe, and the Americas, have mixed with the indigenous Carib culture to 
form a very diverse Antillean culture.  In making the Caribbean and its many cultures the 
focus of its movement, ACRA hoped to appeal to all Antilleans and the many cultural 
heritages with which they identified.  Culture and the Caribbean, not race and Africa, 
became the unifying elements of ACRA’s movement to free Antillean history and 
heritage from French domination.    
In its academic journal, La Revue Guadeloupéenne, ACRA declared itself 
committed to reviving the Creole language and culture: 
 …to take stock of our linguistic treasure; to establish the meaning of the  
  words and proverbial sayings, as well as their genealogy, with notations  
  and anecdotes; to research, in particular, the source of the languages that  
  are a part of Creole; to establish a writing system…to defend it against  
  French, one of its fathers, invasive and abusive.10 
 
                                                
10 Gaston Bourgeois, “Vive l’ACRA!”,  La Revue Guadeloupéenne  no.37  (July-September 1957): 21.   
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ACRA’s defense of the Creole language challenged the assimilation laws of 
departmentalization.  However, its members did not want ACRA to be perceived of as a 
politically subversive organization.  The 1950s and early 1960s was a time of political 
turmoil for the French empire as colonial subjects in North and West Africa fought for 
their independence.  ACRA did not want to be associated with these various nationalist 
groups for fear that the French government would perceive of its organization as another 
independence movement and squelch its efforts to create an Antillean identity around the 
Creole language.  This generation of colonial-educated elites believed that Antilleans 
could achieve cultural autonomy from within the French state.  Unlike their 
contemporaries in France’s remaining colonies, this group of Martinicans and 
Guadeloupeans did not desire independence.  For them, complete integration with France 
was the answer to Antilleans’ demands for political equality.  Thus, ACRA sought to 
separate their cultural claims from the debates concerning Guadeloupe’s and 
Martinique’s political relationship with France, as well as the broader debates about the 
future political status of France’s North and West African colonies. 
 In articles two and five of its charter, ACRA attempted to deemphasize the 
political implications of its cultural movement by referring to Creole as a “patois” and by 
prohibiting political discussions in group meetings.  According to ACRA, its motives 
were purely cultural.  “The objective of this association: is to privilege, on a cultural and 
friendly level, the exchange of views among peoples interested in various creole patois or 
dialect.…The members prohibit all political or religious discussion.”11  ACRA’s 
conscious decision to define Creole as a “patois” endorsed the preservation of Antillean 
                                                
11 ACRA, Statuts, July 27, 1957.  Reprinted in Ellen M. Schnepel “The Politics of Language in the French 
Caribbean: The Creole Movement on the Island of Guadeloupe”  (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 
1990), 445-448. 
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culture; yet, it did not pose a threat to French political and cultural domination.  As an 
inferior “patois” or dialect of French, Creole as well as the Antilles would remain 
politically subordinated to the French language and nation.       
 Despite ACRA’s attempts to detach its cultural movement from the debates about 
the Antilles’ relationship to France, their insistence on defending Creole against an 
“invasive” an “abusive” French culture was nonetheless political.  Their movement 
transformed Creole into a symbol of Antillean identity.  They had made Creole an 
expression of Antilleans’ local culture and solidarity that stood in opposition not only to 
the French language, but also to French political and cultural dominance.  ACRA could 
not separate Creole from politics; they were inevitably linked.   
 
Part II.  The Nationalization of Creole 
The Beginnings of the Antillean Independence Movement 
 In 1946, most sectors of the Antillean population supported Guadeloupe’s and 
Martinique’s change in political status from colonies to departments of France.  Antillean 
representatives, and in particular, Aimé Césaire, also unanimously supported 
departmentalization.  He, like many of his colleagues perceived of the Republic as the 
upholder of equality while white settlers sought to maintain the islands’ colonial status so 
that they could continue to socially and economically dominate Antillean society.  
Césaire argued that a closer political union with France would end the hierarchy of the 
colonial regime, and bring social and economic equality to the Antilles.12  However, a 
decade after departmentalization, a segment of the traditional Antillean left, including 
Césaire, had become disillusioned with the policy.  Departmentalization had failed to 
                                                
12 For more specifics on the change in Guadeloupe and Martinique’s political status from colonies to 
departments see the Introduction.   
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solve the Antilles’ grave social and economic problems; social disparities between 
Antilleans and metropolitans continued to exist, and were only growing larger.  
Moreover, by the mid-1950s, the Antilles had become more economically dependent 
upon the metropole and had progressively lost cultural autonomy.   
 Throughout the 1950s, a series of general strikes occurred in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, culminating in the 1956 agricultural workers’ strike.  At the end of February 
1956, the Federation of Agricultural Workers called for a general strike in protest of their 
low salaries and poor working conditions, as well as the white settlers’ (békés) continued 
control of the sugar industry.  The strike lasted for nearly two months, during which ten 
of thirteen factories were completely paralyzed due to the lack of sugar cane being 
harvested.  On several occasions, violence erupted between the unionized agricultural 
workers and strikebreakers, resulting in the arrest of fifty striking workers.13  From this 
general malaise, there arose new political groups, demanding recognition of group 
identity and more local control.  In 1956, Aimé Césaire broke with the French 
Communist Party (PCF); two years later he founded the Martinican Progressive Party 
(PPM).  Césaire used the Soviet forces’ violent suppression of a popular uprising in 
Hungary as a pretext for leaving the Soviet-aligned PCF.  Yet, his letter of resignation 
was essentially a justification for turning away from the pro-assimilationist PCF toward 
autonomy.  After a decade of departmentalization, Césaire no longer believed that 
assimilation would bring economic and social equality to the Antilles.  Shortly after 
establishing the PPM, he joined forces with the newly formed local Communist parties in 
Martinique (PCM) and Guadeloupe (PCG), which had also recently split from the PCF.  
Together, these three parties opened up the debate on the political status of the islands, 
                                                
13 Marie-Hélène Léotin, Habiter le Monde Martinique, 1946-2006 (Paris: Ibis Rouge, 2008), 25-33. 
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and argued for more local control of political and cultural affairs.  Hereafter, the right-
wing parties distinguished themselves from the left by becoming supporters of 
departmentalization.    
 Up until the early 1960s, it was inconceivable for a political group to speak of a 
“Martinican nation” or a “Guadeloupean nation”.14  The popular PPM, PCM, and PCG 
supported political autonomy for the Antilles within the French state, not as separate 
nations.15  Anticolonial groups, such as AGEG (General Association of Guadeloupean 
Students in France) condemned departmentalization as a continued form of colonial 
oppression; however, at this time, AGEG did not articulate independence as a solution to 
this particular problem.  In December 1960, at its third annual conference in Montpellier, 
AGEG adopted a “Guadeloupean Student Charter”, calling for Guadeloupean students in 
France to fight against colonial oppression: “As a citizen of a colonized country, aware of 
his origins, the Guadeloupean student has the right and duty to conduct a struggle against 
colonialism in all of its forms.”16  This kind of abstract language established AGEG’s 
perception of Guadeloupe as a colonial possession of France despite its legal status as a 
department.  Yet, it did not present the goal of this struggle in specific terms; it was not 
entirely clear that Guadeloupeans should be arguing for independence.    
 In the summer of 1961, when the Antillean-Guianean Front (FAG) emerged in 
France with the objective of “awakening the national consciousness in the Antilles”, the 
                                                
14 Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant, Lettres créoles: tracées antillaises et continentales de la 
littérature, Haïti, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane 1635-1975  (Paris : Hatier, 1991), 130-131. 
15 E.M. Schnepel, “The Creole Movement in Guadeloupe,” International Journal of the Sociology of 
Language 102 (1993): 120. 
16 “Les grandes dates du mouvement nationalist guadeloupéen, 1928-1981: un demi-siècle déjà!,” Le 
Magazine Guadeloupéen (MAGWA), January-February 1981, 17. 
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President of France quickly dissolved the group.17  Two years later, with the formation of 
the anticolonialist group GONG (Group for the National Organization of Guadeloupe), an 
explicitly nationalist movement finally took hold in Guadeloupe and France.  GONG was 
the first politically organized and active nationalist group that focused on mobilizing the 
masses in public protests against colonialism and for national independence.  At an 
international conference uniting various anticolonial groups across Asia and Africa, 
GONG affirmed “the right of Guadeloupe to its national independence” and vowed to 
“employ any means necessary for the complete decolonization of their country.”18  In 
1967, GONG supported and participated in the racial demonstrations and riots that broke 
out in the cities of Basse-Terre and Point-à-Pitre during a construction workers’ strike.  
During the violence, forty-nine Guadeloupeans were killed by the French army, which 
had been sent in to control and dismantle the strike.  Jacques Nestor, a member of 
GONG, was among the dead protesters.  Following the riots, French authorities set out to 
dismantle the anticolonialist resistance and nationalist movement.  It arrested pro-
nationalist Antillean students in Paris and Bordeaux, imprisoned GONG leaders, and 
placed eighteen “guadeloupean patriots” who participated in the riots on trial “for 
undermining the integrity of the French territory.”19 
 After this period of suppression, the nationalist movement reemerged in the 1970s 
with a new political strategy that embraced Antilleans’ Creole culture.  More specifically, 
nationalist leaders associated with GONG, MUFLNG (Movement for Unification of 
Forces for the National Guadeloupean Liberation), and MIM (Martinican Independence 
                                                
17 “Les grandes dates du mouvement nationalist guadeloupéen, 1928-1981: un demi-siècle déjà!,” Le 
Magazine Guadeloupéen (MAGWA), January-February 1981, 17. 
18 Ibid., 18. 
19 Ibid. 
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Movement) chose the Creole language as a symbol of Antilleans’ cultural and national 
difference.  Although cultural groups, such as ACRA, had used Creole as a marker of 
Antilleans’ cultural distinctness prior to the 1970s, the nationalists’ cooptation of Creole 
was different.  Whereas ACRA argued that Creole was merely a cultural symbol, the 
nationalists used Creole to make both cultural and political arguments.  They argued that 
because Antilleans possessed a distinct culture from the metropolitan one, they also 
constituted a distinct nation.  Prior to this period, Creole had been considered a deformed 
patois or dialect and a marker of lower-class status.  In contrast, French was the language 
of prestige; it signified access to social advancement, and was the accepted language of 
the government, schools, courts, and the media.  It seems worth asking, then, why Creole 
suddenly emerged as the nationalists’ symbol of independence when previously language 
had not played a large role in their movement.  The next part of this chapter argues that 
the movement to promote, codify, and popularize the Creole language became politicized 
when both militant nationalists and linguists sought to mobilize the masses in support of 
their respective nationalist and anticolonial movements.   
 
Nationalists’ Appropriation of Creole 
 In the 1970s, interest in the promotion of Creole was almost exclusively 
appropriated by the anticolonialist left and far-left.  The anticolonial left included the 
Martinican and Guadeloupean Communist Parties whose leaders advocated a kind of 
moderate nationalism, known as autonomy.  Autonomists argued for more local control 
of political and cultural affairs, but wanted Guadeloupe and Martinique to remain a part 
of the French nation.  Militant nationalist groups, such as GONG, MUFLNG, and MIM 
made up the far-left.  For these groups, independence was the only solution to Antilleans 
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oppression under French rule.  Both the left and far-left argued that departmentalization 
was a continuation of France’s ideological project of colonialism in which 
Guadeloupeans and Martinicans learned to “despise their national values” and “regard 
their language and culture as something entirely worthless.”20  The purported arms of 
French colonialism—the Church, public schools, and mass media—worked together to 
elevate the French language and culture and devalue Antilleans’ own Creole culture and 
identity.  In an editorial that appeared in Djok, a weekly newspaper published by the 
nationalist group Ligue d’Union Antillais, an Antillean migrant wrote that the time had 
come “to let our white masks fall, to open our mouths, and speak Creole.”21  “For three 
centuries, Creole has been denigrated, ignored, despised.  Speaking French was 
synonymous with beauty and intelligence.  Speaking Creole was synonymous with 
coarseness, stupidity, or even insanity!”22  Far-left nationalist groups, like the Ligue 
d’Union Antillais, argued that in order to fight the process of assimilation that had 
destroyed and degraded the Creole culture and language, Antilleans needed to revalue 
their Creole culture and language and begin to preserve and create new works of Creole 
culture, such as literature, dance, and music.  This preservation and production of the 
Creole culture and language was the first step in the process of independence.  The 
promotion of Creole awakened national consciousness within Antilleans and made them 
aware of their separate national identity.23 
                                                
20 An editorial in the publication Pou Jou wouvé succinctly expresses the position of anticolonial groups 
regarding the struggle to revalorize and preserve the Creole culture in the face of assimilation.  Pou Jou 
wouvé was an organ of the General Association of Martinican Students (AGEM), an anticolonial 
organization dedicated to fighting France’s continued colonial presence in the Antilles.  committed 
“Editorial: Etudions notre réalité nationale!”, Pou Jou wouvé  3, July 1978, 8.  
21 “Editorial, Quand nos bouches s’ouvrent”, Djok 3, November 27-December 3, 1976, 3. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Editorial: Etudions notre réalité nationale!”, Pou Jou wouvé  3, July 1978, 8.  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 Two types of leaders formed the foundation of the Creole movement: nationalists 
who sought to employ Creole as the “language of the people” in their struggle for 
independence and linguists or Creolists who sought to codify, develop, and elevate the 
Creole language as a symbol of political and cultural resistance.  These two distinct 
groups were dependent on each other to gain the popular support that they needed to 
further their own movements and political agendas.  The nationalists needed the linguists 
to scientifically validate their claim that Antilleans’ possessed a distinct national culture, 
and linguists needed to the nationalists’ political influence to mobilize popular support 
for their academic Creole movement.  Both nationalists and linguists discovered in 
Creole a political resource that they could manipulate to promote their vision of 
Antilleans as a culturally distinct people.  Together, they politicized the Creole language, 
and employed it to popularize both the independence and Creole movements.   
 The politcization of Creole first began in the early 1970s when certain trade 
unions decided to use Creole instead of French in their general assembly meetings.  Most 
notably, the UTA (Union des Travailleurs Agricoles), a union of agricultural workers, 
and the UPG (Union de Paysans Pauvres de la Guadeloupe), a union of small farmers 
and peasants, were the driving force behind this break with language traditions.  These 
two local unions had been founded with the support of nationalist intellectuals, such as 
Sonny Rupaire, in 1970 and 1972 respectively.  Like many nationalists of his time, 
Rupaire was radicalized by the Algerian War and the 1967 racial riots that broke out in 
Point-à-Pitre during a construction workers’ strike.  Hailed as the “father of Creole 
poetry”, Rupaire used Creole to create a distinct Antillean poetry tradition that called for 
Guadeloupe’s independence.   
 205 
 During the early 1970s, the Antillean nationalist movement was growing in both 
the Antilles and in France.  Rupaire’s UTA also received support from the metropolitan-
based Antillean student groups AGEG and AGEM (General Association of 
Martinican/Guadeloupean Students).  These associations’ student leaders were politically 
active in organizing demonstrations in Paris against “imperialism” and “French 
colonialism” in the Antilles.24  They linked Antillean workers’ plight in the metropole to 
Antilleans’ struggles in Guadeloupe and Martinique; both experienced oppression at the 
hands of the French government.  Prior to establishing the UTA, Rupaire was a 
representative for AGEG.  In the early 1970s, he used his connections to AGEG to secure 
the group’s support for the UTA.  In February 1971, AGEG and AGEM handed out 
flyers informing Antillean migrants about the UTA’s fight against the “shameful 
exploitation” of workers by “capitalist and colonialist raptors.”25  They called upon 
Antillean migrants to demonstrate outside of the Belleville metro in Paris to show their 
solidarity with Antillean workers.26 
 Rupaire’s participation in both the UTA and AGEG demonstrates that both 
organizations were intimately related.   The UTA and the AGEG shared members who 
perceived of the workers’ and independence movements as part of the same struggle.  
UTA and AGEG leaders argued that the French government and its “white settler 
                                                
24 AGEM (Association Générale des Etudiants Martiniquais), AGEG (Association Générale des Etudiants 
Guadeloupéens), UEG (Union des Etudiants Guyanais), AGTAG (Amicale Générale des Travailleurs 
Antillais et Guyanais), “Samedi 13 février 71 Journée de mobilisation des émigrés antillais et guyanais”, 
Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940380, Art. 30. 
25 BUMIDOM, “Note”, February 8, 1971, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 
940380, Art. 30. 
AGEM (Association Générale des Etudiants Martiniquais), AGEG (Association Générale des Etudiants 
Guadeloupéens), UEG (Union des Etudiants Guyanais), AGTAG (Amicale Générale des Travailleurs 
Antillais et Guyanais), “Samedi 13 février 71 Journée de mobilisation des émigrés antillais et guyanais”, 
Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940380, Art. 30. 
26 Ibid. 
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puppets” in the Antilles had oppressed the Antillean working-class in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, as well as Antillean migrants in metropolitan France.  Therefore, both 
organizations claimed that independence was the only effective solution to workers’ and 
migrants’ grievances.  In the flyer advertising the Belleville demonstration, AGEG and 
AGEM informed Antillean migrants that they were participants in UTA’s “struggle of 
our people against French imperialism, [and] for their national independence.”27  
Antilles-based and France-based nationalist groups worked together to build a trans-
Atlantic movement to unite Antillean workers in Guadeloupe and Martinique with 
Antillean migrants in France.  Their desire for independence produced the need for a 
Creole identity that could unite Antilleans on both sides of the Atlantic.  In addition to 
highlighting Antilleans’ common plight as low-level laborers in both the Antilles and 
France, pro-nationalist leaders sought to make Antilleans aware of their shared cultural 
identity.  Creole provided the cultural platform from which they could construct this 
Antillean national identity.   
 Cognizant of the fact that the majority of agricultural workers spoke Creole and 
did not understand French, nationalist intellectuals encouraged UTA union leaders to use 
Creole in meetings as the most effective way to communicate with members.  They 
argued that the use of Creole “liberated” workers by allowing them to speak freely in 
meetings and understand the union leaders’ political goals.  The nationalist newspaper 
Djok published an illustration depicting how the French language had effectively silenced 
the Antillean worker.  This picture of a black man with a muzzle on his mouth and a 
                                                
27 AGEM (Association Générale des Etudiants Martiniquais), AGEG (Association Générale des Etudiants 
Guadeloupéens), UEG (Union des Etudiants Guyanais), AGTAG (Amicale Générale des Travailleurs 
Antillais et Guyanais), “Samedi 13 février 71 Journée de mobilisation des émigrés antillais et guyanais”, 
Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940380, Art. 30. 
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collar-like apparatus around his neck conveyed in a startling manner Antilleans’ silence 
and feelings of immobility in the face of departmentalization and assimilation.28  In 
addition to this use of Creole in private member meetings, union spokesmen also began 
to use Creole in public rallies and demonstrations, as well as during strikes to 
communicate with workers and mobilize them.29  Thus, not only was Creole being 
valorized through its new role as the language of political struggle, but it had also become 
the symbol of personal and national liberation.  Creole empowered Antilleans to break 
free from the constraints of French assimilation; it liberated workers by permitting them 
to participate in the debates about the Antilles’ political status.  In doing so, it became the 
language in which the argument for independence was discussed and formulated.  
National liberation would be achieved through leaders’ use of Creole to mobilize the 
masses of agricultural workers, small farmers, and peasants in the countryside.   
 In addition to using union meetings to attract workers to their cause, the 
nationalists also founded newspapers, such as Djok, to bring the independence movement 
to the people.  In the 1970s, the principle Parisian dailies and weeklies were all available 
in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  France-Antilles was the only daily on both islands 
dedicated to local Antillean news.  Founded in Martnique in 1964, and first published in 
Guadeloupe in 1967, France-Antilles was a part of Robert Hersant’s media empire in 
metropolitan France.  France-Antilles’s editor consciously avoided reporting on 
controversial local events, especially if they were related to politics.  In Guadelopue and 
Martnique, politics centered on the question of the islands’ relationship to France.  Thus, 
                                                
28 “Editorial, Quand nos bouches s’ouvrent”, Djok 3, November 27-December 3, 1976, 3. 
29 E.M. Schnepel, “The Creole Movement in Guadeloupe,” International Journal of the Sociology of 
Language 102 (1993): 121-124. 
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in avoiding all political subject matter, France-Antilles conveyed a distorted image of a 
politically unified nation, silencing those who challenged departmentalization.30   
 For Antillean nationalists, France-Antilles was an arm of the French government 
that misinformed Antilleans and sought to create a passive citizenry in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  In response, leaders of nationalist groups created their own newspapers and 
magazines, such as Djok, Lendépendans, and Ja Ka Ta, to enlighten Antilleans about 
local politics.  Some publications had one full time paid journalist, but most of the 
reporting was done by a small number of unpaid volunteers.  In general, these weeklies 
and monthlies were written in a simple journalistic French.  However, Creole was 
frequently used in quotations or whole paragraphs denouncing France and its “colonial” 
practices in the Antilles.  Leaflets and small pamphlets inserted into the newspapers for 
special occasions were also written in Creole.  Nationalists encouraged union leaders to 
use Creole in their meetings as the language of struggle and “liberation”, and they did the 
same with their political press.  Because of the ideological affiliations of these 
publications, they were expressions of opinion rather than organs of information.  Their 
intention was to stimulate political debate and attract readers to their nationalist cause.  
Although readership reflected a limited portion of the population (weekly or monthly 
circulation averaged 3,000 to 7,000 in Guadeloupe out of a population of approximately 
325,000 in 1990), as official organs of nationalist groups, these publications were 
                                                
30 For an overview of the Guadeloupean and Martinican press, see: Alvina Ruprecht, “Mass Media in 
Guadeloupe,” in Mass Media and the Caribbean, ed. Stuart H. Surlin and Walter C. Soderlund (New York: 
Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1990), 223-238. Also, see: Ellen M. Schnepel, In Search of 
National Identity: Creole and Politics in Guadeloupe (Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 2004) 104-105. 
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nonetheless representative of the opinions and activities of the nationalist movement 
during the 1970s.31        
 In the spring of 1976, Jingha, a Paris-based Antillean magazine, informed 
Antillean migrants in metropolitan France of the current movement among nationalist 
union leaders to elevate the Creole as the language of the Antillean national movement.  
Antillean migrants founded numerous magazines, such as Jingha, to keep Antilleans in 
the metropole informed about local politics.  In order to build a successful independence 
movement, local nationalists needed the support of all Antilleans, including those who 
had migrated to France.  For this reason, nationalists often used sympathetic France-
based publications, like Jingha, as a political forum to spread the discourse of 
nationalism.  For example, Jingha reported on the public trial of Thernisien Nomertin, an 
Antillean laborer and the general secretary of the UTA, to rally Antillean migrants around 
the movement for independence.  Jingha characterized Nomertin’s public trial as an 
attempt by the “French colonialists” to keep Antilleans in a politically and culturally 
subordinate position.  It then praised Normentin’s refusal to speak anything but Creole 
during the proceedings as a symbolic attack on the French judicial system, a primary 
emblem of French power.  “This transgression of the prohibition of Creole [in court] has 
caused the irritation of the judges and the enthusiasm of the people.  This fact reflects the 
reversal of power relations at the level of language, between French and Creole.  Creole 
                                                
31 Lendépendans, a weekly founded in 1984, is the official organ of the UPLG (Popular Union for the 
Liberation of Guadeloupe).  The UPLG was formed in 1978 as the first official nationalist political party.  
It served as an umbrella organization for the nationalist trade unions, such as the UTA (Union of 
Agricultural Workers).  Ja Ka Ta (meaning “it’s already getting late”) was one of the UPLG’s earliest 
monthly magazines.  See: Ellen M. Schnepel, In Search of National Identity: Creole and Politics in 
Guadeloupe (Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 2004) 104-105. 
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has become a formidable weapon in the fight on ideological grounds.”32  The language 
used in Jingha was instructional, in that it was meant to inform Antillean migrants and 
make them aware of Creole’s new role as a political tool.   
 However, at the same time, the goal of pro-nationalist magazines like Jingha was 
not merely to inform; the director of Jingha, Hughes Drane, also wanted to unite 
Antilleans in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and France in their common struggle against 
French oppression.  In the first issue of Jingha, Drane wrote, “The publication of ‘Jingha’ 
should enable us to better work to strengthen our union…in allowing Antilleans on both 
sides of the Atlantic to understand each other.”33  He argued that in informing Antilleans 
in metropolitan France and in the islands about their respective life experiences, Jingha 
would “help to bring into the same movement that which is scattered.”34  In order to do 
this, Jingha published testimonies from local union members that captured the excitement 
and growing momentum of the nationalist movement in the Antilles: 
  The first of the UTA meetings that I attended was at the Grosse Montagne  
  school in Lamentin.   A dense crowd of 2000 attentive people, animated at 
  times, smiled and burst out laughing at other times.  A crowd of workers  
  in profound agreement over their shared condition, exposing the situation,  
  denouncing abuses, claiming the rights of workers.…Without a doubt for  
  me: the instrument of this deep communion, it was Creole.  First, it  
  allowed a clear understanding of the situation, then it expressed the  
  innermost feelings of these men…Creole revealed itself to me as a   
  language that is perfectly capable of conveying a message, providing  
  information in economic and sociopolitical areas that have previously  
  been reserved for French.35   
 
                                                
32 “Guadloup: Peia tini bon balan an ko-i! Kiles et inkiet’kiles?”, Jingha: Magazine d’Union Antillais, 
April-June 1976, 10.  Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, Côte 4-JO-31746.  
33 Hughes Drane, “Rache vie zeb-la! Jin-n’ Pouss’-la: Baye Langre!”, Jingha: Magazine d’Union Antillais, 
April-June 1976, 3. Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, Côte 4-JO-31746.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Guadloup: Peia tini bon balan an ko-i! Kiles et inkiet’kiles?”, Jingha: Magazine d’Union Antillais, April-
June 1976, 10.  Bibliothèque Nationale de France, François Mitterrand, Côte 4-JO-31746.  
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Immediately following the union member’s statement, Drane, declared that “the unity of 
the people of Martinique, French Guiana, [and] Guadeloupe is today’s agenda and we 
need to realize it.”36  He published the union member’s words to inspire a feeling of 
national solidarity among Antilleans living in the Caribbean and in metropolitan France.  
For Drane, Creole was a powerful political tool: it had unified union members, and now, 
he argued Creole was also the foundation of a common bond uniting all Antilleans into 
their own separate nation.  Creole “touches the deepest part of us” and “inspires us to 
regain confidence in ourselves and dare to fight.”  It had the power to restore Antilleans’ 
cultural identity and unite them in the “face of imperialism.”37    
 By the late 1970s, nationalist groups had succeeded in gaining the support of 
union leaders for the independence movement, known as MUFLNG (Movement for 
Unification of Forces for the National Guadeloupean Liberation).  Together in 1978, they 
formed the first official nationalist political party, the UPLG (Popular Union for the 
Liberation of Guadeloupe).  The UPLG served as an umbrella organization for many of 
the pro-nationalist trade unions, such as the UTA.38  Many of these unions’ leaders were 
also UPLG party members.  The UPLG’s main political goal was to mobilize the masses 
for independence.  They turned to Creole, which had been politicized in union meetings, 
as the most effective tool for rallying the people to the nationalist cause.   
                                                
36 Guadloup: Peia tini bon balan an ko-i! Kiles et inkiet’kiles?”, Jingha: Magazine d’Union Antillais, April-
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 Suddenly, the Creole language was at the forefront of the Antillean nationalist 
movement.  However, the nationalists’ communicative needs and demands could not be 
met by the Creole language in its current state of development.  In the early 1970s, Creole 
was strictly an oral language; it had no established grammar, writing system, or 
vocabulary.  In order to be an effective tool of communication in the mobilization of the 
masses, the Creole language needed to be codified.  Jingha informed the Antillean public 
of the importance of establishing a written Creole system.  It argued that historically, 
cultural production formed the basis of nationalist movements throughout the world; 
Antilleans’ claim for a separate nation hinged on the existence and production of a 
separate Antillean culture and language.  Therefore, “the development of written Creole” 
was the “primary objective” of the nationalist movement.  According to Jingha, it was 
necessary for Antilleans to “fight against the French writing, [and] move forward: written 
Creole literature must take off, our knowledge of our language must deepen.”39  The 
nationalists and union leaders looked to intellectuals to legitimize Creole as a written 
language in its own right.  In the mid-1970s, certain pro-nationalist linguists working 
within the university system, such as Jean Bernabé, became actively involved in the 
standardization of the Creole language.  For these individuals, their efforts to create a 
standard Creole grammar and vocabulary were a conscious political contribution to the 
greater struggle for independence.   
 
GEREC and the Creation of a Nationalist Creole Writing System 
 In 1975, pro-nationalist Martinican linguist, Jean Bernabé, founded GEREC 
(Groupes d’Etudes et de Recherches en Créolphonie, later changed to en Espace 
                                                
39 “La langue créole: l’ecrit et la parole,” Jingha, November-December 1977, 17.   
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Créolophone), a university-based Creole research group.  From 1976-1980, GEREC 
became well known by their publications: Espace Créole, a “theoretical review” and 
Mofwaz, a “Bulletin for Education Liaison and Research”.  Espace Créole was an 
academic journal for linguists that theorized the origins and structures of multiple French-
influenced Creoles.  GEREC used Mofwaz to inform the general public about the cultural 
and political implications of certain developments within Creole studies.  Thus, GEREC 
presented itself as both an academic institution and a group of militants using Creole and 
their academic credentials to promote a nationalistic political agenda.  GEREC infused 
nationalist discourse into their research on the Creole language.  Their characterization of 
Creole as a political tool of resistance and liberation echoed local unions’ appropriation 
of Creole.   
 According to GEREC, during departmentalization, French officials had used the 
French language as an instrument of control and assimilation.  They devalued Creole as a 
patois and bastardization of French.  GEREC perceived of their research as a conscious 
effort to revalue Creole as a language in its own right.  In reconstructing Creole, GEREC 
linguists argued that they were reclaiming Creole from the control of the French 
government, and making it into a political tool in the nationalist resistance against French 
cultural and political domination.   
Language of deviance and of resistance, Creole remains a dominated 
language.  These characteristics give Creole a particularly symbolic 
meaning.  So much so that all who despise Creole, fear its symbolic power 
of subversion; others who know Creole’s resources at the level of the 
imaginary collective rather than the social reality, want to use Creole in 
the development of the people that it concerns.40  
 
                                                
40 GEREC, Mofwaz  1  (1977): 94.   
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 In the above statement, which appeared in the first issue of Mofwaz, GEREC highlighted 
the political symbolism of Creole as a “language of deviance and resistance.”  The study 
and use of Creole was a direct affront to French control and the policy of assimilation, 
which had attempted to eradicate Creole from Antillean society.  GEREC believed that its 
work freed Creole from French domination so that the Antillean people could use it in the 
development of a separate culture and nation.   
 In 1975, GEREC’s leader, Jean Bernabé, returned from a Creole studies 
conference in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.  One of the essential questions discussed at the 
conference was the standardization of a spelling system for Creoles.  Bernabé understood 
that if Creole was to be used as a political tool in the nationalist movement, the time had 
come for Antilleans to choose and create a coherent alphabetical and spelling system for 
their Creole language.  Upon his return to Guadeloupe, Bernabé set out to do just that.  
He published his proposals for an “integrated orthographic code” in both Mofwaz and 
Espace Créole.  First and foremost, Bernabé argued that GEREC’s Creole writing system 
must be based on “scientific arguments as rigorous as possible.”41  This kind of thorough 
and precise study would elevate Creole as a bona fide language and validate it as integral 
component of a distinct Antillean culture.   Bernabé proclaimed that the scientific study 
and construction of Creole was a “political problem”; the main objective of his efforts to 
standardize Creole was “to promote Creole as the bearer of a distinct history and 
culture.”42  Scientifically establishing the existence of a separate Antillean culture and 
language from the French metropolitan one was fundamental to nationalists’ argument 
                                                
41 Jean Bernabé, “Ecrire le créole”, Mofwaz 1 (1977): 12.   
42 GEREC, “Une pseudo-théorie pour apprendre le françias aux petits créolophones”, Mofwaz 1 (1977): 83.   
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that Antilleans’ possessed a different cultural heritage and therefore should be a separate 
nation.   
 After establishing Creole as a marker of Antilleans’ distinct national identity, 
Bernabé theorized how to develop a writing system to reflect and reinforce this fact.   
According to Bernabé, there were two possible options: etymology or phonetics.  He 
could develop a writing system using Creole’s etymological origins in French, or he 
could standardize Creole so that it mirrored the sounds Antilleans made when they spoke 
Creole.  Bernabé quickly dismissed the etymological method, arguing that such a French-
centered script would counteract the nationalist political agenda: “We can already affirm 
that an adequate system of Creole should be simple, concrete, and respect the autonomy 
of the language.  In a word, Creole must not, cannot be written like French.”43  Bernabé 
deliberately avoided the assimilationist tendencies of earlier writing systems that used 
French etymology to codify Creole and thus, reaffirmed Creole as a patois and culturally 
dependent upon French.   
 Instead, Bernabé envisioned a Creole writing system that highlighted Antilleans’ 
separate national identity.  He decided to use the unique sounds Antilleans made when 
speaking Creole to ensure that Creole would look nothing like French.  This type of 
phonological orthography established Creole’s separateness and independence from the 
French language.  Bernabé was aware of the political power of language; his script was 
an intentional political act to promote the nationalist agenda: 
  Writing is a very important instrument. Like any human or humanized  
  instrument, it encompasses a number of ideological and political values  
  that would be futile to ignore. Specifically, one of the roles of a specific  
  writing system, could be to help creole-speakers become aware of the  
  specificity of their language, of their culture, in short of their identity.  No  
                                                
43 Jean Bernabé, “Ecrire le créole”, Mofwaz 1 (1977): 14.   
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  writing system, even those elaborated on scientific principles, is neutral,  
  and ours less than any other.  We affirm, if it even needs to be, its militant  
  character.44   
 
Prior to Bernabé’s efforts to codify Creole, certain Antillean linguists had attempted to 
formulate a Creole script.  Yet, these linguists had not perceived of their work as a 
political act; they believed that their work was purely cultural in that it simply sought to 
preserve the Creole language.45  For Bernabé, this kind of cultural work was inherently 
political.  The promotion of Creole made Antilleans aware of their separate identity as 
Creole-speakers and therefore, formed the foundation of the nationalist movement.  
Moreover, Bernabé claimed that in contrast to nationalist union leaders’ appropriation of 
Creole, his work was rigorously academic.  He used the science of linguistics to prove 
that Antilleans possessed a distinct culture and thus, should constitute their own nation.   
Bernabé’s linguistic work became even more politically militant and nationalistic 
when he decided to use the principle of “maximum deviance” (déviance maximale) to 
construct Creole’s script.  This meant that the form furthest from the French etymological 
model would be selected to create the letters that would make up written Creole words.46  
Maximum deviance pushed Bernabé’s use of phonological orthography one step further.  
Not only did Bernabé use the sound of Creole words to make it visually different from 
French, but now, he also employed maximum deviance to do everything in his power to 
ensure that written Creole would be as distinct as possible from the French language.  
Bernabé included in his Creole script letters, such as w, which rarely appeared in the 
                                                
44 Jean Bernabé, “Ecrire le créole”, Mofwaz 1 (1977): 28.   
45 In the mid-1950s, several colonial-educated elite Antilleans formed the Creole studies group ACRA 
(Académie Créole des Antilles) to promote the preservation of the Creole language.  This group sought to 
keep politics out of its cultural work by forbidding political discussions during group meetings.  Moreover, 
ACRA strategically constructed Creole as a “patois” to temper any potential nationalist overtones of their 
work.   
46 Jean Bernabé, “A propos de la lexicographie créole,” Espace Créole 3 (1978): 87-98.   
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written French language.  It was inconceivable for Bernabé to incorporate the French r in 
written Creole because it did not correspond to the authentic Guadeloupean or Martinican 
pronunciation of an r, which more closely resembled the sound of an English w.  Instead, 
he chose to replace the French r with the letter w.  Bernabé also chose to exclude many 
silent letters, such as the final e of a word, that are an integral part of the French writing 
system.  For example, Bernabé combined these two principles in his Creole orthography 
for the word “rock”.  The Creole word “woch” sounded similar to but looked 
significantly different from the French word “roche”.  The word “woch” may have had 
etymological origins in the French language, but Bernabé used maximum deviance to 
sever these historical and cultural ties.  “Woch” had been creolized; it was no longer 
recognizable as French.47    
French linguists had used what they perceived to be Antilleans’ 
“mispronunciation” of French sounds, such as the throaty r, as evidence for their 
characterization of Creole as a deformed patois of French.  However, for Bernabé, 
Antilleans’ use of the English w in place of the French r, as well as his decision to drop 
all silent French letters not pronounced by Antilleans, was an expression of Antilleans’ 
unique identity.  Therefore, his decision to exclude the French r and silent e from written 
Creole constituted a political statement about Antilleans’ relationship to the French 
nation.  Antilleans’ use of the English w indicated that they were more culturally 
connected to the Caribbean where the English w was prominent; they were not a part of 
the French nation where the English w did not exist.48   
                                                
47 Donald Colat-Jolivière, “A propos du “r” en créole,” Espace Créole 3 (1978): 29-40.   
48 Ibid.   
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Through Bernabé and his GEREC colleagues’ writing system that identified 
Creole as a distinct language from French, the nationalists were able to lay claim to the 
separateness of the Antillean people.  This sociocultural distinctiveness, reinforced by 
GEREC’s scientific research, became the rationalization for seeking and establishing 
political independence.  For example, in its monthly magazine, Ja Ka Ta, the nationalist 
political party, UPLG, used GEREC’s purportedly scientific findings about the history of 
the creation of the Creole language to justify the construction of a separate Antillean 
nation.  In April 1979 Ja Ka Ta published extracts from an academic presentation made 
by GEREC member Roland Thésauros in which he discussed the link between Creole 
and the formation of a national identity in Guadeloupe.  Thésauros claimed that Creole 
was formed in the unique experiences of slaves who were brought to Guadeloupe and 
Martinique from Africa by French colonizers and plantation owners.  He argued that a 
unique Antillean identity emerged from this process of language construction:  
 It is necessary to highlight the decisive contribution to the formation of  
  creole: that of the soil itself.  For these women and men realized quickly  
  enough that there could be no return to Africa, that their destiny was  
  linked to this new land which they worked and made fruitful with their  
  sweat and blood…but this fact made them have a deep desire for a new  
  identity.  This real physical process, the true condition for survival,  
  expressed itself in a language created from scratch, which will be the  
  factor of cohesion and unity for this new people…49 
 
For Ja Ka Ta, Thésauros’s status as an academic and linguist made their arguments for 
independence more credible.  The UPLG and linguists, such as Thésauros and Bernabé, 
were essentially making the same claim that Antilleans possessed a distinct language and 
culture and therefore, constituted a separate nation.  However, it was the linguists who 
proved the nationalists’ claims for independence as a scientific fact.   
                                                
49 Roland Thésauros, “Créole et Identité Nationale (extraits)”, Ja Ka Ta, Avril-Mai 1979, Bibliothèque 
Natioanle de France, François Mitterrand, Côte GR FOL-JO-20224.   
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 Moreover, the standardization of a singular Creole orthography was of the utmost 
importance to nationalist groups because it enabled them to literally create an Antillean 
culture.  Prior to the establishment of GEREC’s writing system, Creole was historically 
an oral language.  Creole stories, dance and music were a part of an oral tradition that 
was carried down through the generations.  Nationalists argued that because most of 
Antillean culture was transmitted orally, a large part of it had been destroyed through the 
processes of colonialism, departmentalization, and assimilation.  In particular, the Creole 
language itself was becoming “Frenchified” as more and more Antilleans attended public 
schools and learned to read and write French.50  Nationalist groups found in GEREC’s 
writing system a scientific way it could preserve the “pure” Creole language and culture 
unaffected by France’s language and culture.   Nationalist writers, playwrights, poets, and 
singers used GEREC’s writing system to record in writing Antillean culture.  In doing so, 
they created a body of Antillean culture from which a distinct Antillean identity could be 
constructed.  Nationalists claimed these cultural productions as Antilleans’ “authentic” 
identity and used it as the foundation of their arguments for independence.   
 Just as the nationalists were dependent upon the linguistic research of groups like 
GEREC to reinforce their political ideology, so, too, the linguists needed a nationalist 
following to promote their ideas among a highly skeptical populace.  GEREC recognized 
that it needed the support of the Antillean masses to popularize the Creole movement.  It 
published Mofwaz for the general public, but its abstract language and content did little to 
inform the Antillean people about the political implications of the current academic work 
in Creole studies.  Ironically, because Mofwaz was written in French, the majority of 
                                                
50 “La Langue Créole: L’Ecrit et la Parole, Man Ka Mandé lé Répondé”, Jingha: Magazine d’Union 
Antillais, Novembre-Décembre-Janvier 1976/1977, 17. Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, 
Côte 4-JO-31746.  
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Antilleans could not understand it.  GEREC intellectuals turned to the nationalists who 
saw in the new writing system an opportunity to use Creole to communicate with the 
Antillean masses and gain popular support for the independence movement.  The UPLG 
launched its magazine, Ja Ka Ta, with the purpose of using a portion of the publication to 
teach Antilleans how to read and write Creole.  From 1977 to 1983, it published four 
articles that described and illustrated GEREC’s new Creole orthography.  These articles 
acted as mini-lessons on how to read and write Creole.51  The UPLG intended for these 
lessons to create popular interest in what it perceived to be Antilleans’ national language.  
However, they also benefited GEREC in that nationalists unanimously adopted and 
popularized its script as the “authentic” way to write Creole.   
 
Educating the People  
 The development of the GEREC writing system strengthened the nationalist 
movement, providing indépendantistes with new material to express their nationalist 
goals.  The new Creole script stimulated efforts among nationalists to spread their beliefs 
to the general population.  Not only did it generate political tracts, slogans, and banners 
written in the new script, but a nationalist press soon emerged.  Nationalists founded 
newspapers and magazines, such as Jougwa, Magwa, Jingha, Djok, Grif-an-te and Ja Ka 
Ta, with the express purpose of using Creole to gain popular support for the 
independence movement.  In the first issue of Djok, the editor proclaimed that the time 
had come for Antilleans to express their thoughts in their own maternal language: “So, 
let’s stop copying the old European style.  Creole is our language.  Our maternal 
                                                
51 For example, see: “Kouman fo ou li e ekri kréyòl,” Ja Ka Ta, Juillet 1980, 8; “Pou Nous a li e make lang 
an nou, Le problème du son /w/,” Ja Ka Ta, Octobre-Novembre 1980, 12.  Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France, François Mitterrand, Côte GR FOL-JO-20224.   
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language.  It is in Creole that we express our most authentic thoughts, our deepest 
feelings.  Why then look elsewhere for what we possess ourselves!”52  Djok employed 
Creole to free its readers from the control of the French language.  Creole released 
Antilleans’ authentic identity and innermost feelings, revealing to them their desire to be 
an independent nation free of French control.   
 The extent of these publications’ use of Creole varied extensively.  Some used 
Creole only in headings, quotations and a limited number of articles; others were written 
exclusively in Creole.  Nonetheless, all incorporated GEREC’s ideological principle of 
maximum deviance in their written Creole to express their nationalist political agenda.  
Nationalist leaders turned editors hoped that their use of Creole would pique the interest 
of the Antillean masses, the majority of which did not understand or read French.  In 
using Creole, nationalists created publications specifically for those Antilleans whom the 
French press had either ignored or misled.  According to Franz Succab, the founder of Ja 
Ka Ta, “these big agencies (like FR3 and France-Antilles) that claim to inform us, give 
us junk.”  They are a “distortion of Guadeloupean public opinion.  Their function is to 
mask the Guadeloupean reality, to intellectually impoverish the Guadeloupean.”53  
Succab argued that the French press distorted Antilleans’ support for the French nation to 
disseminate its assimilationist values.  This resulted in Antilleans’ complacency and 
ignorance about the growing independence movement.  Succab founded Ja Ka Ta as a 
direct challenge to the French press’s control of information.  Through Ja Ka Ta, Succab 
hoped to educate the Antilleans masses about the nationalist agenda.  He explicitly 
claimed Guadeloupe as a “Nation”, arguing that “We are Guadeloupean, we are not 
                                                
52 “DJOK: pou ki-sa?”, Djok, November 12-18, 1976, 3.   
53 Frantz Succab, “Commencer la presse guadeloupéenne”, Jakata, December 1977, 1. 
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French.”54  As the newspaper of the Guadeloupean nation, Ja Ka Ta, the Creole 
expression for “it’s already getting late”, signified the urgency of Antilleans’ political and 
cultural separation from the French nation.    
 GEREC’s written script provided nationalists with the ability to create a public 
forum—the Antillean press—in which they could speak directly with the Antillean 
masses and educate them about the oppression they endured under the French 
government and how to fight against their subordinate position.  However, 
communication with the Antillean people was not as simple as creating Creole 
newspapers.  While all Antilleans in Guadeloupe and Martinique spoke Creole, they did 
not read or write it.  Because Creole was historically an oral language, Antilleans’ 
encounter with the nationalist press was more than likely the first time they had seen 
written Creole words.  Therefore, first and foremost, nationalists needed to teach 
Antilleans how to read Creole.  In articles on Creole grammar and orthography, 
nationalists worked to clarify GEREC’s nationalist agenda and to make Bernabé’s 
writing system accessible to the Antillean people.  Lessons usually opened by placing the 
Creole language squarely within the nationalist movement.  The ability to read Creole 
freed Antilleans from their dependence on the French press and thus, was an act of 
liberation.  In an article explaining the importance of a written grammar, a Djok 
contributor explained that Creole is not “only a language”, but also “a means of political 
liberation.”55  After establishing Creole as a defining element of Antillean national 
identity, these lessons presented Antilleans with vocabulary lists and grammar rules for 
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55 Al Roy, “Créole Grammaire”, Djok, November 19-26, 1976, 3.   
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common words and phrases.56  For nationalists, these Creole lessons educated and 
empowered the Antillean people, who ultimately would form the foundation of the 
independence movement. 
 This kind of public instruction was as much for Antilleans in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique as it was for Antillean migrants in metropolitan France.  In particular, Jingha 
was dedicated to bringing the Creole language and culture to Antilleans in the islands and 
in France:  “The publication of ‘Jingha’ should enable us to work better to reinforce our 
union, the union of Antilleans.”57  Jingha’s editor, Hughes Drane, purposefully circulated 
his publication throughout the Antilles and metropolitan France.  He created Jingha to 
keep Antillean migrants informed about current events in the Antilles and connected to 
their Creole culture.  In doing so, Drane hoped to gain Antillean migrants’ support for the 
nationalist movement.  By the mid-1970s, nearly one third of the Antillean population 
lived in metropolitan France.58  This staggering statistic meant that nationalists needed 
the support of Antillean migrants to sustain a successful independence movement.   
 Therefore, the LUA (Ligue d’Union Antillaise), the nationalist group associated 
with Jingha, began to organize summer camps in the Antilles for metropolitan-born 
Antillean children and university students who had migrated to France to pursue their 
studies.  The LUA was a metropolitan-based group, uniting Antillean students and writers 
who leveraged Creole as a political tool in the movement for independence.  It is most 
known for its publication of Jingha and Djok, the first newspaper to use Creole in the 
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kreyol”, Jakata, July 1980.  “Pou nou sa li é maké lang an nou, Jakata, September 1980.  “Pou nous a li e 
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58 Chantal Madinier, “Les originaires des departments d’outre-mer,” Population (French Edition) 6, (Nov-
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Hexagon.  The purpose of its summer programs was to teach young Antilleans who had 
become far removed from their Creole culture about their Antillean identity.  The LUA 
hoped that through these camps, young metropolitan Antilleans would rediscover their 
Creole culture and become supporters of the nationalist movement.   
 In the summer of 1976, Jingha published the testimony of Claude C., a young 
Antillean student who found his Antillean identity as a participant in LUA’s summer 
program.   
  I am an Antillean born and raised in France, but upon becoming an adult, I 
  felt the need to rediscover my Antillean origins, to know about Antillean  
  life; that’s when I met members of the Ligue d’Union Antillaise.  When I  
  entered the LUA, I discovered the Antillean world, and above all the  
  Antillean people; I think that it is important for people like me, who have  
  not lived in the Antilles or who were cut off very early from their country,  
  to be able to meet and live with Antilleans….What does the LUA offer us?  
  Personally, the LUA has made me realize that I am an Antillean.  I now  
  understand what it means to speak Creole, that it is not a folk language or  
  a simple way to communicate, but Creole represents the life of a country,  
  the reality; and the desire to link the Antillean people begins for me with  
  speaking Creole.59   
 
Claude was one of many metropolitan Antillean students recruited by the LUA to 
participate in its summer Creole programs in the Antillean countryside.  The LUA 
specifically targeted Antillean university students because the French education system 
had purportedly made them the most assimilated class of Antilleans.  Moreover, the LUA 
chose to send its students to the Antillean countryside because it believed that Antilleans 
living in the remote areas of Guadeloupe and Martinique were far removed from the 
larger cities where French was more commonly spoken, and therefore possessed the most 
authentic Creole language and culture.  The LUA contended that the act of being 
immersed in the culturally “authentic” Creole-speaking environment of the Antillean 
                                                
59 Claude C., “J’ai compris ce que voulait dire ‘parler créole’”, Jingha, July-August 1976, 19.   
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countryside enabled metropolitan-born Antilleans, like Claude, to discover their 
relationship with the Antillean people and culture.  The LUA claimed that is was this 
emotional connection, developed through personal interactions in Creole, that encouraged 
metropolitan Guadeloupeans and Martinicans to reclaim their Antillean identity.  Upon 
their return to France, these students served as the ambassadors of Creole culture for 
other Antillean migrants.    
 Claude’s testimony is one such example of how the LUA used its students’ 
experiences to disseminate the Creole movement and its nationalist agenda in France.  It 
reads as a kind of spiritual revelation in which Claude realizes his Antilleanness and the 
importance of the Creole language as the receptacle of this Antillean identity.  The 
nationalist press reported on accounts such as Claude’s not only to attract participants to 
LUA’s summer programs, but also to share this process of self-discovery with those 
Antilleans who could not participate.  Claude’s story was meant to resonate with 
metropolitan Antilleans and help them begin their own search for their Antillean identity.  
In the late 1970s, nationalists’ and GEREC linguists’ efforts to use the Antillean press to 
popularize the nationalist agenda of the Creole movement within France were becoming 
increasingly more important to the success of the independence movement.  As they 
worked to nationalize Creole, another group of pro-departmentalization linguists in 
France was seeking to denationalize the Creole movement and reconstruct Creole as a 
part of the French nation.   
 
CIEC and the Assimilationist Creole Movement 
 In the mid-1970s, both the French government and Antillean leaders were 
working to reconcile Antilleans’ cultural differences with republican universalism.  The 
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emergence of the assimilationist Creole movement in France was a part of this struggle 
between the French government and Antilleans to define how Antilleans would be 
incorporated into the French nation.  It was a direct response to Antillean nationalists 
who had used Creole to argue that Antilleans constituted a separate nation.  For 
nationalists, Antilleans’ cultural differences could not be included in a Republic, which 
required them to assimilate the French culture.  In contrast, the leaders of the 
assimilationist Creole movement highlighted Creole’s cultural ties to France, arguing that 
Antilleans were indeed a part of the French nation. 
 CIEC (Comité International des Études Créoles) emerged from various 
conversations among native French linguists, Robert Chaudenson and Michel Tétu, and 
the Secretariat of AUPELF, Mauritian Jean-Claude Castelain.  The three linguists met in 
November 1972 at AUPELF’s (Association des Universités Partillement ou Entièrement 
de Langue Française) general conference in Geneva.  All were interested in forming a 
French institution to unite the various universities across the French-speaking world that 
supported scientific research in Creole studies.  In 1976, they founded CIEC at the 
University of Provence in Nice with the financial support of AUPELF.  GEREC, their 
nationalist counterparts at the University of the Antilles and Guyana (UAG), immediately 
criticized CIEC as an arm of French assimilation.  GEREC perceived of CIEC as a part of 
AUPELF, a centralized French university system, which was only interested in 
supporting the dissemination of the French language and culture.  According to Bernabé 
and his GEREC colleagues, CIEC was the French government’s attempt to coopt and 
diffuse their nationalist Creole movement.60  Their opinion of CIEC was confirmed, when 
                                                
60 In an article for the International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Robert Chaudenson gives a 
personal account of nationalist linguists’ perception of CIEC.  See: Robert Chaudenson, “Research, politics 
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one of its members, Guy Hazaël-Massieux, proposed an alternative to GEREC’s 
orthography.   
 Born in Guadeloupe, Hazaël-Massieux was at the time one of the most qualified 
native linguists, having completed in 1972 a doctoral dissertation at the Sorbonne on 
Guadeloupean Creole.  However, because his politics did not match GEREC’s nationalist 
ideology, he was not offered a teaching position at UAG.  Instead, he and his French 
wife, Marie-Christine, who was also a linguist of French Creoles, took teaching positions 
at the University of Provence in Aix where they became active members of CIEC.  
Together, they created their own Creole orthography that used French etymology to 
determine the written form of Creole words: 
    Etymology is indispensable to ‘justify’ certain French written forms: why  
  would one refuse Creole from having an ‘origin’ and a history, and  
  therefore from also marking its etymology?  It is the aim of certain  
  politicians to separate Creole from French, with the intent of making  
  Creole the language of ‘national independence.’61 
 
The Hazaël-Massieuxs’ use of etymology openly challenged the GEREC writing system, 
which privileged phonology.  They argued that Creole was historically and culturally 
connected to French and therefore, its writing should reflect these ties.  GEREC’s 
phonological writing system purposefully denied Creole’s French origins to promote a 
nationalist political agenda.  According to the Hazaël-Massieuxs, GEREC’s script was a 
false construction.  There was no scientific or linguistic evidence to support Creole’s and 
Antilleans’ autonomous identity.   
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61 Marie-Christine Hazaël-Massieux, “Annexe: l’Ecriture du Créole,”  quoted in Schnepel, “The Politics of 
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 In contrast, the Hazaël-Massieuxs argued that their etymological script was 
scientifically correct in that it reflected Creole’s connection to the French language and 
culture, as well as Antilleans’ “authentic” identity as French citizens.  At its first Creole 
Studies conference in November 1976, CIEC members openly accused GEREC members 
of appropriating Creole and distorting it for their own political gains.  CIEC leaders 
claimed that it had formed their research group with the intent of giving Creole back to 
the Antillean people who had lost their language to militant nationalists.  Unlike GEREC 
linguists, who had made Creole a highly contested political symbol, CIEC claimed that 
their only objectives were “to serve as an organic link between researchers and Creole-
speakers” and “to promote the creation and development of Creole studies centers.”62  
These purportedly apolitical intentions constituted CIEC’s attempt to denationalize 
Creole and make their organization the objective authority of Creole.  Yet, it is worth 
noting that the creation of an etymological writing system to insist upon Creole’s cultural 
connections to French had broader implications for the Antilles’ political relationship to 
France.  CIEC linguists used their construction of Creole to encourage Antilleans to 
embrace their cultural and political ties to France.  In doing so, they became a credible 
challenge to the Antillean independence movement.   
 The 1979 Creole Studies conference hosted by CIEC in the Seychelles, an 
archipelago of islands in the Indian Ocean and east of Africa, highlights the larger effects 
that these Creole debates had on shaping the discussion about the Antilles’ political and 
cultural relationship to France.  For GEREC linguists, the decision to hold the conference 
in the Seychelles, a former French colony that had recently gained independence, drew 
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attention to France’s continued political control of Guadeloupe and Martinique.  At the 
conference’s first working session, Roland Thésauros, the president of the University of 
Antilles-Guyana and the representative of GEREC, seized upon this opportunity to link 
Seychellens’ and Antilleans’ struggle for cultural and political independence.  He 
denounced France’s “disguised colonialism” in Guadeloupe and Martinique, arguing that 
as Creole-speakers Seychellens’ and Antilleans’ shared the same right to national 
autonomy.63  Although Seychellans’ and Antilleans’ Creole languages were entirely 
distinct from each other, Thésauros noted that both languages were created in the same 
processes of colonialism and slavery.  For this reason, Antilleans’ and Seychellens’ were 
culturally and politically linked in their respective struggles to preserve their Creole 
languages against European assimilation.   
 Thésauros also attempted to discredit CIEC’s claim that Creole Studies was 
simply a scientific and intellectual endeavor.  He contended that the study of Creole was 
innately political in that it established the groundwork for the legitimization of Creole-
speakers’ separate national identities.  These provocative words enraged the French 
Ambassador of the Seychelles who, according to CIEC founder Chaudenson, was visibly 
uncomfortable and angry throughout Thésauros’s speech.  Later, he sent alarmist 
telegrams to Paris expressing his concern that the French universities funding CIEC were 
supporting nationalistic political conferences.64  French officials recognized the 
subversive power of Creole.  They chose to support groups, such as CIEC, that were 
exclusively focused on intellectual pursuits as the counterpoint to GEREC’s nationalist 
                                                
63 Vinesh Y. Hookoomising, “So near, yet so far: Bannzil’s Pan-Creole Idealism”, International Journal of 
the Sociology of Language 102 (1993): 30. 
64 This anecdote comes from Robert Chaudenson’s personal account of the 1979 CIEC conference in the 
Seychelles.  See: Robert Chaudenson, “Research, Politics, and Ideology: The Case of the Comité 
International des Etudes Créoles,”  Journal of the Sociology of Language  102  (1993): 19-21. 
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construction of Creole.  The Ministry of the DOM closely monitored and was heavily 
invested in the codification of the Creole language.  The adoption of a Creole 
orthography either based on etymology or phonetics had serious implications for the 
Antilles’ future political relationship to France.       
 This fight for the control of the Creole script was not limited to the ivory tower.  
As previously mentioned, GEREC used the nationalist press to popularize the pro-
independence ideology of its Creole writing system.  In an effort not to lose its readership 
to the growing popularity of the Creole publications, the assimilationist press, such as 
France-Antilles, began to not only tolerate, but also promote the use of Creole in a 
limited form.  France-Antilles, which was controlled by the assimilationist interest group 
of Robert Hersant in France, promoted a Creole script that more closely resembled 
CIEC’s etymological script and reflected Hersant’s pro-departmentalization position.  
Hersant made a mockery of Creole’s nationalist ideology by allowing advertisers to use a 
bastardized etymological form of GEREC’s script.  For example, an ad for a discount 
store depicted two racially caricatured Antillean men having a conversation in a form of 
Creole closely resembling French.  They discussed going to Martin’s to buy imported 
European beers at discounted prices.  These Creole advertisements appeared alongside 
serious news articles, which were written exclusively in French.  This juxtaposition 
suggested that Creole was a patois that could not be used to report the news or in 
literature.  French was the language of prestige reserved for serious writing, whereas 
Creole was a low-level form of communication among the uneducated Antillean 
masses.65   
                                                
65 Advertisement reprinted in Ellen M. Schnepel “The Politics of Language in the French Caribbean: The 
Creole Movement on the Island of Guadeloupe”  (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1990), 502. 
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 This power struggle between nationalists and assimilationsists also played out in 
the monthly magazine, Guadeloupe 2000, a pro-departmentalization publication edited 
by Edouard Boulogne, the son of white metropolitans born in Guadeloupe.  Boulogne 
openly supported the Hazael-Massieuxs’ choice to use French etymology to standardize 
the Creole language as a necessary political statement against the nationalization of 
Creole.  He argued that the “Creole nationalism of separatists is not only the enemy of 
France, but above all the enemy of the Guadeloupean, of his life and his soul.”66  
Boulogne characterized the Creole movement as “bourgeois”; it kept Antillean peasants 
in a subordinate position by requiring them to learn Creole and denying them access to 
French, the language of social advancement.  “Creole as a national language is a 
movement that prevents the working people and peasants from accessing French culture 
and all that it holds, in order to better establish their position as the ruling bourgeois class 
in a future independent Guadeloupe.”67 As “bourgeois intellectuals”, GEREC linguists 
had the luxury of promoting Creole because they had already mastered the French 
language and achieved social mobility.  They were appropriating Creole to establish an 
independent Guadeloupean nation, which would only advance their interests.  Therefore, 
Boulogne argued that the maintenance of territorial integrity with France better served the 
Antillean people’s social and economic interests.   
 In addition, Boulogne decided to take on the nationalists using their own political 
tool, and introduced written Creole into Guadeloupe 2000.  Boulogne published letters in 
Creole from successful Antillean migrants in metropolitan France.  This reoccurring 
column entitled “Creole Letters” (Lettres Créoles) characterized migration as a path to 
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social mobility, an option that Antilleans would lose if Guadeloupe and Martinique 
became independent nations.  The content of these letters expressed a favorable image of 
the Antilles’ and France’s political union; yet, it was the Creole script that subliminally 
disseminated Guadeloupe 2000’s pro-departmentalization politics.  The orthography used 
in the magazine had no resemblance to GEREC’s pro-nationalist script; instead it 
promoted a highly unsystematic and variable approach to writing that appeared similar to 
French.  For example, in a letter to his cousin Alexandre, Rico, a Guadeloupean living in 
metropolitan France, described in Creole all of the modern conveniences available in the 
Hexagon to Antillean migrants like himself: télévision couleu-la (colored television) 
frigidai-la (refrigerator), and congélateu-la (freezer).  Not only did Rico’s letter 
exaggerate Antillean migrants’ economic circumstances in claiming that the majority of 
them could afford modern electronics and appliances, but Rico’s “Creole” words closely 
resembled French.  His script followed the Creole grammatical structure of placing the 
definite articles (le and la) after rather than before the noun.  However, Rico’s Creole 
words were essentially misspelled versions of the French words: television couleu-la for 
la television couleur, frigidai-la for le frigidaire, and congélateu-la for la congélateur.  
Rico had merely dropped the final “r” and “e” of the French words to form Creole ones.68  
The very format of Rico’s script questioned Creole’s cultural autonomy and underlined 
the language’s subordination to French.  Guadeloupe 2000 repackaged Creole’s 
nationalist image so that it matched its support for departmentalization.69   
                                                
68 For a discussion of the Creole script used in Rico’s letter to Alexandre see: Daniel Compère, “De la letter 
du créole aux “letters créoles” Alizés, March-April 1981, 12, republished in “Le Créole…propagande?”, 
Guadeloupe 2000, Août 1981, 7.   
69 In the spring of 1981, the pro-nationalist magazine Alizés published a critique of Gudeloupe 2000’s use 
of an etymological Creole script that resembled French.  See: “Le Créole…propagande?”, Alizés, March-
April 1981, 12.  “Le Créole…propagande?”, Alizés, May-June 1981, 14. 
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 In the spring of 1981, the pro-nationalist magazine Alizés responded by warning 
its readers that Guadeloupe 2000’s “Creole Letters” was a piece of political propaganda.  
Alizés’s article, entitled “Creole…propaganda?”, not only exposed “Creole Letters” as a 
false depiction of Antillean migrants’ reality in metropolitan France, but also a 
deformation of the cultural integrity of the Creole language.  “Guadeloupe 2000 has 
published fictitious letters in a ‘half fig, half grape’ Creole” in an attempt to supplant 
GEREC’s scientific construction of Creole.70  Alizés characterized the writers of 
Guadeloupe 2000 as “polemicists” who were using Creole to discredit the nationalists.71  
Guadeloupe 2000 quickly published a rebuttal to Alizés’s claims, arguing that the Creole 
orthography used in “Creole Letters” was in fact a scientifically researched script.  It was 
based on the Hazael-Massieuxs’ writing system, which had reshaped GEREC’s 
orthography so that it reflected Creole’s linguistic and cultural connections to French.  
According to Guadeloupe 2000, this script was culturally authentic; it was the GEREC 
nationalists who had created a “false” Creole writing system to promote their nationalist 
ideology.72   
 The Antillean press experienced a remarkable period of growth in France and the 
Antilles during the 1970s.  The development of the GEREC writing system gave 
nationalists the literary tools they needed to create Creole publications and disseminate 
their pro-independence politics.  In response, assimilationists founded their own political 
newspapers.  However, the distribution and readership of this local press remained 
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somewhat limited, especially in Guadeloupe and Martinique where a substantial part of 
the population remained illiterate.   
 Due to the Antilles’ low literacy rate, radio was potentially a more effective 
alternative for reaching a wider audience.  Although radio had been widely available in 
the islands since departmentalization, prior to the early 1980s when the newly elected 
Socialist government implemented a policy of decentralization throughout the Antilles, 
the French government controlled the airwaves.  There was one single French-controlled 
radio-television station, Radio Guadeloupe/FR3.  All programming was under strict 
French government censorship, and the content was limited to metropolitan and 
international news.  The Creole language appeared in a limited number of broadcasts, 
most notably a musical variety program that aired Saturday afternoons.73  The French 
government’s exclusive control of radio broadcasts meant that during the 1970s, 
nationalists were forced to use the written press to disseminate and popularize their 
independence movement. 
 Because nationalists were prohibited from forming their own radio stations, they 
employed the press to critique the departmentalists’ use of Creole on FR3.  In December 
1976, Djok, a weekly newspaper founded by the Paris-based nationalist group LUA, 
characterized FR3’s use of Creole as a political strategy to attract more listeners and 
support for the French government.  According to the testimony of Viviane, a Martinican 
woman who regularly tuned into FR3, “Creole is only used” to “give Martinicans a sad 
image of their country.”74  In one broadcast, the speaker used Creole to explain that 
ultimately it was Martinicans who were “responsible for all the flaws of the colonial 
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system”, including the island’s poor economic state.75  Djok used this Martinican 
woman’s account to inform its Antilleans’ readers about the ways in which pro-French 
organizations were using Creole to get their attention and manipulate them.  It described 
FR3’s use of Creole as “the honey that is used to attract flies to the trap.”76  Martinicans 
needed to be wary of certain groups’ use of Creole to ensure that it was not used in a 
coercive manner to spread departmentalization and lies about Antillean history and 
culture. 
 Beginning in the early 1980s, when the Socialist government in France reformed 
the audiovisual laws, allowing for the existence of radios libres or “free radios” that were 
not under the French government’s control, nationalists formed their own radio stations 
to reach a broader audience, including those Antilleans who could not read Creole or 
French.  In September 1982, Guadeloupe’s nationalist party, the UPLG, founded Radyo 
Tanbou.  This “free radio” was an explicitly political project.  Radyo Tanbou 
implemented a strict policy establishing Creole as the official language of all of its 
broadcasts.  In doing so, it affirmed Guadeloupeans’ non-French identity as Creole 
speakers.  Moreover, the UPLG’s decision to use the Creole word tanbou (meaning 
“drum”) as a part of its radio station’s name was a political act.  During Guadeloupe’s 
colonial past, slaves used drums to communicate with each other and organize rebellions 
against French plantation owners.  In naming its radio station after a tool of resistance, 
the UPLG linked their movement for independence with their enslaved ancestors’ 
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struggle for freedom.  For the UPLG, like a drum, Radyo Tanbou was an oral medium 
that united Antilleans’ in their continued fight against French control.77   
 These debates for the control of the Creole language, which played out in the 
Antillean press and on the airwaves, were not only about creating a scientifically correct 
Creole, they were also about the “authentic” identity of Antilleans.   Linguists used 
purportedly scientific research to analyze the Creole language and make arguments about 
Antilleans’ true cultural origins.  As a visual symbol of Antillean cultural identity, the 
way in which Creole was written had serious implications for the future of the Antilles’ 
political and cultural relationship with France.  Nationalists and departmentalists 
employed linguists’ purportedly scientific claims to construct a Creole language that 
culturally reflected their respective political agendas.  A Creole script, such as CIEC’s, 
that closely resembled French highlighted Antilleans’ cultural relationship with France 
and therefore, culturally justified the Antilles’ political status as a French department.  
Conversely, a Creole script, such as the one developed by GEREC, that distanced itself 
from the French language established Antilleans’ cultural and political separateness from 
the French nation.   
 Throughout the 1970s, the French government closely monitored the 
politicization of Creole; it was acutely aware of Antillean leaders’ ability to use the 
Creole language to mobilize Antilleans either in support of or against the French 
government.  Although the period of decolonization in the 1960s had ended, the question 
of Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s political status remained important to France’s future 
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as a unified nation.  In the 1970s, the Ministry of the DOM debated the implications of 
granting the same regional status to Guadeloupe and Martinique that had been given to 
France’s metropolitan departments.  As regions of France, Antilleans would have more 
control over their local political and cultural affairs.  DOM officials were unsure if 
conceding more local autonomy to the Antilles would strengthen the departments’ union 
with France or if it was the first step in the process of independence.  Therefore, up until 
the early 1980s when the Socialist government decentralized both France and the 
Antilles, the Ministry of the DOM tenuously navigated the islands’ precarious political 
relationship with France, and avoided asserting an official position on the Creole 
question.  When it did enter the debate, the leaders of the Creole movement would 
completely transform their politics to work within and around the constraints of the 
government’s new Creole policy.    
 
III.  The French Response: the Regionalization of Creole 
 In the summer of 1981, a new leftist majority in the French National Assembly 
headed by President Mitterrand and his Socialist party implemented a policy of 
decentralization.  This series of reforms granted more power to local assemblies in the 
both the metropolitan and overseas departments.  During the previous two decades when 
the right was in power (1958-1981), any recognition of regionalist claims for cultural 
diversity had been limited and informal.  Now, the Socialists seemed willing to make 
some official concessions.  On June 21, 1982, the Ministry of Education legally 
recognized France’s regional languages and cultures.  This meant that teachers in 
France’s regions were now free to incorporate their particular regional languages, 
cultures, and histories into their classrooms.  This regionalization of the national 
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curriculum broke from the tradition of republican education that had used teachers as 
“secular missionaries” during the Third Republic to spread republicanism and assimilate 
peasants’ regional languages and cultures into a unified French national culture.78  For 
decades, nationalists from several of France’s regions, most notably Basque and Brittany, 
had been fighting these policies of assimilation and advocating for full independence 
from the French nation.  They argued that their distinct languages and cultures justified 
their political autonomy.  Beginning in the 1960s, these separatist movements became 
more militant when some of its leaders began to resort to terrorism.  Decentralization was 
the French government’s attempt to subdue this more militant branch of regionalism by 
granting local assemblies and politicians more cultural and political autonomy.   
 Simultaneously, Antillean nationalism in Guadeloupe and Martinique was also 
becoming a strong political force.  However, pro-departmentalization Antillean migrants 
distanced themselves from both the Antillean independence movement and regionalism.  
They recognized in regionalism a common struggle for cultural recognition, but they did 
not want to be linked to the violence of the militant regionalist movement.  Instead they 
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articulated a distinct form of ethnic activism to argue for the inclusion of their cultural 
differences in the French nation.  Chapter 2 argued that ultimately, it was the proliferation 
of Antillean cultural associations in metropolitan France during the 1970s that put 
pressure on French officials to reexamine its policy of assimilation and begin to support a 
limited form of multiculturalism even before Mitterrand came to power and formally 
implemented the “right to difference” in France.  In an attempt to appease Antilleans’ 
cultural rights claims while simultaneously reinforcing republican universalism, the 
Ministry of the DOM and BUMIDOM began to financially support Antillean cultural 
groups.  The government’s decision to make room in the Republic for Antilleans’ Creole 
culture and language was a political strategy.  Metropolitan officials wanted to maintain 
their control of cultural diversity in France and they wanted to reinforce France’s political 
union with the Antilles.  Therefore, the Ministry of Education’s decision in 1982 to 
recognize regional languages and cultures must be seen as a part this larger trans-Atlantic 
story concerning the government’s attempts to reconcile not only regional differences, 
but also Antilleans’ cultural differences, with republican universalism.   
 Although Antillean ethnic activism was a strong contributing factor to the 
Socialist government’s decision to recognize France’s distinct regional identities, it 
avoided officially including Antilleans in these legislative measures until 1983.  The 
French government did not want it to seem as if it had given into Antilleans’ cultural 
demands; rather, it wanted to be the molder of cultural diversity in France.  Prior to 
decentralization in the early 1980s, previous legislation had already recognized the 
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existence of culturally distinct regions within metropolitan France.79  The narrative of 
French republicanism had perpetuated the myth that metropolitan regions had assimilated 
to French national culture.  Therefore, the incorporation of their languages and cultures 
into the national curriculum did not pose a threat to national unity; regional languages 
and cultures were simply folkloric in nature.   
 In contrast, the Ministries of Education and DOM perceived of the Antilles’ 
cultural and political union with France as much more tenuous.  Despite Antilleans’ long 
historical connection to France and their status as departments of France, the extent to 
which Antilleans had assimilated French national culture remained in question.  In his 
1975 report on Antillean migrants’ assimilation into the nation, Yvon Gouguenheim 
noted that Antillean migrants were choosing to concentrate themselves in “immigration 
ghettos.”  He claimed that this separation from French society had “facilitated different 
forms of delinquency, such as theft, prostitution, and drugs, and moreover, had provoked 
a large number of deeply psychologically unbalanced [migrants], [who required] 
hospitalization.”80  Gouguenheim’s report demonstrates that metropolitan officials still 
perceived of Antilleans’ and their Creole language and culture as a potential social 
problem.  Therefore, the Ministry of Education was not yet prepared to incorporate 
Creole into the national curriculum.  To do so would recognize Antilleans as a culturally 
distinct part of the nation.  The French government had found a way to reconcile regional 
differences with republican universalism, but it was uncomfortable with doing the same 
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for its overseas departments.  Antilleans and their Creole culture remained a social 
problem that needed to be solved.      
 This abruptly changed on May 22, 1983.  At the opening session of CIEC’s 
Fourth International Creole Studies Conference in Lafayette, Louisiana, Xavier Orville, 
the Chancellor of the Antillean Academy (the highest representative of the French 
Ministry of National Education in the Antilles) made a surprise announcement that the 
Ministry of Education had decided to extend to the Antilles its legislation incorporating 
regional languages and cultures into the national curriculum.  The Antillean Creole 
language and culture would be integrated on an experimental basis in the local school 
systems of Guadeloupe and Martinique. 
  With some controversy, each official [of the Ministry of Education] voted  
  in favor of the  insertion of Creole and the Antillean and Guianean culture  
  in the educational system.  How must we, then, carry out this insertion?  In 
  academic policy, it is advisable at first to consider the language [Creole]  
  as a pedagogical tool intended to stimulate the students’ spirits and to  
  place them more easily in their specific cultural context….To conclude,  
  the purpose of teaching Creole and the Antillean and Guianean culture is  
  to place the school in its specific regional context and to work together in  
  the development of the people, while respecting the cultural identity of  
  each individual.81 
 
In his speech, Orville openly acknowledged that Antilleans were culturally distinct 
citizens, living in a specific regional context, and that the curriculum should take these 
differences into account.  On the surface, the Ministry of Education appeared to be 
recognizing Antilleans as a cultural minority within the French nation.   
 However, the Ministry of Education’s decision to lift the ban on Creole in 
Antillean schools must be placed within the context of the growing popularity of the 
Creole movement in the Antilles and France.  Throughout the 1970s, nationalists had 
                                                
81 Declaration of Xavier Orville’s on May 22, 1983 at the opening of the Fourth International Conference of 
Creole Studies in Lafayette, Louisiana.  Reprinted in Antilla, June 2-9, 1983, 38.   
 242 
made the Creole language a subversive political tool in their struggle for independence.  
For the French government, Creole had become a threat to the Antilles’ political and 
cultural union with France.  Education officials decided to recognize Creole not because 
they were suddenly convinced that Antilleans had become assimilated like other regional 
groups, but because it was a strategy to control the debates about the islands’ relationship 
to France.  Recognizing Creole as a regional language was a conscious political strategy.  
In characterizing the Antilles as a “specific regional context” and Creole as merely a 
“pedagogical tool”, the Ministry of Education stripped the Creole language of its 
nationalist symbolism.  It used this language to reinforce the Antilles’ status as a region 
of France; Creole was not a national language, but an instructive tool to be used to teach 
French to Antillean children.  The Ministry of Education used its existing legislation on 
regional languages and cultures to take Creole out of the hands of the nationalists and to 
determine how Creole, and more generally Antilleans’ cultural differences, would be 
incorporated into the French nation.  Once the French government enacted legislation 
officially asserting their position on the Creole question, the nationalists lost their 
exclusive rights to Creole as a political and cultural demand.     
 The nationalist Antillean press referred to Orville’s shocking announcement as the 
le bombe de Créole or “the Creole bomb”.  In the months leading up to Orville’s 
declaration, DOM and education officials debated how to implement Mitterrand’s 
policies of decentralization in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  Amidst these discussions, 
nationalist leaders denounced the Ministry of Education’s new decentralist policies as yet 
another form of colonialism disguised as regional and cultural rights.   In the fall of 1982, 
Jakata characterized the “law of decentralization for the DOM” as just another attempt 
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by the French government to discredit the independence movement and to keep 
Guadeloupe and Martinique as a “part of the Republic and the French nation.”82  For 
Jakata, the French government’s “discourse of identity reveals its trap” in the discussion 
concerning “the insertion of Antilleans in France.”  Its rhetoric describing Antilleans as 
“complete citizens of France” was not about granting Antilleans the same rights and 
privileges as French citizens.  Rather, Jakata contended that this assertion was a political 
tactic.  In order to maintain its political control of Guadeloupe and Martinique, the 
government felt compelled to “insert” Antillean cultural identity in France by recognizing 
Creole as a “regional language”.  According to Jakata, “our [nationalists’] struggle is the 
one of independence; theirs is the one of ‘specificity’ in the whole of France.”83  In other 
words, the recognition of cultural specificity neutralized the independence movement and 
claimed Antilleans as a part of France, when in fact they possessed their own separate 
national identity.   
 This struggle between nationalists and the Ministry of Education for control of 
Creole and the meaning of cultural rights only caused nationalists to become more 
militant in their claims.  This militancy alienated left-leaning Antilleans affiliated with 
more moderate autonomist groups who previously sympathized with the nationalists’ 
fight for political autonomy, but nonetheless wished to remain a part of the French nation.  
In this way, the government’s cooptation of Creole and Antillean nationalists’ cultural 
rights claims was successful in marginalizing the pro-independence movement.  In 
Martinique, the social and economic advancements that would supposedly accompany 
decentralization convinced the pro-independence PPM (Parti Populaire Martinique) to 
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form a left-wing alliance with the Socialists and put a moratorium on the question of 
Martinique’s political status.  Results of local elections also provide evidence of the 
decreasing support for Antillean nationalism.  During the 1981 presidential race in which 
Mitterrand was elected, nationalists encouraged Antilleans to abstain from voting, 
arguing that they were not French and therefore, should not participate in the processes of 
the French government.  After 1981, pro-independence parties nonetheless presented 
their own candidates in local and regional council elections.  Their nationalist candidates 
garnered minimal support from Antillean voters.  In March 1982, only two pro-
independence representatives won seats in the thirty-six member general council of the 
Antilles.84   
 Under these circumstances of a failing political movement and increasing 
government control of the Creole question, nationalists resorted to the only recourse still 
available: political violence.  In a two-year period from 1983 to 1985, over fifty bomb 
explosions or attempts occurred in Guadeloupe.  In May 1983, a series of explosions took 
place simultaneously in Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana, and Paris, targeting large 
French industries, such as Renault and Air France.  The Caribbean Revolutionary Army 
(ARC) claimed responsibility for these actions, including other smaller bombings at a 
shopping center, a golf course, and a police station in Martinique.  The French 
government officially outlawed the ARC in May 1984, but this did little to stop the 
violence.85  Autonomist and assimilationist political parties came together to condemn the 
pro-independence forces’ use of terrorism.  Moreover, nationalist groups’ use of violence 
                                                
84 William F.S. Miles, “Mitterrand in the Caribbean: Socialism comes to Martinique,” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no.3  (Autumn 1985), 73-75. 
85 Miles, “Mitterrand in the Caribbean: Socialism comes to Martinique,” 73-75. 
 245 
alienated the Martinican and Guadeluopean people, who began to perceive of 
independence as a radical rather than a viable option.   
 By the mid-1980s, militant nationalists had lost both political and popular support 
for their independence movement.  As a group of radicals on the fringe of Antillean 
society, they no longer had any credibility.  This concerned linguists and Creolists, 
particularly those associated with the pro-nationalist GEREC group, who feared that the 
Creole movement would also dissolve with the Antillean independence movement.  
Antillean intellectuals working within Creole studies were concerned that their efforts to 
promote Creole would also become discredited as a cultural movement that had been 
politically linked to Antillean nationalism.  Therefore, they began to reconstruct the 
politics of Creole to distance themselves from militant nationalists and to preserve the 
political and cultural validity of their movement.   
 
IV.  From Nationalism to Multiculturalism: Créolité and the “right to difference” 
 With the radicalization of the pro-independence forces, many Guadeloupeans and 
Martinicans in the Antilles had grown wary of supporting a nationalistic Creole 
movement.  According to Guadeloupean teachers who supported the use of Creole in 
Antillean schools, Antillean parents opposed the Creole movement because “for several 
years, one has assimilated Creole to the idea of independence.”86  In the words of one 
Antillean parent, “you are for Creole…you are indépendantistes.”87  According to Alizés, 
the newspaper in which this letter was published, Antillean parents felt that they could 
not in good conscious support a cultural movement that was politically linked to the 
violence and terrorism perpetuated by pro-independence groups.   
                                                
86 “Enseignants en recherche.  Libérer la parole,”  Alizés, November-December 1984, 8. 
87 Ibid. 
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 In addition to losing local support, nationalists had also failed to gain Antillean 
migrants’ support for Guadeloupean and Martinican independence.  In the early 1980s, 
the Antillean press reported on migrants’ growing disdain for the Creole movement 
because of its nationalistic political agenda.  In the spring of 1980, H. Cléostraste, an 
Antillean migrant living in the Parisian suburb of Romanville, wrote a letter to the editor 
of Flash Antilles Afrique, criticizing intellectuals’ promotion of Creole as political 
isolation for the Antilles: “As for our Creole language that certain individuals want to 
build as a language…it is ridiculous; it is the best way to isolate us from the rest of the 
world…but we will keep our cultural originality.  My purpose is not to create 
controversy, but to wear away at the detractors of the French community, of which we 
are happily a part.  We are [a part of France] for better or for worse; I express with force 
the wish for French continuity in our regions.”88  Cléostraste expressed many Antillean 
migrants’ hesitancy to support any kind of pro-independence movement, including the 
Creole movement.  In general, Antillean migrants supported Guadeloupe’s and 
Martinique’s political union with France.  They had exercised their rights as French 
citizens when they decided to migrate to and live in metropolitan France.  The Creole 
movement’s insistence upon Antilleans’ separate cultural and political identity threatened 
to take away this right and the lives they had carved out for themselves in France.   
Therefore, Antillean migrants tended to be wary of intellectuals’ motives in promoting 
Creole.    
 Beginning in the early 1980s, GEREC linguists and Creolists began to look for 
ways to reestablish the political and cultural integrity of the Creole movement.  GEREC 
                                                
88 H. Cléostraste, “Courrier des lecteurs.  Ne distillez pas le venin, la haine,” Flash Antilles Afrique, March-
April 1980, 7. 
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academics felt as if they had lost control of Creole to two competing groups: militant 
nationalists and the newly elected French Socialist government.  In order to create a 
movement that could be attractive to both Antilleans in the islands and metropolitan 
France, GEREC needed to distance itself from the nationalist rhetoric of separatism while 
simultaneously challenging the Socialists’ control of Creole. 
 With the publication of Charte Culturelle Créole (Creole Cultural Charter or 
CCC) in 1982, GEREC officially broke their political and cultural alliance with Antillean 
nationalist groups.  In the CCC, GEREC noted that its association with Antillean 
nationalism had compromised its reputation as a legitimate organization: 
  GEREC has been boycotted, seen as degenerate by education officials,  
  troublemakers  with an arrogant politics, exclusive and partisan.  One has  
  judged it [GEREC] subversive because it has dared to associate linguistic  
  reflection with development….Whatever the content and form of   
  implementation of decentralization, the ideological conception of the  
  relationship between the languages of the Antilles and Guiana will no  
  longer be exactly the same as it previously was…the landscape has  
  changed, the debate and the struggle will have a perspective that will no  
  longer be exactly the same as it was in the past.89 
 
This realization of its “subversive” reputation pushed GEREC to disassociate with 
nationalist groups.  Moreover, the Socialists’ implementation of decentralization had 
prompted GEREC to reevaluate the political and cultural message of its organization.  
The Socialists’ official recognition of Antillean culture and language had emphatically 
placed Creole within the French nation as a “regional” language.  In doing so, the new 
Socialist government had successfully challenged GEREC’s construction of Creole as the 
national language of Guadeloupe and Martinique.  Because of the Socialists’ cooptation 
of Creole, GEREC argued that now was the time for it to rethink its political strategy for 
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promoting the Creole language.  In an attempt to obtain support from the new left-wing 
French government as a legitimate political and cultural movement with reasonable 
demands, GEREC linguists made the conscious choice to reconstruct the Creole language 
so that it reflected the new Socialist discourse of the “right to difference.”   
 In the early 1980s, the “right to difference” was becoming the accepted way for 
particular cultural groups, such as immigrants, to claim their cultural, political, and social 
rights within the French nation.90  The discourse of the “right to difference” was a distinct 
form of French multiculturalism that broke from the Republican tradition of assimilation, 
which contended that all distinct cultural groups in France had assimilated to a singular 
national culture.  The “right to difference” argued that particular cultural groups within 
the French nation had the right to possess a different cultural identity from that of the 
dominant French nation; furthermore, these groups had the right to be recognized by the 
French government as culturally distinct groups.  Mindful of the acceptance of this new 
political strategy, GEREC sought to transform the meaning of its orthography so that it fit 
into the Socialists’ vision for a culturally diverse French nation.   
 GEREC’s shift away from independence, combined with its decision to move its 
administrative center from Guadeloupe to Martinique, attracted new members to the 
organization who were not as vehemently pro-nationalist as the original founders.  The 
independence movement in Guadeloupe had a long history and a much stronger political 
presence than in Martinique.  This was largely due to unique differences in the islands’ 
                                                
90 See: Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark McKinney, eds., Post-colonial cultures in France  (New York: 
Routledge, 1997); Alain-Philippe Durand, Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in the 
Francophone World (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002); Carrie Tarr, Reframing Difference: Beur and 
Banlieue Filmmaking in France (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Sharif Gemie, French 
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Black Skins, French Voices: Caribbean Ethnicity and Activism in Urban France (Boulder, CO: Westview 
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colonial histories.  In contrast to Martinique, a significant white béké class did not emerge 
on the island of Guadeloupe.  For this reason, Guadeloupe was a much less racially 
mixed compared to Martinique where a large and influential mixed-race middle-class 
emerged.  Moreover, the absence of a large béké class in Guadeloupe meant that there 
was no buffer between locals and the metropolitans who arrived in the island after 1946 
to implement the policies of departmentalization.  Ethnographers have also noted that in 
contrast to Martinique where assimilation to French culture appears to be more 
pronounced, Guadeloupe has retained much more of its African heritage.91  Therefore, 
GEREC’s relocation to Martinique, which was purportedly more assimilated and less 
politically radical than Guadeloupe, symbolized a new period in the development of its 
ideology.   
 Martinican writer and journalist Raphaël Confiant was one of GEREC’s new 
members who was not politically linked to Antillean nationalism.  He worked with Jean 
Bernabé to change the meaning of GEREC’s Creole writing system.  Confiant and 
Bernabé did not make any changes to the linguistic content of its etymology.  They still 
used the principle of maximum deviance to construct a Creole language that looked as 
different from French as possible.  However, instead of using Creole’s distinctiveness to 
argue for independence, GEREC began to highlight Creole’s cultural connectedness to 
French.  In the CCC, Confiant and Bernabé presented Creole’s new meaning.  Previously 
GEREC linguists had avoided comparing the Creole and French languages, arguing that 
such comparisons were irrelevant because the two languages were neither linguistically 
nor culturally related.  Now Confiant and Bernabé contended that scientific comparisons 
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of French and Creole would not subordinate Creole to French; rather, this kind of 
comparative study would further comprehension of the interconnectedness as well as the 
distinct identities of the two languages: 
  To compare Creole and French, is not to subordinate one language to the  
  other; on the contrary, it is to find a scientific principle of description that  
  encompasses both languages….[such comparisons] provide a means to  
  better perceive the identity of each of the languages in question.92 
 
When GEREC was using Creole as a symbol of Antillean nationalism, it had attempted to 
elevate the Creole language above French in the Antilles.  This was an intentional 
decision to invalidate Creole’s traditional construction as a patois of French.  In contrast, 
in the CCC, Confiant and Bernabé advocated for the “equalization of French and Creole” 
while also highlighting each language’s distinct identity.93  This use of linguistic research 
to reformulate Creole as simultaneously separate and connected to, yet also equal to 
French reflected GEREC’s preconception of Antilleans’ relationship to France.  
Antilleans’ cultural and linguistic distinctiveness no longer formed the foundation of 
GEREC’s argument for independence; instead, GEREC argued for recognition of 
Antilleans as both culturally distinct and equal members of the French nation.   
GEREC’s new political ideology had the potential to be more effective than its 
nationalist ideology in arguing for Antilleans’ cultural and political rights.  It fit within 
the Socialists’ discourse of the “right to difference” and therefore appeared to be less 
subversive.  Yet, it still challenged the government’s conception of diversity’s place 
within the Republic by arguing for the recognition of Antilleans as culturally distinct 
citizens of France.  GEREC’s reconstruction of Creole and French as scientifically equal 
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languages supported its new claim that Creole and French cultures had equal statuses 
within the nation.  GEREC maintained that Antilleans did not have to assimilate into the 
French culture; they could be both Creole and French citizens.   
Confiant and Bernabé, along with their GEREC colleague, writer Patrick 
Chamoiseau, formally conceptualized this new challenge to republican assimilation as 
Créolité or “Creoleness.”  Créolité was a particular kind of Antillean multiculturalism 
that called upon the French government to officially recognize Antilleans culturally 
distinct citizens of France.  It contended that Antilleans possessed multiple identities and 
could be both Creole and French.   
  We are at the same time, Europe[an], and Africa[n], nourished by Asian,  
  Middle Eastern, and Indian [cultures] . . . Créolité is ‘the diffracted world,  
  but recomposed’ . . . Because we know that each culture is never an  
  achievement but a constant dynamic . . . that does not dominate but enters  
  in relation [to other cultures], that does not plunder but exchanges. . . .  
  Créolité is an annihilation of the false universality, of monolinguals, and  
  of purity.94 
 
Créolité highlighted Antilleans’ dual French and Creole identity, exposing the myth of 
the French Republican tradition that claimed to have assimilated individuals’ cultural 
distinctiveness into a singular national culture.  Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau 
created the concept of Créolité to argue that as Creoles, Antilleans possessed a 
multicultural identity made up of multiple cultural traditions.  Thus, Antilleans’ status as 
both French citizens and Creole revealed what GEREC perceived to be the “false 
universality” of French republicanism, which had purportedly erased cultural and 
linguistic differences in favor of assimilation to a dominant national culture.   
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 According to the Créolité movement, cultural diversity had always existed in the 
Republic; French national culture had always been in a constant state of construction, 
influenced by other cultures and peoples from around the globe.  Yet, France was not just 
a nation composed of any of the world’s cultures; it was an amalgamation of those 
peoples and cultures that France had colonized.  Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau 
contended that Créolité was “the only concept that permits Békés [white Creoles] to 
finally assume (instead of distinguishing himself from) his Africanness and the non-Béké 
(black Creole) to uninhibitedly reevaluate, and completely clarify, the European 
dimension of his identity.”95  In claiming that the békés or white French colonizers shared 
an African heritage with black Antilleans, Créolité inserted Antilleans’ racial difference 
into metropolitan France.  This challenged constructions of French citizenship that linked 
whiteness to belonging in the French nation.  According to Créolité, Antilleans were the 
most powerful example of the diversity of the French national culture and French 
citizens, and therefore, they should be officially recognized as such.   
 Prior to the articulation of Créolité, GEREC had been aligned with pro-
independence groups.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, GEREC no longer argued for the 
creation of a separate Antillean nation.  Instead, it argued for the reconstruction of the 
French nation so that it included Antilleans’ cultural differences.  At the same time, the 
pro-independence group associated with the nationalist publication, Alizés, also began to 
realize the political potential of a more multicultural ideology and reprinted excerpts of 
GEREC’s Eloge de la Créolité, detailing the Créolité ideology.  In doing so, Alizés hoped 
to disseminate GEREC’s multicultural politics as a movement that could prove to be a 
more effective challenge to French control in the Antilles.  According to Alizés, 
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multiculturalism granted Antilleans the economic benefits of remaining a part of the 
French nation.  Yet, it also granted them more cultural autonomy in permitting them to 
exist in the French nation as culturally distinct citizens.96   
 The Ministry of the DOM agreed with Alizés’s perception of Créolité as a 
potentially subversive movement.  In February 1982, shortly after the publication of 
GEREC’s CCC, French officials in Martinique noted the potential of Créolité to attract 
popular support.  In a bulletin, the Office of Information in Martinique informed the 
Ministry of the DOM, that GEREC’s Créolité movement was not just “intellectual 
activism”, but a political struggle for a “coherent construction of the identity of Creole-
speaking peoples.”97  As a movement that promoted Antilleans’ “cultural specificity”, 
DOM officials perceived of Créolité as a threat to the unity of French national culture.  
For the Ministry of the DOM, Créolité might prove to be even more threatening than the 
Creole movement’s previous nationalist ideology. 
 This shift within the Creole movement from nationalism toward multiculturalism 
permitted a new alliance between the Antilles-based GEREC and the France-based CIEC 
Creole studies groups.  Prior to GEREC’s articulation of Créolité, GEREC’s nationalist 
ideology conflicted with CIEC’s assimilationist ideology.  This ideological split 
weakened the Creole movement, as both groups competed for support for their own 
particular political agenda.  As GEREC moved toward multiculturalism, CIEC also 
moved away from its pro-assimilationist origins toward a multicultural politics.  GEREC 
saw its shift away from Antillean nationalism as a political tactic that used the Socialists’ 
discourse of the “right to difference” to challenge the policy of assimilation and argue for 
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Antilleans’ cultural rights.  In contrast, CIEC supported the Ministry of Education’s 
recognition of regional languages and cultures as an effective strategy for neutralizing the 
Antillean independence movement and Antilleans’ cultural rights claims.  In a letter to 
the Minister of National Education, Robert Chaudenson, one of the founding members of 
CIEC, praised the Minister’s “recent declaration…concerning regional languages and 
cultures” as a “relief” for Guadeloupe and Martinique where “the demand for the French 
education system to take into account cultural and linguistic specificities of the DOM is a 
political claim (autonomy or independence)…”98   
 Despite their different reasons for moving toward multiculturalism, GEREC and 
CIEC were able to come together in their support for a new multicultural Creole 
movement.  In Etudes Créoles, CIEC put forth an argument for diversity’s place within 
the French nation that closely resembled GEREC’s use of Créolité to challenge the 
republican tradition of assimilation: 
  In the perspective of social development, it seems that one must encourage 
  the integrative  elements of ethnicity while preserving the right of diverse  
  groups in these plural societies to have particular ethnic identities and the  
  possibility for these individuals to chose their belonging.99 
 
CIEC openly acknowledged French society as multicultural, and stated its support for the 
right of particular groups, such as Antilleans, to receive official recognition of their 
distinct cultural identities.  This assertion challenged French republicanism’s assumption 
that cultural rights do not need to be attributed to members of specific ethnic groups 
because they already possess civil and political rights and therefore, are already protected 
under the law.   
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 The convergence of CIEC and GEREC in support of Antilleans’ cultural rights 
claims established the foundation for the emergence of Antillean activism in France 
during the 1980s.  GEREC’s original nationalist ideology and CIEC’s assimilationist 
tendencies alienated Antillean migrants who were seeking to maintain both their political 
relationship with France and their Creole identity.  Antillean migrants latched on to the 
new multicultural Creole movement as an ideology that expressed their dual French and 
Creole identities.   Several editorials appearing in the monthly magazine France Antilles 
Afrique reveal how Antillean migrants’ perception of their place within the French nation 
fit into GEREC’s Créolité ideology.   In one such letter to the editor, Antillean migrant 
N. Rogo argued that Antilleans possess a distinct cultural identity, but are also proud of 
being French: “I believe that we are French (whether certain French people want us to be 
or not) and we are also proud of being it with a capital F.…We are precious to France.  
They need us, in the same way that we need them.”100  Rogo expressed Antillean 
migrants’ desire to be recognized as an integral part of the French nation.  They had 
carved out lives for themselves in metropolitan France and wanted the Antilles to 
maintain its political union with France.  Créolité appealed to migrants like Rogo because 
it advocated just that, while also recognizing their particular position in the French nation 
as cultural others.  It validated their feelings of loyalty to the French nation, as well as the 
isolation they felt in metropolitan France as a distinct cultural group.    
 
Conclusion 
The Creole movement is a story of constant transformations in which Antilleans 
in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and France used Creole to navigate their political and cultural 
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relationship to the French nation.  In 1957, a group of educated Martinicans and 
Guadeloupeans employed Creole to challenge the assimilation laws of 
departmentalization.  However, they argued that their movement was strictly cultural, and 
contended that Antilleans could achieve cultural autonomy from within the French state.  
Beginning in the 1970s, nationalists politicized Creole.  They argued that Guadeloupe 
and Martinique possessed a distinct language and culture from metropolitan France and 
therefore, should be independent nations.  In 1981, Mitterrand’s Socialist party rose to 
power and coopted the Creole movement as a part of the government’s move toward the 
“right to difference.”  In response, Creolists who had previously advocated independence 
and those who had promoted assimilation found common ground in an emerging 
multicultural politics.  Instead of using Creole to justify their separate political agendas, 
both groups reinvented Creole as a symbol of French and Antillean cultural 
connectedness.  This newly constructed Creole movement provided Antillean migrants 
with a political strategy to argue for inclusion in the French nation as culturally distinct 
citizens.   
In following the Creole movement from its inception in the 1950s as a part of the 
“Antillean cultural awakening” to GEREC’s nationalization of Creole in the 1970s, and 
finally to Creole’s redefinition during the 1980s as a symbol of multicultural politics, we 
can begin to see how Antillean ethnic activism emerged from the convergence of two 
unsuccessful political strategies: nationalism and assimilation.  In order to gain popular 
support for the Creole movement, nationalists and assimilationists had to come together 
and transform Creole into a particular kind of multicultural politics that Antilleans on 
both sides of the Atlantic could rally around.   
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As French citizens who claimed their distinct Creole identity, Antilleans found 
themselves at the center of the debates about the place of cultural diversity in the 
Republic: How could the French government accept Antilleans’ demands for cultural 
rights that other citizens did not possess?  For the French government, the idea of group-
differentiated rights opposed France’s tradition of assimilation, which required all 
citizens to give up their particular identifications and group affiliations in favor of French 
citizenship.  In using cultural rights claims of “difference” to argue for inclusion in 
French society as culturally distinct citizens, Antilleans were reformulating the 
boundaries of French citizenship to include those racial and cultural “others” who have 
maintained their particular cultural identities, but are nonetheless a part of the French 
nation.   
However, this moment of multiculturalism was short-lived in France.  When the 
National Front rose to power in the 1983 elections, Mitterrand’s socialist government 
stepped away from the possibility of creating a more multicultural France.  As the radical 
right used arguments about race and cultural difference to justify immigrants’ exclusion 
from the nation, the left retreated to safer ground.  Race and cultural difference became 
the territory of the right while the left once again continued to ignore how perceptions of 
race affected Antilleans’ and other minority groups’ access to French political and social 
institutions.  Despite this retreat into republican notions of assimilation during the mid-
1980s, with the formal articulation of Créolité in 1989, Antilleans found a new way to 
argue for inclusion in the French nation.  In highlighting the racial and cultural diversity 
of all French citizens, including white metropolitans, Créolité challenged the French 
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government to reimagine the nation as a culturally and racially diverse entity that was in 
a constant state of transformation.   
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CHAPTER IV  
 
The Creole Question in Republican Education:  
Gérard Lauriette and the Regionalization of the Antilles 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 “It is expressly forbidden for students to speak Creole.”1  Each day, when 
Antillean children arrived at school, they saw these words posted on the walls of their 
classrooms.  This classroom rule reminded Antillean children, teachers, and parents that 
they were French citizens and therefore, were required to speak French.  Their maternal 
language, Creole, had no place in the French nation; Creole was not to be spoken in 
French institutions, such as public schools.  Following departmentalization, the institution 
where the conflict between French and Creole cultures played out most dramatically was 
the local public school system.  This chapter examines these debates about Creole’s place 
in republican education.  It argues that the Creole question was more than a simple debate 
concerning whether or not Creole should be used and taught in Antillean classrooms; it 
was about Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s political and cultural relationship to 
metropolitan France. 
 When Guadeloupe and Martinique became departments of France in 1946, the 
newly formed Ministry of the Overseas Departments (DOM) set out to politically and 
culturally incorporate Antilleans into the nation as French citizens.  DOM officials 
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immediately exported republican education as its most effective tool of assimilation.  
They compelled local Antillean teachers to follow metropolitan directives and implement 
a national curriculum that taught Guadeloupean and Martinican children about French 
culture and history and marginalized Antilleans’ own unique culture.  The Ministry of 
Education banned the use of Creole in schools, and demanded that all Antillean children 
learn to speak, read, and write French, the national language of both France and the 
Antilles.  In classrooms across the Antilles, Guadeloupean and Martinican children 
learned how to be proper French-speaking citizens.  Through public education, 
particularly the acquisition of the French language, French officials hoped to unite 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, and France into one nation with a singular cultural and 
linguistic heritage.    
 However, the Ministry of the DOM could not legislate how Antilleans 
communicated with each other.  Creole persisted in the classroom as students’ and 
teachers’ only form of communication.  It remained the spoken language of the majority 
of Antilleans, and came to symbolize Antilleans’ cultural difference.  Creole activists, 
particularly, Gérard Lauriette, used the Creole question to negotiate Antilleans’ cultural 
and political relationship to the French nation.  The Creole debates focused on several 
issues: First, they questioned whether or not Creole should be a part of the Antillean 
classroom.  Second, they discussed at what level—preschool, primary or secondary—
Creole should be introduced into the educational system.  Finally, they sought to 
determine in what capacity Creole should be introduced into the Antillean classroom.  
Some teachers argued that Creole should solely be used during the early years of 
schooling as an instructional or transitional language that would later be replaced by 
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French.  Others vehemently disagreed, and insisted that Creole was an equal partner with 
French in a fully bilingual program, and should be considered as a discipline of study in 
its own right.2   
 Each group’s opinion on the status and role of Creole in public schools 
corresponded to its own position regarding the Antilles’ political status in relation to the 
French nation.  Teachers who argued for the use of Creole as the sole language of the 
Antilles were often politically aligned with pro-independence nationalist groups.  Those 
who supported the implementation of Creole in public schools alongside French spanned 
the political spectrum from regionalists to cultural autonomists who supported the 
Antilles’ political union with France while simultaneously calling for more control over 
local affairs, such as education and culture.  Some Antillean teachers also felt that 
Creole’s presence in the classroom would impede Antillean children’s acquisition of 
French and threaten their opportunities for social mobility; their opponents labeled them 
pro-French assimilationists.3  Ultimately, these public discussions between French 
education officials and Antillean teacher-activists shaped Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s 
changing cultural and political relationship with France from departmentalization in 
1946, through regionalization in 1972, and the official implementation of decentralization 
in 1982.  These negotiations concerning Creole and public education not only affected 
Creole’s status in French society, but they also transformed Antilleans’ political and 
cultural position in the French nation.  
                                                
2 Ellen M Schnepel, In Search of National Identity: Creole and politics in Guadeloupe  (Hamburg: Helmut 
Buske, 2004). See especially chapter 5, “Conflict in the Capesterre School.” 
3 Ellen M. Schnepel, “The Creole Movement in Guadeloupe,” International Journal of the Sociology of 
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 The first part of this chapter examines Antillean education as a site of conflict 
between one of the most outspoken Creole activists, Gérard Lauriette, and the Ministry of 
Education.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the Ministry of Education was focused on using 
public education to make Antilleans into culturally assimilated French citizens.  It 
perceived of Creole as a social problem that inhibited Antilleans’ assimilation and 
therefore, threatened the political union between France and the Antilles.  In contrast, for 
Lauriette, the Creole question was a political issue.  Hailed as the father of the Creole 
movement, Lauriette was the first teacher to design and implement a Creole pedagogy for 
use in the classroom.  He was a self-proclaimed defender of Antillean rights and critic of 
French colonialism.  For Lauriette, the Creole question symbolized Antilleans’ lack of 
political and cultural authority; in other words, their unequal relationship with France.  
He decried the fact that education in the Antilles was Eurocentric and failed to capture 
the reality of the Antillean child’s cultural, linguistic, and social universe.  He was 
vehemently opposed to making French the sole language of instruction, and argued for 
the use of Creole in Antillean classrooms.  Moreover, he fought against the exclusive use 
of textbooks and pedagogical methods that emanated from a highly centralized 
educational bureaucracy and followed the dictates of the Ministry of National Education 
in France.  To discredit this practice, Lauriette wrote and published his own textbooks, 
utilizing Creole and the Antillean child’s everyday experiences and natural environment 
as a point of reference.4  The first part of this chapter argues that in calling for a reform of 
republican education that took into account Antilleans’ linguistic and cultural 
                                                
4 For a brief biography of Gérard Lauriette and his contributions to the Creole movement see: Ellen M 
Schnepel, In Search of National Identity: Creole and politics in Guadeloupe  (Hamburg: Helmut Buske, 
2004). See especially pages 85-88 chapter 4, “The Creole Movement: An Ideology of Language is infused 
in the Nationalist Movement.” 
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particularities, Lauriette argued for a modification of departmentalization and its laws of 
assimilation.  Lauriette wanted Antilleans to have more cultural and political autonomy, 
beginning with public education.   
 Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy placed pressure on the Ministry of DOM to modify 
the statutes of departmentalization.  For the Ministries of DOM and Education, the 
persistence of Creole in public education meant that departmentalization had not 
succeeded in assimilating Antilleans.  In the late 1960s, when the National Assembly 
considered regional reform for its metropolitan departments, DOM officials looked to 
regionalization as a possible solution to Antillean discontentment and what it perceived to 
be the growing popularity of Antillean independence.  The second part of this chapter 
argues that the debates concerning regionalization and the possibility of granting 
Antilleans more control over local affairs was a response to the Creole question.  When 
regional reform became a real possibility for Guadeloupe and Martinique, Lauriette 
distanced himself from the independence movement and advocated a change in the 
Antilles’ political status from departments to regions.  In the 1970s, the National 
Assembly implemented a system of regions to promote local cultural and economic 
development.  Each region was headed by a prefect and composed of several 
departments.  The prefects oversaw local projects that were too big to be organized by 
each individual department, but were small enough that they could be handled at the 
regional level.  Lauriette believed that once Guadeloupe and Martinique became official 
regions of France, the Ministry of Education would give Antilleans the same economic, 
linguistic, and cultural rights they had previously accorded to metropolitan regions.  
However, this was not the case.   
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 The last section of this chapter examines this differential application of the laws 
of regionalization to metropolitan France and the Antilles during the 1970s.  Despite the 
fact that Guadeloupe and Martinique possessed the same political status as other 
metropolitan regions, the Ministry of Education refused to implement the laws of 
regional language instruction in the Antilles.  Education officials permitted metropolitan 
teachers to alter the national curriculum to include their respective regional languages and 
cultures, but they continued to ban Creole from Antillean schools.  The Ministry of 
Education argued that Creole was an impediment to its efforts to promote French literacy, 
education, and social advancement in the Antilles.  Accordign to education officials, the 
ban on Creole purportedly promoted equality by improving Antillean children’s French 
language acquisition and affording them the same social and economic opportunities as 
metropolitans.  In constructing the Creole question as purely a social problem, the 
Ministry of Education attempted to depoliticize Creole as an issue that concerned 
Antilleans’ rights as French citizens.   
 
Part I.  Gérard Lauriette and the Ministry of Education’s struggle for control of 
Antillean Education 
 
National Unity Through French Literacy 
 On November 7, 1946, five months after the Antilles became French departments, 
French officials requested that all of Guadeloupe’s teachers gather at the Renaissance 
Theater in Pointe-à-Pitre.  In a personal account of this event, Gérard Lauriette claimed 
that the Ministry of Education called this meeting to ensure that Guadeloupean teachers 
understood their new role as instructors within a French department.  When everyone was 
assembled at the theater, a representative from the Ministry of Education announced: 
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“You are no longer a colony; you are assimilated.”5  This meant that Antillean teachers 
were now required to follow the national curriculum of France’s metropolitan 
departments.  In response to this assertion, Lauriette, who at the time was a young 
twenty-four year old elementary school teacher, stood up and shouted: “One cannot 
assimilate a people from a country without winter to a people from a country with winter; 
the French were not able to assimilate the people of Alsace-Lorraine.…As for 
Guadeloupean society, you do not understand it because you have not experienced it, you 
have not lived it.”6  This outburst was the beginning of Lauriette’s forty-year struggle 
against what he perceived to be the government’s use of education to culturally oppress 
and assimilate young Antilleans.  He proclaimed that Antilleans could not be culturally 
assimilated to France because of these two countries’ vast cultural and social differences.  
The extreme contrast between the Antilles’ and France’s weather indicated that the two 
countries were naturally distinct; it was therefore unnatural to culturally assimilate 
Antilleans into the French nation.  Lauriette applied his position to republican education, 
arguing that it was not only unnatural, but also absurd to implement France’s 
metropolitan curriculum in the Antilles.   
 Lauriette’s negative response to departmentalization, and the law of assimilation 
that accompanied it, demonstrated to education officials that the political and cultural 
union between metropolitan France and the Antilles was at best, tenuous.  In response, 
the Ministry of Education turned to republican education to secure France’s political 
position in the Antilles and make Antilleans into French citizens.  It centralized Antillean 
education, making local teachers accountable to the Ministry of Education, and 
                                                
5 Gérard Lauriette, Un homme de couleur antillais créolophone et francophone découvre une philosophie  
(1974), 1.   
6 Ibid.   
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implemented France’s national curriculum in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  In particular, 
the Ministry of Education became preoccupied with teaching Antillean children how to 
speak proper French.  Since departmentalization, Antilleans’ Creole language had 
become the symbol of Antilleans’ cultural differences.7  For the Ministry of Education, 
these differences had no place in the classroom, nor did they fit into the French nation.  It 
perceived of Antilleans’ inability to speak proper French like their metropolitan 
compatriots as an obstacle to Antilleans’ assimilation. 
   In the fall of 1946, the Ministry of Education sent Germain d’Hangest, a general 
inspector of public education, to Guadeloupe and Martinique to evaluate the state of 
Antillean schools and to determine how to implement the French system of universal 
republican education in the islands.  D’Hangest’s report painted a grim picture of 
Antillean education.  He was surprised to discover that in both Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, elementary schools were severely overcrowded and dilapidated.  In one 
school, a single teacher was responsible for the education of nearly one hundred children.  
Moreover, classrooms did not contain the basic supplies, such as notebooks and maps, 
needed to educate students.  These types of conditions not only led to ineffective learning 
environments, but also to poor hygiene.  The bathrooms and classrooms were in such 
decrepit states that cases of dysentery were common among schoolchildren.8   
 Although initially shocked by the state of Antillean schools, d’Hangest noted that 
these problems were easily solvable with the construction of more schools and the 
                                                
7 For a more detailed analysis of how the Creole language became the symbol of Antillean cultural identity, 
see Chapter 3, “From Militant Nationalists to Ethnic Minority:  The Antillean Creole Movement in 
Metropolitan France and the Antilles after Departmentalization”. 
8 L’Inspecteur Général G. d’Hangest à Monsieur le Ministre de l’éducation nationale et à Monsieur le 
Ministre de la France d’outre-mer, décembre 1946, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 
Fontainebleau, 770508, Art. 55. 
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recruitment and training of more teachers.  For d’Hangest, there was a more pressing 
problem: Antillean children’s inability to speak, read, and write the French language had 
made them severely undereducated compared to their metropolitan counterparts.  In his 
letter to the Ministries of Education and Overseas Departments, d’Hangest remarked 
upon Antilleans’ lack of knowledge of the French language as the main problem not only 
facing Antillean education, but also threatening the political unity between France and its 
new departments:   
  From reading high schools’ quarterly reports, as well as various local  
  publications, I have realized that literary subjects [in Guadeloupe] suffer  
  from quite a clear inferiority due to the nearly exclusive oral use of  
  Creole: the true maternal language of the entire population, it is naturally  
  sufficient for the needs of daily life; and in the absence of any other  
  dialect…Creole finds itself promoted to the rank of a national language, at 
  the expense of French, whose phonetics, syntax and spelling are only truly 
  mastered by a small minority of the teachers of local origin.  I have  
  emphasized everywhere (in Martinique as well) the necessity of a   
  sustained effort toward improving the clarity, accuracy and ease in the  
  usage of the administrative and literary language [French], which is  
  indispensable to national solidarity.9 
 
D’Hangest claimed that a large part of the process of incorporating Antillean society into 
the French political and social structure included disseminating French across the Antilles 
as the national language.  He perceived of Creole as a hindrance to Antilleans’ 
acquisition of French, and therefore to the process of national unification.  Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, and France were politically the same nation; however, they could not 
culturally be one nation, if they did not share the same national language.  According to 
d’Hangest, the dissemination of French through public education was the means through 
which to incorporate Antillean society into the French political, economic, and social 
                                                
9 L’Inspecteur Général G. d’Hangest à Monsieur le Ministre de l’éducation nationale et à Monsieur le 
Ministre de la France d’outre-mer, décembre 1946, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 
Fontainebleau, 770508, Art. 55. 
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structure.  Ultimately, this would lead to cultural assimilation and “national solidarity”.  
Education officials’ logic concerning the link among French literacy, assimilation, and 
national solidarity stigmatized Creole as an impediment and threat to assimilation and 
therefore, national unity.  Creole symbolized the “problem” of Antillean assimilation that 
needed to be solved.  French literacy was a tangible solution, and possibly the most 
effective way that the French government could make Antilleans into French citizens.     
 
Lauriette’s Creole Pedagogy 
 Lauriette opposed the Ministry of Education’s characterization of Creole as a 
social problem that impeded Antilleans’ assimilation and prevented the islands from 
achieving the same economic and social stability as metropolitan departments.  From the 
moment Guadeloupe and Martinique became overseas departments, Lauriette was critical 
of assimilation and the ban on Creole that accompanied this policy.  He argued that it was 
the exclusive use of French in Antillean classrooms, not Creole, that caused the Antilles’ 
social and economic problems.  In 1948, Lauriette organized a conference for a 
Guadeloupean teachers’ association at which he presented and defined his educational 
philosophy for Antillean children.  At this conference, Lauriette argued that because 
Antillean children had different social and cultural experiences from French children, 
public education in the Antilles could not simply be the mirror image of metropolitan 
education policy.  In order to properly serve the Antillean people, the national curriculum 
needed to reflect the Antilles’ cultural and social particularities.10  Lauriette was 
adamantly opposed to French officials legislating what should be taught in Antillean 
                                                
10 Gérard Lauriette, Présentation des méthodes et philosphie de l’enseignement d’une école libre de la 
Guadeloupe.  Extraits de quleques livres d’enseignemetn d’’un instituteur guadeloupéen, Lauriette Gérard, 
1975, Bibliothèquqe National François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-14142. 
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classrooms.  They knew nothing about Guadeloupean and Martinican society and culture 
and therefore, were not fit to determine the kind of curriculum and educational methods 
that benefitted the Antilles.  Only Antilleans had the knowledge and authority to 
determine what was best for Guadeloupean and Martinican children.11   
 For Lauriette, Antillean children required a curriculum that valued their Creole 
culture and language.  He argued that from the moment the Antillean child entered the 
French classroom, he was confronted with a metropolitan curriculum that was not 
adapted to the reality of his experiences in Guadeloupe and Martinique.   
  On his first day of school the child trembles. He is afraid.  He is disturbed.  
  His vision is blurry.  The beating of his heart fills his ears with the roar of  
  a waterfall.  There is a smartly dressed man before him that he does not  
  know…Or a woman whose bright red lipstick is the only thing that  
  captivates him.  Now what will come out of these mouths?  Growls,  
  chuckles, yells, words he does not know…12   
 
In his pedagogical writings on Antillean education, Lauriette frequently constructed this 
image of a young, scared Antillean schoolboy who felt alienated by his teachers’ 
exclusive use of the French language.  He employed this image contrasting the confused 
Creole-speaking child with the confident French-speaking teacher to underscore what he 
believed was the French language’s negative affects on Antillean children’s academic 
performance.  Antillean children were unable to successfully learn because they did not 
speak French, and therefore did not understand what was going on around them in the 
classroom.  Like education officials, Lauriette recognized that Antilleans were 
undereducated partly due to the fact that they were Creole-speakers and had to begin the 
difficult task of learning French upon entering the public school system.  However, in 
                                                
11 Gérard Lauriette, Présentation des méthodes et philosphie de l’enseignement d’une école libre de la 
Guadeloupe.  Extraits de quleques livres d’enseignemetn d’’un instituteur guadeloupéen, Lauriette Gérard, 
1975, Bibliothèquqe National François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-14142. 
12 Ibid. 
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contrast to official education policy which enforced the Ministry of Education’s belief 
that the use of Creole in the classroom amplified Antillean children’s confusion between 
the French and Creole languages, Lauriette argued that Creole had a positive effect on 
Antillean children’s academic performance.  In its current state, France’s metropolitan 
curriculum was not functional for the Antilles; the legal ban on Creole from public 
classrooms prevented Antillean children from receiving a proper education.13       
 To resolve this problem, Lauriette proposed that the Ministry of Education permit 
teachers like himself to implement a specific curriculum adapted to Antillean children’s 
cultural and linguistic differences, as well as their everyday experiences in Guadeloupe 
and Martinique.  This kind of adapted pedagogy, which Lauriette described as education 
fonctionnelle or “functional education”, would teach Antillean children according to the 
particularities of their social environment, popular language, and cultural history.14  The 
most important component of Lauriette’s “functional education” was a pedagogical 
method that used Creole to teach the French language to Antillean children.  Lauriette 
believed that French was a foreign language to Antilleans and should be treated as such.  
He reasoned that when French children learned a foreign language, such as English, the 
teacher used French to translate the English words and explain English grammar.  
Therefore, it only seemed logical that teachers in the Antilles would also be able to use 
Creole to define French words and teach French grammar.  Lauriette described teachers’ 
attempts to use French to teach Antillean children who only spoke Creole as “completely 
                                                
13 Gérard Lauriette, Présentation des méthodes et philosphie de l’enseignement d’une école libre de la 
Guadeloupe.  Extraits de quleques livres d’enseignemetn d’’un instituteur guadeloupéen, Lauriette Gérard, 
1975, Bibliothèquqe National François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-14142. 
14 Ibid. 
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absurd.”15  During this time period, all of the pedagogical material on foreign language 
instruction recognized that children needed to use their maternal language in order to 
quickly and effectively learn a foreign one.   
 Despite the Ministry of Education’s ban on Creole, Antillean teachers were still 
using Creole in the classroom because it was the only way they could communicate with 
their Creole-speaking students.  Metropolitan teachers who had been assigned to teach in 
the Antilles also found themselves trying to use Creole in an effort to establish some form 
of communication and understanding.  Therefore, aside from the challenge that 
Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy posed to official educational policy, his efforts to introduce 
Creole into Antillean public schools was not particularly novel.  Both teachers and 
students employed Creole in Antillean classrooms.  What made Lauriette’s pedagogy 
subversive was its use of Creole as a legitimate pedagogical tool and not just a basic form 
of communication.  His “functional education” required the Ministry of Education to not 
only lift the ban on Creole, but also to formally acknowledge the educational value of 
Creole in republican education.  This kind of official recognition was important to 
Lauriette because it elevated Creole from a crude patois to a legitimate language.16 
 According to Lauriette, the Ministry of Education’s ban on Creole debased 
Antilleans’ language and culture and made it inferior to the French language and culture.  
The ban symbolized Creole’s status as an illegitimate and unlawful component of the 
French nation.  The signs posted on the walls of Antillean classrooms stating, “Creole not 
permitted”, taught Antillean children to be ashamed of their Creole language and culture.  
                                                
15 Gérard Lauriette, Présentation des méthodes et philosphie de l’enseignement d’une école libre de la 
Guadeloupe.  Extraits de quleques livres d’enseignemetn d’’un instituteur guadeloupéen, Lauriette Gérard, 
1975, Bibliothèquqe National François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-14142. 
16 Gérard Lauriette, Les Débuts de l’enseignement aux Antillais Créolophones guadeloupéens, 
Martiniquais, n.d., Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-12595. 
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In his pedagogical writings, Lauriette instructed teachers that the most important aspect 
of his “functional education” was to explain to Antillean children that their Creole 
language was equal to French.  “During the first lesson, make it known that the Creole 
language is not a ‘shameful’ language, that…all languages are the same…The French 
language is not more beautiful than the Creole language.”17  For Lauriette, this 
revalorization of the Creole language was a starting point for reforming the national 
curriculum to include Antilleans’ cultural particularities.   
 Lauriette wanted to completely change the curriculum that teachers used in 
Antillean classrooms, including the educational materials available to them.  Antillean 
and metropolitan children read from the same textbooks.  This was problematic for 
Lauriette because metropolitan textbooks were exclusively focused on French history and 
culture.  Lauriette argued that in metropolitan history books, “only white Frenchmen are 
brave, good [and] intelligent.”18  These whites heroes had “long hair, a straight nose, and 
skinny lips”; they look[ed] completely different from black Antilleans who had “curly 
hair, a large nose, and fat lips.”19  Because their physical characteristics did not match 
those of the national heroes they learned about, Lauriette contended that Antillean 
children grew up believing that there were no black heroes.  Only “white models register 
in his [an Antillean child’s] mind and he only has white models to emulate.”20  According 
                                                
17 Gérard Lauriette, Les Débuts de l’enseignement aux Antillais Créolophones guadeloupéens, 
Martiniquais, n.d., Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-12595. 
18 Gérard Lauriette, Présentation des méthodes et philosphie de l’enseignement d’une école libre de la 
Guadeloupe.  Extraits de quleques livres d’enseignemetn d’’un instituteur guadeloupéen, Lauriette Gérard, 
1975, Bibliothèquqe National de François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-14142. 
19 Gérard Lauriette, L’Enseignement du Français à Partir du Créole: Les dix premiers séances 
d’enseignement de la redaction française dans une école guadeloupénne, 1972, Bibliothèquqe National de 
François Mitterrand, Côte EL 4-R PIECE-71. 
20 Gérard Lauriette, Présentation des méthodes et philosphie de l’enseignement d’une école libre de la 
Guadeloupe.  Extraits de quleques livres d’enseignemetn d’’un instituteur guadeloupéen, Lauriette Gérard, 
1975, Bibliothèquqe National François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-14142. 
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to Lauriette, this imitation of white heroes traumatized Antillean children and made them 
feel inferior.  In other words, the Ministry of Education’s exclusion of Antillean culture 
from the national curriculum psychologically damaged Guadeloupean and Martinican 
children.  For Lauriette, “the more a Guadeloupean is instructed in French schools, the 
more he believes himself to be inferior to white people.”21  Lauriette’s “functional 
education” fought against republican education’s purportedly oppressive nature.  It 
insisted upon incorporating stories of “brave, good, and intelligent black men” so that 
young Antilleans had positive role models to which they could relate.22   
 In March 1949, several months after laying out the above pedagogy at a private 
conference for a Guadeloupean teacher’s association, Lauriette wrote a letter to his 
superiors in the administration of the Guadeloupean school district.  In this letter, 
Lauriette restated what he had argued for in his lecture on “functional education”.  He 
also informed his superiors that he refused to monitor his school’s cafeteria as a form of 
protest.  Lauriette argued that this action demonstrated that he was not a complacent 
supporter of France’s education policy.  He did not allow the Ministry of Education to 
control his work schedule; nor did he enforce its ban on Creole.23  After receiving 
Lauriette’s provocative letter, the Vice Rector of Guadeloupe’s school district asked the 
Departmental Director of Health to evaluate Lauriette’s mental state.  In a confidential 
letter to the Vice Rector, the Director of Health informed him that Lauriette’s actions 
                                                
21 Gérard Lauriette, Les Débuts de l’enseignement aux Antillais Créolophones guadeloupéens, 
Martiniquais, n.d., Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-12595. 
22 Gérard Lauriette, Présentation des méthodes et philosphie de l’enseignement d’une école libre de la 
Guadeloupe.  Extraits de quleques livres d’enseignemetn d’’un instituteur guadeloupéen, Lauriette Gérard, 
1975, Bibliothèquqe National François Mitterrand, Côte 4-R-14142. 
23 Letter from Gérard Lauriette to his “Chefs hiérachiques de l’Administration de l’Enseignement official”, 
March 4, 1949.  Published in Gérard Lauriette, Un homme de couleur antillais créolophone et francophone 
découvre une philosophie, 1974, 1-3.  Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, Côte EL-4-Z-228. 
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indicated “a very deficient psychological state.”24  He suggested that he admit Lauriette 
to a hospital for observation and to undergo treatment.  The Director of Health claimed 
that this matter was particularly urgent because of Lauriette’s profession, implying that 
he could possibly harm the children with whom he worked.25  The Vice Rector followed 
the Director of Health’s advice and placed Lauriette on an extended professional leave 
for nearly three years.  Lauriette was only reintegrated into Guadeloupe’s school district 
in May 1952 after pleading his case before a group of psychiatrists at the Salpétrière 
Hospital in Paris.  Years after this incidence, Lauriette speculated that this was the 
beginning of the Ministry of Education’s attempt to silence him and diminish the political 
challenges his Creole pedagogy posed to republican education.26   
 Lauriette’s defiant call for the introduction of the Creole language and culture into 
Antillean schools was a radical reformulation of the Ministry of Education’s assimilation 
policy.  In 1952, only several years had passed since departmentalization, and the 
Minister of Education remained fervently committed to the “laws of assimilation.”  These 
laws required French officials to implement France’s social and economic structures, 
such as education, as they existed in France with no consideration for the differences that 
existed in Antillean society.  For the Ministry of Education, this meant education officials 
applied France’s national curriculum to Antillean classrooms without alteration.  Because 
Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy deviated from this law of departmentalization, the Ministries 
                                                
24 Confidential letter from the Directeur départemental de la santé to Monsieur le Vice Rectorat de la 
Guadeloupe, Pointe-à-Pitre, “Objet: Avis officieux état mental de M. Lauriette”, March 11, 1949.  
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philosophie, 1974, 3.  Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, Côte EL-4-Z-228. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Gérard Lauriette, Un homme de couleur antillais créolophone et francophone découvre une philosophie, 
1974, 4.  Bibliothèque Nationale de François Mitterrand, Côte EL-4-Z-228. 
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of Education and DOM perceived of it as a threat to the government’s project to build the 
political and cultural union between France and the Antilles.   
 The Ministry of Education’s concerns about Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy were 
amplified by the period of decolonization following the Second World War.  During the 
Fourth Republic (1946-1958), the French government faced multiple colonial uprisings, 
including the wars for independence in Indochina, West Africa, and Algeria.  In 1960, 
these wars compelled President Charles de Gaulle to revise the French constitution to 
allow French-ruled territories to unilaterally change their own constitutions and political 
relationship with France.  The majority of France’s territories in Asia and Africa opted 
for and obtained independence that same year.  Two years later, in 1962, Algeria became 
an independent nation.   
 As decolonization swept across its empire, the French government became 
particularly concerned about preserving its political ties to its remaining departments and 
territories, which included Guadeloupe and Martinique.  Former colonial subjects’ 
decision to reclaim their national cultures and histories, and become independent nations 
caused DOM officials to question whether or not it had successfully assimilated 
Antilleans and made them loyal citizens of France.  The French government turned to 
education to establish a politically and culturally unified nation.  The Ministries of the 
DOM and Education focused their attention and funds on educating Antillean children 
about their established historical, cultural, and linguistic ties to France.  Officials hoped 
that knowledge of this relationship between Guadeloupe, Martinique, and France would 
compel Antilleans to feel as if the national link between the Antilles and France was not 
only natural, but also historically and culturally justified.  Republican schools made 
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“peasants into Frenchmen” during the Third Republic, and, now, DOM officials 
employed public education to effectively assimilate Antilleans as the newest citizens of 
France.27    
 
Elementary French and the Social Problem of Creole 
 While Lauriette defiantly developed and implemented his Creole pedagogy in his 
own classroom, the French government experimented with its own curriculum, one that 
was specifically tailored to the Antilles.  Lauriette had failed to persuade the Ministry of 
Education that the ban on Creole negatively affected Antillean children.  However, he 
succeeded in convincing education officials that Antillean children were linguistically 
different from metropolitan children.   The Ministry of Education agreed with Lauriette 
that Antilleans’ inability to speak French negatively affected their academic performance.  
However, whereas Lauriette believed that this linguistic difference justified the use 
Creole as a pedagogical tool in Antillean classrooms, the Ministry of Education 
contended that the persistence of this difference indicated that it had not done enough to 
erase this linguistic particularity.  In order to resolve this “problem” of difference, the 
Ministry of Education developed a pedagogical method to rapidly teach Antillean 
children to speak and read French.    
                                                
27 In Peasants Into Frenchmen, Eugen Weber argues that during the Third Republic, the French 
government effectively used education and language to create a politically and culturally unified French 
nation.  Prior to the Third Republic, a singular French national identity did not exist.  Peasants living in the 
countryside were more likely to identify with their particular region.  French officials used mandatory 
schooling to instill in peasants an awareness of being “French” and belonging to the nation of France rather 
than to one’s own province.  During this time, the 1882 Jules Ferry laws, which made education free, 
secular, and obligatory, also declared French the national language of instruction.  Education officials 
hoped that a national curriculum, combined with a shared language, would ultimately assimilate regional 
and cultural differences into a singular national culture.  In other words, the Ferry laws linked public 
education and French language to the construction of a unified French nation and culture.  See: Eugen 
Weber, Peasants Into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914  (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1976).   
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 In 1952, M. Abraham, the director of the cabinet of the Ministry of Education 
decided to form a committee to study the problem of education in the Antilles.  In a 
meeting held on June 23, 1952, the Committee of DOM Instruction discussed education 
as the most effective means through which the government could promote national 
solidarity among Guadeloupe, Martinique and France.  The committee’s investigation 
revealed that metropolitans and Antilleans did not fully understand their political and 
cultural relationship to each other.  Lauriette, despite being educated in France, was an 
example of one such Antillean who did not understand the unbreakable historical and 
cultural ties uniting Guadeloupe, Martinique, and France together since the seventeenth 
century.  According to Abraham, this lack of knowledge threatened national unity.  “This 
ignorance is certainly at the root of the difficulties that sometimes arise between France 
and these people [of the DOM]…It is essential to ensure a fraternal understanding 
between all peoples who constitute the French Union.”28  Abraham argued that these 
misunderstandings and the subsequent disunity they promoted were solvable through 
education.  The Ministry of Education decided to create a national curriculum focused on 
informing both metropolitan and Antillean children about their shared belonging to the 
Union française or “French Union”.29  This educational initiative was a part of the 
government’s efforts to define a new kind of French nation during the period of 
decolonization.  In an attempt to appease former colonial subjects’ demands for political 
and cultural autonomy, the government replaced its old colonial system of the French 
Empire with the French Union.  However, this “union” needed to be constructed.  The 
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Ministry of Education taught Antilleans and members of France’s other departments and 
territories that they were all a part of a greater French nation, culture, and history.   
 French literacy was an integral part of this national curriculum promoting cultural 
and political unity among members of the French Union.  In February 1950, Professor of 
linguistics Georges Gougenheim, informed the Ministry of Education of the importance 
of disseminating the French language throughout the French Union.  In a report on the 
role of the French language in the French Union, Professor Gougenheim characterized 
French literacy as an “initiation to the civilization of metropolitan French.”30  He 
constructed French literacy as the unifying cultural element of the French Union.  
According to Gougenheim, it offered a solution to the Ministry of DOM’s difficult task 
of uniting the distinct cultures and languages of France’s departments and territories into 
one political union.  On a purely practical level, the French language provided members 
with a common language.  As the administrative body that implemented metropolitan 
directives, the Ministry of the DOM needed the ability to communicate with French 
Union members.  Effective communication between the metropole and overseas 
departments was essential to political and social unity.31  Moreover, French literacy 
promoted social mobility by providing members of the DOM with access to higher levels 
of education.  Gougenheim contended that DOM members’ satisfaction with socio-
economic status would lead to political stability and support for the French Union.32   
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 French literacy was of such importance that the Ministries of the DOM and 
Education worked with linguists, like Gougenheim, to develop a new pedagogical 
method for teaching French to Union members as quickly and as efficiently as possible.  
In January 1952, the Minister of National Education sponsored the formation of the 
Committee of Elementary French, and appointed Gougenheim as its director.  
Gougenheim’s “Elementary French” replaced traditional methods of French instruction, 
which the Ministry of Education believed were slow and often lacking in effectiveness.  
Elementary French purportedly eased Union members’ acquisition of the French 
language by simplifying it into its most basic vocabulary and grammar.33  It was 
originally intended for adults and children who had little formal education.  However, the 
Committee of DOM Instruction recognized the potential value of Elementary French 
within traditional classrooms throughout France’s departments and territories.  In its June 
1952 meeting, the Committee recommended the implementation of Elementary French in 
Antillean schools as a solution to the islands’ education problem.  Antillean children’s 
academic performance was so far behind that of metropolitan children’s because they did 
not understand French.  The Committee feared that Antillean teachers’ and children’s 
dependence on Creole for effective communication was interfering with Antilleans’ 
acquisition of the French language.  Committee members argued that the Elementary 
French method enabled Antillean children to quickly learn French so that they did not 
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have to resort to the use of Creole; in doing so, it facilitated their academic success and 
potential for social mobility.34   
 Following the Ministry of Education’s decision to implement Gougenheim’s 
Elementary French pedagogy in the Antilles, Lauriette once again found himself in 
conflict with both local and national education officials.  Having already been suspended 
once, Lauriette knew that his relationship with education officials was tenuous; yet, he 
continued to ignore and publicly criticize the ban on Creole.  He refused to use the 
Elementary French method, claiming that it was unpractical and ineffective.  For 
Lauriette, Elementary French was just another example of the Ministry of Education’s 
misunderstanding of Antillean society and the causes of its social and economic 
problems.  By the mid-1950s, Lauriette was known for his nonconformist teaching 
methods; administrators knew that he ignored national directives and used Creole in his 
classroom, and they were not particularly pleased with his public defiance.   
 In 1956, the Ministry of Education sent the local education inspector, Mr. 
Pareosse, to Lauriette’s classroom to examine and evaluate his teaching performance.  
Lauriette claimed that the Ministry of Education used the report from this investigation to 
document his purportedly poor performance so that officials could force him out of 
education at a later date.  In response, Lauriette wrote his own report refuting the 
departmental inspector’s critiques, and sent it to the Ministry of Education.  The Minister 
of Education refused to change Mr. Pareosse’s report; instead, he informed Mr. Hélisey, 
the director of The School for Boys where Lauriette taught, of Lauriette’s insubordination 
and refusal to enforce the ban on Creole.  Hélisey insisted that Lauriette follow the 
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national curriculum, but when he refused to do so, Hélisey was forced to temporarily 
suspend Lauriette for not complying with national pedagogy.35   
 However, Lauriette refused to be silenced.  One week after his suspension in 
April 1957, Lauriette published two scathing critiques of French republican education in 
Le Progrès Social, a Guadeloupean newspaper described by its director as an “instrument 
of information for the defense of Guadeloupean interests.”36  In the first article, entitled 
“On the education of young Guadeloupeans who do not speak French”, Lauriette 
described the French education system in the Antilles as a complete failure.  At the 
School for Boys in Capesterre, one of the most prestigious institutions in Guadeloupe, 
only one to three students successfully passed the national primary education exam and 
received their Certificate of Primary Studies.  Lauriette argued that these deplorable 
statistics were a direct result of the Ministry of Education’s refusal to permit teachers to 
use Creole to educate Antillean children.  Educating children “in the metropolitan 
manner” and “in a language that they do not understand has disastrous consequences.”37  
The ban on Creole kept Antillean children in a state of confusion, and prevented them 
from learning French.  Lauriette claimed that one year after he introduced Creole into 
Capesterre’s School for Boys, forty-two students succeeded in obtaining their Certificate 
of Primary Studies.  This was primarily due to the fact that the students were better able 
to understand the exam questions and respond properly in French.  For Lauriette, his 
experience at the School for Boys confirmed his educational philosophy that Creole could 
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be effectively used as a pedagogical tool to facilitate Antillean children’s acquisition of 
the French language.38    
 One week after this article appeared in Le Progrès Social, the newspaper’s 
director published another one of Lauriette’s critiques.  This article, entitled “Young 
Guadeloupean Children and the School”, examined what Lauriette believed to be the 
absurdity of using metropolitan textbooks in the Antilles.  Upon examining his son’s 
schoolbook, he discovered a lesson on the four seasons of France listing the different 
fruits and flowers that grew during each season.  For Antillean children who lived in a 
tropical climate and did not experience the change in seasons, this lesson was completely 
irrelevant.  Lauriette failed to find in his son’s history, grammar, and math books “a 
single example that would interest a Guadeloupean child.”39  For this reason, Lauriette 
claimed that the metropolitan curriculum did not match the reality of Antillean children’s 
experiences in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  He challenged the Ministry of Education’s 
notion that Antilleans “are children of France and must make use of the books of Paris, 
the national capital”, and encouraged Antillean teachers to create their own curriculums 
specifically designed to teach “young Creoles” about their own history, culture, and 
language.40  In closing his article, Lauriette stated that he was “breaking the order of 
silence” surrounding the ineffectiveness of republican education in the Antilles.  He 
argued that Antillean teachers and parents could no longer remain silent about the 
damaging metropolitan curriculum, which was keeping Antillean children uneducated 
and subordinate.  He called upon Antillean teachers and education officials to implement 
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a new Creole pedagogy that would better serve Antilleans’ educational and social 
needs.41   
 When Le Progrès Social published these two articles, the Ministry of Education 
was already well aware of the challenges that Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy posed to 
republican education.  It had already attempted to silence and subdue him by suspending 
him twice.  However, with the publication of these articles, the Ministry of Education 
became even more concerned about the subversive nature of Lauriette’s educational 
philosophy.  Prior to the publication of these articles, Lauriette had only expressed his 
opinions in either private conferences or letters to education officials and administrators.  
The fact that Lauriette had now chosen to publicly critique republican education was of 
particular concern to the Ministry of Education.  Lauriette specifically directed his 
articles to Antillean teachers, suggesting how they could use his Creole pedagogy in their 
classrooms.42  This indicated to education officials that Lauriette was most likely trying 
to organize a popular teachers’ movement to overturn national directives concerning the 
strict implementation of France’s metropolitan curriculum in the overseas departments.    
 Moreover, not only did Lauriette’s articles challenge the ban on Creole, but they 
also argued that Antilleans had a separate identity as “Creoles”.  Lauriette’s Creole 
pedagogy established Antilleans’ separate history, culture, and language, and insisted 
upon cultivating this unique Creole identity within the classroom.43  The Ministry of 
Education feared that the goal of Lauriette’s pedagogy was to create young Antilleans 
who valued a Creole cultural identity separate from their French citizenship.  Education 
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officials perceived of this as a direct affront to departmentalization and its laws of 
assimilation, which required Antilleans to give up their cultural particularities in favor of 
French citizenship.  The Ministry of Education was also wary of the publication in which 
Lauriette’s articles appeared.  Le Progrès Social was allegedly an independent 
publication without any political affiliations.   However, its owner, Henri Rodès was the 
brother of Félix Rodès, a well-known activist for Guadeloupean independence.  This 
worried education officials who perceived of Le Progrès Social as a political platform 
designed to rally the Antillean people around the movement for political autonomy.  The 
Ministry of Education was concerned that nationalist political groups would appropriate 
Lauriette’s use of phrases such as “my native land of Guadeloupe” to popularize the idea 
of a Guadeloupean nation separate from France.  It feared that the indépendantistes 
would latch on to Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy, politicize it, and employ it in their 
struggle for independence.    
 Lauriette was a liability for the Ministry of Education; his Creole pedagogy 
threatened the political union between France and the Antilles.  Eight days after the 
publication of these two articles in Le Progrès Social, the Ministry of Education decided 
to take action.  It made Lauriette’s temporary suspension permanent and placed him on 
an extended leave of absence for mental illness.  In August1959, Lauriette founded the 
“Gérard Lauriette Institution”, a private school for girls and boys who had either dropped 
out or been dismissed from public schools for repeatedly failing to pass the national exam 
for the Certificate of Primary Studies.  This private school provided Lauriette with the 
opportunity to fully implement his teaching methods and Creole pedagogy.  The Ministry 
of Education may have prevented Lauriette from teaching the Creole language and 
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culture in public schools, but it had no jurisdiction over private schools.44  Lauriette 
found a way to challenge the ban on Creole from outside the confines of formal public 
education.  He sent letters to local and national education officials detailing his success 
with students the French public school system had given up on.  In these letters, Lauriette 
boasted that his teaching methods enabled his students to quickly learn French and pass 
the national exam for the Certificate of Primary Studies.  He argued that his 
unprecedented achievements indicated that the Ministry of Education needed to lift the 
ban on Creole and permit teachers to use it as a pedagogical tool.  Lauriette boldly ended 
his letters by informing the recipient that he had attached his Creole pedagogy detailing 
his teaching methods.  He asked the recipient to forward this material to the necessary 
education officials for review and consideration.45 
 In April 1961, Lauriette organized an exhibition at his school.  He presented and 
displayed his numerous writings on his pedagogical philosophy and teaching methods.  
Lauriette also published his writings from this exhibition.  A few days later, Lauriette 
received a letter from the Departmental Medical Committee of Guadeloupe, informing 
him that the Ministry of Education was forcing him to take an early retirement at the age 
of thirty-nine due to “mental illness contracted outside the realm of his profession.”46  For 
Lauriette, the timing of his forced retirement was not a coincidence.  His decision to open 
a private school based on his Creole pedagogy solidified his status as a potentially 
subversive character.  According to Lauriette, the Ministry of Education declared him 
insane in an attempt to discredit him and his authority as an educator.  Lauriette perceived 
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of this as the Ministry of Education’s last resort to disrupt his pedagogy’s challenge to 
republican education.47   
 By the early 1960s, the Ministry of Education was completely frustrated with 
Lauriette’s defiance.  His Creole pedagogy and its potential to mobilize Antilleans for 
cultural and political autonomy symbolized for the Ministry of Education its failure to 
control and improve education in the Antilles.  Moreover, it represented 
departmentalization’s inability to politically and culturally unify the Antilles and France.  
After fifteen years of departmentalization and republican education, economic and social 
malaise still persisted in the Antilles.  The Ministry of Education’s 1962 report on the 
“problems of national education in the departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe” 
confirmed officials’ fears that the deplorable state of Antillean education had the 
potential to exacerbate the social and economic problems and create discontented citizens 
critical of France’s political involvement in the Antilles.  In this report, R. Courtoux, the 
Chief Inspector of Public Schools, informed the Secretary General of the DOM that “the 
pedagogical methods for learning the French language are not fully developed.”48  
Gougeneheim’s Elementary French had yet to be implemented in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique and it showed in Antillean schoolchildren’s poor academic performance.  In 
1961, only thirty five percent of Antillean children had scored within the “average” range 
on the national exam to receive an elementary school diploma.  This contributed to 
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underachievement at the high school level.  More than half of Antillean adolescents left 
school after completing the minimum amount of secondary education.49   
 According to Courtoux, these academic failures presented serious social 
problems.  “One has already begun to see on the streets of Fort-de-France, idle and bitter 
gangs of young boys who are naturally ready for all their bad circumstances and to 
participate in subversive activities of any kind.  As for the girls, they are vulnerable to 
prostitution.”50  Courtoux’s report linked the Antilleans’ inability to speak French or the 
“Creole problem” to the deplorable state of education in the Antilles, which in turn 
created an unstable society.  Social instability led to discontentment and ultimately 
threatened the political union between the Antilles and France.  The Ministry of 
Education used this reasoning to construct public education, and specifically Creole, as 
one of the most important social problems it needed to solve.   
 Over the next two decades, education officials clung to their representation of 
Creole as a purely social problem as Lauriette sought to reshape the Creole debates in 
terms of the Antilles’ political relationship with France.  For the Ministry of Education, 
the dissemination of the French language was about the maintenance of social stability, 
from which political unity would follow.  In contrast, Lauriette perceived of the Ministry 
of Education’s ban on Creole as a strategy to culturally assimilate Antilleans and 
maintain political control.  He contended that the Antilles’ social and economic problems 
did not stem from the Creole language, but from France’s continued political and cultural 
domination of Guadeloupe and Martinique.  In 1966, he founded the Guadeloupean 
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Association for Popular Education (AGEP) to promote a more culturally specific type of 
Creole instruction in Guadeloupean schools.  Lauriette used the association’s bulletin as a 
public forum to publish articles criticizing France’s highly centralized educational 
bureaucracy, which had made French the sole language of instruction and ignored 
Antillean children’s’ cultural and linguistic particularities.  According to Lauriette, he 
sent a copy of each of these articles to the Minister of Education through the office of 
Guadeloupe’s director of education.  Lauriette claimed that he never received any 
responses, but he nonetheless continued to use his Creole pedagogy in his school, and 
lead the struggle against the ban on Creole.51  During the 1970s, the Creole question 
became highly politicized as education officials and Antillean activists, like Lauriette, 
negotiated Creole’s place within French public schools, and more broadly, the Antilles’ 
political relationship with France. 
 
Part II.  Lauriette and the Regionalization Debates 
 Lauriette’s criticism of republican education was an expression of his political 
ideology and his larger involvement in political activism.  Lauriette sympathized with the 
anticolonialist and pro-independence group GONG (Group for the National Organization 
of Guadeloupe).  In the majority of his writings, Lauritete used anticolonial rhetoric to 
critique the Ministry of Education’s ban on Creole.  He argued that public education 
remained “colonial” in that it devalued Antilleans’ Creole language and culture and 
sought to establish French as the language of social prestige.  According to Lauriette, his 
pedagogy was “anticolonial”; it challenged the Ministry of Education’s degradation of 
Creole and granted it equal status with French in the classroom.  He encouraged teachers 
                                                
51 Bulletin de l’Ecole AGEP (Association Guadeloupéenne d’Education Populaire), June 1971, 1-2.  
Bibliothèque National de France, François Mitterrand, Côte 4-JO-26061. 
 289 
to inform their Antillean students that “all languages are equal.”52  “The French language 
is not more beautiful than the Creole language, but considering that French is our 
administrative, religious, political, and written language, it is useful if not essential to 
know it as best as possible.”53  For Lauriette, it was important to master French not 
because it was superior to Creole, but because rightly or wrongly, it was the working 
language of the Antilles.  Lauriette’s equalization of Creole and French reversed 
traditional French colonial pedagogical practices while simultaneously demystifying the 
prestige of French.    
 Throughout the 1960s, Lauriette worked to make his anticolonial pedagogy 
known to a broader public.  He used his political connections to GONG to forge a 
professional relationship with Henri Rodès, the editor and founder of the weekly 
newspaper Le Progrès Social, who was also a supporter of GONG.  Lauriette claimed 
that between April 1965 and May 1967, he contributed over one hundred articles to Le 
Progrès Social in which he defiantly denounced the French colonial education system.54  
In May 1967, Lauriette participated in the construction workers’ strike in Basse-Terre 
that was organized by GONG.  When the strikes escalated into violent anti-France 
protests, French authorities arrested nearly twenty GONG activists, including Lauriette.  
In October 1960, following a wave of economically paralyzing strikes across the Antilles, 
the Ministry of the DOM implemented what Antilleans referred to as the “vile ordinance” 
to discourage any future strikes and protests.  This ordinance authorized the Prefect to 
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remove to metropolitan France any civil servants, including teachers, whose activities 
were considered to be a threat to the public order.  In May 1967, DOM officials in 
Guadeloupe invoked the “vile ordinance” to send Lauriette and his GONG compatriots to 
metropolitan France where they were imprisoned, charged, and tried for undermining the 
integrity of the French nation.   
 From June 2, 1967 until his release in April 29, 1968, Lauriette was a political 
prisoner; he was forced to defend himself and his loyalty to the French nation.  Lauriette 
had to prove that his participation in the May 1967 protests was not an attempt to incite a 
popular movement for Guadeloupean independence.  Ultimately, Lauriette and the other 
GONG activists were declared innocent; however, Lauriette’s experience with what he 
perceived to be a corrupt and tyrannical French judicial system made him further 
question the Antilles’ political relationship with France.  Prior to his imprisonment, 
Lauriette believed that the current French public school system in the Antilles was a 
remnant of the islands’ colonial past.  Now, he was convinced that departmentalization 
and all of the French institutions that accompanied it were no different from colonialism.  
Lauriette argued that like colonialism, departmentalization was a form of social and 
cultural oppression that permeated all facets of Antillean society.  After being released 
from prison, Lauriette returned to Guadeloupe determined to fight departmentalization 
and secure more political and cultural autonomy for the Antilles.   
 In 1968, Lauriette conceived of his own political party, Mystico Rationaliste or 
Mystical Rationalist.  In one of his first publications following his imprisonment, 
Lauriette explained that mystical rationalism was a particular kind of nationalist 
viewpoint that linked the mystical to the rational.  Lauriette defined “mystico” as how a 
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person experienced and created meaning out of his particular world.  “Rationaliste” 
referred to the way in which a person coded his experiences and turned them into 
something relevant to him and the people with whom he communicated.  When 
combined, Lauriette argued that these two philosophies created a specific politics.  The 
Mystico Rationaliste party acknowledged that individuals and the cultural groups to 
which they belonged experienced and understood the world in different ways.  Moreover, 
individuals who shared a particular culture were more likely to share life experiences and 
possess a similar worldview.  For example, because Antilleans shared a Creole culture 
and language, they also held similar beliefs and experienced life in the same way.  
Therefore, Lauriette contended that it was absurd for French officials, who were 
culturally distinct from Antilleans and possessed a different worldview, to govern 
Antillean society.  Lauriette claimed that the Antillean economy remained 
underdeveloped because it was controlled by individuals within the French government 
who did not understand Antilleans and their way of life.  Lauriette’s Mystico Rationaliste 
party was nationalist; it declared that only native Antilleans possessed the specific 
knowledge and the right to effectively govern the society in which they lived. “No man 
passing through [Guadeloupe], whether he be French, [or] Moroccan, can be the head of 
an administration in Guadeloupe; only those who are born in Guadeloupe or who have 
been in this country for at least a generation can be a leader.”55  In insisting that 
Antilleans needed to govern their own nation, Lauriette called upon Antilleans to fight 
French domination and gain control of their own nation.  Only then would Antilleans 
experience social and economic advancement.    
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 Lauriette turned to his area of expertise, education, to provide Antilleans with a 
salient example of how French control prohibited Guadeloupeans and Martinicans from 
improving their social and economic positions.  In 1969, Lauriette held a conference-
debate at his school, Guadeloupean Association for Popular Education (AGEP), 
regarding “the problems of education in Guadeloupe.”  According to Lauriette, “the worst 
enemy of the Guadeloupean people are teachers who teach with the reading and history 
books of France.”56  He noted that a primary school reader used in both Antillean and 
metropolitan classrooms contained an excerpt from Jules Renard’s the “The Unleashed 
Dog” describing an “entirely black dog showing his teeth” as “a negro in revolt.”57  For 
Lauriette, racist statements in French textbooks, such as this one, was proof that France’s 
national curriculum was discriminatory and therefore, detrimental to Antilleans.  French 
public education taught Antilleans to have disdain for themselves and their culture.  In 
doing so, it subordinated Antilleans and prevented them from taking control of their own 
economic and social affairs.   
 Two years later, in 1971, at a different debate on education held at his school, 
Lauriette declared that he could not “conceive of economic and social policy reform 
without a reform of education.”58  According to Lauriette, educational reform recognizing 
Antillean children’s particularities would lead to broader economic and social 
improvements in the Antilles.  Currently, Guadeloupean and Martinican teachers had no 
jurisdiction over what they taught in Antillean classrooms.  The Ministry of Education 
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forced them to follow a curriculum that only took into account how metropolitan children 
experience the world, which contrasted sharply with Antillean children’s worldviews.59  
Because of this, Antillean children had no context for the education they received and 
therefore, were failing school at higher rates than metropolitan children.  Lauriette 
contended that the Ministry of Education needed to implement a curriculum tailored to 
Guadeloupean and Martinician chidlren’s cultural specificities.  This kind of 
particularized curriculum would improve Antillean children’s academic achievements, 
and a more educated population would lead to economic and social stability.   
 However, education reform was not enough for Lauriette, especially if it was 
simply implemented as a directive from the centralized Ministry of Education.  Lauriette 
believed that French education officials could never create an effective form of public 
education in the Antilles because as members of the French culture, they could never 
entirely understand Antillean children’s life experiences.  Therefore, Lauriette argued that 
the French government needed to grant Antilleans more cultural autonomy and legislative 
control of education.  He believed that this autonomy would empower Guadeloupeans 
and Martinicans to build a more prosperous and stable Antillean society.   
 Lauriette’s call for Antilleans to take control of education pressured the French 
government to consider decentralization for the Antilles.  In the late 1960s, the National 
Assembly debated the possibility of regional reform for both its metropolitan and 
overseas departments.  Regionalization was a kind of decentralization of the state 
government.  It gave the locally elected assemblies of each department or region more 
control over its affairs, as well as the power to make legislative decisions that had 
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previously been made by the State.60  On March 26, 1968, President de Gaulle expressed 
his support for the referendum on regionalization in a speech delivered in Lyon.  He 
argued that “centralization, which was necessary for a long time in order to realize and 
maintain [French] unity” was no longer necessary because the “provinces [have] 
successfully joined France.”61  De Gaulle characterized decentralization as inevitable, 
declaring that “regional activities now appear to be the springs of future economic 
power.”62  Despite his enthusiasm, de Gaulle failed to get legislative approval for 
regionalization in 1968.  Members of the National Assembly agreed with de Gaulle that 
France’s once culturally distinct provinces had in fact been assimilated into the nation.  
However, they were concerned that regionalization would fracture metropolitan France 
and adversely affect national unity.   
 In the spring of 1969, de Gaulle decided to consult the voters about 
regionalization.  He declared that he would resign if the public did not approve the 
referendum for regional reform.  On April 27, 1969, 53.5% of the voters voted against 
regionalization; one day later de Gaulle resigned.  However, this negative result was 
more of an expression of the voters’ dissatisfaction with de Gaulle and the recent general 
strikes of May 1968 that had occurred under his leadership rather than a statement against 
regionalization.  With de Gaulle’s resignation and the election of Georges Pompidou as 
president in June 1969, the National Assembly set out to garner popular support for 
regional reform, and began to implement regionalization, but only in metropolitan 
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France.63  The National Assembly was wary of how regional reform would affect the 
Antilles’ political relationship with France.   It was unsure about Antilleans’ loyalty to 
France and the extent to which they had been culturally assimilated into France.   
 Just one year prior in May 1967, the pro-independence group GONG had led a 
construction workers’ strike in Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe, resulting in a violent 
confrontation between Antillean workers and the French army in which nearly fifty 
Guadeloupean workers and protestors were killed.64  The Ministry of the DOM perceived 
of this strike as an anti-France protest, indicating that departmentalization had not 
transformed Antilleans into loyal French citizens.  During this period when anti-France 
voices were growing stronger and DOM officials were struggling to maintain French 
political authority, regional reform was particularly controversial in the Antilles.  DOM 
officials were concerned that the regionalization of Guadeloupe and Martinique would 
potentially weaken the Antilles’ political ties with metropolitan France and move the 
departments closer to independence.  On the other had, the Ministry of the DOM 
wondered if regionalization would solidify the islands’ union with France as distinct 
regions of a singular nation.   
 In a July 1968 memo entitled “Will we keep the Antilles French”, Serge de 
Larrouche, a civil administrator assigned to the Antilles, reported to the Ministry of the 
DOM that there was a “certain malaise” and “resurgence in nationalist feeling” 
developing in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  De Larrouche noted that while only a small 
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number of vocal activists actually supported independence, there was nonetheless a 
general “indictment against departmentalization that is passionate and on certain 
occasions outrageous.”65  De Larrouche worried that the nationalists would gain popular 
support if the Ministry of DOM continued to ignore Antilleans’ disillusionment with 
departmentalization’s failure to solve the islands’ social and economic problems.  He 
contended that there was “serious discord”, which DOM officials needed to “clear up 
while there is still time.”66  In considering possible solutions to Antilleans’ growing 
dissatisfaction, Larrouche turned to regionalization.  He suggested that only 
regionalization could appease Antilleans’ desire for more control of local affairs while 
simultaneously reinforcing French political authority in the Antilles.  He adamantly 
stated, “regionalization is the only card it is possible to play if we want to keep the 
Antilles French.”67  It “would have the double advantage of not scaring off the Metropole 
and diffusing a separatist trend.”68  According to Larrouche, in promoting a limited form 
of political autonomy, regionalization had the ability to create pro-French sentiment in 
the Antilles and strengthen the Antilles’ political union with France.  However, the 
Ministry of the DOM remained wary of the political consequences of regional reform; it 
was a few more years and several more anti-France protests before DOM officials 
decided to support the regionalization of the Antilles.   
 In the fall of 1971, several months after a nine-day trip to Martinique, Pierre 
Messmer, the newly appointed Secretary of the DOM, publicly presented the 
regionalization of the Antilles as a strategy for solidifying the union.  Messmer’s visit to 
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the Antilles coincided with a period of social and political instability in the Antilles; pro-
independence supporters were active and vocal in their demands.  In October 1971, Le 
Monde reported that during Mesmmer’s visit local police blockaded roads and visibly 
armed themselves with grenades and guns as a precaution to squelch the possible 
outbreak of violence from anti-France and pro-independence supporters.  This show of 
force only fuelled the indépendantistes who interpreted the police presence as a symbol 
of colonialism.  When grenades exploded in la Savane, a twelve-acre park in Fort-de-
France where protesters had congregated, the police responded and violence quickly 
erupted.  According to Le Monde, the police escalated the violence as they beat protesters 
and called them “dirty negroes”.  During the chaos that ensued, a grenade killed a young 
high school boy who was only seventeen years old.  The evening after his death, nearly a 
thousand Martinicans gathered at Fort-de-France’s city hall building to protest against 
“colonialism, oppression, and racism.”69  Le Monde contended that after twenty-five 
years of departmentalization, the colonial relationship between the Antilles and France 
persisted.  Guadeloupe and Martinique were economically dependent, social inequalities 
based on race still existed, and Antillean culture remained suppressed.70  The outbreak of 
violence in Fort-de-France demonstrated to Messmer that as the representative of the 
French government in the DOM, he could no longer ignore Antilleans’ discontentment 
with departmentalization and the reality of the strained relationship between the Antilles 
and France.  The violence in Martinique proved that the statute of departmentalization 
was incapable of resolving the question of Antillean identity and belonging.  Messmer 
reasoned that if the French government remained committed to maintaining the status quo 
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of departmentalization, then those Antilleans who remained loyal to France, would 
eventually become disillusioned and find good reason to be pulled into the fight for 
independence.71   
 Messmer turned to regional reform as a possible solution to Antilleans’ growing 
discontentment and demands for change.  Decentralization and the creation of regional 
legislative bodies were received with widespread support among local political and 
cultural groups who had been struggling for decades for more political control.  Messmer 
believed that regionalization would have the same effect in the Antilles.  It would address 
Antilleans’ desire for more cultural and political autonomy by allowing them some 
control of local affairs while still enforcing the Antilles’ political union with France.  In 
early 1972, Messmer consulted local elected officials and socio-professional 
organizations to determine how to implement regional reform in the Antilles.  He offered 
two options.  Antilleans could choose the same regional reform as the metropolitan 
departments, or it could adopt a “particular system of regionalization” specifically 
designed to address Guadeloupe and Martinique’s unique problems and concerns.72  
Throughout the winter of 1972, both the French and Antillean press detailed the heated 
debates that exploded concerning the redefinition of the islands’ political relationship 
with France.73  The indépendantistes rejected the entire regionalization project as another 
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form of colonialism that sought to oppress Antilleans and make them dependent upon 
France.  It was futile in that it detracted from the main goal of independence.74  In 
contrast, the overwhelming majority of Antillean political groups supported the regional 
reform that had already been implemented in France’s metropolitan departments.  They 
rejected “particular regionalization” as a step toward social and economic isolation.  
Antilleans feared that if local assemblies and leaders took control over Guadeloupe’s and 
Martinique’s regional affairs, then they would not be able to continue to enjoy the same 
social and economic benefits as their metropolitan counterparts.  Antilleans had embraced 
the rhetoric that they were “français à part entière” or fully-fledged French citizens, and 
wanted to ensure that regionalization would not divest them of this status.75    
 Lauriette was at the forefront of these regionalization debates.  His calls for a 
more decentralized education system placed pressure on the Ministry of DOM to 
reevaluate the political effectiveness of departmentalization.  Regionalization was not 
what Lauriette and his pro-independence GONG colleagues had imagined for the 
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Antilles.  Nonetheless, when it became apparent that regional reform was a real 
possibility for Martinique and Guadeloupe, Lauriette reframed his political ideology and 
became a staunch supporter of the regionalization of the Antilles.  Lauriette distanced 
himself from GONG, which continued to call for independence as the only acceptable 
political possibility for the Antilles, and advocated for regional reform.  Independence 
still remained the ultimate goal for Lauriette; but, he also envisioned regionalization as a 
kind of interim goal on the path to independence.   
 In 1971, Lauriette contributed an article to Le Progrès Social in which he 
described regionalization and the jurisdiction it granted Antillean educators as a “political 
necessity”.76  He trusted that Guadeloupe and Martinique would receive the same 
political and cultural autonomy that the government had accorded to its metropolitan 
regions.  With this local control, Lauriette argued that Antilleans would be empowered to 
improve education and other social and economic ills as they continued to fight for 
independence.  Lauriette saw in regional reform an immediate solution to the Antilles’ 
poor economic state; independence was possible, but it would take more time before this 
could be achieved.   
 
Part III.  Regionalization’s False Promises for Creole 
 In metropolitan France, by the mid-1970s, the Ministry of Education had granted 
local education officials more jurisdiction over the curriculum taught in their regional 
school districts.  Lauriette was a proponent of regional reform because he believed it 
would give Antilleans the same kind of cultural autonomy.  He viewed regionalization as 
an extension of the Deixonne law to the overseas departments, which according to 
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Lauriette, would permit the use of Creole in Antillean schools.  In January 1951, Maurice 
Deixonne, the leader of the National Assembly’s education commission, implemented a 
law authorizing the teaching of regional languages and dialects in public schools.  The 
“Deixonne law” officially recognized, for the first time, the existence of France’s 
regional languages and dialects.  However, it was not a multicultural policy.  Rather, it 
was a part of the French government’s efforts to rebuild and forge a culturally unified 
nation following the Second World War.  The Deixonne law only permitted elementary 
school teachers to use regional languages, specifically Basque, Breton, Catalan, and 
Occitan, to facilitate their students’ acquisition of the French language.  The second 
article “authorized teachers to use local dialects in primary and preschools only when 
they can benefit from teaching them, particularly for the study of the French language.”77  
Moreover, any kind of formal instruction regarding regional languages and cultures was 
limited to one hour a week and was strictly optional for students.78  Therefore, the 
Ministry of Education ultimately decided to recognize France’s regional diversity 
because it was a strategy to build France’s political and cultural unity.  The Deixonne law 
permitted education officials to closely monitor and control the extent to which difference 
was incorporated into public classrooms. 
 In 1958, regional activists from across France formed the Secular Movement for 
Regional Cultures (MLCR), a special interest group concerned with promoting the 
teaching of regional languages and cultures in public schools.  The proliferation of pro-
regional groups, such as the MLCR, placed pressure on members of the National 
Assembly representing France’s various regions to expand the Deixonne law.  From 1958 
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to 1963, with the support of their constituents, nine different representatives set forth a 
series of motions, petitions, and laws that sought to increase the number of school hours 
dedicated to regional language instruction.  In addition, these legislative propositions 
attempted to carve out a place for regional histories and literature in the national 
curriculum.79  In response to these demands, the National Assembly created the 
“Commission for the study of the problems concerning the teaching of regional languages 
and cultures”.  This Commission was composed of national assembly members who 
supported the expansion of the Deixonne law and regional education activists, such as 
MLCR co-founder Robèrt Lafont.80  The Commission held its first meeting on November 
19, 1964 and shortly thereafter met in Montpellier to discuss how to incorporate regional 
languages and cultures into the national curriculum at all educational levels from 
preschool through university.  In its reports, the Commission encouraged the Ministry of 
Education to apply the Deixonne law to secondary and higher education.  It made 
detailed suggestions concerning the number of hours high school teachers should 
dedicate to regional languages and cultures.  The Commission proposed that instructors 
set aside three hours each school year to explain the linguistic similarities and differences 
between French and regional languages.  It also recommended that the Ministry of 
Education require teachers to give ten lessons on regional and local histories dispersed 
throughout the school year.81    
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 Despite this parliamentary pressure, Christian Fouchet, the Minister of Education 
refused to expand the Deixonne law.  Fouchet argued that it was not possible to increase 
the number of hours dedicated to regional languages and cultures because the extra 
lessons infringed upon the amount of time dedicated to other more important subjects, 
such as French.  In order to avoid decreasing the amount of instruction spent on French, 
the number of hours in the school day needed to be increased.  However, according to 
Fouchet, this was detrimental to the student, whose day was already overloaded.82  
Although Fouchet invoked the logistical unfeasibility of extending the school day to 
dismiss the expansion of the Deixonne law, he expressed his true concern about regional 
languages and cultures when he mentioned his fear that French was being replaced by 
regional language instruction.  Fouchet worried that regional language instruction harmed 
students’ acquisition of the French language, highlighted cultural difference within the 
nation, and threatened national unity.   
 Up until the implementation of the Deixonne law in 1951, the government refused 
to acknowledge the existence of regional languages and cultures, arguing that to do so 
threatened the political and cultural unity of the French nation.  Moreover, militant 
regional activists’ insistence that their linguistic and cultural differences validated their 
claims for political autonomy only bolstered the Ministry of Education’s fears about the 
potential consequences of permitting regional language instruction.  Therefore, 
supporters of regional languages and cultures, such as the Commission and its MLCR 
representatives, had to convince the Ministry of Education that recognition of regional 
particularities did not necessarily threaten the political unity of the French nation.  They 
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did this by framing their support for regional instruction in terms of the government’s 
current preoccupation with building national unity around a singular French language and 
culture.  Raoul Bayou, a commission member and deputy from the Occitan region, 
argued that regional languages were not separate from, but an integral part of the national 
patrimony: 
  Remember that the thinking of the Celts, their prestigious legends, their  
  courtly poetry  came to us through the Breton language.  Occitan reigned  
  at the dawn of modern times…All of Europe has lived the ideals of  
  medieval Occitan culture, and we can still profit from contemplating them, 
  as they contain much human value…To allow these cultures to be lost in  
  the dustbin of history, to not save the languages that support them, is more 
  than a waste.  This type of abandonment is a crime.83   
 
In characterizing Breton and Occitan as precursors to the French language, Bayou made 
these regions a part of France’s cultural and linguistic history.  Because these local 
dialects were a part of French culture, Bayou contended that the Ministry of Education 
needed to require primary and secondary instructors to teach these regional languages to 
their students.  He argued that if regional languages were not taught and allowed to die 
out, then an important part of France’s patrimony would also be lost.   
 Bayou and the MLCR portrayed regional language instruction as “an act of 
patriotism” that permitted teachers to educate young citizens in the regions about their 
French national identity.  According to teachers who supported the MLCR, regional 
language instruction provided an opportunity for students to compare French and regional 
languages and discover their similarities as part of the same national culture:  
  We want to nourish the teaching of the French language by constantly  
  comparing it to our [regional] languages, to make visible all of the   
  connections between national culture and regional culture that are the true  
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  face, although little known, of French intellectual life, of flourishing  
  cultures, but [they] may soon be sacrificed.84 
 
For the MLCR, regional languages and cultures were the “true face” of French national 
culture.  It assured the Ministry of Education that regional language instruction did not 
highlight cultural difference within the nation; rather, it helped students understand how 
their regional cultures came to be a part of French national culture.  Moreover, these kind 
of linguistic comparisons facilitated students’ French language acquisition.  The MLCR 
argued that regional language instruction at the high school level “permitted older 
students to experience a reconciliation between [their] regional language and [their] 
national language…and to correct their ‘local French.’”85  Instruction in a regional 
language and “training for its acquisition will be gradual, and will have a certain utility in 
perfecting the study of the French language itself.”86  In order to extinguish the Ministry 
of Education’s fears that French language instruction would take a back seat to regional 
linguistic differences, the MLCR insisted that regional language instruction improved 
students’ understanding of French.  MLCR members shaped the debate about regional 
languages so that it fit with the Ministry of Education’s efforts to use public education to 
disseminate the French language and culturally unify France’s regions.   
 In making regional languages and cultures a part of France’s national patrimony, 
the Commission and the MLCR neutralized regional activists’ militant use of linguistic 
difference to argue for political autonomy.  According to the MLCR, the “politics [of 
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linguistic unity] has been implemented in all regions” for centuries and has “reached its 
successful conclusion.”87  The MLCR contended that the Ministry of Education had 
successfully assimilated France’s regional languages and cultures into the nation; they 
were an integral part of French national culture.  Therefore, the MLCR argued that 
regional language instruction was nothing more than an innocuous cultural movement to 
preserve a part of France’s national patrimony.  This characterization of regional 
difference enabled the Ministry of Education to reshape its perception of regional 
language instruction as a positive contribution rather than an impediment to national 
unity.   
 In the late 1960s, when the National Assembly debated the merits and dangers of 
regional reform, the MLCR and other supporters of regional languages had already laid 
the groundwork for the Ministry of Education to decentralize and permit local school 
officials to have more control of their particular regions’ curriculum.  In 1970, the 
Ministry of Education allowed high school students to choose to be tested in Basque, 
Breton, Occitan or Catalan as a part of the national qualifying exams for entrance into 
university.  This reform implied that regional education officials needed to have more 
input in determining their specific region’s language curriculum.  The Ministry of 
Education granted local teachers in metropolitan France, as well as on the island of 
Corsica, the power to adjust the national curriculum so that it included their region’s 
particular history, culture, and language. 
 However, the Ministry of Education continued to ban Creole from Antillean 
schools.  Despite the similarities between Corsica, Guadeloupe, and Martinique as island-
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departments, the Ministry of Education remained wary of extending the Deixonne law 
and its various reforms to the Antilles.  It ignored the Antilles’ long colonial history with 
France that dated back to the seventeenth century, and argued that unlike metropolitan 
regions, which had been incorporated into France since the nineteenth-century, 
Guadeloupe and Martinique had only been French departments for thirty years.  The 
Ministry of Education supported regional language instruction in its metropolitan regions 
because it was confident that the peasants of France’s provinces had been assimilated into 
the nation.  Because it was unsure about the extent of Antilleans’ assimilation, the 
Ministry of Education continued to ban the Creole language and culture from Antillean 
schools.  For now, it continued to perceive of Creole as a social problem that contributed 
to poor academic performance and thus, needed to be solved.  In contrast to Basque, 
Catalan, Occitan, and Breton, which were a part of France’s patrimony, Creole remained 
a detriment to national unity.     
 Lauriette vehemently opposed the Ministry of Education’s characterization of 
Creole as something outside of the French nation.  For Lauriette, the question of 
Antilleans’ loyalty was not an issue; Antilleans did not have to demonstrate their 
Frenchness.  The decision to recognize Creole as a regional language was a question of 
Antilleans’ rights as French citizens.  Antilleans possessed the same citizenship status as 
metropolitans and therefore, should be granted the same linguistic rights that the 
Deixonne law had accorded to metropolitans over twenty years ago.  In 1971, Lauriette 
published an article in Le Progrès Social calling for the Ministry of Education to extend 
the 1951 Deixonne law to the overseas departments and permit Creole language 
instruction in Antillean schools.  Lauriette informed Antilleans that regional activists of 
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Brittany and Languedoc had been involved in the same struggle for recognition of their 
respective linguistic differences.88  The only difference was that Breton- and Occitan-
speakers have possessed the right to use their languages in their regional public schools 
for the past twenty years while Antilleans remained embroiled in this fight.  He argued 
that “what has been done for the Breton language, must also be done for the Creole 
language.”89  Lauriette considered anything less to be unequal treatment and 
discrimination.  He described the Ministry of Education’s refusal to recognize Creole as 
“linguistic prejudice” similar to “racial prejudice.”90  For Lauriette, the ban on Creole 
revealed the hypocrisy of a French government that claimed to treat Antilleans as “full 
French citizens”, yet denied them the same linguistic rights as metropolitan citizens.  
Lauriette contended that Antilleans had the same political status as metropolitans and 
therefore, enjoyed “the same right to demand that their language be honored like the ones 
of the white people.”91    
 Six months after this article appeared in Le Progrès Social, Lauriette traveled to 
Paris in an attempt to convince the Ministry of Education to extend the Dexionne law to 
the Antilles and implement his Creole pedagogy.  On September 20, Lauriette went to the 
offices of the Ministry of Education where Terny Josette, the inspector of studies, 
informed him that in order to meet with the Minister of Education, he needed to write his 
office requesting an appointment.  Lauriette drafted his request and left his letter with 
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Josette.92  When he received no response from the Ministry of Education, Lauriette 
decided to write to the Minister of Justice, imploring him to recognize the educational 
benefits of Creole.  He argued that in light of the Ministry of the DOM’s “recent 
announcement concerning a proposed change in the political status of Guadeluope”, the 
Ministry of Education should also consider lifting the ban on Creole.93  For Lauriette, 
regionalization of the Antilles established the political justification the Ministry of 
Education needed to recognize Creole as a regional language of France, and permit its 
use in Antillean classrooms.  He defined “regionalism as first and foremost education 
through the regional language.”94  Lauriette assumed that when Guadeloupe and 
Martinique became regions of France, the Ministry of Education would no longer be able 
to deny Antilleans the linguistic rights that the Deixonne law had granted to 
metropolitans. 
 When Lauriette also failed to receive a response from the Minister of Justice, he 
wrote to Georges Pompidou, the president of France, informing him that the Ministers of 
Education and Justice had refused to meet with a citizen France.  He argued that it was 
this “contempt of French leaders for the honorable men of Overseas France that will 
cause a [political] split, which the majority on both sides fears.”95  With this statement, 
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Lauriette implied that the Ministry of Education’s commitment to ignoring Antilleans’ 
cultural particularities and preserving the ban on Creole pushed Antilleans further away 
from the French nation.  If the government wanted to secure Antilleans’ loyalty to 
France, then it needed to permit them to take control of their own local affairs.  As a last 
attempt to make his voice heard, Lauriette sent a copy of this letter to Michel Rocard, a 
sympathetic Socialist representative of the metropolitan department of Yvelines.  One 
day later, Rocard took up Lauriette’s cause in the National Assembly.   
 Rocard was a known anticolonialist.  He was the author of a leaked report on the 
widely ignored refugee camps of the Algerian War.  Moreover, he was a prominent figure 
of the May 1968 crisis; he publicly supported auto-gestion, which called for workers to 
have more of a voice in decisions regarding their interests.  For Rocard, the 
regionalization of the Antilles and the implementation of Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy 
was a part of an inevitable move toward decentralization and less state control.  In a 
written question published in the Journal Officiel, Rocard asked the Minister of 
Education why he had not considered lifting the ban on Creole.  Considering “the 
exceptional results obtained by Mr. Lauriette’s students, does it not seem natural to 
reconsider the theory defended by this man.”96  Rocard questioned the validity of 
“maintaining in Guadeloupe’s schools, educational materials based on a total ignorance 
of the psychological realities or geographical specificities of this country, on a latent 
racism, on a total contempt for the Creole culture and language.”97  He demanded that the 
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Ministry of Education fix this situation and establish a plan for “the development of the 
Creole culture and language.”98 
 In his written response to Rocard and Lauriette, the Minister of Education, Olivier 
Guichard, refused to lift the ban on Creole, arguing that since departmentalization, the 
implementation of the French national curriculum in Guadeloupe and Martinique has 
vastly improved the Antillean education system.  Guichard cited the increase in 
enrollments in Antillean public schools as proof that the Ministry of Education had 
succeeded in providing Antillean children with the social and economic benefits of 
education.  According to Guichard, education officials needed to focus on “reaching an 
enrollment similar to that of the metropolitan departments.”99  This would establish in the 
Antilles “equal policy with the same conditions and quality of education as in the 
metropole.”100  The Ministry of Education measured equality in terms of opportunity.  It 
upheld equality by ensuring that Antilleans and metropolitans had the same access to 
education and learned the same curriculum.  Therefore, the implementation of a 
particularized curriculum that introduced Creole into Antillean classrooms was an 
impediment to equality.   
 In contrast, for Lauriette, equality meant that Antillean and metropolitan children 
achieved similar rates of academic success.  The Ministry of Education’s statistics clearly 
indicated that Antilleans and metropolitans were unequal with respect to the average level 
of education each group obtained.  In the early 1970s, only three percent of Antillean 
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students completed secondary education, and eighty percent of Antilleans were 
illiterate.101  Lauriette argued that this was the case not because Antillean children did not 
have access to education, but because the curriculum was not adapted to their cultural 
particularities.  Because education in Guadeloupe and Martinique was administered in 
French, a foreign language for the majority of Antilleans, lessons were “poorly acquired, 
poorly assimilated, and quickly forgotten.”102  Lauriette contended that in order to ensure 
that Antilleans and metropolitans obtained equal levels of education and opportunities for 
social advancement, the Ministry of Education needed to recognize Antilleans’ linguistic 
differences.  
 Several months after Lauriette returned from Paris, the National Assembly 
decided to heed his warnings that in delaying regional reform in the Antilles, it was 
alienating Antilleans and pushing them toward pro-independence groups.  In April 1972, 
with widespread support from locally elected officials and Antillean voters, the National 
Assembly decided to make Guadeloupe and Martinique official regions of France with all 
of the same rights and privileges as France’s other metropolitan regions.  However, the 
DOM statute of regionalization did contain one difference: an interregional committee.  
This non-legislative body was made up of both local and nationally appointed officials 
from Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion, and Guyana.  It held conferences to discuss the 
particular problems and interests of these four “department-regions”.  These meetings 
produced policy recommendations for national-level officials, such as the Ministers of 
Overseas Departments and Education.  On the one hand, the interregional committee 
gave Guadeloupe and Martinique more control of its local affairs and representation at 
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the national level; on the other hand, it set in place an official body through which the 
national government could continue to closely monitor its “department-regions.”   
 The Ministry of Education used the interregional committee as a pretense for why 
it could still not lift the ban on Creole despite the fact that Guadeloupe and Martinique 
were now official French regions.  For the Ministry of Education, regionalization was a 
solution to the growing problem of Antillean nationalism, not a recognition of Antillean 
cultural difference.  It remained unconvinced that the introduction of Creole into 
Antillean classrooms did not pose a threat to Antilleans’ assimilation.  Education officials 
at the national level contended that they needed to investigate how Creole affected 
national loyalty in the Antilles before it regionalized Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s 
public schools and granted Antilleans the same rights as metropolitan citizens.   
 In January 1973, André Patris, a civil servant and member of the “interregional 
education mission” travelled to Guadeloupe and Martinique to examine Antillean 
education and how it could be improved.  In his report, Patris noted that public education 
was of great importance because of the overwhelmingly young nature of the Antillean 
population.  In both Guadeloupe and Martinique, more than half of the population was 
under the age of twenty.103  Therefore, public education was the one avenue through 
which the French government could reach the majority of young Antilleans.  Education 
offered the Ministry of Education the opportunity to impart the French culture upon 
Antillean children and teach them to value the opportunities their French citizenship 
afforded them.  Patris argued that public education was essential for creating successive 
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generations of Antilleans who were loyal to the French government and supportive of the 
political union between the Antilles and France.  
 However, Patris argued that during the past twenty years, public education had 
failed to culturally and politically assimilate Antilleans into the French nation.  Patris’s 
analysis of educational data revealed that since departmentalization, the number of 
Antillean children who received an education had significantly increased.  Nonetheless, 
compared to their metropolitan counterparts, Antillean children remained severely 
undereducated.  To a certain extent, Patris blamed overcrowded classrooms, dilapidated 
school buildings, and untrained teachers; yet, he also contended that there was a cultural 
reason for the deplorable state of Antillean education: 
  Repetition of grades, falling behind and failures in school, dropping out of  
  school and truancy is typical behavior of [Antillean] students.  Truancy is  
  the result of climatic conditions, the importance of festivals (in the   
  Antilles, “Carnival” lasts three months), the lack of motivation, poor job  
  prospects, and the mediocre social behavior of the [Antillean] population;  
  this constitutes a large disadvantage, [and] it is not clear how to reverse  
  this.104 
 
Patris perceived of Antillean culture as a lackadasical acceptance of mediocrity, which 
was fuelled by a warm climate and fondness for celebration.  For him, it was clear that 
these peculiarities of Antillean culture were an obstacle to Antillean children’s academic 
success, which on a higher level, greatly affected the Antilles’ economic and social 
development.  These negative particularities of Antillean society not only justified but 
also necessitated an educational policy for Guadeloupe and Martinique that was different 
from the Ministry of Education’s policy for its metropolitan regions.  Patris encouraged 
the Ministry of Education to use public schools as forum to transform Antillean society 
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so that it reflected the French work ethic and desire to achieve success.  Once public 
education instilled these characteristics in Antilleans, Patris argued that Guadeloupe and 
Martinique would experience social and economic advancement on the same level as 
metropolitan France.105   
 After establishing Antilleans’ culture of laziness and amusement as the cause of 
the islands’ underdevelopment, Patris turned to the “problem” of Creole:   
  In spite of the significant development of the education system and the  
  widespread diffusion of the radio, Creole remains the spoken language of  
  the majority of the population.  It is this nonwritten and gramatically poor  
  language that is exclusively spoken in the majority of families, as well as  
  by the young child before his schooling, and the elementary, middle, and  
  high school student during his studies.  The child who arrives for the first  
  time in school must therefore learn not only, like the young metropolitan,  
  to read, write and count, but also he must first learn to speak a language  
  that is not his maternal language.  For the most part, he only speaks French 
  in school.  The result: a significant portion of the young [Antilleans] who  
  are called to military service are illiterate even after having satisfied their  
  schooling requirements.106 
 
Patris argued that Creole’s continued dominance in Guadeloupe and Martinique 
negatively affected both Antillean schoolchildren’s education and the French nation.  He 
viewed Creole’s presence in Antillean society as a social disadvantage; it prevented 
Antillean children from having the same knowledge of French as metropolitan children.  
Therefore, Antillean children were already academically and socially behind upon 
entering the French public school system.   
 Morevoer, Patris’s concern about illiterate Antilleans serving in the French 
military suggests that he also believed that Creole had a negative impact on national 
unity.  He questioned the strength and efficacy of a military whose soldiers did not share 
                                                
105 Report for the Ministry of Education.  André Patris, “Contribution à l’étude des problèmes: de formation 
professionnelle continue, d’apprentissage, de taxe d’aprentissage dans les départements d’outre-mer”, 
March 1973, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 840443, Art. 6.   
106 Ibid.   
 316 
the same national language.  For Patris, departmentalization had failed to assimilate 
Antilleans, and Creole was the obstacle to their assimilation.  Antilleans could serve in 
the military like all other French citizens; yet, they did not possess the most basic 
characteristic of a French citizen: the ability to speak and understand French.  For Patris 
and other DOM officials, it was inconceivable that Antilleans were French citizens, but 
remained attached to Creole at the expense of the French language.  According to the 
Republican tradition, Antilleans had supposedly relinquished their cultural particularities 
in favor of French citizenship.  When Patris’s report revealed what DOM officials already 
knew—that Creole still persisted in Antillean society as the chosen language of 
communication—the Ministry of the DOM renewed its preoccupation with solving the 
“Creole problem.”  It remained committed to the ban on Creole, arguing that Creole had 
no place in Antillean classrooms as long as Guadeloupeans and Martinians remained 
unassimilated and unable to speak French.   
 In March 1974, Lauriette held a conference at this school to refute the Ministry of 
Education’s logic as to why it could not lift the ban on Creole.  Once again, Lauriette 
argued that the Ministry of Education was not upholding the ideals of republican equality.  
In refusing to recognize Creole as a regional language, the Ministry of Education was 
denying Antilleans their rights as French citizens.  Nine months before the conference, 
the Ministry of Education had applied the Fontanet Circulaire to Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  Promulgated on December 4, 1972, this law stipulated that “specific 
provisions” must be given to elementary school students who “enter school without 
knowing French and not speaking it at home.”107  In other words, this law permitted those 
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students whose maternal language was not French to be separated from their French-
speaking peers.  These students followed an alternative curriculum that enabled them to 
quickly acquire the French language.  Lauriette claimed that when applied to the Antilles, 
the Fontanet proclamation granted Antillean teachers the right to give their Creole-
speaking students “specific provisions” and alter the national curriculum to their 
particular needs.  For Lauriette, this meant the destruction all French language books on 
reading, vocabulary, spelling, and grammar currently used in Antillean classrooms and 
their replacement with Creole textbooks.  Moreover, Lauriette contended that the 
Minister of Education, Joseph Fontanet, did not have the authority to implement these 
changes and develop a particularized Antillean curriculum because “he does not know 
Creole, nor has he lived in Guadeloupe.”108  Instead, “it was the teachers and education 
specialists of Guadeloupean origin who needed to seek out the ‘specific provisions’” of 
Antillean education.109   
 On March 11, 1974, Lauriette wrote a letter to Fontanet, demanding that the 
Ministry of Education review his Creole pedagogy and consider its implementation.  In a 
document attached to his letter, Lauriette reminded Fontanet that “regionalization was the 
division of a country into autonomous regions”, meaning that “each region is in charge of 
its own economy and the education of its inhabitants.”110  In July 1973, the Prefect of 
Guadeloupe, Jacques Le Cornec, arrived in Guadeloupe with the mission to regionalize 
the Antilles.  He had purportedly decentralized Antillean institutions so that 
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Guadeloupeans and Martinicans could take more control of their local affairs.  Yet, 
Lauriette noted that he saw no change in Antillean education, which continued to be 
controlled by a centralized Ministry of Education.  He argued that the Antilles’ new 
status as French regions and Fontanet’s recent proclamation concerning non-French 
speaking students validated his arguments for Creole’s introduction into Antillean 
classrooms.111  According to Lauriette, he did not receive a reply from Fontanet.112  This 
silence indicated to him that the Ministry of Education perceived of Antilleans as second-
class citizens.  It did not permit Antilleans to exercise the political and cultural autonomy 
that accompanied regional reform in metropolitan France.   
 Under the new leadership of René Haby, the Ministry of Education continued to 
deny Antilleans the linguistic rights it had granted its metropolitan citizens.  On July 11, 
1975, Haby implemented a law stipulating that regional languages and cultures should be 
a part of the curriculum for all grade levels from preschool through high school.  
However, Haby specified that this law was only applicable to those regional languages 
officially recognized by the 1951 Deixonne law.  Creole was not one of these regional 
languages.  The Ministry of Education used this loophole to uphold the ban on Creole in 
public education.  Shortly after the implementation of the Haby law, the Ministry of the 
DOM wrote a note concerning its linguistic and cultural policy in the Antilles.  In this 
document, it admitted that Guadeloupe and Martinique “are curiously excluded from the 
benefits of certain measures that are purportedly extended to the entire national 
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territory.”113  It explained that the “pedagogical innovations that have emerged in the 
metropole hardly have a counterpart in the DOM.”114  However, according to the 
Ministry of the DOM, the Ministry of Education was justified in its decision not to extend 
the Deixonne law to the Antilles.  The Ministry of the DOM argued that the Antilles’ 
“linguistic and cultural problems cannot be purely and simply reduced to metropolitan 
regionalism.”115  It claimed that whereas other regional language movements were 
exclusively cultural, the recognition of Creole was an ideological movement linked to 
autonomy and independence.  DOM officials feared that Creole’s recognition highlighted 
Antilleans’ cultural differences and encourage the movement for independence.    
 In addition to citing the increasing popularity of the Antillean independence 
movement, the Ministry of Education used the statistics on the high rate of French 
illiteracy among Antilleans to justify its refusal to lift the ban on Creole.  Antilleans’ 
inability to speak French indicated their failure to assimilate and thus, the tenuous state of 
the islands’ political relationship with France.  In 1974, the Inspector of preschool 
education, Madame Jouanelle, reported that only seventeen percent of three-year olds 
attended French preschools in Martinique.  This concerned Jouanelle because it meant 
that Antillean children were not learning French until they entered elementary school at 
the age of five or six, making it more difficult for them to achieve the same academic 
success as French-speaking metropolitan children.  Jouanelle suggested that the Ministry 
of Education focus on increasing preschool enrollment to “address to a large extent the 
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problem of the knowledge of the French language.”116  In its current state, preschool 
education in the Antilles was inadequate for improving French literacy.  The limited 
number of preschools and teachers was not sufficient to educate all Antillean children.  
Furthermore, for the most part, preschools were located in cities, where French literacy 
was not as serious of a problem.  The Ministry of Education needed to prioritize the 
construction of preschools in the countryside where Creole remained the spoken-
language for the majority of the people.117   
 In April 1976, Haby, the Minister of Education, made an official visit to 
Guadeloupe with the express purpose of improving preschool education.  He created the 
new post of “departmental inspector of pre-elementary education”.  This individual 
oversaw the construction of preschools and kindergartens in the Antillean countryside 
and the hiring of thirty-four new teachers, all of which was made possible by Haby’s 
decision to double the Ministry of Education’s subsidies to rural communities.  Haby 
contended that this focus on pre-elementary education would solve the “Creole problem” 
and improve Antillean children’s chances of achieving academic success and social 
mobility.118  This discourse linking Creole and French illiteracy to the Antilles’ social and 
economic problems politicized Creole as a symbol of departmentalization’s failure to 
assimilate Antilleans and solidify the political union between the Antilles and France.  
This justified the Ministry of Education’s decision to continue to ban Creole despite the 
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fact that regionalization had allowed metropolitan school districts to introduce regional 
languages and cultures into their curriculums.   
 For the Ministry of Education, the Creole question was a social issue.  It made the 
Creole debates about teaching French literacy, improving Antillean education, and 
Antillean children’s opportunities for social advancement.  In February 1977, the 
Ministry of Education formed the “Committee on Teaching French in the Overseas 
Departments” to evaluate the state of French language education in the Antilles and 
suggest possible improvements.  In February 1977, the Committee submitted its report, 
confirming the Ministry of Education’s fear that “one of the causes of academic failure in 
this department [Martinique] is the weakness in French of our students, weakness arising 
from the fact that their maternal language is Creole.”119  In identifying Creole as the sole 
cause of academic failure, the report ignored other social factors, such as poverty, that 
negatively affected Antillean children’s scholastic achievements.  Members of the 
Committee noted that the “social origins of the children reveal that these [failing] 
students are from poor rural and urban areas, speaking Creole.”120  The Committee also 
reported that “Creole reinforced these socio-cultural handicaps.”121  This analysis linked 
poverty to Creole, making Creole the main contributor to the social and economic ills of 
Antillean society.   
 For the Committee, promotion of French language education, and the social 
mobility that accompanied it, was the solution to the Antilles’ “Creole problem”.  
“Teaching French” is the “only chance for social promotion and a better future for young 
                                                
119 Ministère de l’Éducation, Commission sur l’enseignement du français dans les DOM-TOM, Compte-
rendu du réunion plénière du 24 Janvier 1977, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 
940381, Art. 26.   
120 Ibid.   
121 Ibid.   
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Martinicans.”122  The Committee claimed that when it took into account the current 
French illiteracy rates among Antillean children, it could not advocate the recognition of 
Creole as a regional language.  To do so would threaten the promotion of the French 
language and Antillean children’s only chance for social mobility.  In a public interview 
for the magazine Guadeloupe 2000, Paulette Urgin, the inspector of public education for 
the Antilles, stated that she was “entirely against any teaching that would be in Creole; 
because it ignores the possibilities of progress for the children of Guadeloupe.”123  
According to Urgin, “French is an international language” that provided Antillean 
children with social and economic “progress”.  Moreover, she believed that Antilleans 
should speak French like all other French citizens.  She “did not see why Guadeloupeans 
would be the only [French citizens] to speak Creole.”124  Urgin saw no place for Creole 
in public education; nor did she consider the possibility of teaching both French and 
Creole in Antillean classrooms.   
 In a report entitled “How to improve French in Guadeloupe”, Urgin argued that 
bilingual education was not an option for the Antilles.  She questioned why Antilleans 
should “have the right and duty to be bilingual” when “one does not give Bretons [and] 
Basques the right to be bilingual.”125  According to Urgin, the recognition of Creole was 
not simply an extension of the Dexionne law; Creole was much more dangerous than 
other regional languages in that it threatened the French language and the cultural 
integrity of the nation.  She noted that “Creole, in and of itself, in its actual form, is not 
                                                
122 Ministère de l’Éducation, Commission sur l’enseignement du français dans les DOM-TOM, Compte-
rendu du réunion plénière du 24 Janvier 1977, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 
940381, Art. 26.   
123 “Une interview de Madame Paulette URGIN, Inspectrice départementale de l’Education Nationale,” 
Magazine Guadeloupe 2000, June 1975, 9. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Paulette Urgin, “Comment améliorer le français en Guadeloupe,” 1976, 1, Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940381, Art. 26. 
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the problem.”126  Rather, it was “the interferences of Creole and French” that confused 
Antillean children and adversely affected their French language acquisition.127  Other 
education officials in the Antilles agreed that Creole caused linguistic and cultural 
confusion, preventing Antillean children from becoming fully assimilated French 
citizens.  In a report entitled “Adapatation of teaching French to children whose maternal 
language is Creole”, Madame Lamy, noted that Antillean children spoke French poorly.  
She argued that because Creole is “often a deformation of a French word”, it “can hinder 
considerably the student.”128   
 For this reason, the Ministry of Education did not recognize Creole as a regional 
language.  Regional languages, such as Breton, Basque, and Occitan, were not an 
impediment to metropolitan children’s French language education and cultural 
attachment to the nation; unlike Antilleans their native language was French.  
Metropolitan regions had purportedly been culturally and politically incorporated into the 
nation for generations.  Thus, before Creole could be recognized as a regional language 
and culture, Antilleans also needed to prove that they had been assimilated like their 
metropolitan counterparts.  For the Ministry of Education, a French literacy rate 
equivalent to that of metropolitan France, and the economic and social stability that 
accompanied French language acquisition, were the benchmarks of successful 
assimilation.   Only then could the Ministry of Education permit Antilleans to enjoy the 
same linguistic rights as metropolitan citizens.   
                                                
126 Paulette Urgin, “Comment améliorer le français en Guadeloupe,” 1976, 1, Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940381, Art. 26. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Madame Lamy, Directrice de l’Ecole Mixte de Trenelle “B” à Fort-de-France, “Adaptation de 
l’enseignement du français aux enfants dont la langue maternelle est le créole, Rapport de synthèse, n.d., 
Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 800285, Art. 13.   
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 In framing the Creole question as a social issue, education officials attempted to 
depoliticize Lauriette’s construction of Creole as a political issue concerning Antilleans 
linguistic and cultural rights as French citizens.  On December 30, 1977, Lauriette wrote 
a letter to President Giscard d’Estaing, detailing the Ministry of Education’s attempts to 
silence him and his struggle for Antilleans’ linguistic rights.129  He informed the 
President that his Creole pedagogy was no different from the regional language 
instruction that was taking place within France’s metropolitan regions.  It advocated 
“teaching a child to read and write the words of his language that he already fluently 
speaks.”130  Lauriette sent his Creole pedagogy to countless education officials in France 
and the Antilles.  However, according to him, they refused to read and implement it 
because “it [did] not develop the concepts of the white man.”131  Lauriette perceived of 
the Ministry of Education’s rejection of Creole language instruction as a conscious 
decision to deny Antilleans their rights because of their race.  According to Lauriette, the 
Ministry of Education wanted to avoid granting political and cultural autonomy to 
Antilleans so that they remained in a position of subordination, similar to that of 
colonialism.  For him, this was the only conceivable reason why the Ministry of 
Education continued to deny Antilleans rights that it already granted to metropolitan 
citizens.   
 In May 1978, the mayor of Pointe-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe wrote to the Secretary 
General of Antillean education to defend Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy and request that it 
be implemented in Antillean schools.  He praised Lauriette for “advancing the question of 
                                                
129 Letter from Gérard Lauriette to M. Giscard d’Estaing, December 30, 1977, Published in Bulletin de 
l’Ecole AGEP, année scolaire 1977-1978.   
130 Gérard Lauriette, Bulletin de l’Ecole AGEP, année scolaire 1979-1980, n˚2, 6. 
131 Letter from Gérard Lauriette to M. Giscard d’Estaing, December 30, 1977, Published in Bulletin de 
l’Ecole AGEP, année scolaire 1977-1978.   
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the Creole language and its utility in education in Guadeluope”, and encouraged the 
Secretary General to consider implementing Lauriette’s “pedagogical initiatives.”132  By 
the late 1970s, the Ministry of Education had done just that.  Pressure from locally 
elected officials, such as the mayor of Pointe-à-Pitre, representing Antilleans’ growing 
demands for more cultural autonomy, encouraged the Ministry of Education to reconsider 
the ban on Creole.  In 1977, the “Commission on Teaching French in the Overseas 
Departments” suggested that the Ministry of Education permit Creole in Antillean 
classrooms under certain circumstances.  For example, the Commission argued for the 
Antillean child’s right to speak to his teacher in Creole during individual 
conversations.133  Moreover, Creole was “acceptable in preschool education as a means 
of communication” and “on the playground.”134  Shortly after the Commission made 
these suggestions, the Ministry of Education wrote to the Rector of the Antilles-Guiana 
Academy, informing him that “the occasional usage of Creole can be used during the 
initial stages of preschool education.”135  However, the Minister of Education also 
explained that this limited use of Creole was by no means ended the ban on Creole.  He 
reminded the Rector that “upon entry to secondary education, the exclusive use of French 
must be the rule.”136   This was far from the Creole pedagogy that Lauriette envisioned.  
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He wanted Antillean educators to be able to develop and implement a curriculum that 
addressed Antillean children’s cultural and linguistic specificities.  For Lauriette, these 
concessions did nothing to equalize Creole and French.  Rather, they enabled the 
Ministry of Education to continue to control the terms under which Creole would be 
permitted in public education.      
 In the late 1970s, Lauriette and the Ministry of Education seemed to be at an 
impasse.  Lauriette continued to use his school’s bulletin as a forum to promote his 
Creole pedagogy.  He framed the Creole question as political issue concerning 
Antilleans’ rights as French citizens.  Lauriette claimed that like all French citizens, 
Antilleans possessed the right to regional language instruction.  For Antilleans, their 
regional language was Creole.  Simultaneously, the Ministry of Education avoided 
comparing the Creole issue to regional rights.  Instead, it continued to construct Creole as 
a social problem that threatened the Antilles’ political union with France.  In a note 
detailing the education problems in France’s overseas departments, the Secretary of State 
for the DOM, recognized that it might be beneficial to adapt the national curriculum to 
the particular linguistic needs of Antillean children.  “It is now recognized that schooling 
in the French language, modeled on the metropolitan curriculum, is a source of 
difficulties for the children of the overseas departments and territories whose maternal 
language, for the most part, is not French.”137  Despite this, the Secretary of State noted 
that it was not in France’s best interest to adapt the metropolitan curriculum to the 
Antilles and permit Creole language instruction because it is “a refuge of cultural identity 
for [Antilleans] who see in it a means to politically affirm themselves against the 
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metropole.”138  According to the Secretary of State, Antilleans used Creole to culturally 
distinguish themselves from metropolitan France.  Creole therefore, threatened 
Antilleans’ political and cultural assimilation.  By the late 1970s, education officials were 
considering the possibility of extending regional language instruction to the Antilles, but 
it heeded the Ministry of the DOM’s warnings, and ultimately decided that Antilleans 
were not ready for these kinds of regional rights.  Creole was linked to the Antillean 
independence movement and thus, too politically dangerous to be introduced into 
Antillean classrooms.   
 
Conclusion 
 For nearly forty years, Gérard Lauriette and the Ministry of Education were 
embroiled in a debate about Creole’s place in public education.  What appeared to be a 
question about Creole’s role as a language of instruction in Antillean classrooms, was in 
reality a struggle for control of Antillean education, and ultimately the Antilles.  For 
Lauriette, the Creole question was a political issue.  From departmentalization until the 
late 1960s, he used his Creole pedagogy to argue that Antilleans needed to have control 
of not only education, but also of Antillean society.  Lauriette believed that Antilleans 
possessed a different culture and language from French metropolitans and therefore, 
should be an independent nation.  In the 1970s, Lauriette distanced himself from 
Antillean nationalism and became an advocate of regional reform.  Instead of arguing for 
independence, Lauriette envisioned a more culturally autonomous Antilles that remained 
politically linked to France.  Yet, he continued to perceive of Creole as a question of 
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Antilleans’ political and cultural rights.  He called upon the Ministry of Education to end 
its treatment of Antilleans as second-class citizens and grant them the same linguistic and 
cultural rights that it had granted to its metropolitan regions with the implementation of 
the Deixonne law in 1951 and the Fontanet Circulaire in 1972.   
 In contrast, the Ministries of DOM and Education perceived of Creole as a social 
problem that needed to be solved.  Creole was a barometer of the extent to which 
Antilleans had been culturally and politically assimilated into the French nation.  DOM 
and education officials argued that Creole was a detriment to Antillean society because it 
prevented Antilleans from achieving academic success and experiencing the same social 
and economic opportunities as their metropolitan counterparts.  For the Ministry of 
Education, the ban on Creole was not an unequal application of regional language laws.  
Rather, it ensured Antilleans’ acquisition of the French language, opening the doors to 
social mobility.  In this way, it was the fulfillment of republican equality. 
 Lauriette constructed the Creole question as the denial of republican equality.  
Conversely, for the Ministry of Education its policies on Creole were the realization of 
republican equality.  These competing constructions reveal that the Creole debates were 
really about Antilleans’ status as French citizens and how their cultural differences fit 
into the nation.  By the mid-1970s, the Antillean independence movement was no longer 
popular, and the majority of Antilleans, including Lauriette, wanted to remain French 
citizens.  However, it was unclear what French citizenship would look like for Antilleans.  
Whereas Lauriette envisioned Antilleans as culturally distinct French citizens, the 
Ministry of Education insisted that incorporation into the French nation required 
Antilleans to give up their Creole identities in favor of a universal French citizenship.  
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These debates concerning Creole’s place in republican education, and more broadly how 
Antillean culture fit into the nation, played out in Antillean classrooms as the Ministry of 
the DOM, education officials, teachers, and students navigated the meaning of 
Antilleans’ French citizenship and their cultural and political relationship with France.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
From Assimilation to Intercultural Education: Immigrant Education Policy  
and the Exclusion of Creole, 1970-1983 
 
Introduction 
Of Antillean origin, I came to France to pursue my studies. . . . One did 
not hesitate to highlight for me my “cultural backwardness”, “my 
shortcomings” without giving me the means to overcome them. . . . After 
getting over the first strong, traumatizing reaction characterized by 
humiliation, shame, and a gnawing rage, I began to view myself just as I 
was, objectively formed-deformed by the colonial phenomenon and 
assimilation. . . . Then, as a professor in the transition classes, in the 
schools of Nanterre and Aubervilles with high percentages of children of 
immigrant workers . . . I realized that the difficulties encountered by these 
students in learning and mastering French were not a result of pedagogy.  
Aware of this sociolinguistic problem, I intuitively felt that the obstacle 
did not solely come from the “qualities” and intrinsic difficulties of the 
linguistic system, that it was more the social relationship of the parents 
and of the children to the language than the language itself, a relationship 
created from the contact with this language, the elevated social status of 
French.  I confirmed this idea when I engaged myself in eliminating the 
illiteracy of immigrant workers. . . . it was the problem of the 
interiorization of a dominant culture by the dominated. . .1 
 
 In the late 1960s, Dany Bebel-Gisler, a young Guadeloupean student crossed the 
Atlantic to pursue her education in France.  While obtaining her doctorate in 
sociolinguistics, Bebel-Gisler taught “transition” classes for children from immigrant 
families in the Parisian suburbs of Nanterre and Aubervilles.  She also led an 
experimental adult literacy program for West African and Algerian immigrants.  
According to Bebel-Gisler, this experience made her realize that the French government 
                                                
1 Danny Bebel-Gisler, La Langue Créole Force Juglée: Étude socio-linguistique des rapports de force 
entre le créole et le français aux Antilles  (Paris: Harmattan, 1985), 3-7.   
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was using education, and in particular, the French language to control and assimilate 
immigrants’ cultural and linguistic differences into a singular national culture.  The 
Ministry of Education promoted French as the language of prestige, devaluing 
immigrants’ maternal languages and cultures as obstacles to a unified French society.  
She claimed that education officials perceived of France’s immigration “problem” as a 
direct result of immigrants’ cultural otherness and incapacity to learn French.  Bebel-
Gisler contended that this exclusion of difference caused immigrants to interiorize their 
cultural inferiority, preventing them from achieving social advancement.  She therefore 
challenged the Ministry of Education’s policy of assimilation and argued for the 
integration of immigrant cultures into the national curriculum.  For Bebel-Gisler, this 
recognition of immigrants’ differences was important for ensuring social equality 
between immigrants and French citizens.2 
 While defending immigrants’ right to difference in Paris, Bebel-Gisler came to 
the realization that the conflict between French and immigrant cultures in metropolitan 
France was the same conflict between French and Creole in the Antilles.  She claimed 
that the Ministry of Education’s exclusion of difference from public classrooms was 
similar to the way in which French colonization and departmentalization assimilated 
Antilleans and attempted to destroy their Creole language and culture.  Antilleans, like 
immigrants, were cultural “others” who occupied an inferior social position.  According 
to Bebel-Gisler, the promotion of the Creole language and culture helped Antilleans 
overcome these feelings of inferiority and empowered them to regain political and 
cultural control of Guadeloupe and Martinique.3 
                                                
2 Bebel-Gisler, La Langue Créole Force Juglée. 
3 Ibid. 
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 Inspired by her work in Paris, Bebel-Gisler returned to Guadeloupe in 1976 to 
teach Creole literacy to poor farmers in the countryside of Lamentin.4  In 1979, she 
founded the Centre d’Education Populaire Bwadoubout (The Standing Wood Center of 
Popular Education), a Creole literacy center for children and adults who lacked formal 
education or came from disadvantaged households in the agricultural regions of Basse-
Terre.5  Creole was the language of instruction at Bwadoubout; reading and writing were 
also taught in Creole.  The metaphorical meaning of the Creole word bwadoubout, “self 
assurance”, embodied Bebel-Gisler’s commitment to promoting Creole and eliminating 
the socially divisive consequences of privileging the French language.  For Bebel-Gisler, 
instruction in Creole facilitated access to knowledge and thus, social mobility. She 
claimed that in insisting that only French be used in the classroom, education officials 
impeded Antillean children’s ability to understand their teachers.  In this way, the ban on 
Creole prevented Antilleans from receiving an education and achieving social 
advancement.6    
 Bebel-Gisler’s story reveals the connection between immigrant education policy 
in France and Creole language policy in the Antilles.  While the Ministry of Education 
debated the place of immigrant languages and cultures in the metropolitan education 
system, it was also embroiled in a political struggle with Antillean activists, such as 
Bebel-Gisler, concerning Creole’s role in Antillean classrooms.  Yet, despite the 
simultaneity of these policy debates, in general, scholars have examined the history of 
                                                
4 Lamentin is of Guadeloupe’s thirty-two communes.  The commune is the lowest level of administrative 
division in the French Republic.  Each commune possesses a mayor (maire) and a municpal council 
(conseil municipal) who jointly manage the local affairs of the commune.   
5 Basse-Terre Island is the name of the western half of Guadeloupe.  It is separated from the other half of 
Guadeloupe (Grande-Terre) by a narrow sea channel.  Basse-Terre is also the name of a the capital city of 
Guadeloupe.   
6 Bebel-Gisler, La Langue Créole Force Juglée. 
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immigrant and Antillean education separately.7  In contrast, this chapter illuminates the 
relationship between these two seemingly separate policies, and seeks to understand how 
the Ministry of Education’s policies on immigrant and Antillean education informed and 
shaped each other across the Atlantic.  In placing the debates on immigrant and Antillean 
education in dialogue with each other, this chapter highlights the points of convergence 
and divergence regarding the French government’s treatment of two culturally and 
politically distinct groups: immigrants and Antilleans, who were French citizens, but also 
culturally distinct like immigrants.   
 From 1946 to 1970, the Ministry of Education treated Antilleans and immigrants 
similarly, and adhered to a policy of assimilation for both groups.  This changed in 1970 
when the Ministry of Education gradually introduced immigrants’ cultures and languages 
into the metropolitan curriculum while continuing to prohibit educators from using 
Creole in Guadeloupean and Martinican classrooms.  Historians have characterized 
France’s exclusionary policies as either a failure of republicanism to live up to its 
inclusionary principles or the result of an inherently flawed republican ideology that only 
purported to promote equality.8   However, the divergence in education policy for 
                                                
7 For studies on Antillean education policy, see: Danny Bebel-Gisler, La Langue Créole Force Juglée: 
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Studies 13, no.4 (June 1983): 489-495. For scholarship on immigrant education see: Jacques Berque, 
L’Immigration à l’École de la République  (Paris: Centre national de Documentation pédagogique, 1985);  
Commission de la République Française pour l’Education, la Science et la Culture, Alphabétisation des 
Migrants Étrangers en France  (Paris: la Direction des populations et des migrations du Ministère du 
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Direction de la Population et des Migrations, 1978); Louis Porcher, ed.  La scolarisation des enfants 
étrangers en France  (Paris: Centre de Recherche et d’Étude pour la Diffusion du Français (CREDIF), 
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8 For scholarship that claims that exclusion occurred from the failure of state officials to live up to the lofty 
ideals of republican equality, see: Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave 
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immigrants and Antilleans reveals that republican assimilation was not intrinsically 
exclusionary or inclusionary.  Rather, it simultaneously included and excluded different 
cultural and political groups, including immigrants and Antilleans.  Although republican 
discourse stigmatized the recognition of difference in the public sphere, in practice, the 
Ministries of Education and the DOM implemented specific education policies for 
immigrants and Antilleans to navigate how each group’s differences were included and 
excluded from the nation.   
 The first part of this chapter examines the period from departmentalization to 
1970 when education policy for immigrants and Antilleans was similar.  From 1946 to 
1970, the Ministry of Education used republican education to assimilate both immigrants 
and Antilleans.  In both metropolitan France and the Antilles, education officials 
implemented various programs to rapidly facilitate immigrant and Antillean children’s 
knowledge of the French language.  The Ministry of Education believed that the ability to 
speak French was the key to assimilation.  French literacy was the means through which 
the Ministry of Education attempted to eliminate both immigrants’ and Antilleans’ 
cultural particularities and make them into French citizens.  
 Beginning in 1970, the Ministry of Education implemented policies specifically 
targeting immigrant children attending metropolitan schools.  It recognized that the 
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national curriculum did not meet the particular needs of immigrant children, and created 
“transition” classes to help them adapt to the French public school system before being 
integrated with their French peers.  In 1975, the Ministry of Education reformed its 
immigrant education policy even further when it invited foreign instructors from southern 
and eastern Europe to come to France and teach immigrant children their maternal 
languages and cultures during regular school hours.  This decision marked a shift from 
the exclusion of immigrants’ diversity from the classroom to “intercultural education” or 
the inclusion of immigrants’ difference in public education.   
 In response, Antillean activists argued for the same recognition of their Creole 
culture and language, prompting the Ministry of Education to reconsider Creole’s place 
in Antillean classrooms.  However, education officials ultimately continued to exclude 
Creole from Antillean classrooms.  The second part of this chapter analyzes this 
divergence in immigrant and Antillean education policy and seeks to understand why the 
Ministry of Education seemed to be more willing to make room in public education for 
immigrant children’s linguistic and cultural differences.   
 When Mitterrand’s socialist government came to power in 1981 and articulated 
the “right to difference”, Antillean activists renewed their fight to end the ban on Creole.  
However, the Ministry of Education applied the “right to difference” differently in the 
metropolitan France and the Antilles.  While it mapped out a comprehensive plan to 
make immigrants’ languages and cultures a part of the national curriculum, it remained 
committed to excluding Creole from Antillean classrooms.  The last section of this 
chapter examines these early 1980s debates about Creole’s place in public education 
leading up to the Ministry of Education’s decision to finally lift the ban on Creole in 
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1983.  It argues that Antillean activists’ participation in these discussions shaped the 
meaning of the “right to difference” in metropolitan France and the Antilles as they 
struggled to reshape education policy and gain official recognition of their Creole 
language and culture.   
 
Part I.  French Literacy and the Assimilation of Immigrants and Antilleans, 1946-
1970 
Creole and the “Problem” of Antillean Assimilation 
 In order to fully appreciate the divergence of the Ministry of Education’s policies 
regarding Antillean and immigrant education during the 1970s, it is first necessary to 
understand how closely Antillean and immigrant education ressembled each other prior 
to 1970.  The following review of Antillean education policy in the two decades 
following departmentalization is meant to provide the essential points of comparison for 
analyzing how the Ministry of Education constructed French literacy as the most 
important component of both Antillean and immigrant education before 1970. 
 In the mid-1940s, French colonial officials and elected Antillean representatives 
debated Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s future political status.  They discussed whether 
the islands should remain French colonies, become independent nations or be fully 
integrated into the nation as overseas departments of France (DOM).  In 1944, during this 
legislative debate, the colonial newspaper, La Tribune Syndicale et Laïque, anticipated 
the departmentalization of the Antilles, and argued that the acquisition of the French 
language was essential for the Antilleans’ political and cultural assimilation.  
  To speak French is an act of patriotism.  A community of one language is  
  the surest way  to guarantee national unity. . . . One must explain to them  
  (Antilleans) that to love France is not only to imitate its customs and  
  traditions, to take advantage of its benefits, protection, laws, to share its  
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  history and glories, but above all to be assimilated, to adopt its doctrines  
  and language.  To be French is to think and speak French.9   
 
For La Tribune, speaking French was synonymous with being a part of the French nation.  
Therefore, the fact that Antilleans possessed a distinct Creole culture and language was 
problematic.  French national unity was dependent upon its citizens sharing a common 
culture and language.  La Tribune argued that as future French citizens, Antilleans 
needed to adopt French culture, beginning with the French language.   
 Two years later, in 1946, when Guadeloupe and Martinique officially became 
overseas departments, the Ministries of the DOM and Education set out to assimilate 
Antilleans into the nation.  Although Antilleans were now French citizens, they were still 
culturally distinct from their metropolitan counterparts.  Their Creole culture and 
language did not fit into popular perceptions of what it meant to be French.  In particular, 
the Creole language was one of the most visible expressions of Antilleans’ difference.  
As such, it became the symbol of the “problem” of Antillean assimilation that the French 
government needed to solve.  DOM officials forced Antillean radio and television 
networks to exclusively broadcast French programs, and imported French newspapers 
replaced the local Antillean press.  French administrators even went so far as to ban the 
use of Creole in political meetings and addresses, the media, as well as public schools.  
Chapter 4 extensively detailed how the French government used public education, 
specifically French language instruction, to make Antilleans into culturally French 
citizens.  For the Ministry of Education, Antilleans’ Creole language and their inability to 
speak proper French created a political and cultural divide between the Antilles and 
                                                
9 La Tribune Syndicale et Laïque, February 1944, 2.  Quoted in Ellen M. Schnepel, “The Politics of 
Language in the French Caribbean: The Creole Movement on the Island of Guadeloupe”  (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1990), 108.   
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metropolitan France.  French literacy was the solution to this Creole “problem”; it 
facilitated the political and cultural assimilation of Antilleans, and secured the Antilles’ 
political relationship with France.10   
 
French Literacy and the Immigration “Problem” 
 While the Ministry of Education implemented education policies designed to 
assimilate Antilleans into the nation as proper French-speaking citizens, it also struggled 
to culturally assimilate immigrants and their families into metropolitan France.  After the 
Second World War, the French government actively encouraged immigration from 
southern and eastern Europe and its former colonies.  These immigrants were a solution 
to the postwar labor shortage; they provided France with the unskilled labor it needed to 
rebuild.  In 1945, the government established the National Immigration Office (ONI) to 
recruit labor and oversee workers’ placement in France.  According to ONI’s director, 
Pierre Bideberry, it was the Office’s responsibility “to protect the national community 
through an effective selection process based on considerations of health, employment and 
moral conduct.”  In addition, the ONI, “guaranteed as far as possible an [even] 
distribution of foreigners in France.”11   ONI officials did not simply recruit immigrant 
labor; rather, it carefully monitored the introduction of foreigners into French society 
according to the government’s criteria for ethnic and cultural balance, as well as 
assimilation.  The republican discourse of “assimilability” stipulated that ethnic 
proximity was essential for ensuring a quick and unproblematic assimilation.  This meant 
that in the eyes of the French government, southern and eastern Europeans were the more 
                                                
10 For more on how the French government constructed French literacy as the solution to the “Creole 
problem”, see chapter 4 of this dissertation, especially the section entitled “National Unity Through French 
Literacy.” 
11 Quoted in Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in 
Modern France  (London: Routledge, 1992), 39. 
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desirable immigrants.  Compared to former colonial subjects from Africa and Asia, they 
were more culturally similar to French citizens and thus, more likely to assimilate.  In 
order to protect France’s national integrity, the ONI attempted to regulate not only the 
amount and distribution of immigrants throughout France, but also the ethnic and racial 
makeup of the immigrants who entered France.    
 Despite the Office’s efforts to favor southern and eastern Europeans, employers 
often chose to recruit labor directly, bypassing the ONI’s criteria for cultural 
assimilability.  Economic planners conceived of immigration as a necessary part of 
postwar reconstruction and consequently, allowed economic demand to dictate and 
control migration flow.  The need for a new and larger labor force took precedence over 
all other considerations, including the regulation of immigration.  In the mid-1960s, an 
increasing number of male immigrant workers from France’s former colonies 
permanently settled in France, precipitating chain migration and family reunification.  
For the French government, immigration quickly transformed from a temporary solution 
to an economic problem into a “social problem” of assimilation, ethnic balance, and 
national security.12  
 This was not the first time that the French government encountered the “problem” 
of assimilating culturally distinct groups into the nation.  France had a long history of 
immigration.13  Moreover, for nearly twenty years prior to the “problem” of postcolonial 
immigration, the Ministry of the DOM had been using public education in Guadeloupe 
and Martinique to make Antilleans into French citizens.  DOM and Education officials 
                                                
12 Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation, 70-95. 
13 See: Gérard Noiriel, The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity, trans. 
Geoffroy de Laforcade  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
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believed that Antilleans remained unassimilated because they did not possess the same 
level of French literacy as their metropolitan counterparts.  In the mid-1960s, as more and 
more former colonial subjects permanently settled in France, education officials feared 
the same outcome in metropolitan France.  They argued that immigrant workers and their 
children were on the verge of becoming another group of unassimilated “others” who did 
not speak French.  For the French government, this fear became a reality in the early 
1970s.  In contrast to their southern and eastern European predecessors who appeared to 
have quickly assimilated the French language and culture, these non-European 
immigrants and their French-born children remained unemployed and concentrated in 
suburban ghettos.  Public discourse linked second-generation immigrants’ inability to 
assimilate to their cultural distinctiveness, and blamed this group for France’s social and 
economic problems.14  While DOM officials made Creole the scapegoat for the Antilles’ 
problems, in metropolitan France, the government also constructed immigrants’ cultural 
“otherness” as a social “problem” and threat to national unity.     
In a memo entitled “Problems concerning the reception and adaptation of 
foreigners”, the Ministry of Education warned that by the end of 1968, approximately 
three million foreigners would be living in France.  This shocking statistic indicated to 
education officials that they needed to do something to quickly solve this “problem” of an 
increasingly large population of unassimilated immigrants.  In the Antilles, the Ministry 
of the DOM was using public education, and in particular French literacy, as a tool of 
assimilation.  The Ministry of Education drew upon its experiences with education and 
assimilation in the islands, and identified French literacy as an effective solution for 
ensuring immigrants’ adaptation to metropolitan French society: “Learning French is 
                                                
14 Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation, 70-89.   
 341 
necessary for the migrant’s adjustment to professional and daily life.”15  In a plan for his 
region’s economic future, Mr. Ruban, the economic advisor for the Rhône-Alpes, noted 
that French literacy was of the utmost importance, especially since immigrants from 
north and west Africa were now a significant part of his region’s workforce.  According 
to him, “the goal of French literacy [was] no longer to [simply] enable an individual to 
acquire a common language.”  French literacy was about ensuring immigrants’ ability to 
receive “training so that they can obtain a vocational profession” and become productive 
members of society.16  For Ruban, and other education and economic officials, French 
literacy promoted immigrants’ adaptation, enabled them to obtain a job, and prevented 
them from becoming an unassimilated, unemployed, and discontented group.   
The Ministry of Labor confirmed regional officials’ analyses that French literacy 
was the key to producing an assimilated and therefore productive immigrant population.  
In a separate report on the education of foreign workers, it called upon the Ministry of 
Education to fund and implement French literacy programs to prepare immigrants to 
enter the workforce while simultaneously introducing them to life in France.17  In 1966, 
the Ministry of Education acted upon the Ministry of Labor’s suggestion.  It placed the 
Fonds d’Action Sociale (FAS), originally a government-funded social welfare 
organization for Algerian workers, in charge of “the educational problems concerning 
                                                
15 Le Ministère de l’Education, “Les problèmes de l’accueil et de l’adaptation des étrangers,” 1968, Centre 
des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art. 14. 
16 M. Ruban, “Place de l’alphabétisation et de la formation professionnelle dans la préparation du 6ème 
plan,” in Préfecture du Rhône, Service de Liaison et de Promotion des Migrants, “Groupe de synthèse de 
promotion des migrants, L’alphabétisation des Etrangers dans la Région Rhône-Alpes, April 17, 1969, 
Centre des Archives Contermporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art. 13.  
17 Commission de la République Française pour l’Education, la Science et la Culture, Alphabétisation et 
Promotion des Migrants Etrangers en France, (Paris: Direction des populations et des migrations du 
Ministère du travail de l’emploi et de la population, 1971), 10. 
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workers of all nationalities and their families.”18  Initially, FAS focused its efforts on 
organizing French literacy classes for male workers during the evening hours.  These 
classes were entirely voluntary.  FAS relied upon employers to encourage their 
immigrant workers to attend these classes.  This meant that in order to recruit students, 
FAS needed to convince employers that French literacy improved their immigrant 
workers’ overall job performance.  FAS used pamphlets to inform employers that 
“learning the host country’s language is necessary for the migrant’s adaptation in his 
professional and daily life.”19  FAS officials argued that immigrant workers without 
knowledge of the French language did not effectively communicate with their employers 
and therefore, were not able to adequately perform their jobs.  FAS’s recruitment 
techniques worked.  French literacy classes slowly gained a reputation among employers 
as a necessary tool of adaptation.  From 1966 to 1967, FAS held 600 French literacy 
classes in approximately 350 public schools and boarding houses throughout France.  In 
its November 1967 report, FAS boasted that it had taught nearly 20,000 immigrant 
workers how to read and write French.20   
Government agencies were not the only organizations preoccupied with 
improving immigrant workers’ cultural adaptation.  Private groups, such as the 
Association for the Education of Foreigners (Amicale pour l’enseignement des 
étrangers), were also concerned about the large number of immigrants living in France 
who could not speak French: “Rare are those among them [immigrants] who have, at 
                                                
18 Le Fonds d’Action Sociale (FAS), “L’Alphabétisation des travailleurs étrangers résidant en France,” 
November 16, 1967, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art.14. 
19 Le Fonds d’Action Sociale Pour les Travailleurs Migrants (FAS), Dix Ans au Service des Etrangers et 
des Migrants  (Paris: Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi, et de la Population, 1972). 
20 Le Fonds d’Action Sociale (FAS), “L’Alphabétisation des travailleurs étrangers résidant en France,” 
November 16, 1967, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art.14. 
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their arrival on our territory, a sufficient knowledge of our langue so that they can 
integrate themselves without too much difficulty, to our way of life.”21  In 
November1961, l’Amicale established itself as a nonprofit association and began to 
coordinate educational classes and programs for immigrant workers and their families.  
Five years later, in 1966, l’Amicale became a member of CLAP (Liaison Committee for 
Literacy and Social Promotion), a federation of organizations dedicated to promoting 
immigrant education and social mobility.  CLAP coordinated the literacy programs of 
nonprofits focused on immigrant social aid.  Its mission was to ensure that immigrants 
residing in all of France’s regions had access to education.   
CLAP perceived of itself as an altruistic organization seeking to improve 
immigrants’ social position and alleviate the economic and social hardships they endured 
in their homeland and in France.  According to CLAP’s president, Robert Buron, the 
promotion of French literacy did more than enable immigrants to communicate; it 
elevated immigrants’ social mobility by opening the door to French culture and society:  
 French literacy, then, does not only represent for them [immigrants] the  
  possibility of access to academic “knowledge” (knowledge of techniques  
  of speech, of reading, of writing, and a foreign language), but the mastery  
  of a dynamic and evolving culture, developing in him [the immigrant]  
  independence of judgment and social mobility, which will serve him in  
  any country where he is called to work, and one day, as soon as possible,  
  in his own [country].22 
 
                                                
21 Amicale pour l’enseignement des étrangers, “Premiers étapes de notre association,” Vivre en France, 
1968, 4.  Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art.14. 
22 Robert Buron, Président du CLAP, “Note on Comité de Liaison pour l’Alphabétisation et la Promotion 
(C.L.A.P.), in Préfecture du Rhône, Service de Liaison et de Promotion des Migrants, “Groupe de synthèse 
de promotion des migrants, L’alphabétisation des Etrangers dans la Région Rhône-Alpes, April 17, 1969, 
Centre des Archives Contermporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art. 13. 
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This discourse of France as a benevolent host society striving to provide immigrants with 
economic opportunities and the skills to improve their own homelands once they returned 
was reflective of the public debate and official policy concerning immigrants’ shifting 
position in French society.  In the early 1960s, dozens of nonprofit associations for 
immigrants implemented literacy programs throughout France.  For the most part, the 
government was content to support these private organizations’ efforts by funding a 
portion of their activities.  CLAP and l’Amicale provided a service to immigrants that the 
government recognized as necessary and valuable, but it did not have the time or 
organizational means to fully oversee the education of immigrant workers.  However, in 
the late 1960s, when it became apparent that this new wave of north and west African 
immigrants were permanently settling in France, the stakes of assimilation were suddenly 
higher.  Government officials wanted to ensure that these culturally and racially distinct 
immigrants assimilated into French society without threatening the stability of the nation.   
 In an attempt to gain control of immigrant education and assimilation, national 
education officials decided to intervene and regulate the cultural content and teaching 
methods used in CLAP’s and l’Amicale’s literacy programs.  In March 1968, the Ministry 
of Education worked with l’Amicale and CLAP to establish a standardized curriculum 
that effectively promoted French literacy and facilitated immigrants’ assimilation to 
French society.   In a letter to l’Amicale’s president, Stanislas Magin, the Minister of 
Education informed him of the government’s desire to fund and work with his 
association.  Under this collaboration, l’Amicale was required to submit its curriculum to 
the Ministry of Education for annual approval.  This process ensured that l’Amicale 
followed the national guidelines for immigrant education.  These guidelines stipulated 
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both the materials and methods l’Amicale needed to use in their French literacy classes.  
One week later, Magin responded, agreeing to collaborate with and follow the Ministry 
of Education’s recommendations.23 
In July 1968, the Ministry of Education published a decree in the Official Bulletin 
of National Education legally formalizing its relationship with l’Amicale.24  Through this 
partnership, the Ministry of Education asserted its control over how immigrants were 
educated and assimilated into French society.  It emphasized the importance of French 
literacy, arguing that assimilation began with the acquisition of the French language: 
“Difficulties [of assimilation] are primarily linguistic, understanding of the spoken 
language being the first requirement for [cultural] exchanges on which foreign workers 
are dependent.  This is why, first and foremost, each teacher must focus on the learning 
of language, without which nothing can be undertaken.”25  The Minister of Education 
argued that “the means to communicate” ensured “equal opportunity between them 
[immigrants] and French workers.”26  In other words, French literacy classes upheld 
Republican equality by providing immigrant workers with an equal opportunity to obtain 
employment and economically succeed in France.  According to the Ministry of 
Education, immigrants’ economic success facilitated their assimilation and thus, solved 
any social problems potentially arising from a discontented population of unemployed 
and unassimilated immigrants.     
                                                
23 Ministère de l’Education, Alain Peyrefitte, au Président de l’Amicale pour l’enseignement des étrangers, 
March 12, 1968.  Published in Amicale pour l’enseignement des étrangers, “Premiers étapes de notre 
association,” Vivre en France, 1968.  Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, 
Art.14. 
24 Le Ministre de l’Education, “Circulaire du 15 juillet 1968,” Bulletin Officiel de l’Education Nationale, 
n˚28, August 1, 1968.  Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art.13.  
25 Ministère de l’Educaiton, quoted in L’Amicale pour l’enseingement des étrangers, Circulaire de Rentrée, 
année scolaire 1970-1971, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainbelau, 770641, Art.13. 
26 Ibid. 
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In the late 1960s, the Ministry of Education firmly controlled the education of 
immigrant workers.  It financed FAS, l’Amicale, and CLAP, and determined the 
curriculum of each organization’s classes.  Yet, state officials were not entirely convinced 
that their French literacy programs were producing a literate and assimilated population 
of immigrant workers.  Out of the hundreds of thousands of illiterate immigrant workers 
residing in France, the Ministry of Labor estimated that only 32,178 participated in the 
government-sponsored programs.27  It blamed the insufficient number of courses as well 
as the strong “indifference of migrants toward literacy” as the main causes of the 
Ministry of Education’s failure to educate and assimilate immigrants.28   
The Ministry of Labor’s growing apprehension became more of a public concern 
in the early 1970s when a series of articles exposing the failures of immigrant education 
appeared in several popular newspapers.  One such article in Le Monde set a fearful tone 
regarding the purported dangers of uneducated immigrants.  This article claimed that 
despite the government’s efforts to convince both employers and immigrants of the social 
and economic benefits of French literacy, both groups remained indifferent to education.  
The “majority of employers…seem unaware that the literacy of their foreign workforce 
would promote stabilization and productivity.”29  Moreover, Le Monde noted that 
workers were often exhausted from their long workdays and did not have the energy to 
travel to and attend evening classes.  This apathy on the part of both employers and 
workers meant that a large number of uneducated immigrants were working and living in 
                                                
27 Commission de la République Française pour l’Education, la Science et la Culture, Alphabétisation et 
Promotion des Migrants Etrangers en France, (Paris: Direction des populations et des migrations du 
Ministère du travail de l’emploi et de la population, 1971), 44. 
28 Ibid., 45-46.   
29 Nicole Bernheim, “L’indifférence d’emplyeurs et l’insuffisance des moyens freinent l’instruction des 
travailleurs migrants,” Le Monde, n.d., n.p., Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 
770641, Art.14. 
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France.  The article estimated that out of the three million foreigners in France, 
approximately a half million of them were illiterate.  In addition to not speaking French, 
Le Monde claimed that a large number of immigrants could neither read nor write in their 
maternal languages.  It warned that the consequence of the government’s failed literacy 
programs was a “situation that radically hampers their professional and social 
integration.”30     
In an attempt to solve this perceived social problem, the Ministries of Labor and 
Education turned to employers who sponsored their own literacy classes for their foreign 
workers.  At the Citroën-Panhard factory in Paris’s thirteenth arrondissement, 
management provided immigrant workers with the pedagogical materials they needed to 
learn French.  It also permitted immigrants to attend French classes during the workday 
for up to two and a half hours per week.31  However, these kinds of programs were 
uncommon and only reached a small number of workers.  In order to increase the overall 
effectiveness of immigrant education, the Ministries of Labor and Education realized that 
it needed to make the Citroën-Panhard model the norm.  The Minister of Labor therefore 
required employers to permit immigrant workers to spend one hour of the workday 
learning to speak and write French.  The July 1970 contract between the National Center 
of French Employers  (Centre national du patronat français) and workers’ unions 
recognized “the right of workers to take training courses” and “reserved a place for 
literacy during work hours.”32   
                                                
30 Nicole Bernheim, “L’indifférence d’emplyeurs et l’insuffisance des moyens freinent l’instruction des 
travailleurs migrants,” Le Monde, n.d., n.p., Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 
770641, Art.14. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Commission de la République Française pour l’Education, la Science et la Culture, Alphabétisation et 
Promotion des Migrants Etrangers en France, (Paris: Direction des populations et des migrations du 
Ministère du travail de l’emploi et de la population, 1971), 11.   
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This initiative was effective in promoting French language acquisition among 
those immigrants who were employed.  However, it failed to reach the growing 
population of young immigrants who were no longer required to attend school, but had 
not yet obtained a job due to their lack of education and knowledge of the French 
language.  In a memo on “adolescent immigrants”, the Minister of Education noted that 
French literacy was an indispensable skill for obtaining professional training and social 
mobility.  Yet, young immigrants between the ages of fourteen and eighteen who had 
aged out of the public school system did not have any opportunities to learn French.  
Consequently, they were relegated to low-paying and unskilled jobs, which ultimately 
slowed the process of assimilation.33   
To address this problem, the Ministry of Education charged both FAS and 
l’Amicale with developing professional training and French literacy courses designed 
specifically for adolescent immigrants.  Beginning in 1966, FAS funded French language 
classes at the Rocheton and Saint-Etiènne boardinghouses outside of Paris.  According to 
FAS, these twelve weeks of intensive language instruction not only prepared young 
immigrants to enter the workforce, but also facilitated their adaptation to French society.  
FAS described Rocheton as a “happy step in the life of these boys.”  “They are 
comfortable; while being supervised, they are free; they have friends.”34  Rocheton 
served as a kind of interim period of adaptation that came shortly after young 
immigrants’ arrival in France, but before they entered the workforce.  It was a “short 
                                                
33 Ministère de l’Educaiton Nationale, Direction de la Coopération avec la Communauté et l’Etranger, 
“Note relative à l’organisation de stages pour de jeunes immigrants étrangers,” n.d., Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art.14. 
34 Service social d’aide aux emigrants, Service social de la main-d’oeuvre étrangère, “Rapport Général 
1966,” Presented to the Asssemblée Générale June 1, 1967, 3-4.  Centre des Archives Contemporaines 
(CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art. 14. 
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acclimation to the French way of life that not only provided them [adolescent 
immigrants] with knowledge of the [French] language, but also constituted a period of 
development and adaptation to a life different than they had known before.”35 
While the Ministry of Education developed literacy and job training programs to 
ease adolescent immigrants’ transition into French society, it also began to focus on the 
education of a different demographic of immigrants: children enrolled in France’s public 
schools.  When the Ministry of Labor recruited male workers to fill France’s labor 
shortage following the Second World War, it assumed that their migration was 
temporary.  However, after finding stable jobs and adequate housing, male immigrants 
often brought their wives and children to France.  This meant that by the 1960s, the 
demographic makeup of the immigrant population was quickly changing from primarily 
young male workers to include women and children.     
 In June 1970, l’Amicale estimated that there were approximately 750,000 
immigrant children under the age of sixteen living in France.36  In order to ensure the 
assimilation of entire families into French society, FAS advocated the implementation of 
“educational action [that] also reach[ed] the wife and children of the migrant.”37  
Convinced of the importance of educating the entire immigrant family, the Ministry of 
Education funded FAS research to “determine the hours and appropriate methods” for 
instructing immigrant children in the French language and culture.38  In January 1965, the 
Ministry of Education charged FAS with subsidizing the Association of pre and 
                                                
35 Service social d’aide aux emigrants, Service social de la main-d’oeuvre étrangère, “Rapport Général 
1966,” Presented to the Asssemblée Générale June 1, 1967, 3-4.  Centre des Archives Contemporaines 
(CAC), Fontainebleau, 770641, Art. 14. 
36 L’Amicale pour l’enseignement des étrangers, “Les enfants des travailleurs étrangers en France,” Vivre 
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37 Le Fonds d’Action Sociale Pour les Travailleurs Migrants (FAS), Dix Ans au Service des Etrangers et 
des Migrants, 40-42. 
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postgraduate courses for foreign nationals (l’Amicale des Cours péri et postscolaires 
pour les ressortissants des pays étrangers) to develop “social promotion courses for 
immigrant workers, their wives and children in France.”39  Several months later in 
October, J. Auba, the president of L’Amicale des Cours péri et postscolaires sent a letter 
informing the director of each of France’s school districts of the necessity of establishing 
cours de rattrapage or remedial French language classes for immigrant children in their 
respective regions.  Auba insisted that French language instruction was essential in that it 
helped young immigrants catch up as quickly as possible to the educational level of their 
peers.  At the same time, Auba did not want immigrant children to be separated from 
their French peers.  He firmly believed that immersion in French classrooms facilitated 
immigrant children’s adaptation and assimilation.  He therefore stipulated in his letter 
that the cours de rattrapage must take place after school hours as a supplement to the 
education immigrant children received in public schools.40   Although the Ministry of 
Education required each school district to establish afterschool French language classes 
for immigrant children, attendance remained voluntary.  Because of this, education 
officials were not confident that the cours de rattrapage were reaching a significant 
number of immigrant children.  A December 1968 police study on the increasing number 
of foreign-born children in Paris’s public schools indicated to the Ministry of Education 
that the education and assimilation of immigrant children was a social issue that needed 
                                                
39 Letter from Président de l’Amicale des Cours péri et postscolaires pour les ressortissants des pays 
étrangers to Monsieur De Baecque, Conseiller d’Etat, March 10, 1966, Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), 770641, Art. 31. 
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to be addressed.41  Education officials acted quickly to solve this emerging social 
“problem”.  In 1970, the Ministry of Education established a national program for the 
education of immigrant children, empowering school officials and teachers to monitor 
and facilitate immigrants’ assimilation into French society. 
 
Part II.  The divergence of Immigrant and Antillean Education Policy: Classes 
d’Initiations, Langues et Cultures d’Origines, and “Intercultural Education”, 1970-
1981 
 Up until 1970, education policy for immigrant and Antillean children was similar.  
On both sides of the Atlantic, the Ministry of Education implemented programs to rapidly 
improve immigrant and Antillean children’s acquisition of the French language.  
Education officials believed that French literacy was the necessary starting point for both 
immigrants’ and Antilleans’ adaptation to the French way of life, employment, social 
mobility, and ultimately assimilation into French society.  They perceived of both 
immigrants and Antilleans as cultural “others” whose linguistic and cultural differences 
threatened their assimilation and thus, the unity of the nation.  This changed in 1970 
when the Ministry of Education took into account immigrant children’s cultural 
differences, but remained committed to excluding Antilleans’ Creole language and 
culture from public schools.  It implemented different policies in the Antilles and 
mainland France as it worked through how to include and exclude each group’s linguistic 
and cultural particularities from the French nation.   
 
 
 
                                                
41 Préfecture de Paris, Inspection Générale, Service d’études et de recherches, “Les élèves étrangers dans 
les écoles de Paris”, December 1968, 770641, Art. 13. 
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Classes d’initiation for Immigrant Children in France 
 Prior to the 1969-1970 school year, the Ministry of Education informed the 
director of each school district that due to inadequate funds, it was no longer providing 
financial support for the cours de rattrapage as they currently existed.  This meant that in 
November 1969, the number of hours immigrant children spent in these “remedial” 
classes each week was cut from six to three.  In addition, the Ministry of Education 
financed only one cours de rattrapage per school and limited the duration of this course 
to the first two trimesters of the school year.42  In response to these changes, the Ministry 
of Education and the Association for the Education of Foreigners, the organization 
charged with promoting immigrant education, received an outpouring of letters from 
school directors who claimed that these modifications in the cours de rattrapage program 
were detrimental to immigrant children’s education and their transition into French 
society.43  Teachers and school administrators valued the cours de rattrapage as both an 
educational and social necessity; they worried that cuts in the program were not only 
harmful to immigrant children’s assimilation, but also the stability of the classroom and 
more broadly, French society.  According to the Director of the School for Girls in 
Marseille, “[immigrant children’s] transition into society [was] certainly disrupted” 
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without the existence of the cours de rattrapage.44   “The consequences of the 
disappearance of these courses [was] not only academic, but can also [brought] about 
profound repercussions from a sociological and political standpoint.”45  This director 
contended that poorly educated and ill-adapted immigrant children fuelled the creation of 
a politically discontent group within French society.   
 During the 1969-1970 school year, the Ministry of Education found itself in a 
difficult position.  It viewed the cours de rattrapage as a social necessity, but as more and 
more immigrant children enrolled in public schools, it no longer possessed the funds to 
finance the program’s increasing number of classes.  The current program was such a 
financial burden because the Ministry of Education had to compensate teachers for the 
additional hours they spent preparing for and teaching the cours de rattrapage after 
regular school hours.  This dilemma compelled education officials to develop a more 
affordable approach to immigrant education, including the possibility of making the 
cours de rattrapage a part of the normal school day.  This decreased the amount of 
overtime paid to instructors, making the cours de rattrapage much more affordable. 
Moreover, it ensured that all immigrant children attended these classes and received the 
educational resources they needed to adapt to French society.46   
 On January 13, 1970, the Ministry of Education officially authorized the creation 
of initiation classes or CLIN (classes d’initiation) as the “appropriate method” for 
assimilating non-Francophone immigrant children into public schools and French 
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45 Ibid. 
46 Ministère de l’Education, Circulaire n˚IX 70-37, Bulletin Officiel de l’Education Nationale, January 13, 
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society.47  Education officials conceived of CLIN classes as a period of transition.  
During this time, immigrant children were separated from their French peers and placed 
in “initiation” classes where they quickly acquired the necessary language and academic 
skills to succeed in French public schools.  For the Ministry of Education, “the mastery of 
the French language” was “an indispensable prerequisite for [immigrant children] to 
integrate into school” and society.48  The CLIN program was about a lot more than 
French literacy; it was about assimilating immigrant children to the French culture and 
way of life.  Claudine Joseph, a CLIN teacher in the Parisian suburb of Aubervilles, 
described the classes d’initiation as “not just language classes where one learn[ed] to 
speak French, but also a step toward the insertion of these children in our society, a new 
society for them where they discover[ed] our culture, our civilization, [and] our 
customs.”49   
 The Ministry of Education firmly believed that immigrant children needed to be 
initiated into the French way of life before they were integrated into classrooms with their 
French peers.  This initial period of separation was essential for ensuring immigrant 
children’s academic success.  It purportedly placed them on the path to assimilation, thus 
securing the stability of the nation.  Yet, the Ministry of Education’s decision to create 
initiation classes was not as simple as it appeared to be.  The introduction of the cours de 
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rattrapage into public education meant that immigrant children were separated from their 
French peers into classes specifically designed for them and their special needs.  For the 
Ministry of Education, this was equivalent to acknowledging immigrant children as a 
culturally distinct group requiring particular considerations.  This kind of recognition 
challenged the ideal of republican equality.  Up until this point, the Ministry of Education 
used the discourse of republicanism to argue that immigrant children were not to receive 
a different education from their French peers; they needed to be immediately integrated 
into classrooms with French students.  In the early 1970, the Ministry of Education 
searched for a way to reconcile its republican ideals with what it perceived to be the 
social necessity of creating separate classes to assimilate immigrant children in an 
efficient and affordable manner.   
The Minister of Education, Olivier Guichard, was wary of the CLIN program’s 
potential challenges to republicanism.  In the early 1970s, distinct political and cultural 
groups, such as Antilleans, were arguing for their cultural rights.50  Because of this 
political atmosphere, Guichard wanted to ensure that these groups did not characterize 
CLIN classes as a government program that advocated the recognition of diversity.  He 
did not want Antilleans and other cultural groups to appropriate the CLIN program as a 
symbol of their struggle for the “right to difference.”  In an attempt to prevent this kind of 
political cooptation, Guichard deliberately constructed the CLIN program as a 
continuation of the republican ideal of universal education.  He argued that CLIN 
fulfilled the French republic’s mission of offering free, obligatory, and secular education 
to all children residing in France.  The CLIN program ensured that “all foreign children 
                                                
50 For more on the emergence of Antillean ethnic activism in France, see chapter 2.  For a discussion of 
Antilleans’ claims for cultural rights in Guadeloupe and Martinique, see chapter 3.    
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between the ages of 6 and 16…have the same opportunities available to them” and 
“under the same conditions as French children.”51  According to the Ministry of 
Education, the CLIN program upheld republican equality by providing all children, 
regardless of their nationality, with the right to an education.      
Moreover, the Ministry of Education’s justification for the separation of 
immigrant and French children into distinct classes constructed CLIN as a republican 
program that promoted complete assimilation.  Guichard insisted that the differential 
treatment of immigrant children was only temporary.  In the written proclamation 
establishing the creation of CLIN classes, Guichard was adamant that the main objective 
of the initiation classes was “to insert foreign children as quickly as possible into a 
normal cycle of studies.”52  This meant that the time an immigrant child spent in the 
CLIN program was limited to either one semester or one trimester.  In less than a year, 
the Ministry of Education expected immigrant children to be fully integrated into classes 
with their French peers.  Guichard also stipulated that this period of temporary separation 
was not meant to cut immigrant children completely off from the activities of their 
French classmates.  He encouraged CLIN teachers to periodically facilitate contact 
between immigrant children and their French peers by allowing them to participate in 
French students’ non-scholastic activities, such as music, art, and physical education.53  
One week after authorizing the creation of CLIN classes, the Ministry of 
Education published in the “Official Bulletin” an explanation regarding its decision to 
develop a separate education program for immigrant children.  According to the Ministry 
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52 Ministère de l’Education, Bulletin Officiel de l’Education Nationale  (19 Janvier 1970). Quoted in Louis 
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of Education, the CLIN program was a part of France’s republican ideals.  It did not 
recognize immigrant children’s cultural differences; rather, it was a necessary program 
that facilitated immigrant children’s academic success and placed them on the path to 
assimilation and equality:   
 The acquisition of the French language can only be done easily (that is to  
  say as quickly  and with firmness) if one puts them [immigrant children]  
  apart [from French children]. . .Once this linguistic mastery is established,  
  one can reasonably hope that the foreign students will find themselves on  
  an equal scholastic standing with their French peers.  They will then  
  reintegrate themselves, well-equipped, into the normal pedagogical track  
  with the same opportunities of success equal to that of French natives.   
  Having abolished their biggest handicap, they are now in a state of   
  educational equality.54 
 
For the Ministry of Education, the CLIN program was a solution to France’s “problem” 
of unassimilated immigrants who did not speak French and had no knowledge of the 
French culture.  Education officials insisted that classes tailored to immigrant children’s 
specific linguistic needs were necessary to ensure their acquisition of the French 
language.  CLIN prevented immigrant children from falling further and further behind 
their French peers.  Educators’ feared the possibility of immigrant children reaching 
adulthood without mastering the French language.  The inability to speak and understand 
French made it difficult for them to obtain employment and thus, assimilation into French 
society.55   
 The Ministry of Education insisted that the period of temporary separation in 
CLIN classes prevented the formation of “ghettos” and the marginalization of immigrant 
children within French public schools: “It is not about isolating them [immigrant 
children], but only about giving them the period of time that they need to adapt 
                                                
54 Ministère de l’Education, Bulletin Officiel de l’Education Nationale  (19 Janvier 1970). Quoted in Louis 
Porcher, ed., La scolarisation des enfants étrangers en France  (Paris: CREDIF, 1978), 121.   
55 Ibid, 120-129. 
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themselves to a new situation.  Thus, it is not a ghetto, but, on the contrary, it is an effort 
to avoid it.”56  CLIN classes eradicated future marginalization by affording immigrant 
children the necessary time to learn the French language and assimilate the French 
culture.  In granting immigrant children a finite period of time to acquire what the 
Ministry of Education referred to as capital culturel or “cultural capital”, CLIN classes 
provided immigrant children with the “same opportunities of success equal to that of 
French natives.”57  In other words, the Ministry of Education claimed that the CLIN 
program granted immigrants egalité de changes or an equal opportunity to succeed.58  In 
this way, it upheld the nation’s Republican ideals.   
 Despite the Ministry of Education’s insistence that the CLIN program created 
equality and was in line with the nation’s republican values, it remained extremely 
controversial throughout the 1970s.  It became the center of the public debate concerning 
the perceived “problem” of immigration.  Education specialists and scholars used the 
forum of education journals to debate the CLIN program’s effectiveness and how it either 
contributed to or confronted the “immigration problem”.  On one side of the debate, 
certain education specialists supported the Ministry of Education’s construction of CLIN 
as a solution to the “immigration problem.”  In 1974, one scholar of elementary education 
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presented her analysis of CLIN in the journal Vers l’Éducation Nouvelle.  She concluded 
that the classes d’initiation provided foreign children with “the same rights, the same 
means, and the same opportunities as the others [French children]” and were therefore an 
indispensable part of Republican education.59  She argued that CLIN classes granted 
immigrant children an “equal opportunity” to learn French.  They ensured that 
immigrants “truly benefitted from obligatory education in France”, and became 
assimilated and productive members of society.60 
In contrast, others argued that CLIN classes were minority “ghettos” that 
marginalized non-Francophone children and their differences.  Jacques Berque was one 
of CLIN’s most outspoken critics.  Born to French parents in Algeria, he was a pied-noir 
(French national born in Algeria) and a prominent Islamic scholar and sociologist who 
supported Algerian independence.  He was also an early defender of the right of Arab 
immigrants in France to be different in a multicultural society.  As a proponent of the 
“right to difference” in France, Berque perceived of CLIN as a program of assimilation 
aimed at erasing immigrant children’s cultural differences and keeping diversity out of 
public education.  In a report for the Ministry of Education, Berque described immigrant 
classrooms as “the CLIN ‘ghetto’ or ‘cocoon’ [that] is in every way too often 
marginalized in relationship to the rest of the school.”61  A year of exclusion in CLIN 
classes psychologically stigmatized immigrant children as separate and “ill adapted” 
children.62  Berque believed that the separation of immigrant children from their French 
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peers wrongly highlighted immigrants’ cultural differences as the social “problem” that 
needed to be solved.  For him, immigrants’ adaptation to French society stemmed from 
accepting and integrating their cultural diversity into classrooms, not excluding it.   
Louis Porcher also condemned the Ministry of Education’s policy on immigrant 
education.  Like Berque, Porcher was a sociologist and proponent of cultural and 
linguistic diversity in education.  For him, republicanism and the acceptance of difference 
were not incompatible.  He argued that the incorporation of immigrants’ cultural diversity 
into the classroom integrated them into society and prevented their marginalization as 
“outsiders”.  According to Porcher, the inclusion of immigrants and their cultures 
promoted equality and was thus the fulfillment of republicanism.  In contrast, it was the 
CLIN program that kept immigrants on the margins of public education and society and 
marked them as “different”.  In a 1978 study for the Center of Study and Research for the 
Diffusion of French (CREDIF), Porcher asserted that “foreign children are naturally 
separate in French school by their inability to speak French and their different cultural 
practices.”  The CLIN program highlighted immigrant children’s difference even more by 
segregating them in special classes.  Porcher contended that “it is necessary to promote a 
system of education such that it reduces this ‘strangeness’ (or this marginalization).”63  
For Porcher, this meant ending immigrant children’s separation in CLIN classes and 
placing them in classrooms with their French peers.  He claimed that this kind of 
integration erased the stigma of difference associated with immigrant children and 
facilitated their integration not only into the French school system, but also the nation as 
a whole.   
                                                
63 Porcher, ed., La scolarisation des enfants étrangers en France, 123. 
 361 
 Both Porcher and Berque advocated for the introduction of immigrant children’s 
cultural particularities into public education.   However, they did so with the assumption 
that this type of integrative education policy would ultimately lead to immigrant 
children’s assimilation.  In their respective studies, both noted that the acquisition of 
French occurred more quickly when immigrant children regularly interacted and 
communicated with their French peers.64  Porcher’s and Berque’s support for integration 
was not a call for multiculturalism.  Rather, they believed that through integration and 
constant contact with the French language and culture, immigrant children assimilated 
into French society.  Although Porcher and Berque may have opposed the CLIN 
program, they agreed with the Ministry of Education that assimilation was the main goal 
of immigrant education policy.  They simply advocated integration and not separation as 
the means through which to achieve this common goal.  Whereas the Ministry of 
Education argued that temporary separation was necessary so that immigrant children 
were focused on quickly acquiring the French language, Porcher and Berque insisted that 
immediate integration was the most effective way to assimilate immigrant children.   
Porcher’s and Berque’s critiques of separation were a part of a larger debate 
concerning the ineffectiveness of CLIN in solving the immigration “problem”.  In the 
mid-1970s, a series of academic studies appearing in popular education journals 
characterized the CLIN program as a complete failure.  These studies warned its readers, 
mostly educators and policymakers, that the nearly one million immigrant children 
attending public schools in France were not achieving the same academic success as their 
French peers.  They remained unassimilated and in a state of psychological confusion 
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between French culture and their culture of origin.65  Moreover, these studies predicted 
that this “problem” was only getting worse as more and more immigrants and their 
families settled in France.66  This mounting concern about the dangers of a large 
population of unassimilated foreigners forced the Ministry of Education to reevaluate the 
effectiveness of separation in promoting assimilation.  It began to consider Porcher’s and 
Berque’s calls for integration as an alternative strategy and possible solution to the 
assimilation problem.     
Simultaneously, across the Atlantic, Antilleans also placed pressure on the 
Ministry of Education to integrate their Creole language and culture into public 
education.  For example, as discussed in chapter 4, Gérard Lauriette, an outspoken 
teacher and activist, was the leader of the local movement to end the ban on the Creole.  
For Lauriette, Creole and French citizenship were not incompatible.  He argued for the 
use of Creole in public schools as a pedagogical tool that enabled Antillean children to 
quickly acquire the French language, achieve academic success, and become productive 
members of French society.67  Throughout the 1970s, the Ministry of Education 
vehemently opposed Lauriette’s teaching philosophy and continued to impose the ban on 
Creole.  Yet, in metropolitan France, the Ministry of Education began to consider the 
possibility of teaching immigrant children their maternal languages and cultures as a way 
to facilitate their integration into French society.  It perceived of Lauriette’s Creole 
                                                
65 For example see: Pierre Grange and Pierre Cherel, “Les enfants de partout et l’école française,” Hommes 
et Migrations  (1975); Christine Heredia-Deprez, “Apprendre une autre langue,” Vers l’éducation nouvelle, 
no.289 (Janvier-Février 1975): 7-13; Andre Meury, “Enfants D’Immigrés: Des étrangers dans la classe,” Le 
Monde de l’Éducation  (Février 1975): 7-10 ; Postel-Vinay et al, “Enfants de Travailleurs Migrants,” 
L’Éducation et développement, no.spécial  (Mai 1975).  
66 The pedagogical journal Vers l’Éducation Nouvelle reported that as of January 1973 nearly one million 
immigrant children attended French public schools. See: Hélène Gratiot-Alphandéry, “Les enfants de 
migrants,” Vers l’éducation nouvelle  278  (Decembre 1974): 5. 
67 See chapter 4, especially the section “Lauriette’s Creole Pedagogy.” 
 363 
pedagogy as a potential danger to France’s and the Antilles’ political and cultural union, 
but in metropolitan France, the Ministry of Education believed that his philosophy might 
prove to be the solution to the immigration “problem”.   
 
Langues et Cultures d’Origines in Metropolitan France and the Exclusion of Creole 
 
In February 1973, the Ministry of Education invited foreign teachers to come to 
France and instruct immigrant children in their “languages and cultures of origin”.  These 
classes, referred to as the LCO program, took place after school hours as a supplement to 
immigrant children’s French schooling.  LCO classes did not recognize the place of 
diversity within public education.  Rather, the Ministry of Education conceived of the 
program as a reinforcement of its assimilation policy.  It contended that immigrant 
children’s mastery of their maternal languages augmented their general literacy skills, 
and facilitated their acquisition of French.  In his argument for LCO instruction, the 
Minister of Education, Joseph Fontanet, claimed that according to educational studies of 
bilingual immigrant children, “maternal language courses, far from harming the 
scholastic achievement of the student, only facilitated it.”68  Fontanet’s reasoning closely 
resembled Lauriette’s argument for the use of Creole in Antillean schools as a stepping-
stone to the French language, and ultimately assimilation.69  Yet, Fontanet remained 
strongly opposed to Lauriette’s linguistic philosophy because according to him, 
acceptance of Creole’s presence in public education was equivalent to recognizing 
Antilleans’ unique cultural identities.  Fontanet argued that the acknowledgement of 
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difference threatened the process of assimilation, as well as the cultural unity of the 
nation.  
On the one hand, the Ministry of Education recognized the benefits of maternal 
language instruction, but on the other hand, it also viewed such instruction as challenge to 
its assimilation policy.  The Ministry of Education struggled with wanting to carve out a 
space for immigrant children’s languages and cultures while upholding the ban on Creole 
in the Antilles.  Before its decision in 1973 to implement the LCO program, the Ministry 
of Education privileged French language instruction to the exclusion of immigrants’ and 
Antilleans’ languages and culture.  It therefore wanted to ensure that its decision to 
promote immigrant children’s maternal languages, but not Creole, was not interpreted as 
a policy of differential treatment.  The Ministry of Education wished to maintain the 
universality of public education in France, which purported to provide all children in 
France and its overseas departments with the same education.  In other words, it did not 
want the LCO program to be perceived of as a kind of special treatment for immigrant 
children. 
For this reason, the Ministry of Education adamantly insisted that LCO instruction 
take place after regular school hours.70  The LCO program was very different from 
Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy, which advocated the use of Creole in Antillean classrooms 
during regular school hours.  The Ministry of Education viewed Lauriette’s Creole 
pedagogy as a challenge to universal education in that it proposed changes to the national 
curriculum.  In contrast, under the LCO program, maternal language classes were not a 
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part of the national curriculum; they were an extracurricular activity that immigrant 
children elected to participate in.  During the school day, immigrant children, like 
Antilleans, remained focused on learning French in classrooms where French was the 
sole language of communication and instruction.  The Ministry of Education used this 
reasoning to justify its decision to permit LCO instruction while it continued to ban 
Creole.  It argued that education in both metropolitan France and the Antilles remained 
universal.  The curriculum during regular school hours was the same; the only difference 
was that immigrant children had the opportunity to learn their maternal languages as a 
part of their extracurricular activities.   
The Ministry of Education insisted that universal education prevailed and that its 
education policies concerning linguistic diversity in metropolitan France and the Antilles 
remained the same.  However, in practice its decision to exclusively permit LCO 
instruction in continental France instituted a hierarchy of cultural difference.  In addition 
to stipulating that LCO classes only be held after normal school hours, the Ministry of 
Education also required the foreign governments of LCO teachers to enter into bilateral 
agreements with the French nation.71  This ensured that the Ministry of Education 
controlled not only how and the extent to which it included diversity in public education, 
but also the specific cultures and languages that entered the nation.  In the mid-1970s, the 
French government used what it perceived to be certain immigrants’ ethnic and cultural 
proximity to France to inform immigration policy and dictate who could enter the nation.  
When contrasted with the new wave of western and northern African immigrants who 
had recently settled in France, the past generations of southern and eastern European 
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immigrants appeared to be more culturally similar to French citizens, and thus more 
desirable and less threatening to national unity.72   
The Ministry of Education applied the same standards of cultural proximity to its 
education policies.  Shortly after the establishment of the LCO program, southern and 
eastern European nations entered into agreements with the Ministry of Education, 
permitting the instruction of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese.73  In contrast, the Ministry 
of Education sought to keep northern and western African languages and cultures out of 
public education, and refused to include Arabic as an official language of the LCO 
program until the early 1980s.74  Similarly, Antilleans’ culture and language was 
considered too different, and the Ministry of Education continued to uphold the ban on 
Creole throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s.  In choosing to only accept 
southern and eastern European immigrants’ languages and cultures as a part of 
afterschool programming, the Ministry of Education carved out a space, albeit limited, 
for a specific kind of diversity in public education.  Difference was not dangerous as long 
as the Ministry of Education controlled its terms and as long as it was not too dissimilar 
from French culture.  Antilleans’ Creole language and culture did not meet these criteria.  
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The Ministry of Education’s refusal to permit the use of Creole in Antillean classrooms 
secured Antilleans’ place as cultural outsiders whose difference challenged national 
integrity.  Bilingualism was a possibility for culturally similar immigrants who had 
proven their assimilability.  However, for Antilleans, bilingual education prevented 
Creole-speaking children from becoming assimilated French-speaking citizens.75   
In 1975, the Ministry of Education’s policies on immigrant and Antillean 
education diverged even further when it decided to permit LCO instruction during normal 
school hours.  In an official bulletin to the head administrators of each school district, the 
Ministry of Education announced that “certain school districts are [now] authorized to 
integrate [immigrant] language courses into the school day for three hours each week.”76  
As a part of the regular school day, immigrant children’s linguistic diversity was 
integrated into the national curriculum.  When he was the Minister of Education (July 
1972 to May 1974), Fontanet insisted that because LCO instruction was an 
extracurricular program, it did not recognize the place of diversity in the classroom and 
therefore, was not a challenge to universal education.  In 1975, the new Minister of 
Education, René Haby, was forced to explain how the new LCO program fit into 
universal education.  The Ministry of Education was unable to continue to claim that its 
policies concerning linguistic diversity in metropolitan France and the Antilles were the 
                                                
75 For education officials’ interpretation of bilingual education as detrimental to Antilleans’ acquisition of 
the French language and assimilation see: “Une interview de Madame Paulette URGIN, Inspectrice 
départementale de l’Education Nationale,” Magazine Guadeloupe 2000, June 1975, 9.  Paulette Urgin, 
“Comment améliorer le français en Guadeloupe,” 1976, 1, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 
Fontainebleau, 940381, Art. 26.  Madame Lamy, Directrice de l’Ecole Mixte de Trenelle “B” à Fort-de-
France, “Adaptation de l’enseignement du français aux enfants dont la langue maternelle est le créole, 
Rapport de synthèse, n.d., Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 800285, Art. 13.  
Also see chapter 4, especially page 61.   
76 Ministre de l’Education, Circulaire n˚75-148,  “Enseignements de langues nationales à l’intention 
d’élèves immigrés, dans le cadre du tiers temps des écoles élémentaires,”  Bulletin Officiel de l’Education 
Nationale, April 15-17, 1975, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 900671, Art. 6. 
 368 
same.  Immigrant children received instruction in their maternal languages during the 
normal school day, but Antilleans did not.   
Education interculturelle or “intercultural education” was the Ministry of 
Education’s attempt to reconcile the implementation of these differential policies while 
still adhering to the republican ideal of universal education.  Intercultural education was 
not unique to France.  It was a set of strategies, programs, and policies that recognized 
and sought to resolve the specific educational issues arising in multicultural and 
multiracial societies.77  The Ministry of Education’s decision to permit LCO instruction 
during regular school hours was a part of this new policy of intercultural education.  
However, according to Haby, intercultural education was not a move toward 
multiculturalism.  Rather, he argued that this change in the LCO program was merely a 
new and better strategy to promote immigrant children’s assimilation.   
In May 1975, the National Labor Union of Teachers in France (USNEF) wrote to 
Haby condemning his decision to permit LCO instruction during the normal school day.  
USNEF’s general secretary, Claude Teboul, claimed that the LCO program did not 
uphold the ideal of equality that defined France’s universal education.  It “formalized 
discrimination between the students attending our schools: French children and foreign 
children.”78  For the USNEF, LCO instruction highlighted immigrant children’s 
differences, widening the cultural divide between French and immigrant children.  The 
Ministry of Education refuted these claims in an official bulletin, arguing that it was 
                                                
77 For a more detailed description of intercultural education in post World War II France, see: Louis 
Porcher, The education of the children of migrant workers in Europe: Interculturalism and teacher training  
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1981). 
78 Letter from Claude Teboul, le Secrétaire Général pour le Bureau National de l’U.S.N.E.F, Union 
Syndicale National des Enseignants de France to Monsieur le Ministre de l’Education, May 21, 1975, 
Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 900671, Art. 6. 
 369 
“erroneous to think that in recognizing the specificity of the national cultures of foreign 
children, one runs the risk of estranging them from the French culture.”79  The Ministry 
of Education argued that marginalization was more of a possibility when LCO instruction 
was strictly an extracurricular program.  Before the change in policy, foreign teachers 
controlled the content of their classes, making it difficult for local and national school 
officials to oversee immigrant children’s education.  In 1975, when LCO instruction 
became a part of the national curriculum, the Ministry of Education finally possessed the 
ability to dictate the terms under which diversity was incorporated into public education.  
Haby claimed that the new policy enabled school officials to ensure that the outcome of 
LCO instruction was equality and assimilation.80  
For the Ministry of Education, the LCO program was a precarious balance 
between diversity and assimilation.  It recognized that “foreign students, who have a 
working knowledge of both languages, as well as contact with both cultures, [were] 
capable of experiencing a particularly enriching education.”81  At the same time, the 
Ministry of Education worried that the integration of difference into public classrooms 
hindered immigrant children’s assimilation.  Education officials therefore sought to 
control diversity’s place in public education by dictating which schools welcomed 
foreign teachers and LCO instruction into their institutions.  The official bulletin 
authorizing LCO classes during regular school hours stipulated that “this type of 
instruction can only be instituted in schools where the number of immigrant children 
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from the same nationality justifies it.”82  Accordingly, the Ministry of Education 
determined which schools possessed a large enough immigrant population to justify the 
creation of LCO classes, and then informed theses schools’ directors of the changes that 
were taking place in their schools.83  The Minister of Education contended that this 
stipulation limited LCO instruction to only those school districts that absolutely required 
it.  It contained the introduction of diversity into public schools, ensuring that French and 
immigrant children continued to receive the same universal education.    
Over the next two years, the Ministry of Education took even more steps to 
guarantee its control of LCO instruction.  In 1976 and 1977, Haby authorized the creation 
of several Training and Information Centers for the Education of Migrant Children 
(CEFISEM) throughout France.  These centers were branches of France’s teaching 
colleges.  They put in place the necessary administrative and institutional support for the 
Ministry of Education to dictate the content of LCO classes.  In the “Official Bulletin”, 
Haby stipulated that all “employees who intervene in the schools [with LCO programs] 
and particularly, the foreign teachers who instruct in [their] national languages” are 
required to attend workshops at CEFISEM centers.84  During these training sessions, the 
Ministry of Education explained the LCO curriculum and detailed exactly how teachers 
were to educate immigrant children about their maternal languages and cultures.85  The 
Ministry of Education created this CEFISEM bureaucracy to ensure that the LCO 
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program did not pave the way to multiculturalism.  Haby acceded to incorporating a 
limited form of diversity into public schools as long as he could closely monitor it, and as 
long as assimilation remained the most important goal of immigrant education policy.     
While Haby developed the Ministry of Education’s plan to oversee the 
incorporation of immigrants’ languages and cultures into public education, he 
nevertheless remained committed to prohibiting the use of Creole in Antillean schools.  
The Ministry of Education insisted that this divergence in policies did not constitute 
differential treatment of immigrants and Antilleans.  Rather, they were two different 
strategies that pursued the singular goal of universal education: assimilation.  The 
Ministry of Education believed that in order to achieve assimilation in both metropolitan 
France and the Antilles, it needed to implement specific policies that fit the political and 
cultural circumstances of each group and place.  In 1970s France, the Ministry of 
Education used LCO instruction to confront the immigration “problem”, which was 
purportedly the result of second-generation immigrants’ refusal to assimilate.  Their 
supposed rejection of republican ideals constituted a threat to national stability.  Social 
scientists concluded that this new generation of young immigrants was not assimilated 
because it was “between two cultures”.  These French-born children of immigrants were 
a lost generation of young people who were disconnected from their countries of origin, 
but also felt that they did not belong in France.   
The Ministry of Education conceived of the LCO program as a solution to this 
psychological issue preventing immigrant children from assimilating.  In a memo on 
LCO policy, Haby noted the “positive effects of this [LCO] instruction, of which the 
most important is, without a doubt, the removal of psychological barriers initially born 
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from a sense of belonging to another culture that is not recognized as such by the school 
system.”86  The LCO program’s “dual objective [was to] facilitate their [immigrant 
children’s] adaptation to school and to French society while avoiding cutting them off 
from their linguistic and cultural roots.”87  According to the Ministry of Education, LCO 
instruction helped immigrant children gradually adapt to French schools and was thus, 
the first step in the process of assimilation.   
In contrast, the Ministry of Education perceived of Creole as a direct challenge to 
Antilleans’ assimilation.  During the 1960s and 1970s, supporters of Antillean 
independence appropriated Creole and made it the symbol of Antilleans’ cultural 
difference.  They argued that because Antilleans possessed a distinct culture, they also 
constituted an independent nation separate from France.88  Because Creole was 
inextricably linked to the independence movement, the Ministry of Education remained 
committed to the ban on Creole.  In February 1977, the “Commission on the Teaching of 
French in the DOM-TOM” recommended that the Ministry of Education’s “efforts must 
remain focused on the acquisition of French.”89  Education officials wanted to prevent 
nationalists from interpreting the Ministry of Education’s potential acceptance of Creole 
instruction as the recognition of Antilleans’ cultural difference and thus, their political 
status as an independent nation.  The French government was struggling to politically and 
culturally unite France and the Antilles into one nation.  Antilleans were French citizens, 
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but according to DOM and Education officials, they were not culturally assimilated.  In a 
report submitted to Haby, the “Commission on the Teaching of French in the DOM-
TOM” cited the statistic that only fifty percent of Antilleans spoke Creole as proof of 
Antilleans’ failure to assimilate.90  Moreover, at a press conference in Fort-de-France, 
Haby complained that the “situation of the Creole language” persisted in the Antilles.  
Creole was “the maternal language of [Antillean] children spoken in their family, not 
French.”91 For the Ministry of Education, Antilleans’ Creole culture and language 
threatened their assimilation, which was fragile at best in the 1970s.   
The Ministry of Education refused to lift the ban on Creole because such a change 
in policy accepted the fact that despite Antilleans’ status as French citizens, they 
possessed a different language and culture.  This acknowledgement threatened the 
cultural unity of the nation and introduced the possibility of an alternative way of being 
French—one that recognized cultural differences.  LCO instruction and the recognition of 
immigrant languages and cultures did not pose a threat to national unity because 
immigrants and their families constituted a particular type of diversity that existed outside 
the nation.  In 1974, the French government banned immigration, arguing that France had 
reached its “threshold of tolerance.”  This meant that the government needed to work on 
assimilating the immigrants already settled in France before it welcomed any more into 
the nation.  Following this change in policy, the government implemented a series of 
policies designed to encourage immigrants’ repatriation.  The LCO program was a part of 
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these repatriation efforts.  In permitting “home country” governments to send teachers to 
France to instruct immigrant children in their “mother tongues”, the Ministry of 
Education hoped to prepare immigrant families for their eventual return to their countries 
of origin.  In two separate pamphlets concerning immigrant education, Haby argued that 
one of the objectives of LCO instruction was “to help [immigrant children] maintain a 
working knowledge of the maternal language and contact with the culture of origin in 
order to preserve the cultural identity of the immigrant child and to enable his eventual 
return to his country [of origin].”92  Even though it was increasingly apparent that 
immigration was in fact permanent, the Ministry of Education tried to reverse this trend.  
It clung to the idea that immigration was temporary.  Haby justified LCO instruction 
during school hours by arguing that it provided immigrants with the linguistic and 
cultural tools they needed to repatriate.  LCO classes were not about carving out a place 
for immigrants’ languages and cultures in public education.  Rather, it was a solution to 
the “immigration problem.”  In encouraging immigrants to return home, Haby argued that 
LCO instruction preserved France’s national and cultural unity.     
The Ministry of Education’s view of LCO instruction contrasted sharply with its 
perception of Creole.  Whereas LCO instruction was the solution to the “problem” of 
diversity, Creole was the problem.  In contrast to immigrants who remained outside of the 
nation as cultural others who would eventually return to their homelands, Antilleans were 
French citizens.  This meant that the inclusion of their cultural and linguistic differences 
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in public education challenged the policy of assimilation requiring Antilleans to give up 
all of their group and particular affiliations in favor of French citizenship.  For the time 
being, the only way to achieve assimilation in the Antilles was to ensure that Creole 
remained excluded from public schools and outside of the nation. 
 
Part III.  Creole Challenges to Republican Education: the “Right to Difference” and 
the “Creole Bomb” 
 In the late 1970s, the Ministry of Education remained publicly committed to 
enforcing the ban on Creole, and upholding its assimilation policy.  Yet, in private, it 
entertained the idea of implementing a trial program to determine how Creole’s presence 
in schools affected Antillean children’s academic success and their assimilation.  In 
November 1978 and January 1979, the newly appointed Minister of Education, Christian 
Beullac, and the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Education, Jacques Pelletier, made 
official visits to Martinique and Guadeloupe in order to assess the present state of 
education in the islands.  In a memo regarding these visits, Beullac noted that despite the 
ban on Creole, Antillean children remained academically behind their French peers due 
to “the [persistent] use of Creole by the students, and often by the teachers.”93  The 
dismal state of Antillean education in the late 1970s forced Beullac to realize that the 
Creole ban had not facilitated improvements in Antillean children’s French literacy. 
Because of this, Beullac decided that the Ministry of Education needed to develop a new 
strategy to solve the “problem” of Antillean education and assimilation.   
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Creole as a Solution to the “Problem” of Antillean Education 
 The Ministry of Education turned to the work of J. Oliel, a teacher of French 
descent who drew upon his experiences in a middle-school in Pointe-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe 
to develop a new pedagogical method for teaching French to Antillean children.  In his 
published study, “Teaching French in Creole-speaking Regions”, Oliel challenged the 
Ministry of Education to adapt the curriculum in Guadeloupe and Martinique so that it 
took into account the unique linguistic situation in the islands.  Despite French’s status as 
the national language, Creole remained Antilleans’ maternal language.  He argued that in 
requiring teachers to use the same methods to teach French in both metropolitan France 
and the Antilles, the Ministry of Education ignored how Creole affected the manner in 
which Antillean children learned French.94    
 According to Oliel, it was impractical to expect non-native French speakers to 
learn French in the same way as native French speakers:  “Our difficulties come when we 
try to teach French to Creole-speakers using the methods and manuals that were 
conceived for French-speakers.”95  Oliel contended the Antillean children did not 
properly speak and write French because of the Ministry of Education’s refusal to accept 
the fact that Antillean children required a different curriculum tailored to their specific 
linguistic needs.  Oliel warned the Ministry of Education that Antillean children’s 
academic failures had much more serious social and economic implications.  In order to 
“succeed professionally, [and] socially, it is necessary [for Antilleans] to obtain diplomas, 
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[or] in other words, demonstrate that one can correctly express himself in French.”96  
Oliel claimed that Antillean children who failed to learn French remained “maladjusted” 
into adulthood, contributing to the already fragile social and economic state of the 
Antilles.    
 Oliel insisted that bilingualism was the answer to the Antilles’ social and 
economic problems.  He argued that instead of banning Creole and privileging French, 
educators needed to “imagine their coexistence”.97  According to Oliel, Creole was a 
“pedagogical tool” that helped Antillean children master the French language and achieve 
their full educational potential.  The Creole ban created linguistic confusion for Antillean 
children who were unable to distinguish between the Creole and French languages.  Most 
Antillean children spoke what Oliel referred to as a “degraded” form of French 
containing many “Creolisms” or Creole words and grammatical structures.98  Because of 
this, Oliel claimed that Antillean children failed to comprehend correctly spoken and 
written French, a necessity for academic success.  Oliel contended that a policy of 
bilingualism enabled Antillean children to differentiate between the two languages, 
ensuring that they spoke and understood proper French as it was spoken across the 
Atlantic in metropolitan France.  In other words, for Oliel, bilingualism facilitated 
assimilation.       
 Oliel was not the first educator to suggest that lifting the ban on Creole was 
essential for improving Antillean education.  As discussed in chapter 4, Lauriette began 
to argue for the introduction of Creole into Antillean public schools more than thirty 
years before the publication of Oliel’s study.  The only difference between their two 
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pedagogies was that Lauriette viewed Creole as much more than a pedagogical tool that 
aided in Antilleans’ assimilation.  For Lauriette, Creole was a symbol of Antilleans’ 
cultural difference, as well as their right to political autonomy.99  Oliel’s bilingual 
pedagogy was a response to Lauriette’s more subversive appropriation of Creole.  During 
a time of uncertainty when the Ministry of the DOM was trying to secure the Antilles’ 
political and cultural union to France, the Ministry of Education was intrigued by Oliel’s 
argument that ending the Creole ban facilitated Antilleans’ assimilation.   It saw in his 
work an opportunity to appease Antillean activists’ calls for cultural recognition while 
still enforcing its policy of assimilation, and ensuring that the Antilles remained a part of 
France.      
 On September 26, 1979, Paul Dijoud, the Secretary of State for the DOM-TOM, 
held a press conference concerning the tenuous state of the Antilles’ political and cultural 
relationship with France.  In his statement to the press, he claimed that the current 
economic and social instability in Guadeloupe and Martinique was not the main catalyst 
of the Antillean independence movement.  Rather, Dijoud argued that the growing desire 
of a new generation of Antilleans to develop a separate nation from France was the result 
of the lack of cultural understanding between metropolitans and Antilleans.100  According 
to Dijoud, this “cultural problem” stemmed from France’s commitment to an outdated 
policy, which sought to “assimilate and align the behavior, approaches and thoughts of its 
compatriots [Antilleans] with those of its metropolitans.”101  The intent of this policy of 
assimilation was to bring Antilleans into a closer cultural and political union with France.  
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However, Dijoud claimed that in practice, it created resentment among younger 
Antilleans who wanted to rediscover their Creole identities, and felt as if DOM officials 
were denying them their right to express their cultural difference.  
 Dijoud contended that the only way to solve this “cultural problem” was to 
modify the assimilation policy.  The Ministry of DOM needed to “make our compatriots 
feel that we [the government] do not seek to deny them their difference, but rather [we 
want] to enhance it.”102  Dijoud believed that the “recognition of these [Antilleans’] 
difference” helped young Antilleans understand that their Creole culture and language 
were not a justification for their political independence.  Rather, there was a place for 
their difference within the French nation.  Dijoud insisted that the inclusion of Creole 
enabled young Guadeloupeans and Martinicans to “reconcile themselves” to their two 
identities so that they “[felt] proud to be French, in the same way, that they [were] proud 
to be carriers of the Creole culture.”103  In order to keep Guadeloupe and Martinique 
politically linked to France, Dijoud argued that the Ministry of the DOM needed to stop 
denying Antilleans their Creole identity, and ensure that Antilleans were culturally 
included in nation.    
 Oliel’s bilingual pedagogy and Dijoud’s suggestions, combined with Antilleans’ 
growing demands for cultural and political autonomy, compelled the Ministry of 
Education to consider the political advantages of ending the ban on Creole.  It started to 
believe that the recognition of Creole as a pedagogical tool had the potential to fulfill 
Creole activists’ demands while also solidifying the cultural union between France and 
the Antilles.  Yet, the Ministry of Education also wanted to be reassured that assimilation 
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and the acquisition of French remained the primary goal of public education in the 
Antilles.  In November 1979, the Ministry of Education sent Maurice Zinovieff, the 
Secretary General of the High Commission of the French Language, to the Antilles to 
investigate how lifting the Creole ban affected the status of French in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  In his report, Zinovieff confirmed Oliel’s belief that Creole needed to be 
used as a pedagogical tool to solve the dismal state of French literacy in the Antilles.  He 
recommended that the Ministry of Education “recognize Antillean cultural specificity, 
with particular attention paid to Creole”, especially since it [Creole] was “likely to 
become a language tool for learning French among the youngest [Antilleans].”104   
 One year after Zinovieff’s trip to the Antilles, the Ministry of the DOM held an 
inter-ministry meeting during which it established an official committee to oversee the 
process of integrating Creole into Antillean classrooms.105  This committee recommended 
“a policy statement showing the Government’s recognition of Creole” as a part of 
Antilleans’ “linguistic and cultural heritage.”106  In 1980, the Ministries of DOM and 
Education privately agreed to recognize Creole’s place in public education, granting 
Antillean children the right to learn about the Creole language and culture in public 
schools.  Yet, the terms of this policy and who controlled its implementation were 
unclear.  In the early 1980s, DOM and education officials found themselves in a political 
struggle with Antillean activists for control of Creole’s incorporation into public 
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education.  In these debates about Creole’s status and place in the classroom and the 
nation, Antilleans shaped the meaning of difference in France.    
 
Creole and the Meaning of the “Right to Difference” in Antillean Public Schools 
 
 In May 1981, François Mitterrand became the president of France, placing the 
Left in control of the government for the first time in over two decades.  Shortly after his 
election, Mitterrand decentralized the government, granting regional officials more 
control over local affairs.  Along with decentralization, Mitterrand reframed the 
longstanding policy of assimilation, arguing that French citizens possessed the “right to 
difference.”  The government officially acknowledged the nation’s distinct cultural 
groups, and their right to possess and express their cultural differences.  These two 
policies—decentralization and the right to difference—were potentially transformative 
for public education in the Antilles.  They provided the Ministry of Education with an 
official policy to justify an end to the Creole ban and the implementation of a 
regionalized curriculum based on Antilleans’ linguistic and cultural particularities.   
 Shortly after being elected president, Mitterrand chose Alain Savary to replace 
Beullac as the Minister of Education.  Like Mitterrand, Savary was a member of the 
Socialist party and a supporter of the right to difference.  For Savary, the introduction of 
Creole into Antillean classrooms as a “pedagogical tool” was the fulfillment of the “right 
to difference”.  It recognized that Antilleans’ possessed a distinct language, and that this 
reality needed to be taken into account when teaching French to Antillean children.107  
However, certain Antillean activists and teachers did not agree with the Ministry of 
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Education’s interpretation of the “right to difference” and its vision for introducing 
Creole into Antillean classrooms.  For them, the “right to difference” meant that 
educators taught and used Creole in Antilleans schools as a language in its own right.  
This group of Antillean activists argued that the Ministry of Education’s construction of 
Creole as a “pedagogical tool” was a distortion of the true meaning of the “right to 
difference”; it was just another attempt by the government to control Antilleans’ 
difference and facilitate their assimilation. 
 Jakata, a pro-independence Guadeloupean newspaper, denounced the Ministry of 
Education’s support of Oliel’s bilingual pedagogy as a political strategy to weaken the 
Antillean nationalist movement.  Jakata characterized Oliel was a “foreigner” with a 
“colonial mentality.”108  According to Jakata, the only reason Oliel supported the use of 
Creole in Antillean classrooms was because he believed it facilitated Antillean children’s 
acquisition of the French language.  Jakata argued that Oliel’s intentions were clear: he 
wanted to make Creole yet another tool of assimilation.  Moreover, Jakata refuted Oliel’s 
conception of Creole as the cause of the Antilles’ social and economic problems, insisting 
that the islands’ difficulties stemmed from the French government’s control of education 
and its insistence that Creole was merely a “technical instrument” for learning French.  
Jakata claimed that the only way for Antilleans to reclaim control of education and 
Creole, was to sever their islands’ political ties with France and become independent 
nations.  Creole belonged to Antilleans and therefore, only Antilleans possessed the right 
to “appropriate the elements of their culture” and “truly defend it.”109  For nationalist 
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groups like those represented by Jakata, the right to difference meant political and 
cultural independence.   
 Jakata was by no means representative of the dominant political opinion among 
Antilleans, but for the French government, it was potentially the most subversive.  Like 
Antillean nationalists, moderate Creole activists were also wary of the political reasons 
behind what appeared to be the Ministry of Education’s sudden interest in Creole’s role 
in Antillean education.  Yet, unlike nationalists, they did not want to give up their French 
citizenship; they strove to claim and achieve recognition of their Creole identity while 
working within the confines of the nation.  These activists saw the move toward the 
“right to difference” in the early 1980s as an opportunity to work with the Ministries of 
DOM and Education to shape the meaning of diversity in France and the incorporation of 
Antilleans’ Creole culture and language into the nation.   
 Hector Poullet was one of the most prominent members of this group of Creole 
activists.  Poullet came from a middle-class and educated Guadeloupean family.  
According to him, he grew up believing that France was the generous motherland who 
granted Antillean slaves their freedom and rights.  He believed in the legitimacy of 
France’s presence in the Antilles, and that he was as much a French citizen as those 
metropolitans who lived on the other side of the Atlantic.  When he migrated to France to 
pursue his studies in 1957, Poullet claimed that like all Antilleans of his generation, he 
experienced the “psychological shock” of realizing that he was not French.  In Paris, 
Poullet confronted racism and discrimination and learned that metropolitans viewed him 
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as a foreigner and immigrant, not a fellow French citizen.  This experience radicalized 
Poullet, driving him to become a supporter of the Antillean independence movement.110   
 In 1968, eleven years after leaving the Antilles, Poullet returned to Guadeloupe 
where he underwent another political transformation.  Faced with what he described as 
“the Guadeloupean reality” of a “country that is not politicized and not prepared to 
realize the ideal” of Antillean nationalism, Poullet began to question the viability of 
“immediate independence” for Guadeloupe and Martinique.111  While searching for a 
different political answer to the Antilles’ social and economic problems, Poullet met 
Gérard Lauriette.  Poullet quickly became a student and supporter of Lauriette’s Creole 
pedagogy; he shared Lauriette’s belief that Antilleans’ cultural and linguistic differences 
needed to be included in the French national curriculum.  Together, Lauriette and Poullet 
challenged the Ministry of Education to end the ban on Creole, arguing that Antillean 
children possessed the right to learn about their Creole culture and language in public 
schools.  For two years, Poullet taught math at Lauriette’s private school for Antillean 
children who had failed out of the public education system.  The school encouraged 
teachers’ use of Creole in the classroom, and students learned to read and write in Creole.  
While working at Lauriette’s school, Poullet saw firsthand Creole’s positive effects on 
Antillean children’s academic success.  He became convinced that Creole needed to have 
place in Antillean education.112   
 In 1976, Poullet implemented Lauriette’s Creole pedagogy in one of 
Guadeloupe’s public school.  At a middle school in Capesterre, Poullet teamed up with 
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three other teachers, Danièle Montbrand, Moïse Sorèze, and Sylviane Telchid, to create a 
curriculum for introducing Creole into Antillean classrooms.  Together, the three teachers 
conducted Creole workshops on Wednesday afternoons when school was not in session.  
They purposefully avoided making Creole a part of the regular school day because they 
did not want the Ministry of Education to perceive of their workshops as a challenge to 
the Creole ban.  At the time, Poullet and his colleagues were more interested in 
developing a useful pedagogy for teaching Antillean children how to read and write 
Creole.  They wished to avoid making their afterschool Creole program a political 
struggle between Antillean educators and the Ministry of Education.113  The Ministry of 
Education was also sensitive to the potential political implications of these Creole 
workshops.  It therefore chose to ignore them.  The Ministry of Education realized that a 
forceful demand to end the Creole workshops might agitate Antillean nationalists.  
Antillean independence was a real fear for the Ministry of Education, and it wanted to 
avoid giving its supporters a platform at all costs.114   
 From 1976 to 1980, Poullet developed his Creole pedagogy relatively freely 
without interference from the Ministry of Education.  In their weekly Wednesday 
afternoon classes, Poullet and his colleagues refined their methods for teaching Antillean 
children how to read and write in Creole.  In 1980, these workshops culminated with the 
publication of a Creole teaching manual, which served as a pedagogical guide for 
Antillean teachers.  In addition, the manual presented the politics of Poullet’s Creole 
pedagogy, and explained why Antilleans needed to learn Creole.  During their Creole 
workshops, Poullet and his colleagues discovered with their students that Creole could be 
                                                
113 See: Interview with Hector Poullet, published in Bebel-Gisler, Les enfants de la Guadeloupe, 131-132; 
Interview with Hector Poullet, published in Le Journal Guadeloupéen (JOUGWA), June 1982, 40.   
114 See: Schnepel, In Search of National Identity, 117-121. 
 386 
written, and was therefore, a language with its own vocabulary and grammar.  Poullet 
believed that the Ministry of Education’s repression of Creole taught him and other 
Antillean children to despise their maternal language and culture.  In the preface to his 
teaching manual, Poullet noted, “it is the negation of Creole that has led to the failures 
that we know [in Antillean society].”115  He argued that “the recognition of its [Creole’s] 
existence” in his afterschool workshops has “helped our students to get rid of their firmly 
rooted language complex, and little by little [has] removed their feelings of guilt” about 
their Creole identity.116  According to Poullet, his Creole pedagogy fought the French 
government’s degradation of Creole and inspired Antilleans to value their identity as 
Creole-speakers.  He insisted that Antilleans did not have to assimilate; they could remain 
connected to their Creole culture while also embracing their French citizenship.117  
 Poullet’s Creole pedagogy challenged the Ministry of Education’s vision for 
introducing Creole in Antillean classrooms.  For the Ministry of Education, “the right to 
difference” was about recognizing how Antilleans’ cultural particularities affected their 
assimilation.  It conceived of Creole as a “pedagogical tool” for improving French 
literacy.  In contrast, for Poullet, Antilleans’ cultural differences were not a hindrance to 
Antilleans’ assimilation.  He wanted Antilleans’ Creole culture and language to be a part 
of the French nation, and a part of their identity as French citizens.  Poullet argued for the 
introduction of Creole into schools as a language and culture in its own right.  In two 
separate interviews appearing in the Guadeloupean press, he explained that his pedagogy 
“was not about using Creole to learn French in order to ensure that Creole was 
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abandoned.”118  It was about “teaching them [Antillean children] to read and write Creole 
so that they reconciled themselves with the language” and learned to value their Creole 
identity.119  Poullet insisted that Creole was not simply a steppingstone to the more 
advanced and valued French language.  Creole was equal to French; it was a literary 
language that deserved serious academic study alongside French.  In calling for the 
coexistence of Creole and French in Antillean classrooms, Poullet challenged the 
Ministry of Education to reevaluate its assimilation policy and recognize Antilleans as 
both Creole and French.  
 This debate concerning Creole’s place in Antillean classrooms and the French 
nation came to head in the early 1980s as both Antilleans and the Ministry of Education 
sought to control Creole’s role in public education.  While Poullet and his colleagues 
developed their pedagogy, the Ministries of Education and DOM considered the political 
benefits of recognizing Antilleans’ Creole language and culture.  In a note dated 
November 26, 1980, the Ministry of DOM argued that its impending decision to lift the 
ban on Creole was a political strategy to retain its authority over the Antilles and the 
Creole question.  According to the Ministry of DOM, the ban on Creole radicalized a 
generation of young Antilleans who “found revenge in the exacerbation of certain 
revolts” against the French government.120  In 1978, two nationalist political parties 
emerged in the Antilles: the Martinican Independence Movement (MIM) and the Popular 
Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG).   Both groups argued for national 
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liberation from France and sought to rally Antillean voters around their political platform 
of independence.  Because of the purportedly growing popularity of these nationalist 
parties, DOM officials contended that “it may be time to solve a tense situation in several 
places with a political decision and legal act.”121  By the end 1980, the Ministry of the 
DOM was seriously considering the “legal act” of ending the ban on Creole.  For DOM 
officials, this was a “political decision” necessitated by Antilleans’ growing 
discontentment with the French government and its assimilation policy. 
 In 1981, the Ministries of the DOM and Education began to develop its plan for 
legally recognizing Creole as a regional language and culture of France.  On January 7, 
1981, the Ministry of the DOM suggested that the Ministry of Education form a “think 
tank” in Guadeloupe and Martinique to discuss and determine “the respective places of 
French and Creole in education.”122  In a note concerning the think tank’s goals, the 
Ministry of the DOM revealed that its “support for the Creole issue (language and 
culture)…was planned to meet the aspirations for cultural identity manifested by the 
young generations.”123  At the end of the year, in December 1981, Henri Emmanuelli, the 
Minister of the DOM, formally requested that the Ministry of Education implement pilot 
programs in the Antilles to slowly introduce Creole into the curriculum.  Although 
Emmanuelli noted that his decision to end the ban on Creole was to “meet [Antilleans’] 
demands for cultural identity”, he stipulated that the recognition of Creole and 
Antilleans’ “right to difference” was meant to promote Antillean children’s acquisition of 
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the French language.  Emmanuelli suggested that “teachers and researchers working in 
educational reform conduct experimental programs introducing Creole during the early 
stages of education (preschool, kindergarten, first grade), followed by a gradual transition 
to learning French.”124  For Emmanuelli, Antillean children’s immersion in the French 
language resulted in linguistic confusion, impeding their ability to distinguish between 
French and Creole.  He supported the use of Creole in early elementary education as a 
pedagogical strategy for improving Antillean children’s French language skills.  
Therefore, his decision to recognize Antilleans’ distinct Creole language and culture was 
not about acknowledging Antilleans’ “right to difference” as envisioned by Poullet and 
his colleagues.  Rather, it was a political strategy designed to appease nationalists’ 
cultural claims for independence while simultaneously promoting Antilleans’ 
assimilation of the French language and culture.   
 Poullet and his colleagues were worried that Emmanuelli’s support for pilot 
Creole programs was just another one of the government’s attempt to solidify French 
officials’ control of Antillean education and ensure that Creole remained a secondary 
language behind French.  They therefore became much more vocal and forceful in their 
insistence that Creole be introduced into Antillean classrooms as a language of academic 
study.  In a December 1981 interview, Poullet explained that the time had come for him 
and other Antillean educators to “take control of our linguistic destiny.”125  In an attempt 
to preempt what they perceived to be the Ministry of Education’s cooptation of their 
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movement to introduce Creole into Antillean schools, Poullet and his colleagues sought 
official recognition of their Creole pedagogy.  Prior to the opening of the 1981-1982 
school year, Poullet, Sorèze, and Telchid met with the principal of Capesterre’s middle 
school to discuss the possibility of implementing a Creole language program as a 
supplement to the students’ French classes.  The principal, a naturalized French citizen of 
Polish background, was supportive of their idea.  From 1981 to 1982, Poullet and his 
colleagues taught Creole alongside French, highlighting Creole’s status as a valuable 
literary and academic language.   At the end of the school year, the three teachers agreed 
that their program had achieved this goal.  They reported a greater openness among their 
students in expressing themselves in Creole.  For Poullet, Sorèze, and Telchid, their 
students’ acceptance of Creole indicated that young Antilleans were learning to value and 
be proud of their Creole language and culture.  For the following school year, Poullet 
recommended that the teaching of Creole be separated from French instruction so that the 
study of Creole was a discipline in its own right.126    
 Encouraged by the apparent success of Poullet’s Creole pedagogy, in May 1982, 
Capesterre’s principal wrote to Savary, hoping to gain the Ministry of Education’s 
official recognition of his school’s “Creole experiment.”127  Although the Ministry of 
Education was internally debating the possibility of introducing Creole into Antilleans 
schools as a “pedagogical tool”, Poullet’s Creole pedagogy was not what officials had in 
mind.  Savary did not approve of elevating Creole to the same level as French.  In a 
February 1982 report on the Ministry of Education’s suggestions for introducing Creole 
into Antillean classrooms, Savary justified “the limited use of Creole in schools” by 
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arguing that Antilleans did not possess a distinct Creole identity.128  He contended that 
the Creole language and culture were merely “a part of the overall [French] national 
patrimony.”129  In claiming Creole as a part of French national culture, Savary adhered to 
the policy of assimilation requiring Antilleans to give up their cultural distinctiveness in 
favor of French citizenship.  This contrasted sharply with Poullet’s Creole pedagogy, 
which insisted that Antilleans’ possessed the right to express and preserve their separate 
cultural identity.  Poullet wanted Antillean children to learn French and Creole alongside 
each other, reflecting their French and Creole identities.   
 Because of the political implications of lifting the ban on Creole, Savary and the 
Ministry of Education continued to theoretically support the limited use of Creole in 
Antillean classrooms while avoiding any legal recognition of the Creole language and 
culture.  On June 21, 1982, a new ministerial directive authorized the teaching of 
France’s regional languages and cultures.  Savary mapped out a comprehensive plan to 
introduce regional languages progressively into schools at the nursery, primary and 
secondary levels.  However, he intentionally ignored the Creole question.  In a note 
further explaining the directive, Savary noted that “at no point does this circular mention 
the DOM” and insisted that the directive only applied to “the five languages already 
legally recognized”, including Breton, Basque, Catalan, Occitan, and Corsican.130  He 
acknowledged that the directive “was bound to disappoint many peoples in the overseas 
departments…considering the numerous steps taken by the Ministry of Education aimed 
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at upgrading the status of Creoles.”131  Nonetheless, Savary and Emmanuelli worried that 
the Creole question was too politicized for the Ministry of Education to officially 
recognize Creole as a regional language of France.  In October 1982, the directors of 
education for the overseas departments met with Savary and Emmanuelli to discuss the 
possibility of extending the June 1982 directive to Guadeloupe and Martinique.  The 
islands’ education officials recommended that the Ministry of Education recognize 
Creole as a regional language of France and slowly introduce Creole into the curriculum.  
Yet, in a letter to Savary, Emmanuelli noted that “the Creole question is often distorted 
by partisan considerations.”132  The Ministries of Education and the DOM therefore put 
off legally recognizing Creole as a regional language of France.  Savary and Emmanuelli 
did not want to antagonize Antillean nationalist groups who considered Creole a national 
language and not one of France’s regional languages.      
 Despite the ambiguity concerning the June 1982 circular’s applicability to the 
Antilles, Poullet and his colleagues forged ahead with their “Creole experiment”.  With 
the support of their school’s principal, Poullet, Sorèze, and Telchid continued to teach 
their students how to read and write Creole during the 1982-83 school year.  Poullet and 
his colleagues viewed their decision to teach unauthorized Creole language classes as a 
challenge to the Ministry of Education’s authority and control of education in the 
Antilles.  The instructors referred to themselves as nèg mawon (maroons in Creole).  In 
doing so, they compared themselves to runaway slaves who had formed independent 
                                                
131 Ministre de l’Education Nationale, “Prise en compte de la culture et de la langue créoles dans 
l’enseignement,” February 1982, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940381, Art. 
26.     
132 Letter from Le Secrétaire d’Etat auprès du Ministre d’Etat, Ministre de l’Intérieur et de la 
Décenralisation chargé des Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer to Monsieur le Ministre de 
l’Education Nationale, “Objet: Mise au point d’une circulaire Ministérielle relative aux langues locales des 
DOM et TOM,” February 23, 1982, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940381, 
Art. 17.   
 393 
settlements in the hills of Guadeloupe during the period of French colonial control.  Their 
self-identification as “maroons” symbolized their renegade status in the French national 
education system while conjuring up images of rebellious behavior and resistance to 
domination.  For Poullet and his colleagues, their struggle to gain official recognition of 
Antilleans’ Creole language and culture was a continuation of the slaves’ fight to liberate 
themselves from the control of their French owners and the colonial government that had 
set in place the system of slavery.133     
 Poullet and his colleagues’ open defiance was particularly concerning for the 
Ministry of Education because of the political reputation of the town in which they 
decided to implement their Creole pedagogy.  Since the 1960s, Capesterre was known as 
a community that attracted pro-independence sympathizers.  In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, a number of nationalists and former members of GONG (Group for the National 
Organization of Guadeloupe) taught in the local secondary schools.  Moreover, Poullet, 
Telchid, and Sorèze were members of SGEG (General Union of Education in 
Guadeloupe), a nationalist teachers’ union.  The SGEG publicly opposed French cultural 
and political domination and supported an alternative educational model that recognized 
Antilleans’ cultural specificity.  Language was critical for the SGEG; the introduction of 
Creole into Antillean classrooms was the union’s chief political demand.  In order to 
achieve this, SGEG’s members, the majority of whom were teachers, needed to be 
educated in the Creole script and its nationalist ideology.  In the early 1980s, the union’s 
leadership worked to establish a Creole pedagogy, such as the one created by Poullet and 
                                                
133 Schnepel, In Search of National Identity.  See especially chapter 5 entitled “Conflict in Capesterre 
School,” 121-124. 
 394 
his colleagues, to educate Antillean children about their cultural particularities and raise 
national consciousness among the masses.134   
 Because of Capesterre’s anti-France reputation and Poullet and his colleagues’’ 
nationalist affiliations, by the end of the 1982-83 school year, the Ministries of Education 
and the DOM viewed the “Creole experiment” in Capesterre as a political challenge to 
departmentalization with the potential to instigate a full-fledged independence movement.  
Savary and Emmanuelli were concerned that Poullet’s language classes were promoting a 
nationalist agenda privileging Antilleans’ Creole identity above their French citizenship.  
The possibility of a bourgeoning movement for national independence in Capesterre was 
of particular concern because it was the third most populated municipality in 
Guadeloupe.  Savary and Emmanuelli feared that Capesterre’s numerous voters had the 
ability to elect pro-independence representatives to challenge not only the French 
government’s control of education, but also the political union between France and the 
Antilles.  In order to maintain France’s political authority in the Antilles, the Ministries of 
Education and the DOM decided that it needed to regain control of Creole and its place in 
Antillean schools.  In a note on the Creole question, Emmanuelli argued for the 
“preparation of a decree declaring the Creoles [of the Antilles] regional languages.”  He 
encouraged the Ministry of Education to take the necessary administrative steps to 
prepare for the “optional teaching of these languages [Creole] at all levels” during the 
1983-84 school year.135  Emmanuelli explained that it was “desirable for the Government 
to take into account these incremental and progressive proposals before the [Antillean] 
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people’s wishes transform themselves, in the near future into very passionate and entirely 
politicized demands.”136 
 
The Ministry of Education’s Cooptation of the Creole Question 
 
 On May 22, 1983, at the Fourth International Creole Studies Conference in 
Lafayette, Louisiana, the highest representative of the French Ministry of Education in 
the Antilles, Xavier Orville, made a surprise announcement.  He officially lifted the ban 
on Creole and recognized Creole as a regional language of France.  The text of this 
declaration or the “Creole bomb” as it was satirically referred to in the Antillean press, 
was a strategic political move by the French government.137  On the surface, the 
document acknowledged Antilleans’ Creole identity.  It claimed that “the purpose of 
teaching Creole and Antillean culture was to insert the school in its specific regional 
context and to work…to respect the cultural identity of each [individual].”138  However, a 
closer examination of the Louisiana declaration revealed that the Ministry of Education 
was more interested in separating the Creole question from the nationalist movement than 
in recognizing Antilleans’ right to difference.  One month after Orville’s announcement, 
the Ministries of Education and the DOM held a meeting to discuss the political 
implications of ending the ban on Creole, as well as how the process of including Creole 
was to take place.  The official note on this meeting described the decision to make 
Creole a regional language as “necessary…when considering the risks of local 
                                                
136 Ministère des Départements et Territories d’Outre-Mer, “Vers les Créoles: Lanuges Régionales”, n.d., 
Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 940388, Art. 15.  
137 Schnepel, In Search of National Identity, 125-126. 
138 Declaration of Xavier Orville’s on May 22, 1983 at the opening of the Fourth International Conference 
of Creole Studies in Lafayette, Louisiana.  Reprinted in Antilla, June 2-9, 1983, 38.   
 396 
susceptibilities” to political arguments.139  Moreover, education and DOM officials in 
attendance at the meeting insisted that the introduction of the Creole language and culture 
had to be “gradual” and “cautious” in order to “firmly maintain French as the language” 
of the Antilles.140    
 While the Louisiana declaration clearly established Creole as a regional language 
of France, it did little to resolve the ambiguity surrounding Creole’s place in Antillean 
classrooms.  The Ministry of Education did not outline any specific directives to 
implement Creole language instruction.  The classes were optional and supplemental.  
This meant that each school district and its staff of teachers determined how and if Creole 
was offered as a part of the local curriculum.  Organizational barriers within the Antillean 
educational system also made the implementation of the Louisiana declaration 
particularly challenging.  For example, there was no formal program in the teachers’ 
colleges to instruct future educators on how to integrate Creole into their classrooms.   
Furthermore, the Ministry of Education did not set in place a process for codifying 
Creole.  This meant that multiple forms of Creole were introduced into Antillean 
classrooms.  Local teachers and educational officials in Guadeloupe and Martinique 
clashed over which Creole orthography to use.  The debate concerning Creole’s status as 
a “pedagogical tool” for learning French or as a language of study in its own right also 
continued to divide Antillean educators.  In not articulating the specific policies for 
implementing the Louisiana declaration, the Ministry of Education made Creole’s status 
even more ambiguous and contentious.  In this way, the Ministry of Education effectively 
                                                
139 “Note. Objet: réunion du 23 jeudi 23 juin sur le IVème colloque international des etudes créoles 
(Lafayette, 22-28 mai 1983),” July 20, 1983, Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 
940381, Art. 27. 
140 Ibid. 
 397 
diminished Creole’s symbolism as the unifying force of the Antillean people while 
simultaneously making the Creole question subject to state control.141   
 
Conclusion 
 
 For the Ministry of Education, cultural diversity played a distinct role in France’s 
metropolitan and overseas departments.  As early as 1970, the Ministry of Education 
recognized immigrants’ cultural and linguistic particularities when it implemented 
“transition” classes for children of immigrants in metropolitan France.  In 1973, the 
Ministry of Education reformed its immigrant education policy even further when it 
invited foreign teachers from southern and eastern Europe to come to France and instruct 
immigrant children in their languages and cultures of origin.  Two years later, in 1975, 
the Ministry of Education made these LCO programs a part of the normal school day.  
According to the Ministry of Education, these policies did not include immigrants’ 
cultural specificities in the national curriculum.  Rather, they facilitated immigrant 
children’s adaptation to the French school system and their acquisition of the French 
language.  The Ministry of Education argued that it employed these policies to promote 
immigrant children’s assimilation.   
 Across the Atlantic, in its overseas departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique, 
the Ministry of Education was equally concerned with Antilleans’ assimilation into the 
French nation.  However, until May 1983, it banned Antilleans’ Creole culture and 
language from public education and refused to recognize the pedagogical benefits of 
introducing Creole into Antillean classrooms.  Although the Ministry of Education 
acknowledged the potential of LCO instruction to ease immigrants’ transition into French 
                                                
141 Schnepel, In Search of National Identity, 123-129. 
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society, it viewed the Creole question as a divisive issue that threatened the Antilles’ 
political and cultural union with France.   
 This divergence in education policy was largely due to immigrants’ and 
Antilleans’ different political statuses.  In the 1970s, the French government conceived of 
immigration as temporary and actively supported immigrants’ repatriation.  Because 
French officials believed that immigrants and their families would eventually return to 
their homelands, their languages and cultures did not threaten national unity.  
Immigrants’ cultural specificities remained outside of the nation.  In contrast, Antilleans 
were French citizens; they were a part of the French nation.  Therefore, their attachment 
to their Creole identity challenged France’s cultural integrity.  The Ministry of Education 
only decided to end the Creole ban and recognize Antilleans’ cultural specificities when 
it appeared politically advantageous.  It justified the Louisiana declaration by arguing that 
this change in policy wrested Creole from the hands of pro-independence activists.  In 
recognizing Creole as a regional language of France, the Ministry of Education hoped to 
neutralize Creole’s challenge to republican assimilation as a symbol of cultural difference 
and national liberation.   
 Historians have argued that republican assimilation was either entirely 
inclusionary or exclusionary.  However, the Ministry of Education’s differential policies 
concerning immigrant and Antillean education reveal that republican assimilation was 
simultaneously inclusionary and exclusionary.  Although republican discourse 
stigmatized the recognition of difference in the public sphere, in practice the Ministry of 
Education took into account the cultural and linguistic particularities of immigrants and 
Antilleans when implementing its respective policies for each group.  For the Ministry of 
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Education, the recognition of cultural difference potentially appeased Antilleans’ political 
claims and promoted assimilation.  In contrast, Creole activists, such as Poullet, viewed 
the inclusion of Creole in Antillean classrooms as an expression of Antilleans’ distinct 
Creole identity.  Therefore, the introduction of Creole into Antillean classrooms was 
neither an inclusionary nor an exclusionary policy.  The inclusion of diversity in 
metropolitan and Antillean classrooms was a series of negotiations in which the Ministry 
of Education sought to include Creole in public education as a way to exclude the more 
radical constructions of Creole as a symbol of Antilleans’ separate national identity.  The 
Ministry of Education and Antillean activists used existing policies concerning 
immigrants’ cultural specificities, as well as regional languages and cultures to navigate 
Creole’s place in public education and the French nation.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
“On sèl pèp, on sèl chimen”:  The Pan-Creole Movement, 1959-1989 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 On May 20, 1979 at the Second International Creole Studies Conference, Jacques 
Hodoul, the Minister of Education and Culture for the newly independent Seychelles, 
articulated the existence of a Creole-based cultural identity.  “We are here to proclaim the 
existence of a language and to witness our solidarity with the peoples who speak 
it.…Torn from everywhere, from all horizons of the planet, we have searched for a 
common way of expressing ourselves.  That is how the creole language has sprung forth, 
the symbol of a people who refuse to be silenced.”1  As of one of the leaders of a young 
revolutionary republic, Hodoul seized the opportunity to link the conference with the 
struggle for linguistic and cultural recognition of Creole-speaking peoples across the 
globe.  In his opening address to conference participants, Hodoul made it clear that 
Creole was not merely an object of scientific analysis and intellectual study; it was also a 
shared cultural identity.  Creole languages were formed in the colonial context, resulting 
in a social hierarchy that elevated the colonizer’s languages and subordinated the 
colonized’s Creoles.  In characterizing Creole languages and cultures as inferior to those 
of Europe, the colonizers sought to keep Creole-speakers under their control.  According 
                                                
1 Jacques Hodoul, “Allocution” at CIEC’s Second International Creole Studies Conference.  Published in 
Etudes Créoles 2, 1980, 142. 
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to Hodoul, it was this shared experience of colonization and the struggle to overcome 
domination that united Creole-speakers in a singular cultural identity.      
 Hodoul’s conscious desire and concerted effort to forge a distinct Creole-based 
cultural identity was not something entirely new.  However, his statement marked the 
first time that a leader of a Creole-speaking nation explicitly expressed Creole-speakers’ 
common cultural identity as the foundation for a political and cultural movement against 
Europe’s continued domination of Creole-speaking peoples.  Two simultaneous 
occurrences contributed to the emergence of this kind of pan-Creole movement.   
Following the Second World War, the movement for decolonization linked cultural 
identity to political freedom as former colonized peoples used their distinct cultural 
identities to argue for independence.  Moreover, the development of modern 
sociolinguistics questioned the stigma attached to Creole languages as well as the 
discrimination of their speakers.  Together, these two developments laid the ideological 
groundwork for Creole-speakers to claim their Creole languages and cultures in their 
shared fight against European domination.    
 So far, this dissertation has focused on how Antilleans have used Creole to shape 
the Ministries of Education and DOM’s position on the place of diversity within the 
French nation.  In other words, Creole activists and intellectuals, as well as migrants, 
have employed Creole as a political tool to make claims about the French nation.  
Whether they were arguing for independence or a distinct kind of multiculturalism, these 
Antilleans were mainly concerned with their relationship to France; yet, they were 
equally aware of their position within the greater international community.  Antillean 
Creole activists did not limit their political activities to France or the French Caribbean.  
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In addition to carving out a space for themselves within the French nation, Antilleans also 
struggled to create their own political and cultural spaces outside of the French nation. 
They created a broader movement that united all Creole-speakers in their struggle against 
European domination, and was not necessarily tied to a specific nation.  At the same time 
that Antilleans appropriated Creole to make nation-based claims, they were also forming 
political and cultural networks with other Creole activists across the Caribbean and 
Europe.  They employed these networks to propose an alternative to French nationality: a 
pan-Creole identity.  In doing so, they constructed a Creole movement that not only 
shaped the debates about diversity in France, but also forged a unique Creole identity that 
was neither geographically nor culturally bounded to the French nation.     
In telling the history of Antilleans’ role in creating a pan-Creole politics that did 
not fit into the boundaries of a singular nation-state, this chapter argues that the Creole 
movement had no geographical center; rather, it consisted of transnational and 
international political and cultural networks.  In other words, the Creole movement was 
not limited to trans-Atlantic exchanges between the Antilles and France.  Antilleans also 
used Creole to carve out “Creole spaces” that crossed national and regional boundaries 
throughout Europe and the Caribbean.  This chapter interprets Antillean activists’ 
identification and creation of a Creole identity as a practice through which not only to 
claim French citizenship rights, but also to claim a cultural and political identity that was 
not national, but nonetheless deserved recognition.  My consideration of the Antillean 
Creole movement in relation to international networks of Creole activists builds upon the 
work within both postcolonial and new imperial studies’ that has brought the metropole 
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and the colony into one analytical framework.2  Scholars of postcolonialism have 
decentered Europe, but they have nonetheless left intact the sanctity of the nation as the 
proper subject of history.  Postcolonial history has become the history of how the nation 
was constructed in the colonies.3  This chapter uses the metropole-colony framework of 
postcolonial as a starting point from which to exam how Antilleans have shaped the 
French nation.  It also expands this framework and takes into account how Creole 
activists from other colonial peripheries, such as the British Caribbean, have also shaped 
debates about diversity in France.  In doing so, it argues that postcolonial France was not 
only constructed by Antilleans, but also by individuals and groups outside of the French 
metropole-colony framework.   
Theoretically, pan-Creolism eclipsed Creole-speakers’ racial, cultural, political, 
and experiential differences while uniting them around their shared, but also distinct 
Creole languages.  Yet, despite a common history of colonialism and creolization, could 
such racially, ethnically, geographically and linguistically diverse peoples unite as one 
political and cultural group of Creole-speakers?  Were Creole languages a useful rallying 
                                                
2 Scholars of postcolonial cultures in Europe have demonstrated how postcolonial migrants’ cultures have 
reshaped Europe’s national cultures.  For the French case, see: David Beriss, Black Skins, French Voices: 
Caribbean Ethnicity and Activism in Urban France  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004);  Herrick 
Chapman and Laura L. Frader, eds., Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of 
Difference  (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004);  Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark McKinney, eds., Post-
Colonial Cultures in France  (London: Routledge, 1997);  Kamal Salhi, ed., Francophone Post-Colonial 
Cultures  (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003).  For the British case see: Paul Gilroy, "There Ain't No Black 
in the Union Jack": the Cultural Politics of Race and Nation  (London: Hutchinson, 1987); Paul Gilroy, 
The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1993);  Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s 
Britain  (London: Hutchinson, 1982).   
Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler articulated the research agenda of for the “new” imperial history.  See 
Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World  (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997).  Catherine Hall’s edited volume also provides a good overview of the 
new imperial history’s historiographical interventions.  See: Catherine Hall, ed., Cultures of Empire: 
Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Reader  (New York: 
Routledge, 2000).   
3 Antoinette Burton makes a similar critique of new imperial historians’ privileging of the metropole-
colony framework.  See Antoinette M. Burton, After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the 
Nation  (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003).   
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point around which “Creolophones” could create a pan-Creole movement against 
European political, economic and cultural domination?4  Was it possible to forge one 
Creole culture and political movement out of multiple cultures, political views, and 
linguistic differences?   
This chapter explores these questions by tracing the emergence of the pan-Creole 
movement from its inception at the first Creole language studies conference in 1959 to 
the articulation of Créolité in 1989.  Since 1959, debates among intellectuals, activists 
and native Creole-speakers about who controls and has the rights to Creole languages 
have hindered attempts to build an international Creole movement.  This chapter 
examines three major divisions in pan-Creolism between French and British Creole 
studies groups, foreign and native linguists, and intellectuals and local activists.  It argues 
that in appropriating Creole to promote their particular political goals, competing groups 
have polarized the Creole community; they have failed to create a shared cultural identity 
among Creole-speakers.  Because divergent groups have molded Creole to fit the 
specificities of their politics, the Creole language may not be a useful departure point 
from which to build a pan-Creole identity.  Competing political and cultural interests on a 
national level, as well as on an international scale have prevented the coalescence of a 
single pan-Creole movement. 
The first part of this chapter examines academics’ role in providing the 
intellectual framework for the development of a pan-Creole movement.  It argues that 
from its inception as an academic movement, pan-Creole studies was fraught with 
cleavages pitting British and French intellectuals against each other.  Their conflicting 
                                                
4 Créolophone is a French word referring to those whose native language is Creole, but it has also been 
adopted by English and Spanish-based Creole-speakers.   
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views concerning Creole languages’ political and social meanings prohibited them from 
consolidating their common intellectual and political goals into a single international 
Creole studies group.     
As Francophone Creole studies gained momentum in the 1970s, another fissure 
emerged between foreign scholars of Creole and native Creole-speaking linguists.  The 
second part of this chapter highlights this struggle between European and native 
academics for political control of Creole.  It argues that native linguists perceived of 
foreign academics dominant involvement in Creole studies as a continuation of Europe’s 
cultural and political domination of Creole-speakers.  In an attempt to reclaim Creole 
from this kind of colonial domination, native intellectuals broke with the broader 
Francophone Creole movement in 1982, and founded the group Bannzil Kréyòl.  A self-
described “international” and “nativist” organization, Bannzil Kréyòl attempted to forge a 
pan-Creole identity based on native Creole-speakers’ common struggle against European 
domination.   
However, within Creole-speaking regions, Bannzil Kréyòl stirred up conflict 
between intellectuals who supported Bannzil Kréyòl’s vision of pan-Creole solidarity and 
local activists who were more concerned with using Creole to forge national identities.  
The third part of this chapter contends that intellectual pan-Creole movements, such as 
Bannzil Kréyòl, ultimately pitted the educated elite against nationalistic activists.  
Nationalistic activists resented what they perceived to be intellectuals’ cooptation and 
depoliticization of Creole.  Leaders of the local Guadeloupean and Martinican pro-
nationalist Creole movement began to accuse linguists of intellectualizing and destroying 
the “authenticity” of the Antillean people’s language.  The result was the further 
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polarization of Creole between international academic Creole studies groups and local 
grassroots movements.   
This schism promoted a group of Antillean activists to articulate yet another 
distinct Creole movement: Créolité.  They constructed Créolité as a new kind of pan-
Creole politics that appealed to both foreign and native intellectuals, local activists, as 
well as Creole-speaking migrants in Europe and North America.  The last section of this 
chapter argues that Créolité might be the movement capable of resolving the cultural and 
political tensions among the different interest groups within pan-Creolism, and creating a 
global pan-Creole identity.  
 
Part I.  The Academic Creole Studies Movement: Cooperation and Dissent Between 
British and French Linguists  
 
 Creole emerged as a language of intellectual study in March 1959 at the first 
“Creole Language Studies” conference at the University College of the West Indies 
(UCWI) in Kingston, Jamaica.  Attended by scholars from across the globe, this week-
long conference marked the first international discussion concerning the scientific study 
of Creole languages.  During the 1950s, linguists, particularly those trained in Britain and 
the United States, were becoming increasingly interested in English-based Creole 
languages and the process of creolization.  However, for the most part, they were 
working in isolation from each other, separated by oceans and continents.  In the 
conference proceedings, R.B. Le Page, a prominent scholar of Jamaican English, stated 
that he had organized the conference to put Creole linguists in contact with each other 
and to facilitate the exchange of information.5  This new interest in promoting Creole 
                                                
5 R.B. Le Page, ed., Creole Language Studies: Proceedings of the Conference on Creole Language Studies  
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1961), 123.  
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studies was not purely academic; it arose with the dismantling of the old European 
empires and the national liberation struggles that broke out across the globe following the 
Second World War.   
 The emergence of Creole studies as an academic discipline was a part of the 
attempt by disintegrating empires, such as Britain, to redefine their relationship with their 
former colonies.  In the conference’s opening statement, F.G. Cassidy, a linguist of 
British Caribbean Creoles, argued that knowledge of Creole was essential for establishing 
a Federation of the West Indies: 
  To try to deal with people without understanding their native language  
  was bound to be ineffective; to try to form a Federation of the West Indies  
  while ignoring the language problems of the peoples compromising that  
  Federation was to overlook a most important factor.  It was not enough to  
  say that the official language was English; it must be recognized that the  
  peoples of the West Indies speak languages and dialects which are not  
  Standard English; that Creole languages are for most of these people their  
  native languages.6 
 
In January of 1958, as colonized peoples from around the world struggled for 
independence, the British government created the Federation of the West Indies as a last-
ditch effort to maintain control of its Caribbean colonies.  The intention of the Federation 
was to create a political unit that would eventually become independent from Britain as a 
single state.  British officials hoped that this would allow them to maintain a political 
presence in the Caribbean as head of the Federation while simultaneously satisfying the 
demands for independence from all colonies in the region.  Cassidy’s statement arguing 
for the elevation of Creole to a language of academic study reflected the British 
government’s efforts to balance its desire to hold on to its colonies with nationalists’ calls 
                                                
6 F.G. Cassidy, opening statement for Creole Language Studies Conference at UCWI, Kingston, Jamaica, 
March 28, 1959.  Published in R.B. Le Page (ed.), Creole Language Studies: Proceedings of the 
Conference on Creole Language Studies  (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1961), 117. 
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for self-determination.  In taking a serious intellectual interest in West Indians’ native 
cultures, Cassidy believed that Britain would be able to rebuild its strained relationship 
with its Caribbean colonies.  He argued that the main goal of Creole studies was to use 
scientific evidence to rectify any contempt that still persisted for Creole languages.   
 In the preface to the conference proceedings, Le Page asserted that when Creole 
languages were “objectively studied”, as they were at the conference in Jamaica, “they 
were found to be languages in their own right.”7  Therefore, “it was necessary to combat 
the popular misconception that pidgins and Creoles were dishonourable debasements of 
European languages.”8  Le Page’s insistence on using vigorous academic study to elevate 
Creole languages echoed nationalists’ calls for Caribbean peoples to fight against 
colonial oppression, which had taught them to despise their languages and cultures as 
socially inferior.  British linguists’ focus on rescuing Creole from its history of 
degradation had the potential to be politically subversive in that it highlighted Creole-
speakers common experience of oppression.  In doing so, it revealed the political 
usefulness of Creole in the struggle against European colonialism.  However, Le Page 
perceived of the promotion of Creole quite differently; for him, the study of Creole was a 
means through which former colonial powers, such as Britain, could maintain their 
influence in the Caribbean.9  At a time when colonized peoples were claiming their 
cultural and linguistic differences to argue for independence, British officials hoped that 
certain concessions, such as the recognition of West Indians’ Creole language, would 
defuse nationalists’ claims and solidify their political union with the Caribbean.   
                                                
7 Le Page, ed., Creole Language Studies, 114.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
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This relationship between Creole and geopolitics was also apparent in the United 
States’ financial support for Creole studies.  Le Page sought and obtained funding for his 
conference from the Rockefeller Foundation.10  He understood the United States’ interest 
in developing a sphere of influence in the Caribbean; he knew that American institutions 
would want to be involved in the development of the region as the islands successively 
gained independence.  As the British and French were pushed out of the Caribbean, the 
United States seized the opportunity to establish political control as the supposed 
benevolent protector of the newly independent Caribbean nations.  Its financial support of 
Creole studies was a part of this strategy.  Together with British scholars, American 
linguists played a leading role in the establishment of Creole studies as an autonomous 
discipline.11  American academics’ involvement in Creole studies provided the United 
States with the ability to claim the Caribbean as its area of expertise; this, in turn, enabled 
the United States to assert its political influence in the Caribbean.   
 As a part of this strategy to develop their authority in the Caribbean as experts of 
Creole languages and cultures, both British and American linguists intentionally 
approached the study of Creole as a strictly scientific and intellectual endeavor.  The 
conference in Jamaica was devoid of any discussions concerning the political 
implications of Creole’s social and cultural meanings.  Participants limited their interests 
to defining Creole languages and their common structural components, as well as the 
linguistic processes from which Creole languages emerged.  According to Le Page, 
“desirable” studies of Creole languages emphasized the importance of “first-hand 
information obtained by field work . . . the first step [of which] should be the collection 
                                                
10 Le Page, ed., Creole Language Studies, 125.  
11 Vinesh Y. Hookoomsing, “So near, yet so far: Bannzil’s pan-Creole idealism,” International Journal of 
the Sociology of Language 102 (1993): 29. 
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of ‘texts’, from which grammars and dictionaries should then be prepared.”12  Le Page 
and his cohort of British and American linguists were primarily interested in amassing 
scientific data on the linguistic characteristics of Creole languages.  Their conference 
papers only briefly acknowledged the colonial histories of violence and oppression that 
produced Creole languages and culture.13  Rather than recognizing the troubled history, 
as well as the cultural and social complexities of each distinct Creole, they set out to 
control Creole by developing a single classification system for its many distinct 
languages.  This was a conscious effort to depoliticize nationalists’ appropriation of 
Creole to argue for independence.  In making Creole studies a science, British and 
American linguists hoped to neutralize Creole-speakers’ emotional connection to Creole 
as a language of resistance.  In doing so, Britain and the United States would be able to 
assert their influence and promote their nation’s respective political agendas in the 
Caribbean.14     
Moreover, the proceedings of the 1959 Creole studies conference indicate that 
British and American linguists perceived of their study of Creole languages as an act of 
benevolence toward Creole-speakers.  It reflected Western linguists’ lingering colonial 
impulses to economically and culturally uplift peoples who had failed to help 
themselves.15  The scientific study of Creole would not only benefit the academic 
community by revealing new methods of linguistic theory, but it would also promote self-
                                                
12 Le Page, ed., Creole Language Studies, 125. 
13 Ibid., 123-130. 
14 For a discussion of knowledge gathering as a form of colonial control see: Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism 
and Its Form of Knowledge: The British in India  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).   
15 This 19th and 20th century idea that the more “civilized” nations were morally obligated to bring Western 
civilization to supposedly “backwards” peoples was most explicitly expressed in France’s “civilizing 
mission.”  For a more detailed discussion of France’s “civilizing mission” see Alice L. Conklin, A Mission 
to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930  (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997).   
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understanding and social mobility among native Creole-speakers.  Foreign linguists 
argued that their elevation of Creole as a valuable language of study would empower 
Creole-speakers of “newly-emergent nations” to rediscover their cultural richness as an 
“essential preliminary [step in] making the fullest use of their resources, both economic 
and cultural.”16  According to Le Page, one of the most important social benefits of 
Creole studies was its intervention in the education of Creole-speakers.  Linguists’ 
standardization of Creole languages would enable teachers to use Creole to effectively 
teach English and other European languages.  In the 1950s, British education officials 
were investigating how the government could improve the deplorable state of education 
in the Caribbean.  They viewed West Indians’ inability to speak the “Queen’s English” as 
the main factor contributing to the high percentage of uneducated West Indians.  Despite 
linguists’ claims that Creole was “on par with any other language”, the acquisition of 
Western languages remained the most effective path to social mobility.  Therefore, 
Creole was valuable in that it could be used as a pedagogical tool to reinforce the 
supremacy of English and Britain’s cultural domination in Caribbean.  
Following the first Creole studies conference in 1959, British and American 
linguists organized two more conferences in 1968 and 1975 at the University of the West 
Indies (UWI) and the University of Hawaii respectively.  The content of these two 
conferences signaled a radical shift in Creole studies.  Up until 1968, the field of Creole 
studies had been devoted to the identification and description of Creole languages.  The 
small group of scholars who gathered at UWI oriented research away from descriptive 
concerns toward broader theoretical issues, such as the social and cultural factors 
                                                
16 Le Page, ed., Creole Language Studies, 127. 
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involved in the process of creolization.17  They argued that in order to fully understand 
Creole languages, linguists needed to closely study the distinct societies in which they 
developed.  This new focus on the connection between language and society made the 
question of colonialism unavoidable.18  At the 1959 conference, scholars had avoided 
discussing colonization and European powers’ role in denigrating Creole for fear that 
such discourse would encourage anticolonialists.  Now, they openly acknowledged 
colonialism as the culprit.19  
In the preface to the published volume of papers presented at the 1968 conference, 
American anthropologist Dell Hymes linked the stigmatization of Creole languages to the 
violence of colonization: 
These [Creole] languages have been considered, not creative adaptations, 
but degenerations; not systems in their own right, but deviations from 
other systems.  Their origins have been explained, not by historical and 
social forces, but by inherent ignorance, indolence, and inferiority.  Not 
the least of the crimes of colonialism has been to persuade the colonialized 
that they, or ways in which they differ, are inferior—to convince the 
stigmatized that the stigma is deserved.  Indigenous languages, and 
especially pidgins and creoles, have suffered in this respect.20 
 
Hymes accused linguists of reproducing colonizers’ disparagement of Creole languages, 
peoples and cultures.  Their decision to exclusively study the linguistic structure of 
Creole in relationship to European languages had reinforced Creole’s inferiority as a 
“degeneration”.  Hymes challenged scholars to examine the historical and social forces 
from which Creole materialized, namely colonialism and slavery.  He argued that this 
reexamination of Creole languages’ histories and social uses would precipitate a 
                                                
17 David DeCamp, “The Field of Creole Language Studies,” Latin American Research Review 3, no.3 
(Summer 1968): 25. 
18 Hookoomsing, “So near, yet so far,” 27.   
19 Dell Hymes, ed., Pidginization and Creolization of Languages: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the 
University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, Aril 1968  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 
3-11 
20 Ibid. 3. 
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revaluation of Creole as a creative and adaptive language instead of a degenerative form 
of a superior European culture.  
 The involvement of scholars outside the field of linguistics, such as Hymes, 
reflected the new broader scope of Creole studies.  It was no longer just about the 
scientific study of language; linguists also drew on work within sociology and 
anthropology to contextualize the role of language in Creole cultures and societies.  In the 
1968 conference report, scholars of Creole studies argued for the “study of creolization 
within the context of the general process of hybridization, convergence, and 
acculturation.”21  Their conference papers were particularly interested in the historical 
processes that precipitated the emergence of unique Creole languages and cultures, as 
well as the present social and political importance of Creole in the Caribbean region.22  
This acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of Creole societies and cultures attracted 
many more native Creole-speaking scholars who saw an opportunity to make their study 
of Creole a political act.  For these academics, their efforts to develop knowledge about 
Creole societies and cultures proclaimed the existence of these societies and cultures as 
distinct entities.  In other words, Creole studies was a critique of colonialism; it was 
about elevating Creole peoples and their cultures to argue for more cultural and political 
autonomy.   
Despite this growing interest among native scholars, the 1968 and 1975 Creole 
studies conferences were still dominated by British linguists who were interested in 
                                                
21 Hymes, ed., Pidginization and Creolization of Languages, 7. 
22 See: Albert Valdman, “The Language Situation in Haiti”; Mervyn C. Alleyne, “Acculturation and the 
Cultural Matrix of Creolization”; Christian Ersel, “Prestige in Choice of Language and Linguistic Form”; 
Dennis R. Craig, “Education and Creole English in the West Indies: Some Sociolinguistic Factors”; and 
Allen D. Grimshaw, “Some Social Forces and Some Social Function of Pidgin and Creole Languages”.  All 
published in Dell Hymes (ed.), Pidginization and Creolization of Languages: Proceedings of a Conference 
Held at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, Aril 1968  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971).    
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maintaining their political influence in the Caribbean region and American academics 
who perceived of the Caribbean as a region that would become increasingly important to 
the United States as its islands gained independence.23  French linguists were also 
involved in the newly emerging field of Creole studies; however, unlike Britain who had 
lost its West Indian colonies during the wave of decolonization following the Second 
World War, France held on to its Caribbean colonies by transforming them into 
departments.  For France, the promotion of Creole was therefore antithetical to the 
politics of departmentalization, which called for the complete cultural and political 
integration of Martinique and Guadeloupe into the French nation.   
Yet, Antillean academics understood the political importance of their Creole 
languages and cultures.  In 1969, a group of secondary teachers and university-level 
researchers at the Center for Antilles-Guiana Regional Studies (became the University of 
Antilles-Guiana in 1982) founded the Association of Inter-Caribbean Exchanges 
(Interca).  The goal of the organization was to “develop educational, cultural and personal 
ties the Caribbean zone” and “to implement exchange programs of peoples and ideas, 
giving habitants of the region a better reciprocal understanding of each other.”24  
Throughout the 1970s, Interca organized exchanges between the French and British 
Caribbean islands.  In general, high schools and universities in the British Caribbean and 
the French Antilles served as the institutional sponsors of these exchange programs.  
                                                
23 Only two of the papers presented at the 1968 UWI conference discussed French-based Creoles: John E. 
Reinecke’s “Tay Boi: Notes on the Pidgin French spoken in Vietnam” and Albert Valdman’s “The 
Language Situation in Haiti”.  For complete texts of these papers see: Dell Hymes (ed.), Pidginization and 
Creolization of Languages: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the University of the West Indies, Mona, 
Jamaica, Aril 1968  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).  Only one paper on a French-based 
Creole was presented at the 1979 Creole studies conference:  Danielle d’Offay de Rieux’s “Creole and 
Educational Policy in the Seychelles”.  For a complete text of this paper see: Albert Valdman and Arnold 
Highfield (eds.), Theoretical Orientations in Creole Studies  (New York: Academic Press, 1980).   
24 Statuts de l’Association Intercaraïbe d’Echanges.  Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), 
Fontainebleau, 840446, Art. 3.   
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During their summer vacations, Martinican students and teachers traveled to Barbados, 
Trinidad and Jamaica; they also welcomed these students to Martinique.  According to 
Interca’s annual report, these exchange programs enabled Caribbean students and 
teachers to learn about each other’s distinct cultures while also discovering their shared 
experiences as peoples of the Caribbean.25 
These shared experiences included the violence of colonization and slavery from 
which their Creole languages emerged.  Interca’s founders believed that this common 
history connected Caribbean peoples and justified them joining forces in the struggle 
against Europe’s continued influence in the Caribbean.  In order to become a strong 
political entity in the face of European oppression, Caribbean peoples need to support 
each other and combine their resources.  This process began with mutual understanding 
fostered by exchange programs, such as those organized by Interca.  In 1976, the monthly 
magazine, Flash Antilles-Guyane, suggested that Creole was the starting point for this 
kind of Caribbean collaboration.  The promotion of Creole “would permit the inhabitants 
of the Anglophone and Francophone islands to better understand each other, in order to 
organize together a closer cooperation within the Caribbean world.”26  Flash Antilles-
Guyane argued that Creole transcended the cultural particularities of each Caribbean 
island.  It suggested that Creole be used as the “lingua franca” of the Caribbean to 
promote cultural and political links among the islands.27  The interest of a popular 
publication, such as Flash Antilles-Guyane, in the promotion of a kind of Caribbean 
union, indicates that the Antillean people were also becoming aware of their relationship 
                                                
25 L’Association Intercaraïbe d’Echanges, Programme d’Activité, 1973-194, Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, 840446, Art. 3.  
26 M. Lourel, “A propos de l’usage du Créole: un point de vue,” Flash Antilles-Guyane, May 1976, 13.   
27 Ibid.   
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to other Caribbean islands.  Interca’s exchange programs had created a generation of 
Antilleans who had knowledge of other Caribbean islands and were interested in 
exploring their cultural ties to the Caribbean.  Moreover, Interca shaped Jamaicans’, 
Trinidadians’ and Barbadians’ understanding of their close relationship with Antilleans.      
Interca marked the beginning of Antillean academics’ interest in collaborating 
with other scholars in the English-speaking Caribbean.  In contrast to the British and 
American sponsored international Creole studies conferences, Interca was an exclusively 
Caribbean organization.  It was founded by Antilleans and was based in Fort-de-France, 
Martinique.  This enabled Antilleans to set their own agenda.  Previously, Britons and 
Americans had dominated the conversation at Creole studies conferences, privileging the 
scientific study of Creole languages.  Now, with the formation of Interca, Antilleans 
entered the debate.  For Antilleans, discussion of Creole languages and cultures should 
not be limited to the ivory tower; it was about cultural exchange among the peoples of the 
Caribbean.  Guadeloupe and Martinique were politically tied to France; yet with the 
founding of Interca, Antillean teachers and academics asserted their cultural and political 
ties with other Caribbean islands.  In other words, they were beginning to explore their 
distinct Caribbean identity separate from their French citizenship.  A decade later, at the 
1979 Creole studies conference, native Creole-speakers clearly articulated this idea of a 
shared pan-Creole cultural identity.     
 Interca was Antillean teachers’ and academics’ entry point into discussions about 
Caribbean collaboration and pan-Creolism.  This prompted non-native French linguists to 
form their own distinct Creole studies groups so that they too could claim a stake in the 
emerging Creole debates.  Following the 1968 and 1975 conferences, the importance 
 417 
acquired by Creole studies could not be ignored, particularly as a new generation of 
native scholars, like those associated with Interca, were claiming the distinct identity of 
Creole societies.  The formation of the Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherches en Espace 
Créolophone (GEREC), a Creole research group founded by Antillean scholars in 1973, 
illustrated the native seriousness of purpose.28  Moreover, the predominance of Anglo-
American scholars in the field of Creole studies motivated French linguists to form their 
own Creole research organizations for fear that they would lose intellectual authority of a 
language spoken in many of its former colonies and overseas departments.   
 By the mid-1970s, interuniversity and intergovernmental organizations, such as 
AUPELF (Association des Universités Partiellement ou Entièrement de Langue 
Française) and ACCT (Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique), had grown 
wary of British and American universities’ political intentions in dominating the field of 
Creole studies.  In 1975, the ACCT sponsored the first French-based Creole studies 
conference held in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.  Formed in 1970, the ACCT was an 
intergovernmental organization of twenty-one states and governments, who came 
together based on the sharing of the French language.  Its mission was to promote the 
cultures of its members, to improve cultural cooperation among members, and to 
strengthen the solidarity and connection among French-speaking states.  The ACCT 
financed the conference in Haiti to support and encourage French scholars’ involvement 
in Creole studies.  It had long perceived of the promotion of the Creole language as an 
activity inspired by the United States with the intention of reducing the role of the French 
language and France in the Caribbean.  The proliferation of American scholars’ work on 
                                                
28 For a more detailed history of GEREC, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation, entitled “From Militant 
Nationalists to Ethnic Minority:  The Antillean Creole Movement in Metropolitan France and the Antilles 
after Departmentalization.” 
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Haitian Creole proved to French academics that this was indeed the case.  Therefore, as 
the organization that represented francophone nations, the ACCT became actively 
involved in supporting Creole studies as a means to secure France’s political interests in 
the Caribbean.29    
 French linguists responded to Anglo-American dominance in Creole studies and 
the growing militancy of native academics by attempting to bring everyone together on a 
common cosmopolitan platform.  In November 1976, with the support of ACCT and 
AUPELF, French linguist, Robert Chaudenson, organized the first French Creole 
conference in Nice, France.  On this occasion, the Comité International des Etudes 
Créoles (CIEC) was formed with Chaudenson as its president.  It was Chaudenson’s 
intention to achieve the widest possible representation at CIEC’s First International 
Creole Studies Conference by welcoming native and nonnative participants from around 
the world.  The newly formed Creole studies group was thus cosmopolitan in 
composition, but French-controlled.  In the preface to the first issue of CIEC’s journal, 
Etudes Créoles, Dankoulodo Dan Dicko and Jean-Marc Léger the secretary generals of 
the ACCT and AUPELF respectively, emphasized that it had become “more and more 
urgent” to support the study of French-based Creole languages.30  CIEC resented 
Anglophone linguists’ privileging of English-based Creoles in the Caribbean, and felt that 
French-based Creoles needed to be studied more rigorously.  CIEC’s constitution 
emphasized the need to promote and develop French-lexicon Creole studies and to 
disseminate scientific research conducted in French in the related fields of linguistic and 
                                                
29 Robert Chaudenson, “Research, politics, and ideology: the case of the Comité International des Etudes 
Créoles,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 102 (1993): 16-19.   
30 Dankoulodo Dan Dicko and Jean-Marc Léger, “Avant Propos,” Etudes Créoles (1978): 9-10. 
 419 
cultural creolization.31  The result was a split between Francophone and Anglophone 
linguists that prevented Creole studies from becoming a truly international discipline and 
movement.   
   In the spring of 1979, Anglophone and Francophone scholars held separate 
Creole studies conferences.  The National Science Foundation, the College of the Virgin 
Islands, and Indiana University sponsored British and American linguists’ fourth Creole 
studies conference from March 28 to April 1 on the island of St. Thomas in the U.S. 
Virgin Islands.  Less than two months later, AUPELF and ACCT financed CIEC’s 
second conference in the Seychelles.  Ideologically both conferences claimed to be 
international in scope, welcoming scholars of Creole languages and cultures form around 
the world.  Organizers of the St. Thomas conference boasted that their conference had 
attracted more than 150 participants representing twenty different nations.32  In using the 
word “international” in their conference title and their groups’ name, CIEC also claimed 
to be a global organization.  However, in reality, these two conferences were divided 
along linguistic lines.  The papers presented at the St. Thomas conference almost 
exclusively discussed English-based Creoles, and although CIEC insisted upon its 
international status, it also proclaimed its staunch commitment to furthering the study of 
French-based Creoles.33  The university and government organizations funded these 
Anglophone and Francophone Creole studies conferences with their own particular 
political interests in mind.  They perceived of their involvement in creation of knowledge 
                                                
31 Constitution of Comité International d’Etudes Créoles (CIEC), published in Etudes Créoles (1978): 175. 
32 Arnold Highfield and Albert Valdman, eds., Historicity and Variation in Creole Studies, (Ann Arbor, 
MI: Karoma Publishers, Inc., 1981), vii. 
33 The papers presented at the 1979 Creole studies conference in St. Thomas were published in Arnold 
Highfield and Albert Valdman, eds., Historicity and Variation in Creole Studies, (Ann Arbor, MI: Karoma 
Publishers, Inc., 1981), vii. 
Constitution of Comité International d’Etudes Créoles (CIEC), published in Etudes Créoles (1978): 175. 
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about Creole languages and cultures as a way to assert their political and cultural 
presence in the Caribbean region.  Thus, their competing interests prevented them from 
forming a Creole studies group that bridged the divide between French-based and 
English-based Creoles.  Instead, Anglophone and Francophone Creole studies groups 
vied for control of Creole as they also fought for political and cultural control of the 
Caribbean.   
 In addition to solidifying the divide between Anglophone and Francophone 
Creole studies, the 1979 conferences revealed another cleavage in Creole studies between 
native and nonnative scholars.  The emergence of newly independent Creole-speaking 
nations in the 1970s such as Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, and the Seychelles, as well as 
the rising tide of nationalism in other Creolophone territories still dominated by European 
metropoles, such as France’s overseas departments, brought to the fore discussions about 
the politicization of Creole in connection to national movements.  As native scholars 
became increasingly invested in the political stakes of Creole studies, they also began to 
express their resentment of what they perceived to be non-native scholars’ unmerited 
control of Creole studies.  Native Creole-speakers at both the St. Thomas and Seychelles 
conferences openly questioned nonnative linguists’ authority to study Creole languages.  
They believed that as native Creolophones, they spoke authentic Creole uncorrupted by 
European influences and therefore, should possess exclusive rights to standardizing their 
own languages.  Francophone and Anglophone scholars’ dominant presence in Creole 
studies was a continuation of European colonialism, resulting in the further degradation 
of Creole languages and cultures.  In this respect, the St. Thomas and Seychelles 
conferences marked a radical departure from previous conferences where tensions 
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between native and non-native scholars remained in the background.  In 1979, native 
scholars joined Anglophone and Francophone linguists in the struggle for control of 
Creole and Creolophone regions, further fracturing the international Creole movement.   
 
Part II.  Bannzil Kréyòl: A Native Pan-Creole Movement 
 In 1979, native Creolophone scholars seized the opportunity of the St. Thomas 
and Seychelles conferences to reclaim control of their Creole languages.  In the course of 
impassioned discussions at the St. Thomas conference about Creole’s place in Haitian 
education, native Creole-speakers did not hesitate to communicate in their maternal 
tongue.34  This elevated Haitian Creole by dramatically demonstrating its adequacy and 
suitability for intellectual discourse.  Yet, perhaps more importantly, the native scholars’ 
use of Haitian Creole excluded the predominantly non-native and Anglophone linguists 
from the discussion who did not specialize in and thus, did not understand Haitian Creole.  
This symbolized a conscious effort by native linguists to reclaim control of their language 
and assert their right to determine how it would be used and integrated into their 
societies.   
 It is notable that the native scholars who openly expressed their dissent with non-
natives’ involvement in Creole studies spoke a French-based Creole and were citizens of 
a former French colony.  In contrast to Britain, whose Caribbean colonies had gained 
independence by the late 1970s, France adhered to the politics of continuité territoriale.  
Conferring the status of département d’outre-mer (DOM) on its Creole speaking colonies 
of Martinique and Guadeloupe meant that France maintained its authority to privilege the 
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French language at the expense of Creole.  The unresolved issue of France’s continued 
political and cultural domination of the DOM gave the study of French-based Creoles a 
political dimension that was absent in Anglophone Creole studies.35  In the French 
Antilles, Creole became a symbol of resistance against French control.  Because of this 
politicization of Antillean Creole, French-based Creole studies was much more fractured 
as competing groups sought to use Creole to promote their own political agendas.  Native 
linguists appropriated Creole in their struggle against French control while non-native 
linguists used Creole studies to assert their power and influence in the Caribbean.   
 Two months after Haitian linguists asserted their intellectual authority at the St. 
Thomas conference, the conflict in French-based Creole studies between native and 
nonnative scholars came to a head in at CIEC’s second conference in the Seychelles.  In 
his opening address, CIEC’s President, Robert Chaudenson, proclaimed that Creole 
studies was about promoting the development of Creole-speaking regions: 
  I think that the researcher, particularly in developing countries, cannot  
  ignore the consequences or the eventual applications of his work.  “An  
  underdeveloped country is an understudied country”; this statement  
  illustrates two kinds of phenomena: the obvious need to develop   
  knowledge, a prerequisite for development itself, but also the impossibility 
  that these countries generally find themselves in of achieving this self- 
  knowledge prior to development.36       
 
Chaudenson argued that in neglecting to develop self-knowledge about their societies and 
cultures, Creole-speaking regions had failed to encourage their own social and economic 
progress.  Therefore, it was the scholar’s job to create this knowledge that would 
stimulate development.  For Chaudenson, Creole studies was a benevolent project; it was 
                                                
35 Prudent Lambert-Félix and Ellen M. Schnepel, “Introduction,” International Journal of the Sociology of 
Language 102  (1993): 6. 
36 Robert Chaudenson, “Allocution” at CIEC’s Second International Creols Studies Conference.  Published 
in Etudes Créoles  2 (1980): 144-151.   
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about saving Creole-speakers from underdevelopment and helping them achieve social 
mobility.  A telegram from the General Director of UNESCO addressing the conference 
participants praised Chaudenson’s decision to organize the conference around this theme 
of “Creole studies and development”.  He stated that CIEC’s conference, “which aims to 
make Creole an instrument of development”, also “reflects the concerns of UNESCO’s 
efforts to promote development.”37  As European empires decolonized, 
intergovernmental organizations, like UNESCO, became involved in promoting 
sustainable development and international collaboration through education, the sciences, 
and culture in former colonies across the globe.  For UNESCO, international conferences 
that increased understanding of different cultures, like those organized around Creole 
studies, were important for creating cultural understanding, international collaboration, 
and peace in the world.   
 However, native scholars at the Seychelles conference understood Chaudenson’s 
and UNESCO’s support of Creole studies as instrument of development quite differently.  
They perceived of nonnative involvement in the study and standardization of Creole 
languages as a continuation of colonial rule in Creole-speaking regions.  UNESCO 
purportedly furthered the doctrine of human rights and the fundamental freedoms, such as 
political sovereignty, proclaimed in the United Nations Charter; yet it supported Creole 
studies, which was preoccupied with the scientific study of Creole and ignored European 
nations’ persistent dominance of Creole-speaking regions.  Native scholars saw this 
hypocrisy within Creole studies as an attempt by nonnative linguists to appear to be 
supportive of Creole cultures while seeking to establish control of them.  Frustrated with 
                                                
37 Telegramme adressé aux participants par M. Amoudou Mahtar M’Bow, directeur general de l’UNESOC.  
Published in Etudes Créoles 2 (1980): 153.   
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what they perceived to be nonnative scholars’ misappropriation of Creole studies, native 
scholars used the forum of the Seychelles conference to reclaim the study of Creole 
cultures and languages for native linguists.   
 In his opening statement, Jacques Hodoul, the Minister of Education for the 
Seychelles, criticized nonnative linguists’ attempts to avoid the politicization of Creole 
studies by focusing on the scientific analysis of Creole languages.  He made it clear that 
“the Creole language cannot be at this symposium a mere object of a simple scientific 
dissection, coldly carried out.”38  Instead, he linked the study of Creole to Creole-
speakers’ struggle for cultural and political recognition, arguing that Creole studies was 
inherently political.  To support this claim, Hodoul underscored Creole’s importance in 
the recent Seychellois struggle for independence:   
  In the Seychelles, the people knew how to react, and knew how to make  
  language, once an instrument of domination, an instrument of their  
  liberation.…What wonder one beautiful morning in June 1977,   
  when the people recovered their right to speak, the first words   
  announcing this liberation on the radio, as you suspected, were   
  Creole words! And since this big day, our language had grown   
  freely and has also become the instrument of our     
  development.…Today, uncovered, [Creole] intends to appear as its  
  true self and lends itself to the new role of the people, a role fully   
  and completely sovereign.39 
 
For Hodoul, the story of the Seychelles’ independence was an example of how Creole-
speakers rallied around Creole as a symbol of their distinct cultural identity to argue for 
and gain political liberation.  Creole studies was about the development of Creolophone 
regions; however, it was not for nonnative scholars to decide how Creole would be used 
in this development.  Native linguists needed to reclaim their authority and regain control 
                                                
38 Allocution de M. Jacques Hodoul, Ministre de l’Education et de la Culture de la République des 
Seychelles.  Published in Etudes Créoles 2 (1980): 142. 
39 Ibid, 142-143. 
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of their Creole languages so that they could determine Creole’s place in their societies.  
This would enable them to use Creole studies to address to the problem of Europe’s 
continued political and cultural domination of Creolophone regions.  Hodoul claimed that 
“there is only one objective, to enable people to live in sovereignty, thanks to their 
inalienable right to speak.”40  He called upon native linguists’ to distance themselves 
from nonnative linguists’ apolitical research, and make the study of Creole a political 
struggle against European control.   
 In organizing the Seychelles conference, CIEC had attempted to bring together 
nonnative and native scholars under the cosmopolitan platform of scientific research; yet, 
the dissatisfaction of native linguists expressed by Hodoul in his opening statement, 
revealed that intellectual cooperation among such politically diverse linguists was 
precarious and fraught with tension.  Hodoul’s speech made the conference conducive to 
expressions of Creole militancy.  In the following working session, Ronald Thésauros, 
President of the University of the Antilles-Guiana (UAG) denounced the “disguised 
colonialism” of the French in the DOM.41  As the representative of GEREC, the UAG’s 
Creole studies group, Thésauros used his inflammatory words to deliberately separate 
GEREC from the CIEC, the French-controlled sponsor of the Seychelles conference.  
Thésauros did not want GEREC to participate in a Creole studies movement that 
continued to be complacent about French control in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  A few 
months after the conference, he published an article entitled, “Creole and National 
Identity”, in the pro-nationalist magazine Jakata.  In this article, Thésauros articulated his 
                                                
40 Allocution de M. Jacques Hodoul, Ministre de l’Education et de la Culture de la République des 
Seychelles.  Published in Etudes Créoles 2 (1980): 142. 
41 Roland Thésauros, quoted in Vinesh Y. Hookoomsing, “So near, yet so far: Bannzil’s pan-Creole 
idealism,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language (1993): 30. 
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vision for a native-controlled Creole movement that promoted Antillean independence.  
He wrote that the “Creole language wants to be one of the elements of struggle in the 
recovery of national heritage” and “national independence”.42  According to Thésauros, 
Antilleans needed to rehabilitate their Creole language, which had been denigrated under 
French colonialism, and continued to be characterized as an inferior language by 
European linguists working within Creole studies.  He called for a separate native-
controlled Creole movement as the only solution to the Antilles’ continued oppression at 
the hands of France.   
 Hodoul’s and Thésauros’s recognition of Creole as a fundamental part of 
Creolophones’ struggle for cultural and political liberation made native linguists aware of 
Creole-speakers’ common cultural and historical links beyond the language connection.  
In his speech, Hodoul touched upon these feelings of pan-Creole solidarity, proclaiming 
that “the history of a language and that of the people who speak it are one and of the 
same history.”43  Creole-speakers are “torn from everywhere, from all horizons of the 
planet”, and have “looked for, from the very beginning, a common way of expressing 
ourselves.”44  It was in this manner that “the Creole language was born, the symbol of a 
people who refused to be silenced.”45  Hodoul argued that Creole-speakers’ mother 
tongues developed out of the same history of colonization and slavery; moreover, they 
were politically connected in their common struggle against European domination.  
Because of this, they shared a Creole cultural identity.   
                                                
42 Roland Thésauros, “Créole et Identité Nationale,” Jakata, September-October, 1979, 9. 
43 Allocution de M. Jacques Hodoul, Ministre de l’Education et de la Culture de la République des 
Seychelles.  Published in Etudes Créoles 2 (1980): 142. 
44 Ibid. 
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 Several months after Hodoul planted this seed for a pan-Creole movement 
separate from an academically focused Creole studies movement, Thésauros also 
recognized the political power of Creole to link otherwise culturally and geographically 
disparate Creolophone regions into one political and cultural movement.  In the same 
article mentioned above, Thésauros ended his discussion of Creole and national identity 
with the assertion that “Creole allows [us] to transcend all ethnic cleavages because it is 
the maternal language of an entire people.”46  He saw in Creole not only its ability to 
promote Guadeloupean and Martinican nationalism, but also its importance in uniting all 
Creolophones, regardless of their cultural differences, in a singular pan-Creole movement 
against European oppression.  This kind of pan-Creole cultural politics necessarily 
excluded nonnative linguists, further fracturing the intellectual Creole studies movement 
between nonnative and native scholars.   
  In May 1981, at CIEC’s third conference in St. Lucia, this native/nonnative 
conflict became even more apparent.  The conference took place during a time when 
debates concerning the merits of using Creole, as opposed to French, as the preferred 
language of communication were at the forefront of Creole studies.  In general, French 
was the predominant language of Creole studies.  Both native and nonnative scholars 
wrote, presented, and discussed their work in French.  They agreed that their exclusive 
use of French reinforced the stigma of Creole as underdeveloped and inadequate for 
intellectual communication.  This contradicted the main goal of Creole studies, which 
was to elevate Creole languages.  Yet, this problem was not easily solvable.  There was a 
significant obstacle to using Creole as the favored language of Creole studies: Creolists 
spoke many different Creole languages; in other words, there was no main Creole 
                                                
46 Roland Thésauros, “Créole et Identité Nationale,” Jakata, September-October, 1979, 9. 
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language understood by all scholars within Creole studies.  By default, French was 
necessarily the main language of oral and written communication.  CIEC appeared to be 
open to resolving this dilemma.  Its president, Chaudenson, offered the solution of 
developing an “inter-Creole” language that would be comprehensible to all 
Creolophones.  He argued that “a common graphical code would favor mutual 
understanding of Creole cultures and would facilitate their dialogue.”47  This would 
“permit the development of an autonomous communication among the different 
Creolophone countries of a region and would inevitably reinforce [their] independence 
from control by the North.”48  An inter-Creole language would not only promote 
communication and understanding among Creole-speaking regions, but it would free 
them from the grasp of the French language, and permit them to take more control of 
their own local affairs.    
 Despite CIEC’s interest in promoting inter-Creole, such a project proved to be 
difficult and complicated to implement and was for all intents and purposes quickly 
abandoned.  Native linguists perceived of inter-Creole’s dissolution as one of many 
examples of the hypocrisy of Creole studies which proclaimed to support the elevation of 
Creole languages, but in reality reinforced the supremacy of French.  This tension 
between native and nonnative scholars erupted at the St. Lucia conference, resulting in 
the formation of Bannzil Kréyòl, an exclusively native pan-Creole movement that 
separated itself from the French-controlled CIEC.  During the conference, an 
unanticipated breakdown in communication occurred due to the difficulties experienced 
by the host country’s delegation in speaking French.  This problem was momentarily 
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resolved when several native Creole-speakers spontaneously decided to speak in their 
respective Creoles.49  However, this was problematic to CIEC and ACCT, one of its 
French sponsors, who perceived of the use of Creole as the primary language of 
communication as an affront to their control of the conference proceedings.  To 
reestablish their authority over what it perceived to be a deteriorating situation, CIEC and 
ACCT reasserted French as the conference’s “working language”.  During the first 
working session, the ACCT reminded participants that it was an intergovernmental 
organization whose members were united around their common use of the French 
language.  Therefore, because ACCT was one of the conference’s major donors, French 
should remain the sole “working language” of CIEC and Creole studies in general.50    
 In reflecting upon this tension concerning Creole’s place within Creole studies, 
Chaudenson reevaluated his previous support of the development of an inter-Creole 
language.  He highlighted French’s status as the international language of science, and 
used this fact to contend that French should be the official language of Creole studies.  
Chaudenson argued that because of the linguistic diversity of the many French-based 
Creoles, Creole was not an effective means of communication.  The reality was that the 
majority of the people in the Creole world spoke French.  Thus, “cultural and scientific 
cooperation, inevitably in French…was necessary for the progress of Creole studies.”51  
Chaudenson’s argument stripped Creole of its intellectual legitimacy and its potential to 
be a language of academic communication and production.  Native linguists at the St. 
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Lucia conference perceived of CIEC’s privileging of French as a cooptation of their 
Creole languages under the guise of scientific research.  It was suddenly clear to native 
Creolophone scholars that CIEC was not interested in elevating Creole languages and 
cultures; it was just another European-dominated organization interested in maintaining 
Creole’s subordination.52   
 Convinced by CIEC’s actions that the legitimization of Creole could not be 
achieved from within a French-controlled organization, native linguists began to explore 
the possibility of establishing a native-controlled Creole studies group.  In an act of 
defiance, a group of native scholars stopped attending the workshops CIEC had planned 
for the St. Lucia conference.  Instead, they organized impromptu meetings exclusively for 
native Creole-speakers.  During these sessions, they discussed the possibility of creating a 
pan-Creole communication system that would enable Creole-speakers to understand each 
other.  Their goal was to forge an inter-Creole language that would replace French as the 
official working language of Creole studies.53  They signed a resolution promising to “use 
Creole languages in the creation of their scientific research.”54  In this resolution, native 
Creole-speakers asserted that foreign academics’ use of French to study Creole languages 
had degraded Creole as a non-intellectual language.  In order to revalue Creole 
languages, native scholars argued that they needed to demonstrate Creole’s usefulness 
and employ it in their own work. 
 Native scholars’ break from CIEC was not just about their disapproval of its 
privileging of French; it was also about creating an autonomous organization to explore 
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their pan-Creole feelings beyond the language connection.  During the conference’s 
closing session, Father Patrick Anthony presented native scholars’ position to CIEC’s 
general assembly: 
  Having come here together, as people from different parts, we have  
  experienced a unity which we never knew existed before.  We have  
  experienced that we are Creolophone peoples, but although we come from  
  Reunion or Mauritius, although we come from the Seychelles, we have  
  something in common: the Creole experience.  We can speak to each other 
  in Creole, we can reflect intelligently and scientifically on our reality in  
  Creole, and in a way, understand our very Creole being and our Creole  
  way.  That experience has caused us to come together and put our minds  
  together to form a committee to organize a conference on the coming  
  together of Creole people.55 
 
Over the course of their impromptu meetings in St. Lucia, native scholars discovered 
their linguistic and cultural connections with each other.  In addition to being 
Creolophones, linked by a common language, they also became aware of their shared 
cultural identity as Creoles.  This discovery of their collective “Creole experience”, 
“Creole being” and “Creole way” produced pan-Creole feelings that they had never 
before experienced.  With the above statement, native scholars officially proclaimed that 
they were creating Bannzil Kréyòl, their own autonomous organization in which they 
could freely express and develop this pan-Creole identity that CIEC had denied them and 
discouraged.  
 One year later, Bannzil Kréyòl’s founding members met in Mahé during the 
“Creole week” organized by the Seychelles in 1982.  The outcome of this meeting was 
the formal launching of Bannzil Kréyòl and the establishment of its objectives.  Antillean 
scholars Jean Bernabé and Raphël Confiant played an important role in shaping what 
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Bannzil Kréyòl stood for as a pan-Creole movement.  During the St. Lucia conference, 
Bernabé took the lead in organizing the impromptu meetings during which native 
scholars broke with CIEC and discussed the possibility of forming an inter-Creole 
language.  Confiant became the face of Bannzil Kréyol as its first president.  During the 
1970s, both were militant proponents of Creole and members of GEREC, the pro-
nationalist Creole studies group associated with the University of Antilles-Guiana.  In the 
early 1980s, Bernabé and Confiant began to distance themselves from Antillean 
nationalism and articulated a new kind of Creole multiculturalism.56  In December 1980, 
they hosted a conference on the theme of “formation and divergence of Creole societies” 
with the Horizons créoles, a Creole studies group focused on the Indian Ocean region.  
This conference addressed the linguistic commonalities between the Antilles (Martinique, 
Guadeloupe, Haiti) and the islands of the Indian Ocean (Reunion, Mauritius).  It sought 
to understand how two such geographically separated and culturally distinct societies 
developed strikingly similar Creole languages.57  Bernabé’s and Confiant’s collaboration 
with Horizons créoles marked Antillean scholars’ growing awareness of their cultural 
and linguistic connections to other Creolophones across the world, particularly those who 
spoke other French-based Creoles of the Indian Ocean.  It was the beginning of their 
theorization of a pan-Creole identity, which they formalized with the creation of Bannzil 
Kréyòl in May 1981 and their publication of Eloge de la Créolité in 1989.  
 Bernabé suggested the name of Bannzil Kréyòl or “Creole Islands” for the native 
scholars’ autonomous organization.  Bernabé constructed the phrase by combining three 
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words: bann, the Indian Ocean Creole marker of plurality, zil, the Creole word for island, 
and kréyòl, the Antillean spelling of Creole.58  Bernabé chose to combine both Indian 
Ocean and Antillean Creole languages so that Bannzil Kréyòl’s name would visually 
express its pan-Creole motto of “unity within diversity”.  For Bernabé and other native 
scholars, Bannzil Kréyòl represented a particular kind of unity among Creolophones.  
Creole-speakers possessed diverse languages and cultures, yet they were united in their 
shared experiences of colonialism and slavery.  Although Bannzil Kréyòl’s statutes 
defined the organization as an academic movement to “develop and promote the study of 
Creole languages and culture”, Bannzil Kréyòl was a political movement in that it sought 
to create an pan-Creole identity that challenged Europe’s cultural and political control of 
Creole regions.59  Its founding declaration defined the movement as an association of 
linguists, educators, researchers, artists, and writers who perceived of themselves as 
“members of a great family scattered over the world” and who regarded Creole as a 
“synonym of identity.”60   
 Shortly after the St. Lucia conference during which Bannzil Kréyòl’s was 
founded, Bernabé published an article proclaiming the existence of a pan-Creole identity: 
“There exists a Creole civilization, just like there exists a Greek, Roman or African 
civilization.”61  For Bernabé, the St. Lucia conference “marked an important date in the 
history of [Creole] societies.”62  Creole-speakers had always been a part of a unique 
civilization, but the founding of Bannzil Kréyòl was the moment when Creole scholars 
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realized and articulated their shared pan-Creole identity.  Bernabé defined this concept of 
pan-Creole identity as créolité.  Créolité emerged during the St. Lucia conference as an 
“instrument of identity.”63  It developed from the “necessity of creating a new kind of 
man” who is “situated at the crossroads of multiple heritages”.64  In other words, Créolité 
proved to be unifying concept because it cut across Creole-speakers’ geographical and 
cultural differences.  This empowered native scholars to realize their shared identity as 
“Creoles” so that they could unite in their desire to prevent foreign scholars’ from 
controlling Creole studies and the construction of their Creole languages.  For Bernabé 
and other native scholars, Créolité was about “positively taking control of our 
development on our own.”65  Bannzil Kréyòl activists perceived of their ability to control 
and develop their own Creole languages as a part of their struggle to regain political and 
cultural control of their respective Creole regions.   
   However, merely stating the existence of Créolité was not enough to build a 
popular pan-Creole movement.  Native scholars associated with Bannzil Kréyòl needed to 
convince Creole-speakers across the globe that they shared a Creole cultural identity.  
This was the goal of Bannzil Kréyòl’s second official meeting in Lafayette, Louisiana on 
May 27, 1983.  During the meeting, Bernabé encouraged native scholars to create a local 
Bannzil Kréyòl branch in their respective regions.  He perceived of each branch as a local 
promoter of Creole identity, where Creole-speakers could come to learn more about pan-
Creolism.  For example, Bernabé wanted each local section of Bannzil Kréyòl to have a 
viewing of the film, “Vivre en Créole”, which detailed the Creole languages and cultures 
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throughout the world.66  According to Bernabé, these kind of public cultural activities 
would promote support for Bannzil Kréyòl by distancing it from “all these debates 
surrounding the Creole language, which rather than uniting us, now tend to divide us.”67  
Instead of continuing to promote the construction of an inter-Creole language as their 
central project, members of Bannzil Kréyòl began to focus on making Creole more 
“accessible” and “user friendly”.68  Bannzil Kréyòl activists believed that their intellectual 
analysis alienated the Creole-speaking masses and made them disinterested in what 
Bannzil Kréyol had to say about créolité.   
 The Lafayette conference represented a turning point for Bannzil Kréyòl.  From 
that moment on, its members began to work to simplify and popularize their pan-Creole 
message.  A few months after meeting with Bannzil Kréyòl members in Lafayette, 
Bernabé promoted the idea of pan-Creolism in the popular Guadeloupean magazine 
Magwa.  He described to his Antillean readers the “experience of Creole in which we are 
all immersed.”69  Antilleans shared with all Creole-speakers the same “basic habits, the 
unstated code of social relationships, [and] beliefs.”70  Bernabé left out the academic 
discourse analyzing Creole-speakers’ linguistic similarities and the process of 
creolization in which all Creole languages and cultures formed.  Instead, he described 
pan-Creolism as a feeling of solidarity among a people who had been culturally and 
politically oppressed.  Over the next couple of years, Bannzil Kréyòl leaders organized 
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Creole cultural events across the world with the intention of promoting pan-Creole 
sentiments among Creolophones.   
 On October 28, 1984, Bannzil Kréyol celebrated the first International Creole 
Day.  Bannzil Kréyòl members organized Creole art exhibitions, music performances, 
theater productions, and parades in their respective regions.  In Guadeloupe, the theater 
troop Volkan Téyat put on a play in Creole that told the story of how the language 
became the foundation of Guadeluopeans’ Creole identity.  The local chapter of Bannzil 
Kréyòl also worked with the teachers’ union to organize an exhibition of Antillean 
students’ artwork and a reading of their poems and stories written in Creole.  According 
to Guadeloupean teachers, this kind of celebration of Creole taught “the young 
Guadeloupean to love his language and his culture” and helped him to “feel culturally at 
ease.”71  For Bannzil Kréyòl, this valorization of Creole was the first step in the process 
of forging a pan-Creole identity.  In order for Creolophones to support the idea of 
créolité, they first needed to accept Creole as a positive aspect of their identity.  Bannzil 
Kréyòl also used International Creole Day to educate Creolophones about all Creole 
cultures and languages across the world.  Bannzil Kréyòl leaders hoped their two 
strategies of celebration and education would help Creole-speakers realize their pan-
Creole identity and create a popular créolité movement.   
 In response to native scholars’ attempts to control Creole studies with the 
formation of Bannzil Kréyòl, nonnative linguists and members of CIEC articulated their 
own pan-Creole studies movement.  As early as 1980, Jean Benoist, a French 
anthropologist specializing in Martinican and Reunion societies, published an editorial in 
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CIEC’s academic journal, Etudes Créoles, in which he argued for the creation of  a 
monde créole or “Creole world”.  He perceived of CIEC as the creator of this “Creole 
world”, describing its conferences as a place of “meetings and dialogue” for scholars of 
Creole languages and societies from across the globe.  However, Benoist’s monde créole 
was significantly different from Bannzil’s construction of a pan-Creole cultural identity.  
Monde créole was about scientific collaboration: “We…maintain at all costs rigorous 
scientific [study], which can only give meaning to [Creole].”72  In making science the 
focus of CIEC’s monde créole, Benoist hoped to depoliticize pan-Creolism and mold it 
into a more innocuous academic movement.    
 In 1981, Robert Chaudenson, the president of CIEC and professor of Reunion 
Creole at the University of Aix-Marseille, presented to the Ministry of Education his 
argument for the establishment of the monde créole as an official aire culturelle or 
“cultural area” of study.  Chaudenson lamented that because speakers of French-based 
Creoles were geographically separated, scholars studied these regions in isolation from 
each other.  The islands of Reunion, Mauritius, Rodrigues, and the Seychelles were 
considered a part of Africa, the Antilles were attached to the Caribbean and Louisiana 
and Guiana were linked to the Americas.  Chaudenson contended that unifying these 
Creolophone regions into a singular area of academic study, headed by himself and based 
at the University of Aix-Marseille, would facilitate cooperation among these regions’ 
multiple governing bodies.  Moreover, it would make France the central intellectual 
authority on the monde créole, thus increasing its role in the development of these 
Creolophone regions.  During a time when the influence of British and American 
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academics was increasing in French-based Creolophone regions, especially those areas 
associated with the Caribbean and the Americas, Chaudenson argued that French scholars 
needed to assert their intellectual authority in these areas.  He feared that France’s 
political influence would diminish as British and American scholars gained more 
knowledge about the Creolophone world.73  For Benoist and Chaudenson, the creation of 
monde créole was a conscious effort to secure France’s political and intellectual authority 
in the Creole-speaking world.  On the one hand, they wanted to ensure that native 
linguists did not coopt Creole studies with their politics of pan-Creolism; on the other 
hand, monde créole was a way for France to prevent the United States and Britain from 
encroaching on its political influence in the Caribbean.  
 In April 1982, the Secretary for the Ministry of the Interior sent a letter to the 
Ministry of National Education concerning the designation of the Creole world as a 
cultural are of study.  He agreed with Benoist’s and Chaudenson’s assessment of the 
benefits of creating the monde créole and advised the Minister of National Education to 
approve their request.  The Secretary of the Interior perceived of the monde créole as a 
necessary response to pan-Creolism: “The emergence of the feeling of a Creole 
community in the new generations [of Creole-speakers] makes more urgent the 
development of research in this area.”74  In addition, “such an enterprise would…create 
an intimate association between the University of Aix-Marseille and the researchers at the 
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university centers of the DOM.”75  The French government was astutely aware of the 
Antillean scholars’ use of Creole to forge a political movement around a Creole cultural 
identity.  For the Ministry of the Interior, monde créole was a way the government could 
monitor and possibly diffuse this kind of subversive politics.   
 The Ministry of the Interior’s support for monde créole aligned with the new 
Socialist government’s policy of decentralization, which permitted France’s regions, 
including Guadeloupe and Martinique, to exercise more control of its local political and 
cultural affairs.  Socialists promoted decentralization as a more efficient government 
structure; however, it was also a political strategy designed to offer some concessions to 
leaders of nationalist regional movements while solidifying regions’ political union with 
France.76  At the same time that the Socialist government granted regions more freedom 
to express their cultural differences, it also became more involved in the patrimony of 
France’s regions.  Beginning in 1981, under the leadership of Socialist Jack Lang, the 
Ministry of Culture significantly increased its financial support for the preservation and 
creation of France’s regional cultural heritages.  In doing so, the Socialists’ hoped to 
control how difference was incorporated into and expressed in the nation.  Moreover, the 
Ministry of Culture wanted to garner loyalty from France’s regions as the benefactor of 
their local patrimonies.  The proliferation of government-funded research projects on 
Creole culture and the Socialists’ support for Creole cultural festivals and associations in 
the Antilles was a part of this new political tactic of cultural decentralization. 
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 In 1983, the Ministry of Culture organized a “cultural mission” for the Antilles.  
Lang gave mid-level functionaries within the Ministry of Culture the task of assessing the 
state of Creole culture in Guadeloupe and Martinique.  In their report, this taskforce for 
the “cultural development of the DOM” concluded that the Ministry of Education needed 
to do more to promote the development of an Antillean culture that could coexist with 
and was not in opposition to French culture.  Currently, in Guadeloupe and Martinique, 
“the search for a Caribbean cultural identity is often part of an opposition to European 
culture, particularly French culture, which is perceived as imperialist.”77  In order to 
avoid the development of this kind of Antillean culture that distanced Guadeloupeans and 
Martinicans from their French citizenship, the Ministry of Culture’s taskforce argued for 
a “true politics of cultural development and creation” in the Antilles.78  The functionaries 
envisioned the construction of cultural centers that would house Antillean patrimony and 
support the creation of Antillean culture.  In addition, they suggested that the Ministry of 
Culture build education centers to train Antillean artists, musicians, and writers.  The 
taskforce believed that this kind of financial patronage would create popular support for 
the French government.   
 Several months after the taskforce submitted its report, the Ministry of Culture 
created a “special fund” of one million francs for the “diffusion, promotion, and 
exchange” of DOM cultures.79  It created the “Office of DOM Cultures” to oversee the 
distribution of this money.  The Ministry of Culture established this office “under the 
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new politics of decentralization” as means to “coordinate local, interregional, and 
international [cultural] project.”80  In June 1984, Jean-Pierre Colin, the chief officer of the 
“cultural mission” in the Antilles, informed Lang that the maintenance of the Antilles’ 
political union with France was dependent upon the Ministry of Culture’s involvement 
the development and expression of Antillean culture.  Colin argued that “it is necessary to 
help Martinicans express themselves in their own manner.”  The “politics of difference” 
was “the only way, and not otherwise, that one will maintain the French presence in the 
region.”81  The Ministry of Culture was not just concerned with promoting Antillean 
culture in Guadeloupe and Martinique; it also supported the “diffusion” and “exchange” 
of culture between the Antilles and France, as well as between the Antilles and other 
regions of the Caribbean and Pacific.82  According to Colin, “it is indispensable to open 
the French islands of the Antilles to the world that surrounds them.”83  He advised the 
Ministry of Culture to “encourage at all costs, including financially, artists and 
intellectuals to increase contacts with English- and Spanish-speaking islands, as well as 
with the [United] States on the continent.”84 
 Colin’s interest in supporting the Antilles’ political and cultural relationship with 
nations other than France indicates that The Ministry of Culture was aware of not only an 
emerging Antillean identity, but also a pan-Creole identity that encompassed all Creole-
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speakers across the world.  Colin noted that the Antilles’ “exclusive relationship with the 
metropole has a somewhat schizophrenic side, and it is not tenable at the moment.”85  In 
describing the Antilles’ relationship with France as “schizophrenic”, Colin was referring 
to the multiple identities that were emerging in the Antilles.  Guadeloupeans and 
Martinicans were simultaneously French, Antillean, and Creole.  Colin argued that the 
Ministry of Culture needed to understand these multiple identities and Antilleans’ 
relationship with other Creolophones so that it could determine how to incorporate this 
difference into the French nation.  As a part of the project of monde créole, which 
designated Creole-speaking regions as a distinct cultural area of study, the Ministry of 
Research and Technology formed the Committee for the Coordination and Research in 
the Overseas Departments and Territories (CORDET).  This committee oversaw and 
funded academic research in the Antilles.  One of its most important projects looked at 
the development of a Creole identity across entire Caribbean region.  It characterized the 
development of Creole identity as an important political and cultural movement that had 
implications for Antilleans’ place in the French nation.  CORDET wondered how the 
“concept of Creole identity” affected Antilleans’ feelings of attachment to France.86  The 
Ministry of Culture was invested in financing research that helped it address the 
emerging politics of créolité.   According to CORDET’s report on its yearly planning 
meeting, the Antilles were also of particular interest because of their close proximity to 
other Caribbean islands and the Americas.  CORDET perceived of its collaboration with 
other researchers of Creole societies in these neighboring regions as an essential part of 
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the French government’s role in navigating the social and economic development of the 
Caribbean as a whole.87   
 The Ministry of Culture also designated a portion of its “special fund” for 
“cultural action” in the DOM to support inter-Caribbean cultural festivals.  In 
Guadeloupe, it funded the Festival of Inter-Caribbean Music that united musicians from 
across the Caribbean.88  In becoming involved in this cultural exchange among 
Creolophones, the Ministry of Culture wanted to assert its role in the formation of this 
new kind of cultural politics.  Under the new policy of decentralization, Antilleans were 
supposed to gain more control of their local cultural affairs.  However, in reality, 
Socialists’ used the politics of the “right to difference” that accompanied decentralization 
to justify their involvement in the preservation and creation of Antillean culture.  The 
Ministry of Culture argued that the creation of new French-controlled institutions in the 
Antilles, such as the Office of DOM Cultures, was to ensure the promotion of the “right 
to difference” in the Antilles.  Its sudden interest in Antillean culture was an attempt to 
control the terms of the debate about Antillean identity, pan-Creolism and how these new 
identities fit into the French nation.   
 Throughout the 1980s, the French government, foreign scholars, and native 
Creolophone members of Bannzil Kréyòl vied for control of an emerging pan-Creole 
movement and identity.  Although both native and nonnative linguists sought to 
popularize Creole languages and cultures, for the most part, the debates about pan-
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Creolism remained within the government and the university.  As a result, pan-Creolism 
became almost exclusively an intellectual movement.  Local nationalist activists who had 
appropriated Creole to argue for independence resented what they perceived to be 
academics’ cooptation of the Creole movement to support their own intellectual 
endeavors.  For them, Creole was a national movement, not an obscure identity linking 
Creolophones across national borders.  As Bannzil Kréyòl sought to transform the 
Antillean Creole movement into pan-Creolism, local nationalists also entered the struggle 
for pan-Creole identity, seeking to maintain their grasp on Creole as a tool of nationalism.     
 
Part III.  Intellectuals’ and Nationalists’ Struggle for “the people’s language” 
 
 During the 1970s, nationalists and academics associated with GEREC, the 
University of the Antilles-Guiana’s Creole studies group, had worked together to 
construct Creole as a symbol of Antillean national identity.  Beginning in the 1980s, 
GEREC linguists began to distance themselves from nationalists as they became more 
militant, resorted to terrorist tactics, and lost popular support.89  Another factor 
contributing to this ideological split was GEREC linguists’ involvement in the emerging 
politics of pan-Creolism.  As early as 1978, GEREC’s leaders demonstrated their 
awareness of a broader Creole identity that extended beyond the Antilles when they 
changed their groups name from Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherches de la Créolophonie 
to Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherches en Espace Créole.  The word créolophonie was a 
play on the word francophonie, which described the political cooperation and cultural ties 
among French-speaking nations of the world.  In replacing créolophonie with espace 
créole, GEREC argued that it was distancing Creole-speakers’ ties to European 
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institutions, such as francophonie and broadening the focus of its organization to include 
all Creole-speakers across the globe.90  GEREC was beginning to think not only about 
Creole’s importance as a symbol of Antillean identity, but also about Antilleans’ 
connections to a pan-Creole identity that crossed national boundaries.  In 1982, when two 
of GEREC’s most prominent scholars, Jean Bernabé and Raphaël Confiant, also became 
founding members and leaders of Bannzil Kréyòl, local nationalist activists became 
resentful of what they perceived to be academics’ attempts to intellectualize and 
neutralize the nationalist Creole movement.   
 Following Bannzil Kréyòl’s celebration of its first International Creole Day in 
October 1984, articles critical of GEREC’s and other academic activists’ support of pan-
Creolism appeared in the Antillean nationalist press.  One such article published in the 
pro-Communist Guadeloupean newspaper, Combat Ouvrier, characterized pan-Creolism 
an intellectual attempt to coopt the Antillean nationalist movement, and transform Creole 
from an agent of political change into an innocuous cultural movement.  According to 
Combat Ouvrier, the sole purpose of Bannzil Kréyòl’s International Creole Day was to 
“remind everyone that Creole is a living force throughout the world, that it is for many 
the driving force of our daily life.”91  Combat Ouvrier perceived of Bannzil Kréyòl’s 
decision to only highlight the large number of Creolophones across the globe as a 
conscious attempt to ignore and thus, neutralize Creole’s nationalistic symbolism:        
One cannot take into account the Creole question, as many do, outside the 
political context in which it develops.  In almost all the countries where it 
exists, Creole is an object or the tool of underhanded political struggles.  
For example, in Martinique and Guadeloupe, the nationalist supporters use 
it as a unifying myth, as a national value on the same scale as a flag or a 
national hymn.  In their eyes, Creole contributes to unifying the people (a 
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single people!), bourgeoisie and working classes, into a single block in the 
struggle for independence.92  
 
For the pro-communist Combat Ouvrier, Creole could not be separated from nationalism.  
To do so would be to the detriment of the working classes and the social unity of the 
Martinican and Guadeloupean nations.  It argued that Bannzil Kréyòl’s denationalization 
of Creole and privileging of an international pan-Creolism identity had divided the Creole 
movement along class lines.  In separating Creole from nationalism, “bourgeois” 
academics, like those associated with Bannzil Kréyòl, had made Creole a tool for the 
domination of the working classes.  Combat Ouvrier argued that a “left-wing aristocracy, 
speaking four languages, has economically exploited the people, and as a consolation has 
formally recognized their popular culture to silence the poor.”93  In other words, pro-
Creole intellectuals were only interested in Creole as way to manipulate and subjugate 
the working classes.  Pro-Creole intellectuals had achieved their secure positions through 
access to languages of international prestige, such as French, not Creole.  Therefore, in 
attempting to control Creole, the only language available to the working classes, the pro-
Creole bourgeoisie was seeking to protect their superior social status and prevent the 
working classes from achieving social mobility.   
 The Combat Ouvrier’s characterization of pan-Creolism as an intellectual 
movement that only advanced the interests’ of the bourgeoisie created a fissure in the 
Creole movement between linguists and leaders of local nationalist movements.  This 
ideological split was centered on the question of who had the rights to Creole.  Combat 
Ouvrier contended that Creole languages belonged to the Guadeloupean and Martinican 
workers and framers.  In contrast to French-educated academics, the working classes had 
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not been corrupted by the French language.  Therefore, workers and farmers were the 
“authentic” speakers of Creole.  As such, Combat Ouvrier contended that they were the 
only group with the authority to standardize the Creole language and determine its artistic 
uses.  Despite Antillean nationalists’ collaboration with intellectuals in the 1970s to 
standardize the Creole language, they had always perceived of Creole as the “people’s 
language” and had been wary of linguists’ involvement in the Creole movement.  In 
1977, the newspaper of the pro-nationalist organization, Ligue d’Union Antillais, 
described “the people” as “the master of the word” and therefore must “play the dominant 
role” in the Creole movement.94  Combat Ouvrier warned the working classes that they 
could not permit pro-Creole intellectuals “to mask the necessary condition for a genuine 
flourishing of culture in the people, and the poor’s attainment of control of their own 
affairs.”95  In other words, workers had to wrest Creole from the hands of academics and 
continue to use it in their struggle for independence.  Only then would they be able to 
fully develop their own Creole culture and language, and control their own affairs.   
 Criticism of Bannzil Kréyòl and its pan-Creolism was not limited to the nationalist 
press.  While Antillean nationalists perceived of Bannzil Kréyòl as an affront to the 
independence movement, departmentalists were wary of pan-Creolism as a challenge to 
Antilleans’ cultural ties to France.  The week following International Creole Day, a letter 
from Michèle Montantin appeared in the pro-French newspaper France-Antilles.  
Montantin was the director of the Centre d’Action Culturelle de la Guadeloupe (CACG), 
a local cultural organization funded by the French government.  CACG had sponsored the 
cultural events, which mostly consisted of theater performances, for Bannzil Kréyòl’s 
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International Creole Day at Fort St. Charles in the city of Basse-Terre.  In her letter, 
Montantin regretted that certain individuals had used these cultural events to express their 
nationalist politics.  On the afternoon of the theater performances, the CACG received 
threats from nationalists wanting to protest Bannzil Kréyòl and the involvement of a 
French government-funded organization, such as CACG, in promoting Creole culture.  
Montantin responded by arguing that “Creole belongs to all those who want it, and not 
only to those who want to make it into weapon of combat.”96  In contrast to nationalists 
who believed that the Antillean people had the exclusive right to Creole, Montantin 
insisted that everyone, including native linguists, foreign Creole studies groups, French-
sponsored cultural organizations, as well as the Antillean people had access to the Creole 
language.  In doing so, she blurred the political distinctions among the many groups with 
a stake in the Creole movement in an attempt to depoliticize it and make Creole 
exclusively a cultural issue.     
 This controversy surrounding Bannzil Kréyòl suggests that it did not develop a 
lucid coherent vision of what it stood for as a pan-Creole movement.  The abstract idea of 
a great Creole family scattered around the world failed to gain enough attraction to 
overcome Creole-speakers’ feelings of distance and difference.  On the one hand, pan-
Creolism alienated Antillean nationalists who were more interested in using Creole to 
forge independent Guadeloupean and Martinican nations.  They perceived of Bannzil 
Kréyòl’s construction of a pan-Creole identity as an affront to their efforts to create an 
Antillean national identity.  On the other hand, Bannzil Kréyòl distanced itself from 
foreign linguists, giving up the possibility of receiving financial support from the French 
                                                
96 Michèle Montantin, “ ‘Téyat è Kréyòl’ mise au point de la directrice du CACG,” France-Antilles, 
November 7, 1984, n.p. 
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government.  Native linguists founded Bannzil Kréyòl as a challenge to what they 
perceived to be nonnatives’ dominance of Creole studies and thus, Creole-speaking 
regions.  This only served the purpose of creating more divisions within the Creole 
movement as both natives and foreign linguists sought to control what pan-Creolism 
would look like.  Moreover, Bannzil Kréyòl failed to achieve one of its main goals: the 
construction of an inter-Creole language through which all Creole-speakers could 
communicate.  Without this shared form of communication, many Bannzil Kréyòl 
members questioned whether or not a pan-Creole identity could be achieved.   
 In particular, Bernabé and Confiant began to look for a new way to express a pan-
Creolism that was not fraught with divisions like those within Bannzil Kréyòl.  In 1989, 
with their Martinican colleague, Patrick Chaomiseau, Bernabé and Confiant articulated 
their philosophy for a separate pan-Creole movement in Éloge de la Créolité.  Créolité 
expressed a pan-Creole viewpoint that was essentially the same as Bannzil Kréyòl’s; 
however, in focusing on appealing to all participants in the Creole debates, including the 
French government, native and nonnative linguists, nationalists, and working class 
Creole-speakers, it attempted to give new life to pan-Creolism as a movement supported 
by all groups from across the political spectrum. 
 
Part IV.  Créolité: The Answer to Pan-Creole Divisions? 
 
 As members of GEREC, Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau had been 
developing their ideas on créolité or “creoleness” since the beginning of the 1980s.97  In 
1982, GEREC’s Charte culturelle créole recognized the existence of a “Creole matrix” 
                                                
97 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation, especially Part IV entitled “From Nationalism to Multiculturalism: 
Créolité and the ‘right to difference’”, for a more detailed account of how the concept of créolité emerged 
as a distinct part of the Creole movement.   
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that transcended the diversity of Creole languages and cultures.98  This idea of a shared 
Creole identity connecting Creolophones of all nations was an integral part of the Bannzil 
Kréyòl movement.  However, Créolité was only formalized as a cultural and political 
movement in 1989 when it became clear that Bannzil Kréyòl had failed to create a 
cohesive pan-Creole identity and politics.  In 1988, Bannzil Kréyòl lost its reputation as a 
movement that challenged Europe’s control of Creolophone regions when it registered 
itself as an official French cultural association.  Bannzil Kréyòl members believed that 
this kind of formal legal status would solve its organizational problems and internal strife.  
But in reality, this decision emptied Bannzil Kréyòl of its political objectives.  In 
attaching itself to the French government, Bannzil Kréyòl comprised its status as an 
international movement linking Creole-speakers across national borders around a singular 
pan-Creole identity.  Bannzil Kréyòl had placed itself squarely within France, securing 
Creole-speakers’ political and cultural attachment to western European nations.   
 In response to Bannzil Kréyòl’s political paralysis, combined with what they had 
learned about pan-Creolism’s unintentional divisive nature, Bernabé, Confiant, and 
Chamoiseau forged the Créolité movement.  The tension between European governments 
and Creolophone regions, nonnative and native scholars, as well as pan-Creole supporters 
and nationalist activists demonstrated to Bernabé, Confiant and Chamoiseau that the 
success of a pan-Creole identity and movement depended on the coalescence of these 
competing interests around a singular ideology.  For Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau, 
créolité was this ideology that would mend the cultural, political, and regional divisions 
within the Creole movement.  Like Bannzil Kréyòl, the Créolité movement emphasized 
the political and cultural unity underlying Creole peoples’ diverse languages, 
                                                
98 Groupes d’Etudes et de Recherches en Espace Créole (GEREC), Charte Culturelle Créole, 1982. 
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nationalities, and cultural heritages.  However, the Créolité movement also linked this 
pan-Creole identity to a larger international trend of diversity: 
  The world is progressing toward a state of creoleness.  The old national  
  tensions are yielding under the advance of federations, which maybe will  
  not live long.  Underneath the all-embracing universal crust [of the earth],  
  Diversity is maintaining itself in the small peoples, in the small languages, 
  in the small cultures.…There is a new humanity emerging, which will  
  have the characteristics of our creole humanity, all of the complexity of  
  Creoleness.99      
 
Créolité was a critique of France’s Republican tradition of universalism, which required 
the government to ignore its citizens’ cultural differences and interact with them as 
universal individuals.  For Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau, French universalism was 
“false” in that it obliged individuals to assimilate to the French national culture.  They 
argued that the ideal of a universal individual did not exist; according to the French 
government, French citizens had to be culturally French.  In critiquing French 
republicanism, Bernabé, Chamoiseau, and Confiant argued for a new kind of universal 
individual that was culturally connected to many different nations.  Creole peoples, who 
possessed cultural characteristics from Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, were 
an example of this universal individual.  Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau contended 
that the world was moving toward this new state of cultural diversity or créolité. 
 The Créolité movement’s emphasis on not only the diverse nature of Creole 
cultures, but also the heterogeneity of all cultures, including those of Europe, called for 
the equalization of all the cultures of the world.  Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau 
argued that European nations should not have control over Creolophone regions, simply 
because they perceived of Creole as a degradation of their own cultures.  All cultures 
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were amalgamations and therefore equal.  However, Créolité was not simply another 
anticolonial movement.  In fact, Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau argued that Créolité 
“liberates us from anti-colonialist militantism.”100  They realized that in order for Créolité 
to be a successful movement, it needed to be a unifying ideology, not a divisive 
movement like Bannzil Kréyòl.  Thus, they were careful to distance Créolité from an 
anticolonial discourse that pitted Creolophones against European powers.  Instead, 
Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau contended that Creole peoples’ who possessed 
European nationalities, such as Antilleans, could be Creole and still remain politically 
attached to a European nation, like France.  In doing so, they hoped to present Créolité as 
a politically nonthreatening movement, and gain European support for pan-Creolism.  
Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau also worked to construct Créolité as a 
movement that bridged the divide that Bannzil Kréyòl had created between intellectuals 
who supported pan-Creolism and nationalist activists.  As previously discussed in this 
chapter, nationalists framed the Creole debates in terms of social class.  Nationalists 
perceived of intellectuals’ involvement in the Creole movement as a bourgeois attempt to 
keep working-class Creolophones in a subordinate position by controlling their languages 
and cultures.  To erase pan-Creolism’s stigma as an intellectual and bourgeois, Bernabé, 
Confiant, and Chamoiseau, constructed Creole not only as a racially unifying ideology, 
but also a movement that cut across class lines.   
 In multiracial societies, such as ours, it is urgent that we let go of the usual 
  racial distinctions and that one resumes the habit of designating the man of 
  our country with the only word that suits him, whatever his complexion:  
  Creole.  The socio-ethnic relations of our society, will now take place  
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de la Créolité”, Alizés, July-October 1988, 22. 
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  under the common seal of Creoleness, which will obliterate, not in the  
  least, class confrontations.101 
 
According to Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau, in equalizing all cultures as fusions of 
many different cultures, the Créolité movement erased class distinctions based on race 
that privileged white European culture over multiracial Creole cultures.  Moreover, 
Créolité argued for the equalization of European and Creole languages.  In doing so, it 
also broke down the class hierarchy between those educated Creole-speakers who had 
mastered a language of prestige, such as French, and uneducated Creoles who only had 
access to Creole and therefore, could not achieve social mobility.   
 Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau also distanced Créolité from Bannzil 
Kréyòl’s intellectualism in constructing it as a movement that necessitated the people’s 
involvement.  They critiqued linguists’ use of scientific jargon as alienating and not 
useful to the majority of Creole-speakers.  Instead, the Créolité movement encouraged 
“each Crelophone to become a specialist in his own words.”102  In describing Créolité as 
a socially equalizing movement that sought to place Creole back in the hands of the 
working-class people who spoke it, Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau hoped to gain 
the support of the support of the nationalists.  Although they wanted to distance 
themselves from what was becoming an increasingly militant nationalist movement, 
Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau realized that pan-Creolism needed the support of all 
groups within the Creole movement, including the nationalists, if it was to develop into 
an effective cultural and political movement. 
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Creole-speaking migrants was another group whose support Créolité sought to 
acquire.  Bannzil Kréyòl’s anticolonial politics did not appeal to Creole migrants living 
across Europe and North America.  It had considered them as an integral part of the pan-
Creole world; yet, it failed to recognize that while migrants were critical of the 
discrimination they endured at the hands of western governments, they were nonetheless 
invested in staying politically connected to these nations as residents and citizens.  
Bannzil Kréyòl’s focus on fighting western government’s continued political control of 
Creole-speaking regions, such as the French Antilles, did not provide Creole migrants 
with an ideology that embraced their desire to be both Creole and citizens of a western 
nation.  In contrast, Créolité addressed migrants’ particular situation and gave them the 
flexibility to be, for example, in the case of Antilleans, both Creole and French.   
Within France, Antillean migrants have interpreted Créolité as a type of 
multicultural politics to argue for the inclusion in the French nation as a distinct ethnic 
group.103  In particular, they have appropriated its rhetoric of the diversity and changing 
nature of all cultures to challenge the myth that France has assimilated generations of 
immigrants into the French national culture.  According to the Créolité ideology, “each 
culture is never an achievement, but a constant dynamic researcher of new questions, of 
new possibilities, who does not dominate, but enters into relation to, who does not steal, 
but exchanges.”104  Therefore, France never possessed a unified and constant national 
culture to which all migrants assimilated; rather, generations of migrants have shaped 
French culture into its current heterogeneous and changing state.  Créolité gave Antillean 
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migrants the discourse they needed to fight assimilation and reshape the boundaries of 
France’s patrimony to include their Creole culture and language.   
Bernabé, Confiant, and Chamoiseau articulated the Créolité ideology to create a 
politically and culturally unified pan-Creole movement.  They hoped to resolve the 
fissures in the international Creole movement that Bannzil Kréyòl had revealed.  Despite 
their efforts, Bernabé, Confiant. and Chamoiseau did not succeed in salvaging pan-
Creolism or in making Créolité an international movement.  Creolophones across the 
globe were members of culturally distinct regions, each of which had a different political 
relationship with Europe.  Some lived outside of Europe, but remained politically 
attached to the continent; some lived inside of Europe; and others were a part of 
independent nations.  This political diversity meant that Creolophones had different 
perspectives on the relationship of their Creole languages and cultures to those of Europe.  
Therefore, it was next to impossible to create a unified international Creole movement 
that appealed to all of Creolophones’ different politics.  In reality, Bernabé, Confiant, and 
Chamoiseau ended up articulating a particular kind of Creole multiculturalism that 
proved to be more useful for making specific claims on the French nation.  Créolité was 
successful in that gained the popular support of Antilleans residing in Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, and France and united them into a singular cultural and political movement.  
However, Créolité was not successful in creating a multicultural French society.  
Antilleans have made some strides in gaining state recognition of their Creole culture.  
The French government funds more cultural associations for Antilleans than any other 
ethnic group, and it promotes Creole cultural festivals throughout France and the Antilles.  
Yet, the distinction between public identity and private expressions of cultural difference 
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remains.  In public, Antilleans and other minorities must disguise their particularities and 
express their universal French citizenship; in private, they are free to express their 
difference as they wish.  The failure of the antiracism movement and the successive 
restrictions, which began in 1989 and continue today, on Muslim women’s right to wear 
headscarves and the niqab in public spaces indicate that there is still no place for 
difference in French society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Despite numerous efforts on the part of linguists and activists, a politically and 
culturally cohesive pan-Creole movement has not emerged.  Since the first international 
Creole studies conference in 1959 to the articulation of Créolité in 1989, pan-Creolism 
has been fraught with political divisions.  The conflict between Anglophone and 
Francophone Creole studies, native and foreign linguists, and intellectuals and local 
nationalist activists centered on the question: Who controls Creole?  Native linguists 
argued that as “outsiders”, foreign linguists did not understand Creole’s political stakes 
and therefore, should not be involved in the Creole movement.  According to nationalist 
activists, both foreign and native linguists do not have the authority to codify Creole, 
which is the people’s language, not an intellectual endeavor.   
 Moreover, intellectuals and activists argued about the political effectiveness of a 
pan-Creole movement.  They questioned whether or not the development of a singular 
Creole identity would free Creole-speakers from their cultural oppression or if it was 
more useful to use Creole to implement political change on a regional and national scale.  
These tensions among the creators and leaders of pan-Creolism only heightened the 
cultural and geographical differences separating Creolophones that naturally impeded the 
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development of a singular Creole identity.  Without a unified leadership, pan-Creolism 
could not become a popular movement.     
 Yet, despite these multiple divisions and political conflicts, the ideal of pan-
Creolism persists.  The Bannzil Kréyòl and Créolité models of pan-Creolism have been 
integrated into the International Organization of Creole Peoples (IOCP), which unites 
over twenty different Creole-speaking regions of the world.  Founded in Los Angeles in 
2005 by an eclectic group of Creole scholars, activists, and artists, the IOCP is committed 
to promoting the Creole culture worldwide and coordinating efforts at the local and 
international level to build a Creole identity.105  In making its objectives open and broad, 
the IOCP is attempting to unite all groups within the Creole movement, including foreign 
scholars, native linguists, local activists, Creole migrants, and working-class Creole-
speakers.  In its founding charter, IOCP members declared, “We, the Creole people from 
all over the world are determined to establish the conducive atmosphere to unite Creoles 
from different parts of the world” and “to galvanize all forces within the Creole world to 
build up the PanCreole movement.”106  Conscious of the political conflict that has divided 
previous pan-Creole movements, such as Bannzil Kréyòl and Créolité, IOCP’s founders 
insisted that as an organization IOCP needed to work to “develop friendly relations 
among the different bodies or individuals working for the promotion of Creole 
Culture.”107  They argued that this kind of unified leadership would “maintain [the] close 
relationship and harmony among Creole people.”108  The IOCP understood that the 
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success of its pan-Creole movement was dependent upon the organization’s ability to 
mend the political and regional divisions created by Bannzil Kréyòl and Créolité. 
 The recent founding of the IOCP indicates that while an actual pan-Creole 
identity may not yet exist, it is still the ideal that many Creole scholars and activists strive 
for.  Local and regional Creole groups are realizing that their efforts to promote their 
local Creole languages and cultures might prove to be more successful if they work 
alongside an international organization that has the ability to raise funds and reach out to 
more people.  Nonetheless, in order to avoid dissension among its diverse members, 
international Creole organizations, such as the IOCP, have distanced themselves from 
articulating any kind of political platform that challenges Europe’s cultural domination of 
the Creole world.  Therefore, in aligning themselves with pan-Creolism, many local 
Creole movements, which are generally more anticolonial and nationalistic in nature, 
have had to either downplay or abandon this political aspect of their movements.  For 
better or worse, the current efforts to build a pan-Creole identity are exclusively cultural; 
it remains to be seen whether or not this cultural identity can be mobilized by 
Creolophones to achieve political recognition as a distinct ethnicity.   
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CONCLUSION
 
 On February 1, 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy sent his Secretary of State for the 
DOM, Yves Jégo to Guadeloupe to negotiate with workers’ unions and resolve the 
general labor strike that had been paralyzing the island for nearly two weeks.1  On 
January 20, the LKP (“Liyannaj kont pwofitasyon” or Collective against extreme 
exploitation), an organization representing fifty of Guadeloupe’s unions, cultural 
associations, and political parties, called for a general strike and set forth a platform of 
146 demands.  That same day, six thousand Guadeloupeans took to the streets, protesting 
the high cost of living, the rapidly increasing prices of basic commodities, including gas 
and food, and workers’ low wages which were not rising with the price of housing and 
goods.2  More specifically, the LKP demanded an immediate reduction of 50 centimes on 
car fuel, a lowering of prices for transport and water, a rent freeze, an increase of 200 
euros in the monthly minimum wage, and the right to education and professional training 
for Guadeloupean youth and workers.3   
 Four days after this initial demonstration, the LKP organized another mass protest 
on January 24.  The organization’s leader, Elie Domata, claimed that Guadeloupeans 
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assembled to support the unions’ demands for higher wages.  Less than a week later, a 
private research group reported that between 55,000 and 65,000 Guadeloupeans (out of 
an entire population of 410,000) demonstrated on January 30 in the island’s capital of 
Pointe-à-Pitre.4  The protests in Guadeloupe resonated with Antillean cultural and 
political groups in metropolitan France.  The Collectif DOM (Collective of the Overseas 
Departments) called upon Antilleans in the Hexagon to meet outside the Nation metro 
stop at the Place des Antilles to gather in solidarity with their fellow protesters in 
Guadeloupe, and to call attention to the island’s economic and social problems.5   
 On February 5, the unrest spread to Martinique.  According to local police, 
approximately 11,000 protesters participated in demonstrates during the first seven days 
of the strike.  Martinican union leaders disagreed, arguing that at least 25,000 people 
attended the rallies and marches held on the streets of Martinqiue.6  In both Guadeloupe 
and Martinique the strikes brought the islands to a near standstill.  Grocery stores, gas 
stations, banks, and hotels were closed.  The strikes also forced the shut down of public 
services, including education, transportation, utilities, and sanitation.   
 After a month of relatively peaceful demonstrations, the general strike escalated 
into rioting.  On February 17, the New York Times reported that protesters were looting 
shops, torching cars, and burning trashcans in Point-à-Pitre.  According to Le Monde, tear 
gas was fired during a standoff between two squadrons of riot police and a group of sixty 
                                                
4 Nathalie Calimia-Dinane, “Le Mouvement Social en Guadeloupe: 20 Janvier 2009 – 4 mars 2009,” in La 
Guadeloupe en Bouleverse 20 janvier 2009 – 4 mars 2009 (Point-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe: Editions Jasor, 
2009), 30-31. 
5 “Collectif DOM: Communiqué de soutien,” Dossier spécial LKP, Union Générale des Travailleurs de 
Guadeloupe (UGTG), accessed January 3, 2012, http://ugtg.org/article_721.html. 
6 Abayomi Azikiwe, “French Colonies in the Caribbean Demand Decent Pay, End to Racism,” March 2, 
2009, accessed January 4, 2012, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=07 
d1c4c88d666f61cda39fc01a74264a. 
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protestors, several of whom were reportedly armed with handguns.7  Just after midnight 
on February 18, Jacques Bino, a union activist, was shot dead near a roadblock in Point-
à-Pitre as armed youths opened fire on police.8  The next day, nearly 500 French police 
officers arrived in the southern town of Saint-Anne, Guadeloupe in an attempt to subdue 
the ongoing violence following Bino’s death. Protestors stormed and occupied Saint-
Anne’s city hall and looted and burned the town’s businesses.9    
 After 44 days of general strike, the LKP voted to end demonstrations on March 4, 
2009 when the French government agreed to raise minimum wage by 200 euros per 
month and granted the LKP their top 20 demands, including a 6% reduction in the price 
of water, jobs and training for youth aged 16 to 25, a rent freeze and ban on evictions, 
and numerous provisions for the development of the Creole culture and language.  As 
Secretary of State for the DOM, Jégo represented the French government’s interests and 
acted as the mediator between the LKP and business owners.  All parties agreed that 
wages in the islands needed to be raised; negotiations focused on who would pay for the 
costs of these wage increases.  The agreement, called the “Jacques Bino Accrod” in 
memory of the union activist who was killed during the strike, stipulated that local 
employers, as well as the French and local governments would share the costs, with small 
business employers responsible for only a quarter of the increase.10   
                                                
7 “Strike in Guadeloupe escalates into rioting”, New York Times, February 17, 2009, accessed January 3, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/europe/17iht-france.4.20259662.html. 
8 Lizzy Davies, “Guadeloupe riots turn paradise into war zone as one protestor shot dead,” The Guardian, 
February 18, 2009, accessed January 3, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/18/nicolassarkozy-guadeloupe. 
9 “France proposes to raise salaries to end Guadeloupe violence,” New York Times, February 19, 2009, 
accessed January 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/world/europe/19iht-
france.4.20315766.html. 
10 Richard Fidler, “Guadeloupe: General strike scores victory, spreads to other colonies,” Green Left, 
March 13, 2009, accessed January 3, 2012, http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/41236. 
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 The general strikes in Guadelopue and Martinique began over the high cost of 
living in the islands and workers’ low wages, which did not reflect the rising cost of 
housing and basic commodities.  However, the strikes exposed the deep racial and social 
tensions and disparities within Antillean society.  The protesters were particularly 
angered by what they perceived to be an uneven distribution of wealth along racial lines 
within Guadeloupean society as well as between citizens residing in metropolitan France 
and the Antilles.  The LKP claimed that Guadeloupe’s current economic problems were a 
result of the legacy of French colonial rule, which had made the island and Antilleans 
dependent on France for imported goods and jobs.  Although the békés, the ethnically 
French and white European descendants of the islands’ colonial settlers, only make up 
one percent of the island’s population, they control the majority of Guadeloupe’s largest 
land and business assets.  The majority of the Guadeloupean population, who are of 
African or mixed-race descent, live in comparative poverty to the békés.11   
 In addition, LKP supporters decried the relative wealth and economic security of 
metropolitans compared to Antilleans.  According to 2007 statistics, the unemployment 
and poverty rates for the Antilles were double those found in mainland France.12  
Guadeloupe and Martinique had two of the highest unemployment rates in the European 
Union.  Guadeloupe had the highest youth unemployment rate with 55.7% of 15 to 24 
                                                
11 See: Estelle Shirbon, “Paris falling to end island protests, seen spreading,” Reuters, UK Edition, February 
13, 2009, accessed January 3, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/02/13/france-protests-caribbean-
idUKLD40833620090213.  
Béatrice Gurrey, “Un minister à l’écoute tardive de la colère de la Guadeloupe,” Le Monde, 6 février 2009, 
1.  
12 Angelique Chrisafis, “France faces revolt over poverty on its Caribbean islands,” The Guardian, 
February 11, 2009, accessed January 3, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/12/france-revolts-
guadeloupe-martinique. 
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year-olds unemployed.13  While average salaries were lower and unemployment higher in 
metropolitan France, basic commodities and food staples were thirty to sixty percent 
more expensive in the islands due to the high cost of importing these goods from 
France.14  The LKP condemned the békés’ and the French government’s “extreme 
exploitation” of Antilleans who continued to live in poverty as the white settlers, business 
owners, and metropolitans extracted the islands’ wealth for their own economic and 
social gains.   
 The way in which the LKP framed its demands is reflective of how Antilleans 
have navigated their political and cultural relationship to the French nation following 
departmentalization.  On the one hand, the LKP denounced France’s political control of 
Guadeloupe and Martinique, and argued for Antilleans’ right to govern their own 
societies.  During demonstrations, protesters chanted in Creole the LKP’s slogan: 
“Guadeloupe belongs to us.  Guadeloupe does not belong to them.  We will not let them 
do what they want in our country.”15  In referring to Antilleans as “us” and the French 
government as “them”, the LKP was highlighting Guadeloupe’s and Martinique’s 
distinctiveness as separate political and cultural entities from France.  Antilleans and 
metropolitans were two discrete groups that did not belong to the same nation.  It is also 
noteworthy that the LKP used Creole not only in their organization’s motto, but also in 
the preamble to their list of 146 demands, as well as their press release calling for a 
general strike on January 20.  Since the 1970s when nationalist groups appropriated 
                                                
13 “French isles top EU jobless table”, BBC News, last updated February 16, 2009, accessed January 3, 
2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7892773.stm. 
14 Françoise Thull and Pierre Mabut, “Guadeloupe general strike isolated by French trade unions,” World 
Socialist Website, published by the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), accessed 
January 3, 2012, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/feb2009/guad-f09.shtml.  
15 Sadi Sainton, “La grève générale en Guadeloupe vécue de l’intérieur,” in La Guadeloupe en bouleverse 
20 janvier 2009 – mars 4 2009 (Point-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe: Editions Jasor), 57. 
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Creole for its own political agenda, Antilleans’ Creole language and culture has been 
linked to both the Guadeloupean and Martinician independence movements.16  The 
LKP’s use of Creole thus associated their political demands with those of the nationalists 
who argued that as Creole-speakers, Antilleans constituted a separate nation.  Moreover, 
the LKP’s use of the word pwofitasyon or “extreme exploitation” linked Antilleans’ 
current demands to Antilleans’ past struggles against slavery and French colonial rule.  
For the LKP, its current fight for more economic security was a part of Antilleans’ 
greater struggle for political liberation and freedom.   
 Yet, on the other hand, in several interviews during the general strike, the LKP’s 
leader, Domata, insisted that his group was not interested in changing the islands’ 
political status, and that Antilleans wished to remain French citizens.17  A closer 
examination of the LKP’s demands reveals that its leaders believed that Antilleans could 
achieve economic and social change as a part of the French nation.  The LKP’s principal 
grievance was that as French citizens, Antilleans did not possess the same economic 
stability as their metropolitan counterparts.  According to the LKP, it was the 
government’s duty to increase wages and lower the cost of goods on the islands to ensure 
that Antilleans had the same standard of living as citizens in the Hexagon.  In a statement 
to the press Domota explained, “We are saying that the state has to help small 
Guadeloupe businesses to develop, to have access to bank credits, and also to pay for our 
                                                
16 For more on the relationship between the Antillean nationalist movement and Creole, see chapter 3 of 
this dissertation, especially Part II entitled “The Nationalization of Creole.” 
17 See: Béatrice Gurrey, “Un minister à l’écoute tardive de la colère de la Guadeloupe,” Le Monde, 6 février 
2009, 1. “Interview du porte-parole de Lyannaj kont pwofitasyon,” L’Express, January 26, 2009, posted in 
“Dossier spécial LKP” on website Union Générale des Travailleurs de Guadeloupe (UGTG), accessed 
January 3, 2012, http://ugtg.org/article_702.html.  
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wage increases.”18  For the LKP, the French government was not in and of itself the 
oppressor or the obstacle impeding the Antilles’ economic development. Rather it was 
the government’s complacency that had permitted the békés—the true oppressors—to 
control the islands’ local economies and amass all the wealth for themselves.  The LKP’s 
perception of the Republic as the upholder of liberty and equality and as Antilleans’ 
protector against the white settlers who sought to keep them in subordinate positions 
reflected how Antilleans perceived of their relationship to France during the 
revolutionary period, the Third Republic, and then departmentalization.  As former slaves 
and colonial subjects, Antilleans had supported complete integration into the Republic as 
an opportunity to achieve French citizenship and all of the rights and privileges that 
accompanied this legal status.19  Similarly, LKP supporters clung to their French 
citizenship, arguing that the government had not lived up to its republican ideals of 
ensuring equality for all of its citizens regardless of their race.    
 The LKP’s political platform and its strategy for achieving their demands 
highlighted Antilleans’ desire for the government to recognize their culturally distinct 
identity and their right as French citizens to enjoy the same economic and social security 
as their metropolitan counterparts.  This struggle to be both French and Creole points to 
the contemporary debates about diversity in France, which concurrently recognize and 
dismiss difference as a part of France’s national heritage and history.  Proponents of the 
right to difference claim that French citizens have the right to express their cultural 
                                                
18 Estelle Shirbon, “Paris fails to end island protests, seen spreading, Reuters Edition UK, February 13, 
2009, accessed January 3, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/02/13/france-protests-caribbean-
idUKLD40833620090213. 
19 For more discussion of Antilleans’ support for and involvement in the French Revolution see: Laurent 
Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004).   
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difference, and that diversity has always been a part of French society.  In contrast, 
opponents contend that the right to difference fundamentally violates what it means to be 
French.  They argue that according to the principles of republican universalism, French 
citizens are required to give up individual particularities and group affiliations.  This 
absence of differentiation is what ensures that all citizens are equal before the 
government.  Recently, members of the radical right, particularly those affiliated with the 
Front National, have appropriated the language of the right to difference to argue that 
immigrants are in fact intrinsically different and thus, cannot be a part of the French 
nation.  According to the Front National, French national culture is immutable, and any 
attempt to include difference undermines the nation’s political and cultural integrity.   
 Through an examination of the specific case of Antilleans and how they have 
used the debates about Creole and its place in public education to argue for the right to 
difference, this dissertation helps to illuminate the complexities in the discussions about 
diversity in France after the Second World War.  In placing Antilleans at the center of 
these debates, I argue that republican assimilation was not a monolithic policy that either 
entirely included or excluded different migrant groups from the nation.  Rather, 
Antilleans and the French government negotiated the terms of assimilation and the extent 
to which Antilleans’ Creole culture and language was included in the nation.   
 Inclusion and exclusion were inseparably linked in the Creole debates because of 
the fundamentally incompatible goals of the Ministry of Education and Antillean activists 
who argued for Creole’s incorporation into republican education.  The Ministry of 
Education wanted to preserve the universalist ambitions of the Republic’s national 
curriculum, but it insisted that the language and culture of universalism was French.  
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Simultanesouly, Antillean teachers and activists argued that Creole was an autonomous 
culture with its own linguistic legitimacy.  They viewed independence as the only 
possible resolution to Antilleans’ struggle to preserve and express their Creole identity.  
Yet, Antillean activists also recognized that their Creole movement needed the support of 
Antillean migrants who wanted to retain their French citizenship.  Therefore, Creole 
activists reframed the debate in terms of Antilleans’ “right to difference”.  On both sides 
of the Atlantic, Antilleans challenged the republican ideal of universal French citizenship 
and argued for inclusion in the French nation as both Creole and French.   
 In general, scholars have tended to focus on the importance of postcolonial 
immigrants and their children, particularly those from North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, 
Morocco) and of Muslim descent, and how they have challenged France to reconcile its 
republican ideals of universalism and assimilation with the nation’s new multicultural 
reality.20  This privileging of the “immigration question” is largely due to the political 
controversy surrounding recent events, including the headscarf affairs in the late 1980s 
and 1990s culminating in the 2004 headscarf ban and the 2005 riots in the rundown 
suburbs of French cities (banlieues).21  During several nights of looting and car burning, 
                                                
20 See: Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark McKinney, eds., Post-Colonial Cultures in France  (London: 
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Islamique: La Production D'un Racisme Respectable  (Roubaix: Geai bleu, 2004); John Richard Bowen, 
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(Paris: Découverte, 1995), Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
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young French citizens, many of whom were children of postcolonial immigrants, 
condemned what they perceived to be the prevalence of racial discrimination in French 
society, and demanded equal access to housing and employment.  For the most part, 
Antilleans are absent from the discussions of difference precipitated by these events 
because of their particular history as French nationals.  As French citizens, Antilleans 
who migrated to mainland France in the 1950s and 1960s had access to civil servant jobs 
that were unavailable to other ethnic and racial groups, including postcolonial 
immigrants.  Although Antilleans generally occupied low-level positions compared to 
metropolitans, public service jobs nonetheless initially provided Antillean migrants with 
more opportunities for social advancement than postcolonial immigrants.22  Moreover, 
unlike other immigrant groups, Antilleans spoke French and possessed knowledge of 
French cultural symbols.  This first generation of Antillean migrants achieved higher 
rates of economic success and social mobility and were therefore, generally perceived as 
the “model” of assimilation to which postcolonial immigrants should aspire.23  Antilleans 
who arrived in the Hexagon during the 1950s and 1960s also distanced themselves from 
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postcolonial immigrants’ struggle for the right to difference, particularly the bourgeoning 
antiracism movement of the 1980s.  Instead, they preferred to highlight their French 
citizenship to argue for equal access to housing and employment, not their cultural and 
racial difference.24  Because of Antilleans’ status as the “models” of assimilation, as well 
as first-generation migrants’ decision to downplay their cultural and racial specificities, 
scholars have tended to overlook Antilleans’ role in shaping discussions about difference 
and the “problem of immigration” in France.25   
 At the same time, other scholars have discounted the specificity of Antilleans’ 
experiences in metropolitan France.  Unlike previous scholarship, Antilleans are not 
absent from these studies.  Instead, this body of work has analyzed Antilleans’ social and 
economic position in France alongside those of postcolonial immigrants, arguing that as 
cultural and racial “others”, Antilleans and postcolonial migrants experienced the same 
forms of discrimination and exclusion.26  This academic treatment of Antilleans as 
postcolonial immigrants was the result of a demographic and political shift within the 
Antillean community in metropolitan France.  As the second-generation of metropolitan-
born Antillean migrants came of age in the 1980s, they confronted high unemployment 
rates (25-30%) comparable to those experienced by the second-generation of postcolonial 
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immigrants, many of whom were also French citizens by birth.27  This perception of 
social inequality encouraged this new generation of metropolitan-born Antilleans to reject 
their parents’ acceptance of assimilation.  Like the second-generation of postcolonial 
immigrants, they have claimed their distinct identities and demanded the right to be both 
different and French.28   
 Both bodies of scholarship—those that excluded Antilleans from their discussion 
of immigration and its impact on France and those that equate Antilleans’ struggle with 
those of postcolonial immigrants—have marginalized the history of Antillean migration 
and Antilleans’ important role in shaping debates about diversity and what it meant to be 
French in an increasingly multicultural nation following the Second World War.29  In 
looking at the specific case of Antilleans and their distinct political and cultural position 
in France, this dissertation demonstrates how Antillean migration prompted the 
government to construct exclusionary meanings of French citizenship.  For example, 
chapter one argues that in determining the character and cultural traits required of 
Antilleans for migration, BUMIDOM defined what it meant to be a proper French 
citizen.  More specifically BUMDIOM officials defined French citizenship against what 
they perceived to be Antilleans’ negative characteristics, including their lack of 
education, poor work ethic, dirty households, and purportedly loose sexual relationships.  
In doing so, BUMIDOM created a definition of French citizenship that excluded 
Antilleans on the basis of their purported cultural differences.  However, in letters to 
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BUMIDOM and other government officials, Antilleans argued for a definition of French 
citizenship that included their Creole culture.  Ultimately, it was these exchanges between 
BUMIDOM and Antilleans migrants that opened up the possibility for the right to 
difference in France.   
 In addition, this dissertation contends that the specific way in which Antilleans 
argued for the “right to difference” sheds light on the current discussions of diversity 
centered on religious difference, and in particular Islam’s perceived threat to French 
national integrity.  Chapter two claims that Antilleans’ struggle for the “right to 
difference” made cultural associations the acceptable forum for forging group identities 
in France.  In general, Antilleans asserted their difference by exercising their right as 
French citizens to form cultural associations; they used these organizations as a political 
platform to carve out a space for their Creole culture in the French nation.  These 
organizations’ leaders sought financial support from BUMIDOM to fund their cultural 
programs, which publicly asserted Antilleans’ Creole and French identity.  The 
emergence of hundreds of Antillean cultural associations across metropolitan France 
challenged the government’s perception of French citizens as universal citizens without 
particular group affiliations.   
 Antilleans’ decision to express their difference within the established republican 
framework of cultural associations contrasts sharply with female French Muslims’ 
current struggle to assert their religious and cultural differences by donning headscarves 
in public spaces, such as schools and courtrooms.  French Muslim’s desire to express 
their religious and cultural differences outside of the contraints of cultural associations is 
so controversial because it is a break from how other minority groups, such as Antilleans, 
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have previously argued for the “right to difference” in France.  Therefore, this 
dissertation’s focus on Antilleans broadens our understanding of the contemporary 
“politics of difference” in France.  Historians have tended to characterize French 
multiculturalism as a response by President François Mitterrand and his Socialist 
government to the rise of the far Right and its campaign against Algerian immigrants, 
particularly those of the Muslim faith.  Instead, this dissertation argues that as early as the 
1970s, state officials and Antillean migrants negotiated the “politics of difference” as 
they determined Creole’s place in French society.  Not only did Antillean activists’ and 
migrants’ earlier demands to be recognized as both Creole and French shape the 
government’s understanding of diversity’s place in the Republic, they also laid the 
foundation for other groups’ claims for the “right to difference” in the early 1980s.   
 Chapters 4 and 5 also explore how Antillean Creole activists and the French 
government understood Antilleans’ cultural position in the nation in relationship to other 
cultural groups, including French citizens who claim distinct regional identities and 
postcolonial immigrants.  In these chapters, I situate Antilleans’ claims for the right to 
difference, and more specifically their struggle to introduce Creole into Antillean 
classrooms, within the concurrent debates concerning the place of regional and immigrant 
languages and cultures in public education.  In doing so, I reframe other scholars’ 
understanding of republican assimilation as either entirely inclusionary or exclusionary.30  
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 When the government’s policies on Antillean education, regional languages and 
cultures, and immigrant education are placed in dialogue with each other, it becomes 
apparent that the government did not enforce a singular policy of assimilation for all of 
the Republic’s distinct cultural and linguistic groups.  Despite the government’s refusal to 
publicly acknowledge its citizens particularities, in practice, the Ministries of Education 
and DOM implemented differential education policies for Antilleans, immigrants, and 
children with distinct regional identities.  For example, chapter five highlights the 
Ministry of Education’s decision to develop an education policy that took into account 
immigrants’ languages and cultures nearly a decade before it considered doing the same 
for Antilleans.  I argue that this decision was largely informed by Antilleans’ and 
immigrants’ different political relationships to the nation.  While the government viewed 
immigrants’ presence as temporary, Antilleans were French citizens and permanent 
members of the nation.  For the Ministry of Education, this meant that the political stakes 
of Antilleans’ assimilation was much higher.  Whereas instruction in their languages of 
origin helped prepare immigrants’ children for an eventual return to the homeland, Creole 
language instruction was a hindrance to Antilleans’ assimilation and thus, the cultural 
integrity of the nation.  In examining the Ministry of Education’s decision to implement 
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differential education programs for Antilleans and other distinct cultural groups, chapters 
four and five argue that the government constantly reevaluated its understanding of 
assimilation.  The Ministry of Education did not simply maintain a monolithic policy of 
assimilation.  Rather, it adjusted republican assimilation and its position of diversity so 
that it reflected the different political and cultural positions of the Republic’s many 
diverse groups.    
 Lastly, this dissertation demonstrates how Antilleans used Creole to claim their 
right to difference within and outside of the French nation.  Chapter three argues that 
Antillean ethnic activism emerged from the convergence of two unsuccessful political 
strategies: nationalism and assimilation.  In order to gain support for the Creole 
movement, Antillean nationalist and assimilationists came together and transformed 
Creole into a particular kind of multicultural politics that Antilleans on both sides of the 
Atlantic could rally around.  Yet, Antillean Creole activists were equally concerned with 
their position within the greater international community.  They created a broader 
movement that united all Creole-speakers across the globe in their common struggle 
against European domination.  In examining Antilleans’ construction of a pan-Creole 
identity that moved beyond France and the French Caribbean, chapter six contends that 
the postcolonial French nation was not just constructed in the colonies or by immigrants 
who migrated to France following decolonization.  Antilleans formed political and 
cultural networks with other Creole activists across the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa.  
They used their interactions with Creole activists across national boundaries to also shape 
debates about diversity in France.  In this way, postcolonial France was not only 
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constructed by Antilleans, but also by individuals and groups outside of the French 
metropole-colony framework.   
 While Antilleans are just one of many distinct cultural groups that have 
challenged republican assimilation, this dissertation argues that attention to their specific 
case is particularly important for understanding the multiple meanings and applications of 
the “right to difference” in France.  The debates about diversity were not top-down 
government decisions to either completely include or exclude difference from the French 
nation.  From departmentalization through the end of the ban on Creole in 1983, 
Antilleans negotiated with the Ministries of Education and the DOM for the inclusion of 
their Creole language and culture in public education.  In highlighting these negotiations, 
this dissertation argues that the policies concerning the right to difference in France were 
not only developed by state ministries, but also by the actions of Antillean migrants and 
Creole activists on both sides of the Atlantic.    
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